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Abstract	  	  This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   policies	   of	   Senator	   Jesse	   Helms	   (R-­‐NC)	   toward	  Central	   America	   between	   1972	   and	   1992,	   focusing	   on	   El	   Salvador,	  Nicaragua,	  and	  Panama.	  It	  places	  the	  senator	  within	  the	  context	  of	  several	  historiographies,	   including	   the	   rise	   of	   modern	   American	   conservatism,	  Latin	   America’s	   Cold	   War,	   and	   the	   role	   of	   Congress	   and	   congressional	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  rejects	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  uniform	  conservative	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  late	  Cold	  War,	  and	  adds	  to	   literature	   that	   points	   out	   the	   often-­‐fractious	   relationships	   among	  conservatives	   over	   how	   to	   reconcile	   principle	   and	   the	   realities	   of	  government.	   Helms	   emerges	   as	   a	   resolute	   protector	   of	   a	   principled	  conservative	   international	   agenda,	   doing	   so	   through	   a	   campaign	   of	  entrepreneurship	  that	  enjoyed	  considerable	  successes	  while	  also	  suffering	  notable	  failures.	  	   Chapter	   one	   examines	   Jesse	   Helms’	   policies	   in	   Panama,	   and,	  specifically,	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties.	   It	   illustrates	   how	   he	   shaped	   a	  conservative	  opposition	   that	   rejected	  any	   transfer	  of	   the	  waterway	   to	   the	  Panamanian	   government.	   Chapter	   two	   focuses	   on	   Helms	   and	   Nicaragua	  between	  1979	  and	  1984,	  as	  he	  worked	  to	  build	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  strategy	  that	  later	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine.	  Chapter	  three	  looks	  at	  the	  senator’s	   work	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   where	   his	   relationship	   with	   the	   Reagan	  administration	  was	  almost	  non-­‐existent.	  Chapter	  four	  returns	  to	  Nicaragua,	  looking	  at	  how	  Helms	  coped	  with	  the	  dramatic	  collapse	  of	  Contra	  policy	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandals,	  the	  Esquipulas	  peace	  accords,	  and	  the	  1990	   election	   defeat	   for	   the	   Sandinistas.	   Chapter	   five	   considers	   Helms’	  efforts	  to	  force	  the	  United	  States	  to	  reconsider	  its	  alliance	  with	  Panamanian	  strongman	   Manuel	   Noriega,	   and	   how	   this	   effort	   led	   the	   senator	   to	   an	  unlikely	  but	  effective	  alliance	  with	  liberal	  and	  moderate	  foes	  in	  Congress.	  	  	  	   	  	  
	   3	  
Contents	  	  	  Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………….2	  Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………………..5	  Author’s	  Declaration……………………………………………………………………………….6	  Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………...7	  i. Mapping	  Modern	  American	  Conservatism…………………………..9	  ii. Jesse	  Helms	  and	  Conservative	  Foreign	  Policy……………………13	  iii. Methodology	  and	  Sources	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  34	  iv. Chapter	  Outline……………………………………………………………….38	  Chapter	  1:	  Panama,	  1972-­‐1981……………………………………………………………..42	  i. The	  Canal	  and	  First	  Wave	  Opposition,	  1972-­‐1975……………	  45	  ii. Helms,	  Reagan	  and	  Second	  Wave	  Opposition,	  1976…………..60	  iii. The	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties,	  1977-­‐1978……………………………75	  Chapter	  2:	  Nicaragua,	  1979-­‐1984………………………………………………………	  	  	  103	  i. Somoza	  and	  the	  Sandinistas,	  1979…………………………………	  105	  ii. The	  Helms-­‐Reagan	  Doctrine,	  1980-­‐1984………………………	  	  	  123	  Chapter	  3:	  El	  Salvador,	  1979-­‐1992………………………………………………………153	  i. ‘A	  torch	  tossed	  in	  a	  pool	  of	  oil’:	  El	  Salvador,	  1979-­‐1981…	  	  155	  ii. Helms	  and	  Reagan	  the	  Pragmatist,	  1981-­‐1988………………	  	  169	  iii. ‘The	  fight	  is	  not	  yet	  over’:	  Resisting	  Peace,	  1989-­‐1992……	  201	  Chapter	  4:	  Nicaragua,	  1985-­‐1992………………………………………………………	  	  215	  i. ‘Jesse	  Helms’	  Boys’:	  Lew	  Tambs	  and	  the	  Contras,	  1985	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  ii. The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Scandal……………………………………………...…227	  iii. Reinvigorating	  the	  Network,	  1989-­‐1992………………………	  	  	  249	  Chapter	  5:	  Panama,	  1981-­‐1992………………………………………………………..	  	  	  	  	  265	  
	   4	  
i. A	  Disappearing	  Cause?	  The	  Panama	  Canal,	  1981-­‐1986……268	  ii. Their	  Man	  in	  Panama:	  Manuel	  Noriega,	  1986-­‐1988…………271	  iii. A	  Just	  Cold	  War	  Cause:	  Removing	  Noriega,	  1989-­‐1992…	  	  	  .302	  Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………..	  	  .321	  Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………….329	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   5	  
Acknowledgements	  	  My	   supervisor,	   Alex	   Goodall,	   has	   been	   a	   constant	   source	   of	   support	   and	  encouragement	   in	   my	   five	   years	   of	   postgraduate	   study	   at	   York.	   I	   am	  indebted	  to	  him	  for	  the	  time	  and	  effort	  he	  has	  put	  in	  to	  helping	  me,	  not	  just	  in	  approaching	  this	  thesis,	  but	  also	  in	  every	  part	  of	  postgraduate	  life.	  Nick	  Guyatt	  and	  Richard	  Bessel	  were	  incredibly	  supportive	  throughout	  the	  four	  years	  as	  members	  of	  my	  advisory	  panel,	  and	  their	  comments,	  suggestions,	  and	  questions	  were	  invaluable.	  	  Several	   organisations	   helped	   with	   my	   research.	   The	   University	   of	   York’s	  Santander	  International	  Connections	  Award	  provided	  funds	  for	  my	  trip	  to	  the	   United	   States,	   as	   did	   a	   grant	   from	   the	   Political	   Studies	   Association’s	  American	  Politics	  Group.	  Staff	  and	  archivists	  at	  the	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  and	  Jimmy	  Carter	  Presidential	  Libraries	  were	  incredibly	  helpful	  during	   my	   visits.	   The	   reading	   room	   staff	   at	   the	   British	   Library,	   in	   St.	  Pancras	   and	   especially	   at	   the	   Document	   Supply	   Centre	   in	   Boston	   Spa,	  helped	  enormously	  with	  my	  endless	  trips	  and	  requests.	  	  I	  simply	  could	  not	  have	  reached	  this	  point	  without	  a	  group	  of	  friends	  who	  mean	  the	  world	  to	  me	  –	  those	  from	  Leeds	  and	  St.	  Andrews,	  and	  my	  fellow	  HRC-­‐ers	   from	   over	   the	   years	   at	   the	  Humanities	   Research	   Centre	   in	   York.	  Thanks	  especially	  to	  Laura,	  Huw,	  Graeme,	  and	  Sarah,	  for	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  read	  through	  various	  chapters.	  	  Finally,	   I	   want	   to	   thank	   my	   family	   –	   mum,	   dad,	   and	   sister.	   They	   have	  supported	   me	   without	   reservation	   through	   four	   years	   of	   PhD	   life,	   and	  everything	  else.	  I	  cannot	  thank	  them	  enough,	  for	  everything.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   6	  
Author’s	  Declaration	  	  The	  work	  contained	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  author’s,	  and	  the	  author’s	  alone.	  All	  supporting	  work	  and	  evidence	  has	  been	  referenced	  accordingly.	  This	  work	  has	   not	   previously	   been	   presented	   for	   an	   award	   at	   this,	   or	   any	   other,	  University.	  Material	   in	  the	  Nicaragua	  chapters	  is	  expanded	  from	  an	  article	  titled	   “What	   You	   Know	   and	   Who	   You	   Know:	   Senator	   Jesse	   Helms,	   the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  and	  the	  Nicaraguan	  Contras”,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  the	  universities	  of	  Birmingham	  and	  Nottingham’s	  49th	  Parallel	  journal	  (Volume	  33,	  Winter	  2014).	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  journal’s	  editors	  for	  their	  permission	  to	  use	  the	  material	  here.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   7	  
	  Introduction	  	  	  When	   Senator	   Jesse	   Helms	   passed	   away	   on	   4	   July,	   2008,	   Phyllis	  Schlafly,	   the	   godmother	   of	   modern	   American	   conservatism,	   fondly	  remembered	  the	  senator	  as	   ‘the	  authentic	  voice	  of	  conservatism	  for	  three	  decades.’	   Helms,	   she	   said,	   ‘was	   a	   role	   model	   of	   an	   incorruptible	   public	  official	  who	  adhered	  to	  principle	  despite	  the	  pressures	  that	  surround	  those	  with	   political	   power,	   and	   he	   gave	   us	   a	   standard	   by	  which	   others	   can	   be	  measured.’	  The	   title	  of	  Schlafly’s	  eulogy,	  printed	   in	   the	  pages	  of	   the	  ultra-­‐conservative	  magazine	  Human	  Events,	  was	  simple	  but	  powerful:	  ‘The	  Most	  Important	  Senator	  of	  Our	  Times’.1	  	  Helms’	   reputation	   among	  post-­‐war	   conservatives	  was	   forged	  on	   the	  back	   of	   a	   passionate	   commitment	   to	   a	   modern	   American	   conservative	  movement	  that	  reshaped	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  second	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   In	   his	   pre-­‐Senate	   career	   as	  congressional	   aide,	   banking	   lobbyist,	   and	   media	   commentator,	   and	   over	  thirty	   years	   representing	   his	   home	   state	   of	   North	   Carolina	   in	   the	   Senate,	  Helms	  worked	  to	  deconstruct	  the	  liberal	  New	  Deal-­‐Great	  Society	  state	  that	  had	   dominated	   the	   middle	   years	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   In	   its	   place,	  Helms	   sought	   a	   United	   States	   in	   which	   the	   role	   of	   government	   was	  significantly	  reduced,	  religion	  and	  traditionalism	  defined	  social	  norms,	  and	  foreign	  policy	  was	  predicated	  upon	  a	  commitment	  to	  expanding	  the	  forces	  of	  ‘freedom’	  around	  the	  world.	  In	  a	  sign	  of	  appreciation	  for	  the	  consistency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Phyliss	   Schlafly,	   “The	   Most	   Important	   Senator	   of	   Our	   Times,”	   Human	  
Events,	   8	   July,	   2008	   accessed	   21	   June,	   2014,	  http://www.humanevents.com/2008/07/08/jesse-­‐helms-­‐the-­‐most-­‐important-­‐senator-­‐of-­‐our-­‐times.	  
	   8	  
and	  vigour	  of	  his	  efforts,	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Union	  awarded	  Helms	  a	  one	  hundred	  per	  cent	  rating	  every	  year	  from	  1974	  onwards.2	  	   	  	  Though	  modern	   conservatives	   attached	   great	   importance	   to	   Helms’	  contributions	  to	  their	  movement,	  it	  was	  only	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  his	  life	  that	  scholars	  began	   to	  pay	   close	   attention	   to	  his	   influence.	  Ernest	   Fergurson’s	  1986	   biography	  was	   a	   richly	   detailed	   account	   of	   Helms’	   life	   and	   political	  career	  to	  that	  date,	  but	  its	  journalist	  author	  never	  fully	  asked	  questions	  of	  where	  the	  senator	  fitted	  into	  a	  conservative	  movement	  that	  was	  enjoying	  a	  period	   of	   national	   prominence.3	  	   It	   took	   until	   the	   early	   2000s,	   and	  Bryan	  Hardin	  Thrift’s	  doctoral	  thesis,	  “Jesse	  Helms,	  the	  New	  Right,	  and	  American	  Freedom”	   for	   a	   serious	   scholarly	   assessment	   of	   Helms’	   relationship	  with	  the	   post-­‐war	   right.	   Thrift	   argued	   that	   Helms	   constructed	   a	   new	   form	   of	  conservative	   politics,	   ‘a	   deft	   combination	   of	   populist	   and	   elitist	  conservatism.’	   Harnessing	   southern	   conservatism,	   but	   expanding	   upon	   it	  with	   ‘ideological	   rigor,	   media	   savvy,	   and	   Republican	   Party	   connections’,	  Helms	  helped	  construct	  a	  national	  New	  Right.4	  	  Thrift’s	   work	   was	   followed	   by	  William	   Link’s	   full-­‐length	   biography,	  
Righteous	  Warrior:	  Jesse	  Helms	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  Conservatism,	  before	  Tom	  Packer	  added	  further	  academic	  rigour	  to	  the	  study	  of	  Helms	  with	  his	  recent	   doctoral	   work	   on	   the	   senator	   and	   North	   Carolina	   politics	   in	   the	  1970s	   and	   early	   1980s.5	  Packer	   astutely	   pointed	   out	   the	   largely	   non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  only	  exception	  was	  1973,	  when	  the	  ACU	  gave	  the	  senator	  96,	  due	  to	  three	   missed	   votes.	   See	   ACU	   Ratings,	   American	   Conservative	   Union,	  accessed	  1	  July,	  2014,	  http://www.conservative.org/legislative-­‐ratings.	  
3	  See	  Ernest	  B.	  Furgurson,	  Hard	  Right:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Jesse	  Helms	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  1986).	  
4	  See	   Bryan	   Hardin	   Thrift,	   “Jesse	   Helms,	   the	   New	   Right,	   and	   American	  Freedom”	  (Ph.D.	  diss.,	  Boston	  University,	  2005),	  1.	  
5	  William	   A.	   Link,	   Righteous	  Warrior:	   Jesse	   Helms	   and	   the	   Rise	   of	   Modern	  
Conservatism	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  2008),	  and	  Tom	  Packer,	  “Jesse	  Helms	   and	   North	   Carolina	   Politics,	   1972-­‐1984	   (Ph.D.	   diss.,	   University	   of	  Oxford,	  2012).	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partisan	   nature	   of	   Helms’	   politics,	   which	   revolved	   around	   a	   consistent	  commitment	  to	  movement	  conservative	  principles,	  not	  necessarily	  those	  of	  the	   wider	   Republican	   Party.	   With	   the	   help	   of	   revolutionary	   fundraising	  techniques	   and	   organisational	   machinery,	   Helms	   was	   able	   to	   harness	  sufficient	  support	   to	  maintain	  his	  position	   in	  Washington	  D.C.	  Packer	   tied	  Helms	   to	   the	   wider	   New	   Right	   organisation,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   movement	  conservative	  community	  that	  he	  argues	  reinforced	  Helms’	  positions	  in	  the	  Senate.	  	  Link’s	  biography,	   the	  most	   comprehensive	  assessment	  of	  Helms’	   life	  and	  political	   career	   to	  date,	   took	  as	  a	   starting	  point	  a	  more	  elite-­‐oriented	  view	   of	   modern	   conservatism.	   Although	   recognizing	   that	   grassroots	  developments	  were	   critical	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   post-­‐war	   conservatism,	   Link	  nevertheless	   stressed	   the	   role	   of	   national	   leaders	  who	   ‘helped	   to	   forge	   a	  national	  constituency,	  to	  communicate	  with	  it	  effectively,	  and	  to	  mobilize	  it	  politically.’	  Individuals,	  Link	  argued,	  matter.6	  	   Mapping	  Modern	  American	  Conservatism	  	   	  Link’s	  methodology	  and	  arguments	  drew	  upon	  an	  older	   tradition	  of	  scholarship	  on	  post-­‐war	  conservatism	  that	  emphasised	   the	  centrality	  of	  a	  national,	   elite-­‐led	   movement.	   This	   historiographical	   interpretation	  emerged	   in	   the	   late	   1960s,	   as	   historians	   began	   to	   reject	   the	   dismissive	  accounts	   of	   American	   conservatism	   put	   forward	   by	   liberal	   consensus	  scholars	   of	   the	   preceding	   twenty	   years.	   Instead	   of	   portraying	   modern	  conservatism	  as	  a	  dysfunctional	  pathology	  in	  the	  long	  history	  of	  American	  liberalism,	   as	   Louis	   Hartz,	   Daniel	   Bell,	   and	   Richard	   Hofstadter	   (among	  others)	   argued,	   first	   wave	   scholars	   identified	   a	   specific	   and	   consistent	  strand	   of	   conservative	   thought	   in	   the	  United	   States.7	  They	   picked	   out	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Link,	  Righteous	  Warrior,	  5.	  
7	  See	  Richard	  Hofstadter,	  The	  Paranoid	  Style	  in	  American	  Politics	  and	  Other	  
Essays	   (London:	   Jonathan	   Cape,	   1966),	   and	   Louis	   Hartz,	   The	   Liberal	  
	   10	  
leaders	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   movement,	   and	   fashioned	   a	   more	   nuanced	  understanding	   of	   the	   ideological	   principles	   behind	   post-­‐war	   American	  conservatism.8	  	  Nevertheless,	   for	   Alan	   Brinkley,	   writing	   in	   1994	   for	   the	   American	  
Historical	   Review,	   first-­‐wave	   scholarship	   remained	   unsatisfactory.	   He	  declared,	   in	   a	   discussion	   centred	   on	   his	   essay	   “The	   Problem	  of	   American	  Conservatism”,	   that	   the	   study	  of	  modern	   conservatism	  was	   ‘something	  of	  an	   orphan’.9	  Existing	   scholarship	   had	   marginalised	   and	   even	   ignored	   the	  lessons	   of	   modern	   conservatism,	   and	   research	   was	   needed	   to	   find	   ‘a	  suitable	  place	  for	  the	  Right…	  within	  our	  historiographical	  concerns’,	  where	  new	  frameworks	  would	  make	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  ‘diverse	  and	  inconsistent’	  traditions	   of	   conservatism. 10 	  Others	   were	   sceptical	   of	   this	   pessimism	  regarding	  early	  work	  on	  conservatism	  –	  Leo	  Ribuffo,	   for	  example,	  pointed	  out	   that	   first-­‐wave	  scholarship	  was	  both	   ‘more	  extensive	  and	  better’	   than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Tradition	  in	  America:	  An	  Interpretation	  of	  American	  Political	  Thought	  since	  
the	  Revolution	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Brace,	  1955).	  
8	  For	   first	  wave	  scholarship,	  see	   J.	  David	  Hoeveler,	   Jr.,	  Watch	  on	  the	  Right:	  
Conservative	   Intellectuals	   in	   the	   Reagan	   Era	   (Madison:	   University	   of	  Wisconsin	   Press,	   1991),	   Sidney	   Blumenthal,	   The	   Rise	   of	   the	   Counter-­‐
Establishment:	   From	   Conservative	   Ideology	   to	   Political	   Power	   (New	   York:	  Perennial	   Library,	   1988),	   John	   P.	   Diggins,	   Up	   From	   Communism:	  
Conservative	  Odysseys	   in	  American	   Intellectual	  History	   (New	   York:	   Harper	  and	  Row,	  1975),	  and	  Allen	  Guttman,	  The	  Conservative	  Tradition	  in	  America	  (New	   York:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   1967).	   Other	   works	   in	   first-­‐wave	  scholarship	   include	   Steve	   Bruce,	   The	   Rise	   and	   Fall	   of	   the	   New	   Christian	  
Right:	   Conservative	   Protestant	   Politics	   in	   America,	   1978-­‐1988	   (Oxford:	  Clarendon,	   1988),	   Desmond	   S.	   King,	  The	  New	  Right:	   Politics,	  Markets	   and	  
Citizenship	   (Basingstoke:	   Macmillan,	   1987),	   Gillian	   Peele,	   Revival	   and	  
Reaction:	  The	  Right	  in	  Contemporary	  America	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  1984),	  A.	  James	   Reichley,	   Conservatives	   in	   an	   Age	   of	   Change:	   The	   Nixon	   and	   Ford	  
Administrations	   (Washington,	   D.C.:	   Brookings	   Institution,	   1981),	   and	  George	   H.	   Nash,	   The	   Conservative	   Intellectual	  Movement	   in	   America	   Since	  
1945	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1976).	  
9	  Alan	   Brinkley,	   “Response	   to	   the	   Comments	   of	   Leo	   Ribuffo	   and	   Susan	  Yohn,”	  American	  Historical	  Review	  99,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1994):	  450-­‐452.	  
10	  Brinkley,	  “Response,”	  410,	  and	  Alan	  Brinkley,	  “The	  Problem	  of	  American	  Conservatism,”	  American	  Historical	  Review	  99,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1994):	  409-­‐429.	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Brinkley	  acknowledged	  –	  but	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  historians	  nevertheless	  decided	  to	  take	  up	  Brinkley’s	  challenge.11	  	  	  In	  doing	  so,	   this	  post-­‐Brinkley	  second	  wave	  asked	  how	  and	  why	  the	  post-­‐war	  right	  achieved	  such	  prominence	  in	  the	  period	  given	  the	  apparent	  dominance	   of	   New	   Deal-­‐Great	   Society	   liberalism. 12 	  Their	   explanations	  varied.	   In	   her	   examination	   of	   the	   grass-­‐roots	   conservatism	   of	   Orange	  Country,	   California,	   Lisa	   McGirr	   stressed	   a	   shared	   anti-­‐communism	   that	  drew	   together	   white,	   educated,	   and	   upwardly	   mobile	   conservatives	   of	  “Reagan	   Country”	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s.13	  Matthew	   Lassiter,	   Joseph	  Crespino,	  and	  Kevin	  Kruse	  looked	  at	  the	  racial	  backlash	  politics	  of	  southern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Leo	  P.	  Ribuffo,	  “Why	  is	  There	  so	  Much	  Conservatism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	   Why	   Do	   So	   Few	   Historians	   Know	   Anything	   about	   It,”	   American	  
Historical	  Review	  99,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1994):	  438-­‐449.	  
12	  For	  overviews	  of	  this	  second	  wave,	  see	  the	  roundtable	  discussion	  in	  The	  
Journal	   of	   American	   History’s	   December	   2011	   edition,	   particularly	   Kim	  Phillips-­‐Fein’s,	  “Conservatism:	  A	  State	  of	  the	  Field,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  American	  
History	   98,	   No.	   3	   (December,	   2011):	   723-­‐743,	   as	   well	   as	   Julian	   Zelizer,	  “Reflections:	  Rethinking	  the	  History	  of	  American	  Conservatism,”	  Reviews	  in	  
American	  History	  38,	  No.	  2	  (2010):	  367-­‐392,	  Leo	  P.	  Ribuffo,	  “The	  Discovery	  and	   Rediscovery	   of	   American	   Conservatism	   Broadly	   Conceived,”	   OAH	  
Magazine	  of	  History	  17,	  No.	  2,	  Conservatism	  (January,	  2003):	  5-­‐10.	  	  
13	  Lisa	  McGirr,	   Suburban	  Warriors:	  The	  Origins	  of	   the	  New	  American	  Right	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001).	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conservatism.14	  Some	  scholars	  picked	  out	  the	  evangelical	  Christian	  right	  as	  a	   focal	   point,	  while	   still	   others,	   notably	  Kim	  Phillips-­‐Fein,	   focused	   on	   the	  role	   of	   anti-­‐New	   Deal	   business	   leaders. 15 	  Regardless	   of	   their	   specific	  concerns,	   however,	   second	  wave	   historiography	   accepted	   the	   importance	  of	   grassroots	   conservative	   activists	   and	   organisers	   in	   moulding	   a	  movement	  capable	  of	  challenging	  post-­‐war	  liberalism.	  	  Despite	  this	  substantial	  body	  of	  work,	  important	  areas	  of	  the	  modern	  conservative	  movement	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  examined.	  Julian	  Zelizer	  has	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	   coherence	   of	   modern	   conservatism	   has	   often	   been	  exaggerated,	  owing	  to	  the	  tendency	  of	  second-­‐wave	  scholars	  to	  seek	  issues	  that	  brought	  conservatives	  together.16	  	  A	  third	  wave	  of	  scholarship,	  Zelizer	  suggests,	   should	   now	   look	   more	   closely	   at	   the	   inconsistencies	   and	   fault	  lines	   of	   conservatism,	   especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	   its	   transition	   from	  opposition	  to	  national	  office	  holders	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1980s.	  ‘A	  new	  look’,	  he	   states,	   ‘will	   not	   downplay	   the	   centrality	   of	   conservatism	   in	  contemporary	  politics	  but,	  just	  the	  opposite,	  provide	  a	  better	  appreciation	  for	   how	   they	   achieved	   what	   they	   did	   given	   the	   numerous	   internal	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 	  Kevin	   Kruse,	   White	   Flight:	   Atlanta	   and	   the	   Making	   of	   Modern	  
Conservatism	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	   2005),	   Matthew	  Lassiter,	   The	   Silent	   Majority:	   Suburban	   Politics	   in	   the	   Sunbelt	   South	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  Joseph	  Crespino,	  In	  Search	  of	  
Another	   Country:	   Mississippi	   and	   the	   Conservative	   Counterrevolution	  (Princeton:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	   2007).	   Despite	   focusing	   on	   the	  south,	   Kruse,	   Lassiter,	   and	   Crespino	   rejected	   the	   myth	   of	   southern	  exceptionalism.	  Instead,	  they	  argued,	  like	  many	  white	  suburbanites	  across	  the	   country,	   southern	   conservatives	   reinforced	   the	   status	   quo	   of	   race	  relations	   through	   their	   control	   of	   low-­‐level	   regulation.	   Dan	   Carter,	   while	  sharing	   their	   concern	   with	   placing	   Southern	   politics	   within	   a	   broader,	  national	   context,	   nevertheless	   argued	   in	   his	   work	   on	   Alabama	   governor	  George	   Wallace	   that	   there	   was	   a	   distinct	   racial	   backlash	   politics	   in	   the	  development	  of	  modern	   conservatism.	  Dan	  T.	  Carter,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Rage:	  
George	  Wallace,	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  New	  Conservatism	  and	  the	  Transformation	  
of	  American	  Politics	  (Baton	  Rouge:	  Louisiana	  State	  University,	  1995).	  
15	  Kim	  Phillips-­‐Fein,	  Invisible	  Hands:	  The	  Businessmen’s	  Crusade	  Against	  the	  
New	  Deal	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  2009).	  
16	  Zelizer,	  “Rethinking	  the	  History,”	  370.	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external	  obstacles	  they	  faced.17	  Writing	  in	  2011,	  one	  year	  after	  Zelizer,	  Kim	  Phillips-­‐Fein	   pointed	   out	   that	   modern	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	   also	  deserved	  closer	  inspection	  –	  an	  especially	  profitable	  area	  given,	  as	  Brinkley	  noted,	   the	   ‘ample	   evidence	   for	   distinctive	   conservative	   arguments	   about	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  world’.18	  	   Jesse	  Helms	  and	  Conservative	  Foreign	  Policy	  for	  Central	  America	  	   In	  Central	  America,	  during	  the	  final	  decade	  and	  a	  half	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Jesse	   Helms	   defined	   one	   of	   these	   distinctive	   conservative	   arguments.	  Grounded	   in	   the	   three	   essential	   ingredients	   of	   post-­‐war	   conservative	  ideology	  –	  anti-­‐communism,	  economic	  liberalism,	  and	  traditionalism	  –	  the	  senator’s	  foreign	  policy	  vision	  was	  simple	  in	  its	  prescription	  for	  the	  region:	  ‘there	   is	   no	   substitute	   for	   military	   victory	   over	   the	   Communist	   forces	   in	  Central	   America’,	   he	   proclaimed,	   ‘and	   there	   is	   no	   substitute	   for	   free	  enterprise	  to	  bring	  prosperity	  and	  a	  better	  life	  for	  all	  in	  the	  region.	  It	  is	  at	  our	  peril	  that	  we	  forget	  these	  fundamental	  truths.’19	  	  It	   was	   a	   basic	   message,	   but	   a	   popular	   one	   among	   post-­‐war	  conservatives	  who	  accepted	  both	  the	  threat	  of	  international	  communism	  –	  ‘messianic	   world-­‐conquering’	   Communism,	   as	   conservative	   icon	   Frank	  Meyer	   described	   it	   –	   and	   the	   necessity	   of	   an	   expanded	   national	   security	  state	  to	  counter	  it.20	  Owing	  much	  to	  the	  theoretical	  contributions	  of	  James	  Burnham,	   one	   of	   the	   movement’s	   most	   prominent	   intellectuals	   and	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid.,	  386.	  
18 	  Kim	   Phillips-­‐Fein,	   “Conservatism:	   A	   State	   of	   the	   Field,”	   Journal	   of	  
American	   History	   98,	   No.	   3	   (December,	   2011),	   735,	   and	   Alan	   Brinkley,	  “Conservatism	  as	  a	  Growing	  Field	  of	  Study,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  History	  98,	  No.	  3	  (December,	  2011),	  749.	  
19	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “The	   Elections	   In	   El	   Salvador,”	   Congressional	   Record	  (hereafter	  Cong.	  Rec.)	  130	  (1984),	  10694.	  
20	  Frank	   S.	  Meyer,	   “Consensus	   and	  Divergence,”	   in	  What	   is	  Conservatism?,	  ed.	  Frank	  S.	  Meyer	  (New	  York:	  Holt,	  Rinehardt	  and	  Winston,	  1964),	  231.	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editor	   of	   the	   influential	  National	  Review	  magazine,	  modern	   conservatives	  reached	   a	   consensus	   that	   rejected	   the	   remnant	   of	   World	   War	   II-­‐era	  isolationism	   as	   dangerously	   naïve.21	  Instead,	   as	   Burnham	   advocated,	   an	  outward	   looking,	   activist	   foreign	  policy	  was	   required	   to	  protect	   domestic	  liberties	   by	   first	   defeating	   the	   apocalyptic	   external	   threat	   posed	   by	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	   its	  proxies.	  Containment	  and	  détente,	  shibboleths	  of	   the	  foreign	   policy	   establishment,	   were	   criticised	   as	   weak	   and	   defeatist.	  Burnham	   and	   his	   disciples	   instead	   argued	   that	   the	   only	   viable	   path	   to	  victory	   was	   to	   take	   the	   offensive	   and	   liberate	   nations	   under	   communist	  control	   via,	   among	   other	   approaches,	   large-­‐scale	   propaganda	   campaigns	  and	  wholehearted	  support	  for	  anti-­‐communist	  liberation	  movements.	  Post-­‐war	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	   ideas	   largely	   developed	   from	   this	  framework.22	  	  Helms’	  advocacy	  for	  free	  enterprise	  was	  founded	  on	  Wilhelm	  Röpke’s	  conservative	  maxim	  that	  ‘[t]he	  economy	  is	  freedom’s	  first	  line	  of	  defense.’23	  The	   senator,	   as	   part	   of	   a	   general	   consensus	   in	   modern	   conservative	  philosophy,	  saw	  the	  pursuit	  of	  this	  freedom	  in	  fusionist	  economic	  thought,	  which	  combined	  economic	  liberalism	  with	  moral	  traditionalism.	  To	  Helms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Two	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  isolationist	  dissidents	  were	  Frank	  Chodorov	  and	   Murray	   Rothbard.	   For	   their	   criticism	   of	   outward-­‐looking	   Cold	   War	  foreign	   policy,	   see	   Frank	   Chodorov,	  Out	   of	   Step:	   The	  Autobiography	   of	   an	  
Individualist	   (New	   York:	   The	   Devin-­‐Adair	   Company,	   1962),	   and	   Murray	  Rothbard,	   For	  A	  New	  Liberty:	   The	   Libertarian	  Manifesto	   (Auburn:	   Ludwig	  von	   Mises	   Institute,	   2006),	   accessed	   13	   April	   2013,	  http://library.mises.org/books/Murray%20N%20Rothbard/For%20a%20New%20Liberty%20The%20Libertarian%20Manifesto.pdf.	  
22	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  Burnham’s	  contributions,	  see	  Jerome	  Himmelstein,	  To	  
The	   Right:	   The	   Transformation	   of	   American	   Conservatism	   (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1990),	  38-­‐40.	  Burnham’s	  career	  at	  National	  
Review	   is	   recounted	   by	   his	   colleague	   Jeffrey	   Hart	   in	   his	   history	   of	   the	  publication,	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Mind:	  National	  Review	  
and	  its	  Times	  (Wilmington:	  Isi	  Books,	  2007).	  
23 	  William	   Röpke,	   “Education	   in	   Economic	   Liberty,”	   in	   What	   is	  
Conservatism?,	  ed.	  Frank	  S.	  Meyer	  (New	  York:	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1964),	  78.	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and	  other	  advocates,	  among	  whom	  were	  conservative	  intellectual	  icons	  like	  Frank	  Meyer,	  William	   Buckley,	   and	  M.	   Stanton	   Evans,	   fusionism	   dictated	  that	   the	   pursuit	   of	   prosperity	   could	   only	   be	   undertaken	   within	   a	   moral	  framework	   founded	   on	   the	   spiritual	   traditions	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and,	  more	  broadly,	  western	  civilisation.24	  This	  would	  simultaneously	   legitimise	  a	  citizen’s	  economic	  liberty,	  and	  strengthen	  the	  nation’s	  moral	  fortitude	  in	  line	  with	  the	  absolute	  and	  transcendental	  morals	  of	  the	  west.25	  	  Helms’	   fusionist	   ideal	   represented	   what	   Jerome	   Himmelstein	   has	  defined	  as	  ‘pristine	  capitalism’.	  This	  was	  a	  model	  in	  which	  the	  accumulation	  of	  wealth	  never	  gave	  way	   to	   the	  baser	  elements	  of	   the	   free	  market.	  Thus,	  the	  emphasis	  was	  on	   the	  entrepreneur,	  not	   the	  monopolist.	  Ownership	  of	  personal	  property	  and	  tools	  of	  production	  was	  favoured	  over	  the	  control	  of	  stock	   and	   bonds.	   While	   these	   aspects	   of	   capitalism	   were	   not	   attacked,	  pristine	   capitalists	   believed	   they	   were	   not	   vital	   to	   the	   system.26	  Pristine	  capitalism	   evoked	   an	   era	   of	   rural	   agrarianism,	   in	   which	   a	   sense	   of	  individual	   productivity	   and	   self-­‐sufficiency	   were	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  citizen’s,	   and	   the	   nation’s,	   economic	   life.	   Helms	   spoke	   of	   this	   ideal	   with	  fondness	   when	   he	   recalled	   that	   his	   family	   ‘were	   no	   strangers	   to	   simple	  living,	  and	  our	  economy	  was	  tied	  to	  agriculture	  more	  than	  manufacturing.	  We	  stuck	  to	  the	  basics	  and	  hoped	  for	  the	  best.’27	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Traditionalists,	  such	  as	  Russell	  Kirk,	  Richard	  Weaver,	  and	  Robert	  Nisbet,	  did	  not	  reject	  outright	  the	  importance	  of	  economic	  liberty	  in	  a	  free	  society,	  but	   they	   happily	   recalled	   the	  moral	   purpose	   and	   spiritual	   foundations	   of	  the	  previous	  century	  and	  shared	  a	  strain	  of	  anti-­‐capitalism	  reminiscent	  of	  the	   populist	   movements	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century.	   Himmelstein,	   To	   The	  
Right,	   45-­‐53	   and	   Patrick	   Allitt,	   The	   Conservatives:	   Ideas	   and	   Personalities	  
Throughout	   American	   History	   (New	   Haven:	   Yale	   University	   Press,	   2009),	  97-­‐98.	  
25	  A	   cogent	   assertion	   of	   this	   position	   can	   be	   found	   in	   M.	   Stanton	   Evans,	  “Raico	   on	   Liberalism	   and	   Religion,”	   New	   Individualist	   Review	   4,	   No.	   2	  (Winter,	   1966),	   accessed	   12	   April	   2013,	  http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2136/195435.	  
26	  Himmelstein,	  To	  The	  Right,	  47.	  
27	  Helms,	  Here’s	  Where	  I	  Stand,	  4.	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   Together,	   anti-­‐communism,	   fusionism,	   and	   pristine	   capitalism	  provided	   the	   intellectual	   foundation	   for	   Helms’	   Central	   America	   policy.28	  They	   very	   much	   fit	   into	   what	   Mendelbaum	   and	   Schneider	   described,	   in	  1979,	   as	   ‘conservative	   internationalism’.	   It	  was	  a	   vision	   that	   ‘pictures	   the	  world	  primarily	  in	  East-­‐West	  terms:	  democracy	  versus	  tyranny,	  capitalism	  versus	  communism,	   freedom	  versus	   repression’,	   and	  provided	   for	  a	  more	  competitive	   internationalism	   than	   its	   liberal	   alternative.	  29	  Julian	   Zelizer’s	  more	  recent	  examination	  of	  the	  national	  security	  state	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  
Arsenal	  of	  Democracy,	  offers	  a	  similar	  description:	  a	  right-­‐wing	  opposition	  to	   Cold	   War	   policies	   emerged	   from	   discontent	   over	   the	   1945	   Yalta	  conference,	   subsequent	   containment	   doctrine,	   and	   détente.	   Helms’	   broad	  strategic	   framework	   for	   international	   affairs	   is	   a	   case	   study	   in	   the	  application	  of	  this	  thinking.30	  	  It	   is	   also	   an	   example	   of	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   contesting	   visions	   of	  ‘conservative	  internationalism’	  played	  out.	  Henry	  Nau’s	  2013	  Conservative	  
Internationalism:	   Armed	   Diplomacy	   Under	   Jefferson,	   Polk,	   Truman,	   and	  
Reagan	   argued	   that	   the	   ideas	   of	   conservative	   internationalism	   were	   not	  exclusively	   devoted	   to	   the	   application	   of	   power,	   but	   rather	   sought	   to	  promote	   freedom	   through	   diplomatic	   initiatives	   tempered	   by	   force.	   Nau	  rejected	   the	   idea	   that	   this	   was	   a	   Cold	  War	   phenomenon,	   and	   traced	   the	  ideology	  back	  to	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  –	  though	  he	  believe	  Ronald	  Reagan	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  Jesse	  Helms,	  “A	  New	  Policy	  for	  Latin	  America.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Social,	  
Political,	  and	  Economic	  Affairs	  1,	  No.	  1	  (January,	  1976):	  15-­‐20. 
29 	  Michael	   Mandelbaum	   and	   William	   Schneider,	   “The	   New	  Internationalisms,”	   in	   Eagle	   Entangled:	   U.S.	   Foreign	   Policy	   in	   a	   Complex	  
World,	   eds.	   Kenneth	  A.	  Oye,	  Donald	  Rothchild,	   and	  Robert	   J.	   Lieber	   (New	  York:	   Longman,	   1979),	   63.	   See	   also	   Eugene	   R.	   Wittkopf,	   Faces	   of	  
Internationalism:	   Public	   Opinion	   and	   American	   Foreign	   Policy	   (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  
30	  Zelizer,	   Arsenal	   of	   Democracy:	   The	   Politics	   of	   National	   Security	   –	   From	  
World	  War	  II	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism	   (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2010),	  83-­‐96. 
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the	  foremost	  exponent	  of	  these	  principles.	  Helms	  was	  certainly	  suspicious	  of	  centralised	  international	  organisations	  and	  liberal	  internationalism,	  thus	  fitting	  within	  Nau’s	  model,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  can	  hardly	  be	  argued	  that	  he	   saw	   diplomatic	   solutions	   as	   an	   equal	   goal	   alongside	   the	   projection	   of	  American	  power.	  	  Central	  America	  was	  a	  crucible	   for	   this	  conservative	   internationalist	  agenda.	  While	  the	  senator	  held	  an	  active	  interest	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	   world,	   from	   East	   Asia	   to	   Africa,	   the	   fate	   of	   Central	   America	   was	   a	  particular	  priority	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  until	  the	  early	  1990s.	  His	  concern,	  a	  common	   one	   among	   movement	   conservatives,	   was	   that	   the	   relentless	  march	  of	   communist	   expansionism	   in	   the	  United	  States’	  backyard	   spelled	  an	   imminent	   threat	   to	   both	   the	   country’s	   ideological	   principles	   and	   its	  territory.	   It	   wasn’t	   simply	   that	   communist	   guerrillas	   in	   Central	   America	  would	   sweep	   up	   over	   the	   U.S.-­‐Mexico	   border	   if	   their	   progress	   was	  unchecked,	   but	   that	   American	   republicanism	   would	   be	   demolished	   as	  communism	  infected	  the	  country’s	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  life.	  	  Wider	   American	   interest	   in	   Central	   America	   has	   been	   assigned	  various	  motivations	  by	  scholars.	  Some	  see	  a	  response	  to	  perceived	  failings	  in	  Vietnam	  a	  decade	  earlier.	  As	  William	  M.	  LeoGrande	  argues	   in	  Our	  Own	  
Backyard:	   The	   United	   States	   in	   Central	   America,	   1977-­‐1992,	   the	   definitive	  account	   of	   American	   policies	   in	   the	   region,	   policymakers	   saw	   a	   way	   ‘to	  exorcise	   the	   ghosts	   of	   Vietnam	   and	   renew	   the	   national	   will	   to	   use	   force	  abroad.’31	  Greg	  Grandin,	  who	  likewise	  sees	  a	  determined	  effort	  by	  the	  U.S.	  to	  restore	  its	  lost	  power	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Vietnam,	  believes	  U.S.	  intervention	  was	  a	  means	  of	  expanding	  its	  global	  hegemony.32	  Thomas	  Carothers,	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  William	  M.	   LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard:	   The	  United	   States	   in	   Central	  
America,	   1977-­‐1992	   (Chapel	   Hill:	   North	   Carolina	   University	   Press,	   1998),	  590.	   Alan	   McPherson	   also	   ties	   intervention	   to	   Vietnam	   in	   Intimate	   Ties,	  
Bitter	   Struggles:	   The	   United	   States	   and	   Latin	   America	   Since	   1945	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Potomac	  Books,	  2006).	  
32	  Greg	   Grandin,	  Empire’s	  Workshop:	   Latin	  America,	   the	  United	   States,	   and	  
the	  Rise	  of	  the	  New	  Imperialism	  (New	  York:	  Metropolitan	  Books,	  2006).	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sympathetically,	  saw	  a	  genuine	  desire	  among	  American	  officials	   to	  spread	  democracy	   throughout	   the	   region. 33 	  Helms’	   record	   indicates	   a	   pre-­‐occupation	  with	  the	  re-­‐application	  of	  force	  in	  a	  post-­‐Vietnam	  world,	  as	  well	  as	   a	   desire	   to	   expand	   those	   ideals	   he	   saw	   as	   American	   freedoms	   –	  including,	   of	   course,	   democracy.	   It	   also	   says	   much	   about	   the	   critical	  importance	   of	   national	   security	   considerations	   and	   anti-­‐communism.	  Indeed,	   this	   was	   the	   overwhelming	   concern	   among	   those	   conservatives	  who	  shared	  Helms’	  interest	  in	  the	  region	  in	  this	  period.	  	  That	  the	  senator	  identified	  the	  region	  as	  critical	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  also	  says	  much	   about	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   periphery	   to	   those	  who	  intended	  to	  fight	  communism	  wherever	  it	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  growing.	  As	  much	   as	   the	   Cold	   War	   was	   about	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  as	  mainstream	  historians	  such	  as	   John	  Lewis	  Gaddis	  tend	  to	  emphasise,	  Third	  World	  players	  were	  critical	  in	  shaping,	  and	  being	   shaped	   by,	   the	   conflict.34	  Odd	   Arne	   Westad’s	   globalist	   Cold	   War	  scholarship,	   in	  which	   local	   actors	   are	   shown	   to	   be	   of	   vital	   importance	   in	  ‘abetting	  and	   facilitating’	  U.S.	   intervention	   in	   the	  Third	  World,	  demands	  a	  broader	   approach	   to	   the	   periphery.35	  There	   is	   a	   danger	   in	   striving	   to	   see	  the	  periphery	  as	  the	  dominant	  agent	  –	  something	  Westad’s	  work	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  –	  but	  it	   is	  nevertheless	  the	  case	  that	  through	  Helms’	  work	  in	  Central	  America	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  just	  how	  relevant	  it	  is	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  “broad”	  Cold	  War.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Thomas	   Carothers,	   In	   the	  Name	  of	  Democracy:	  U.S.	   Policy	  Toward	   Latin	  
America	   in	   the	   Reagan	   Years	   (Berkeley:	   University	   of	   California	   Press,	  1991).	  
34	  John	   Lewis	   Gaddis,	   The	   Cold	  War:	   A	   New	   History	   (New	   York:	   Penguin	  Books,	  2007);	  We	  Now	  Know:	  Rethinking	  Cold	  War	  History	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997).	  
35	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War:	  Third	  World	  Interventions	  and	  the	  
Making	  of	  Our	  Times	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  397.	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However,	   Helms’	   record	   also	   suggests	   the	   need	   to	   treat	   the	   term	  ‘conservative	   internationalism’	  with	  care,	  and	   in	  doing	  so	  question	  overly	  broad	   foreign	   policy	   categorisations	   that	   ignore	   the	   subtleties,	  inconsistencies	   and	   contradictions	   within	   the	   post-­‐war	   right’s	   foreign	  policy	   agenda.	   As	   Colin	   Dueck	   rightly	   argues,	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	  was	   characterised	   by	   ‘sheer	   variety’	   and	   ‘recurring	   tensions’.36 	  Helms’	  interventionism,	   for	   example,	   and	   fear	   for	   the	   future	   of	   western	  civilisations	   should	   Central	   America	   fall	   to	   communism,	   did	   not	   translate	  into	  calls	  for	  U.S.	  troops	  to	  fight	  in	  the	  jungles	  of	  El	  Salvador	  and	  Nicaragua.	  While	  unilateralist	  and	  deeply	  suspicious	  of	  multilateral	  power	  structures,	  the	   senator	   nevertheless	   embraced	   a	   transnational	   conservative	  community	   that	   included	   actors	   and	   organisations	   from	   Argentina,	   Chile,	  Guatemala,	   Honduras,	   and	   Costa	   Rica	   (as	   well	   as,	   of	   course,	   El	   Salvador,	  Nicaragua,	   and	   Panama).	   He	   worked	   with	   dictators	   and	   repressive	  oligarchs	   to	   support	   a	   social	   and	   political	   status	   quo	   that	   had	   stunted	  equality	   and	   social	   justice	   throughout	   the	   region	   during	   the	   twentieth	  century,	  but	  also	   lauded	  the	  region’s	  democratic	   transition	  and	  supported	  democracy,	   albeit	   tightly	   defined	   as	   the	   presence	   of	   free	   elections	   and	   a	  free-­‐market	  economy.	  	   As	  such,	  Helms’	  case	  exemplifies	  the	  importance	  of	  making	  sure	  that	  conservative	   foreign	   policy	   is	   not	   oversimplified,	   and	   that	   scholars	  recognise	   the	   multitude	   of	   agendas	   among	   the	   post-­‐war	   right.	   Robert	  Mason,	   Julian	   Zelizer,	   and	   Sandra	   Scanlon	   have	   each	   highlighted	   how	   the	  late	   1960s	   and	   early	   1970s	   saw	   a	   fragmentation	   in	   the	   right’s	   foreign	  policies,	   as	   sharp	  disagreements	   over	  President	  Nixon’s	  Vietnam	   strategy	  and	   rapprochement	   with	   China	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   led	   a	   hard-­‐line	  conservative	  community	  to	  condemn	  the	  president’s	  retreat	   from	  the	  war	  in	  South	  East	  Asia	  and	  embrace	  of	  Henry	  Kissinger’s	  realism	  and	  détente.37	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Colin	  Dueck,	  Hard-­‐Line:	  The	  Republican	  Party	  and	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  Since	  
World	  War	  II	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  28-­‐30.	  
37	  See	   Robert	   Mason,	   The	   Republican	   Party	   and	   American	   Politics	   from	  
Hoover	  to	  Reagan	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  Robert	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Helms’	   contribution	   to	   the	   debates	   over	   the	   relationship	   between	  pragmatism	  in	  power,	  and	  movement	  principles,	  emerged	  out	  of	  this	  intra-­‐Republican	  debate	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  	  Later,	  in	  the	  1980s,	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine,	  which	  was	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  senator’s	   foreign	  policy	   in	  Central	  America,	   became	  another	  battleground	  over	   principle	   and	   pragmatism	   between	   conservatives.	   The	   doctrine	  supported	   anti-­‐communist	   rebels	   in	   their	   conflicts	   with	   socialist	  governments,	   and	   was	   first	   articulated	   by	   conservative	   Time	   columnist	  Charles	   Krauthammer	   in	   1985.	   Krauthammer	   declared	   Reagan’s	   backing	  for	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua,	  mujahedeen	  in	  Afghanistan,	  and	  UNITA	  rebels	  in	  Angola	  was	  ‘overt	  and	  unashamed	  American	  support	  for	  anti-­‐Communist	  revolution’	  on	   the	  grounds	  of	   ‘justice,	  necessity	  and	  democratic	   tradition’,	  and	   he	   saw	   a	   uniform	   implementation	   of	   the	   strategy	   across	   these	  countries.38	  Subsequent	   scholars	   and	   commentators,	   including	   those	  who	  worked	   on	   Reagan’s	   foreign	   policies,	   have	   challenged	   Krauthammer’s	  assertions	   over	   the	   coherence	   of	   the	   doctrine.	   What	   has	   emerged	   over	  three	  decades	  of	  scholarship	  is	  an	  understanding	  that	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  was,	  like	  the	  administration’s	  foreign	  policy	  more	  generally,	  a	  fragmented,	  changeable,	   and	   contested	  means	   of	   implementing	   a	   conservative	   foreign	  policy	  vision.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mason,	   “Foreign	   Policy	   and	   the	  Republican	  Quest	   for	   a	  New	  Majority,”	   in	  
Seeking	  a	  New	  Majority:	  The	  Republican	  Party	  and	  American	  Politics,	  1960-­‐
1980,	  eds.	  Robert	  Mason	  and	  Iwan	  Morgan,	  169-­‐187	  (Nashville:	  Vanderbilt	  University	   Press,	   2013),	   Sandra	   Scanlon,	   “Building	   Consensus:	   The	  Republican	   Right	   and	   Foreign	   Policy,	   1960-­‐1980,”	   in	   Seeking	   a	   New	  
Majority:	   The	   Republican	   Party	   and	   American	   Politics,	   1960-­‐1980,	   eds.	  Robert	  Mason	  and	  Iwan	  Morgan,	  152-­‐168	  (Nashville:	  Vanderbilt	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  Robert	  Mason,	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  a	  New	  Majority	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2004),	  Zelizer,	  Arsenal	  
of	  Democracy,	  240-­‐243,	  and	  Sandra	  Scanlon,	  “The	  Conservative	  Lobby	  and	  Nixon’s	  “Peace	  with	  Honor”	  in	  Vietnam,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  Studies	  43,	  No.	  2	  (August,	  2009):	  255-­‐276.	  
38	  Charles	  Krauthammer,	  “The	  Reagan	  Doctrine,”	  Time,	  1	  April,	  1985.	  
39	  Edward	  A.	  Lynch,	  The	  Cold	  War’s	  Last	  Battlefield:	  Reagan,	  the	  Soviets,	  and	  
Central	   America	   (Albany:	   State	   University	   of	   New	   York	   Press,	   2011),	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  The	  most	  important	  of	  these	  works	  is	  James	  M.	  Scott’s	  1996	  Deciding	  
to	   Intervene,	   which	   showed	   how	   a	   fragmented	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   was	  constructed	   from	   competing	   ‘constellations’	   of	   policy	   activists	   that	   came	  together	   in	   support	   of	   common	   causes.40	  Scott	   relied	   on	   Peter	   Rodman’s	  contentious	   study	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   in	   the	   Third	  World	   for	   its	   theoretical	  framework,	   in	   which	   the	   decision-­‐makers	   were	   divided	   into	   three	  competing	   factions:	   advocates,	  pragmatists,	   and	  opponents.	  Disagreement	  stemmed	  not	  from	  divergent	  strategic	  goals	  –	  conservatives	  were	  united	  in	  seeking	   to	   undermine	   communist	   government	   –	   but	   from	   competing	  visions	   of	   power	   and	   force.	   Advocates	   embraced	   power	   and	   rejected	  diplomacy,	  while	  opponents	  prioritised	  diplomacy	  over	   force.	  Pragmatists	  fell	   in	   the	  middle,	   looking	   to	   balance	   the	   two	   in	   pursuit	   of	   foreign	   policy	  goals.41	  Rodman’s	  work	  was	  justly	  criticised	  as	  a	  paean	  to	  the	  Doctrine	  and	  ‘a	   testament	   to	   American	   exceptionalism’,	   but	   the	   author’s	   service	   in	   the	  National	  Security	  Council	  during	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  was	  helpful	  in	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   “The	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   Principle,	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   Policy,”	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   Studies	   Quarterly	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   Presidential	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   The	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   Sources	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   American	  
Conduct	  in	  the	  Cold	  War’s	  Last	  Chapter	   (Westport:	  Praeger,	  1994),	  Michael	  McFaul,	   “Rethinking	   the	   "Reagan	   Doctrine"	   in	   Angola,”	   International	  
Security	   14,	   No.	   3	   (Winter	   1989-­‐1990):	   99-­‐135,	   and	   Robert	   W.	   Tucker,	  “Reagan’s	  Foreign	  Policy,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  68,	  No.	  1,	  America	  and	  the	  World	  1988/89	   (1988/1989):	   1-­‐27.	   Jeane	   Kirkpatrick,	   Reagan’s	   envoy	   to	   the	  United	   Nations	   and	   a	   prominent	   neoconservative	   in	   the	   administration,	  charitably	   described	   the	   doctrine	   as	   an	   ‘evolving	   set	   of	   policies	   and	  principles’	   in	  her	   introduction	   to	  Walter	  Hahn’s	  1987	  edited	   collection	  of	  laudatory	  Strategic	  Review	   articles.	   Jeane	   J.	   Kirkpatrick,	   “Introduction,”	   in	  
Central	  America	  and	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine,	  ed.	  Walter	  F.	  Hahn	  (Boston:	  The	  Centre	  for	  International	  Relations,	  1987),	  xvi.	  
40	  James	  M.	  Scott,	  Deciding	  to	  Intervene:	  The	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  and	  American	  
Foreign	  Policy	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  
41	  Peter	  Rodman,	  More	  Precious	  than	  Peace:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Struggle	  
for	  the	  Third	  World	  (New	  York:	  C.	  Scribner’s	  Sons,	  1994).	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revealing	   the	  multiple	   and	   shifting	   alliances	  which	  operated	   in	  pursuit	   of	  differing	  approaches	  to	  the	  doctrine.42	  	  	   This	   policy	   fragmentation,	   especially	   during	   the	   Reagan	  administration,	   was	   critical	   for	   Helms	   in	   his	   quest	   to	   influence	   Central	  America	   policy.	   The	   continued	   rejection	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Presidency,	   and	  further	  discord	  between	  those	  unwilling	  to	  jettison	  détente	  and	  Reaganites	  preaching	   a	   more	   militarised	   international	   agenda,	   provided	   scope	   for	  individual	  members	   of	   Congress	   to	   identify	   spaces	   of	   policy	   autonomy.43	  Helms	   achieved	   influence	   because	   he	   was	   better	   able	   to	   locate	   and	   take	  advantage	   of	   these	   spaces	   than	   many	   of	   his	   fellow	   legislators.	   He	  recognised	   that	   traditional	   sources	  of	  policy	   influence,	   such	  as	   committee	  assignments,	  personnel	  appointments,	  and	  legislation,	  were	  still	  important	  in	   the	   late	   Cold	  War.	   Yet	   he	   astutely	   understood	   that	   he	   could	   achieve	   a	  greater	   influence	   in	   foreign	  policy	  by	  also	  working	  outside	  these	  avenues.	  Thus	   he	   encouraged	   greater	   independence	  within	   his	   fiercely	   ideological	  staff,	  and	  cultivated	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  contacts	  around	  the	  world	  that	  provided	  an	  unrivalled	   information-­‐gathering	  apparatus	  as	  well	   as	   access	  to	  participants	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  process	  –	  what	  John	  Kingdon	  describes	  as	  ‘players	  in	  the	  game.’44	  	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   network	   was	   a	   selection	   of	   aides	   employed	   by	  Helms	   in	  Washington	   D.C.	  Whether	   on	   his	   office	   staff	   or	   assigned	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  For	  criticism	  of	  Rodman’s	  work,	  see	  Stephan	  G.	  Rabe,	  “More	  Precious	  than	  
Peace:	   The	   Cold	   War	   and	   the	   Struggle	   for	   the	   Third	   World	   by	   Peter	   W.	  Rodman,”	  The	  American	  Historical	  Review	  101,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1996):	  593,	  and	  Elizabeth	  Kridl	  Valkenier,	  “More	  Precious	  Than	  Peace:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  
Struggle	   for	   the	   Third	   World	   by	   Peter	   W.	   Rodman,”	   Political	   Science	  
Quarterly	  110,	  No.	  2	  (Summer,	  1995):	  346-­‐347.	  
43	  Richard	   A.	   Melanson,	   American	   Foreign	   Policy	   Since	   The	   Vietnam	  War:	  
The	  Search	   for	  Consensus	   from	  Richard	  Nixon	  to	  George	  W.	  Bush	   (Armonk:	  M.	  E.	  Sharpe,	  2005),	  4.	  
44	  John	  W.	   Kingdon,	   Agendas,	   Alternatives,	   and	   Public	   Policies	   (New	   York:	  Longman,	  1995),	  21.	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Senate	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee,	   this	   group	   was	   committed	   to	   the	  movement	   conservative	   agenda,	   and	   afforded	   extensive	   latitude	   by	   the	  senator	   to	   fulfil	   this	   mission	   in	   Central	   America.	   Their	   conservative	  credentials	  were	  impeccable.	  Christopher	  Manion,	  for	  instance,	  was	  the	  son	  of	  Clarence	  Manion,	  the	  Old	  Right	  isolationist	  media	  commentator	  who	  had	  forged	   links	   between	   business	   executives	   and	   the	   growing	   national	  conservative	  movement	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  The	  elder	  Manion	  helped	  persuade	  Barry	  Goldwater	   to	   run	   for	   the	  presidency	   in	   1964,	   and	  was	  invited	  by	  William	  F.	  Buckley	  Jr.	  to	  join	  the	  founding	  board	  of	  directors	  at	   National	   Review.	   During	   Helms’	   pre-­‐Senate	   career,	   Manion	   spoke	   to	  North	  Carolina	  businessmen	  at	  Helms’	  request,	  and	  he	  later	  campaigned	  for	  Helms	  in	  his	  1972	  Senate	  election	  race.45	  	  Deborah	   DeMoss,	   one	   of	   the	   senator’s	   most	   active	   staffers	   in	   Latin	  America,	   was	   also	   part	   of	   an	   important,	   albeit	   less	   public,	   conservative	  family.46	  Her	  father,	  Arthur	  DeMoss,	  had	  created	  the	  Atlanta-­‐based	  DeMoss	  Foundation,	   funding	  evangelical	  missionary	  work	  across	  the	  United	  States	  and	   abroad.	   Highly	   secretive	   about	   its	  work,	   the	  DeMoss	   Foundation	   has	  been	   identified	  as	  an	  early	  and	   leading	   influence	  on	  the	  modern	  Christian	  Right	   that	   was	   itself	   absolutely	   critical	   to	   both	   Helms’	   worldview	   and	  electoral	   success.47	  As	   scholars	   of	  modern	  American	   religion	   and	  modern	  American	  conservatism	  acknowledge,	  the	  organisational	  savvy	  of	  the	  New	  Christian	  Right	  combined	  with	  its	  dire	  warnings	  over	  Cold	  War	  social	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Manion’s	   life	  and	  contribution	  to	  modern	  conservatism,	  especially	   in	   its	  Goldwater	   1964	   guise,	   are	   examined	   in	   Rick	   Perlstein,	   Before	   the	   Storm:	  
Barry	  Goldwater	  and	  the	  Unmaking	  of	   the	  American	  Consensus	   (New	  York:	  Hill	   and	  Wang,	  2001).	  For	  Manion’s	   relationship	  with	  Helms,	   see	  Phillips-­‐Fein,	  Invisible	  Hands,	  81-­‐86.	  
46	  DeMoss	  married	   a	   colonel	   in	   the	  Honduran	  military	   in	  1993,	   becoming	  DeMoss	  Fonseca.	  
47	  See	  William	  Martin,	  author	  of	  With	  God	  on	  Our	  Side,	  in	  David	  Van	  Biema,	  “Who	   Are	   Those	   Guys?”	   Time,	   1	   August,	   1999,	  http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,28859-­‐1,00.html,	  accessed	  5	  July,	  2014.	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political	   decay	   were	   fundamental	   in	   the	   rise	   of	   modern	   conservatism.48	  Helms,	  a	  staunch	  Southern	  Baptist,	  whose	  electoral	  success	  owed	  much	  to	  the	   work	   of	   Sunbelt	   Christian	   activists,	   echoed	   the	   Cold	   War	   anti-­‐communist	  fervour	  of	  earlier	  twentieth	  century	  preachers	  who	  had	  stoked	  controversy	  with	  their	  scathing	  attacks	  on	  those	  unwilling	  to	  face	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  spread	  of	  socialist	  ideology.49	  	  The	  most	   flamboyant	   character	   on	  Helms’	   staff	  was	   John	   Carbaugh,	  who,	   though	   not	   belonging	   to	   a	   conservative	   dynasty	   like	   DeMoss	   or	  Manion,	   nevertheless	   held	   a	   long	   association	   with	   the	   movement.	   A	  member	  of	   the	  college	  Young	  Republicans,	  Carbaugh	  worked	   in	  the	  Nixon	  White	  House	  at	  just	  twenty-­‐three	  years	  old,	  and	  later	  moved	  to	  the	  staff	  of	  Senator	   Strom	   Thurmond	   (R-­‐SC),	   another	   icon	   of	   southern	   conservatism	  and	   one	   of	   Helms’	   strongest	   supporters	   in	   his	   1972	   Senate	   election	  campaign.50	  It	  was	  in	  Thurmond’s	  office	  that	  Carbaugh	  met	  James	  P.	  Lucier,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  General	  works	  on	  the	  modern	  Christian	  Right	  include	  Bethany	  Moreton,	  
To	  Serve	  God	  and	  Wal-­‐Mart	   (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	   2009),	  Steve	  Bruce,	  “Modernity	  and	  Fundamentalism:	  The	  New	  Christian	  Right	  in	  America,”	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  41,	  No.	  4	  (December,	  1990):	  477-­‐496,	   and	   Gillian	   Peele,	   Revival	   and	   Reaction:	   The	   Right	   in	   Contemporary	  
America	   (Oxford:	   Clarendon	   Press,	   1985).	   For	   the	   Christian	   Right’s	  contribution	   to	   foreign	   policy,	   see	   Andrew	   Preston,	   Sword	   of	   the	   Spirit,	  
Shield	   of	   the	   Faith:	   Religion	   in	   American	  War	   and	   Diplomacy	   (New	   York:	  Anchor	   Books,	   2012).	   The	   relationship	   between	   the	   religious	   right,	  conservatism,	   and	   the	  media	   is	   a	   focus	   for	   Heather	   Hendershot’s	  What’s	  
Fair	   on	   the	  Air:	   Cold	  War	  Right-­‐Wing	  Broadcasting	  and	   the	  Public	   Interest	  (Chicago:	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Press,	   2011)	   and	   Shaking	   the	   World	   for	  
Jesus:	   Media	   and	   Conservative	   Evangelical	   Culture	   (Chicago:	   University	   of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2004).	  
49 	  Among	   these	   figures	   was	   Carl	   McIntire,	   whose	   anti-­‐communist	  campaigns	   are	   studied	   in	   Markku	   Ruotsila,	   “Carl	   McIntire	   and	   the	  Fundamentalist	   Origins	   of	   the	   Christian	   Right,”	   Church	   History	   81,	   No.	   2	  (June,	  2012):	  378-­‐407,	  and	  Heather	  Hendershot,	  “God's	  Angriest	  Man:	  Carl	  McIntire,	   Cold	   War	   Fundamentalism,	   and	   Right-­‐Wing	   Broadcasting,”	  
American	  Quarterly	  59,	  No.	  2	  (June,	  2007):	  373-­‐396.	  
50	  Kathy	  Sawyer,	  “Two	  Helms	  Point	  Men:	  Locking	  Horns	  with	  the	  Liberals,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  27	  November,	  1979,	  A2,	  and	  Link,	  Righteous	  Warrior,	  124.	  Strom	  Thurmond’s	  role	  as	  the	  ‘avatar’	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party’s	  “Southern	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a	  former	  literature	  teacher	  and	  journalist	  who	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  hard-­‐line,	   right	   wing	   John	   Birch	   Society	   in	   his	   early	   writings.	   Like	   Carbaugh,	  Lucier	  transferred	  to	  Helms’	  staff,	  running	  the	  senator’s	  foreign	  policy	  staff.	  Lucier’s	   tendency	   to	   provide,	   as	   Furgurson	   notes,	   the	   philosophical	  justifications	   and	   geographical	   specifics	   for	   Helms’	   more	   monochromatic	  judgements	   about	   world	   affairs	   made	   him	   a	   critical	   member	   of	   the	  senator’s	  foreign	  policy	  staff.51	  	  	   	  Helms’	  staff,	  however,	  were	  but	  one	  part	  of	  a	  wider,	  ever	  fluctuating	  and	   evolving,	   network	   of	   contacts	   that	   the	   senator	   cultivated	   across	   the	  United	  States	  and	  Central	  America.	  The	  senator	  had	  long	  been	  an	  energetic	  participant	  in	  political	  networks,	  constructing	  a	  large	  array	  of	  conservative	  contacts	  during	  his	  pre-­‐Senate	  career.52	  After	  his	  election	  to	  the	  Senate,	  and	  as	   his	   interest	   in	   foreign	   policy	   developed,	   Helms	   and	   his	   foreign	   policy	  aides	   moved	   within	   a	   broad,	   transnational	   network	   of	   policy	   allies	   that	  included	  many	  Central	  American	  conservatives	  who	  shared	  a	  commitment	  to	  rigid	  anti-­‐communism,	  social	  traditionalism,	  and	  free-­‐market	  enterprise.	  Though	   Helms	   portrayed	   the	   network	   in	   his	   memoir	   as	   a	   conduit	   for	  accurate	   information	   to	  use	   in	  his	  arguments	  back	   in	   the	  United	  States,	   it	  also	   provided	   a	   mechanism	   by	   which	   local	   conservative	   activists	   could	  connect	   with	   Helms	   and	   his	   staff	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   substantive	   policy	  change.53	  	  	   In	  this	  way,	  Helms’	  network	  had	  similarities	  with	  the	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  (TANs)	  that	  scholars	  have	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  as	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strategy”	   is	   wonderfully	   illuminated	   in	   Joseph	   Crespino’s	   Strom	  
Thurmond’s	  America	  (New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  2012).	  
51	  Furgurson,	  Hard	  Right,	  192.	  
52	  For	  an	  excellent	  overview	  of	  this	  network	  and	  its	  benefits	  for	  Helms,	  see	  Hardin,	  “Jesse	  Helms,”	  105-­‐121.	  
53	  Helms	  wrote	  in	  his	  memoir	  that	  ‘In	  order	  to	  prove	  my	  point,	  I	  had	  to	  have	  facts.	   The	   most	   reliable	   way	   to	   get	   those	   facts	   was	   to	   get	   them	   from	  trustworthy	  outside	  sources.’	  Helms,	  Here’s	  Where	  I	  Stand,	  208.	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important	  element	  of	  late	  twentieth	  century	  international	  politics.	  TANs,	  as	  defined	  by	  Margaret	  Keck	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink	  in	  their	  influential	  Activists	  
Beyond	  Borders,	   are	   ‘networks	   of	   activists,	   distinguishable	   largely	   by	   the	  centrality	   of	   principled	   ideas	   or	   values	   in	   motivating	   their	   formulation.’	  They	  include	  ‘relevant	  actors	  working	  internationally	  on	  an	  issue,	  who	  are	  bound	   together	   by	   shared	   values,	   a	   common	   discourse,	   and	   dense	  exchanges	   of	   information	   and	   services.’54	  Scholarship	   has	   pointed	   to	   the	  importance	   of	   such	   networks	   in	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   with	  Mathew	   Evangelista	   providing	   a	   particularly	   compelling	   account	   of	   the	  contribution	   such	   networks	   made	   to	   the	   peaceful	   conclusion	   of	   the	  conflict.55	  Part	   of	   the	   growing	   wave	   of	   transnational	   histories	   that	   have	  emerged	   in	   the	   past	   thirty	   years,	   such	   studies	   offer	   greater	   insight	   into	  what	   Chris	   Bayly	   has	   termed	   the	   ‘interpenetration’	   of	   ideas	   and	  resources.56	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Margaret	   Keck	   and	   Kathryn	   Sikkink,	   Activists	   Beyond	   Borders	   (Ithaca:	  Cornell	   University	   Press,	   1998),	   1-­‐2.	   See	   also,	   Sanjeev	  Khagram,	   James	  V.	  Riker,	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  eds.,	  Restructuring	  World	  Politics:	  Transnational	  
Social	   Movements,	   Networks,	   and	   Norms	   (Minneapolis:	   University	   of	  Minnesota	   Press,	   2002),	   	   Ann	  M.	   Florini,	   ed.,	  The	  Third	  Force:	  The	  Rise	  of	  
Transnational	  Civil	  Society	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Japan	  Center	  for	  International	  Exchange	   and	   Carnegie	   Endowment	   for	   International	   Peace,	   2000),	   and	  Thomas	   Risse,	   Stephen	   C.	   Ropp,	   and	   Kathryn	   Sikkink,	   eds.,	   The	   Power	   of	  
Human	   Rights:	   International	   Norms	   and	   Domestic	   Change	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  
55	  Matthew	   Evangelista,	   Unarmed	   Forces:	   The	   Transnational	   Movement	   to	  
End	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  
56	  C.	   A.	   Bayly,	   Sven	   Beckert,	   Matthew	   Connelly,	   Isabel	   Hofmeyr,	   Wendy	  Kozol,	   and	   Patricia	   Seed,	   “AHR	   Conversation:	   On	   Transnational	   History,”	  
The	   American	   Historical	   Review	   111,	   No.	   5	   (December,	   2006),	   1442.	   For	  more	  on	   transnational	  history	   as	   a	   field	  of	   study,	   see	  Laura	  Briggs,	  Glady	  McCormick,	   and	   J.	   T.	   Way,	   “Transnationalism:	   A	   Category	   of	   Analysis,”	  
American	   Quarterly	   60,	   No.	   3,	   Nation	   and	   Migration:	   Past	   and	   Future	  (September,	   2008):	   625-­‐648,	   Ian	   R.	   Tyrrell,	   Transnational	  Nation:	   United	  
States	   History	   in	   Global	   Perspective	   Since	   1789	   (Basingstoke:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2007),	  Alan	  McPherson,	  Intimate	  Ties,	  Bitter	  Struggles,	  111-­‐139,	  and	   Ian	   Tyrrell,	   “American	   Exceptionalism	   in	   an	   Age	   of	   International	  History,”	  The	  American	  Historical	  Review	  96,	  No.	  4	   (October,	  1991):	  1031-­‐1055.	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   The	  effectiveness	  with	  which	  Helms	  integrated	  into	  these	  networks	  suggests	   the	   importance	   of	   expansive	   definitions	   of	   transnational	  networks.	   As	   Khagram,	   Riker,	   and	   Sikkink	   note,	   transnational	   networks	  have	   been	   defined	   in	   both	   restrictive	   and	   more	   open	   terms.	   Restrictive	  frameworks	   reject	   the	   inclusion	   of	   state	   actors,	   drawing	   only	   NGOs	   and	  social	   movements	   into	   these	   networks. 57 	  More	   expansive	   approaches,	  however,	   argue	   that	   while	   these	   groups	   are	   the	   primary	   driving	   force	  behind	   transnational	   collective	   action,	   some	   elements	   of	   state	   and	  international	   organisations,	   as	   well	   as	   think	   tanks,	   corporations,	   and	  domestic	   interest	   groups,	   should	   also	   be	   included.58	  The	   latter	   group,	  dubbed	  ‘mixed	  actor	  coalitions’,	  provides	  a	  more	  productive	  framework	  for	  Helms’	   work.59	  In	   Central	   America,	   it	   was	   evident	   that	   anti-­‐communist	  conservatives	   relied	   on	   Helms	   for	   access	   in	   Washington,	   just	   as	   he	  depended	  on	  their	  local	  influence.	  As	  such,	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  exclude	  him	   from	   the	   network	   process.	   Like	   Daniel	   C.	   Thomas’	   suggestion	   that	  congressional	   actors	   represented	   a	   ‘network	   bastion’	   in	   the	   American	  human	  rights	  movement	  of	  the	  1970s,	  Helms	  was	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  later	  conservative	  networks.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  scholarship	  that	  restricts	  transnational	  networks	  to	  non-­‐government	  actors,	  see	  Ann	  Florini’s	  The	  Third	  Force.	  
58	  Sanjeev	  Khagram,	  James	  V.	  Riker,	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “From	  Santiago	  to	  Seattle:	   Transnational	   Advocacy	   Groups	   Restructuring	   World	   Politics”	   in	  Sanjeev	  Khagram,	   James	  V.	  Riker,	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  eds.,	  Restructuring	  
World	   Politics:	   Transnational	   Social	   Movements,	   Networks,	   and	   Norms	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2002),	  9-­‐10.	  
59 	  For	   more	   on	   these	   groups,	   see	   Timothy	   M.	   Shaw,	   “Overview	   –	  Global/Local:	   States,	   Companies	   and	   Civil	   Societies	   at	   the	   End	   of	   the	  Twentieth	   Century,”	   in	   Global	   Institutions	   and	   Local	   Empowerment:	  
Competing	   Theoretical	   Perspectives,	   ed.	   Kendall	   Stiles	   (New	   York:	   St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  2000):	  1-­‐8.	  
60	  Daniel	  C.	  Thomas,	  “Human	  Rights	  in	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy,”	  in	  Restructuring	  
World	  Politics:	  Transnational	  Social	  Movements,	  Networks,	  and	  Norms,	   eds.	  Sanjeev	   Khagram,	   James	   V.	   Riker,	   and	   Kathryn	   Sikkink	   (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2002),	  76-­‐78.	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Briggs,	  McCormick,	  and	  Way	  have	  noted	  that	  transnationalism	  reveals	  the	  nation	  as	  ‘a	  thing	  contested,	  interrupted,	  and	  always	  shot	  through	  with	  contradiction.’61	  Applying	  the	  framework	  to	  Helms’	   initiatives	  allows	  us	  to	  perceive	   of	   his	   work	   as	   a	   product	   and	   cause	   of	   these	   contradictions.	   In	  doing	   so,	   it	   suggests	   that	   apparently	   nationalistic	  movements	   like	  Helms’	  movement	   conservatism	   were	   capable	   of	   pursuing	   their	   agenda	   through	  transnational	  cooperation	  and	  advocacy.	  	  More	   work	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   done	   on	   such	   transnational	   conservative	  networks.	   In	   their	   description	   of	   transnational	   civil	   society,	   Florini	   and	  Simmons’	   describe	   its	   ‘currency’	   as	   ‘credible	   information	   and	   moral	  authority’,	  not	  force.62	  Given	  the	  overwhelming,	  almost	  exclusive,	   focus	  on	  transnational	  networks	  dedicated	  to	  liberal	  causes,	  scholars	  appear	  to	  have	  implicitly	   ignored	   the	   fact	   that	   credible	   information	   and	   moral	  righteousness	  were	   just	   as	   relevant	   to	   conservatives.	  What	  was	   the	   Cold	  War	   for	   conservatives,	   after	   all,	   if	   not	   a	   moral	   battle	   between	   a	   just,	  democratic	  west	   and	   a	   repressive,	   totalitarian	   communism?	  Moreover,	   as	  Helms’	  network	  shows,	   information	  was	  no	   less	  relevant	   to	  conservatives	  looking	  to	  secure	  a	  change	  in	  norms	  within	  U.S.	  administrations	  they	  saw	  as	  too	  wrapped	  up	  in	  the	  mantras	  of	  containment	  and	  détente.	  	  Nevertheless,	   while	   this	   project	   has	   sought	   to	   elaborate	   on	   Helms’	  network,	  it	  has	  not	  provided	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  connections	  the	   senator	   forged	   among	   Central	   American	   conservatives.	   The	   details	   of	  the	  reciprocal	  flows	  of	  information	  and	  influence	  are	  elusive,	  often	  closely	  protected	   by	   those	   who	   participated	   in	   such	   networks.	   As	   Rebecca	  Hersman	   notes	   in	   her	   own	   informative	   overview	   of	   the	   realities	   of	   the	  foreign	   policy	   process,	   informal	   power	   does	   not	   leave	   much	   of	   a	   paper	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Briggs,	  McCormick,	  and	  Way,	  “Transnationalism,”	  627.	  
62	  Ann	  M.	  Florini	  and	  P.	   J.	  Simmons,	  “What	  the	  World	  Needs	  Now?”	  in	  The	  
Third	   Force:	   The	   Rise	   of	   Transnational	   Civil	   Society,	   ed.	   Ann	   M.	   Florini	  (Washington,	   D.C.:	   Japan	   Center	   for	   International	   Exchange	   and	   Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  2000),	  11.	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trail.63	  Tantalising	   examples	   of	   the	   power	   of	   Helms’	   network	   crop	   up	  throughout	   this	  work,	   and	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	  evidence	  available	   that	   the	  network	  was	  important	  to	  his	  activities	  in	  the	  period.	  However,	  judging	  the	  extent	   of	   the	   network	   is	   a	   task	   yet	   to	   be	   fully	   accomplished	   and	   only	  suggestions,	  not	  definitive	  conclusions,	  are	  offered	  about	  the	  role	  of	   these	  connections	  in	  Helms’	  foreign	  policy.	  	   	   Such	   efforts	   were	   part	   of	   a	   much	   wider	   campaign	   of	  entrepreneurship,	   which	   Helms	   adopted	   as	   a	   means	   of	   gaining	   influence	  over	   policy.	   Different	   to	   congressional	   activism	   and	   assertiveness,	  entrepreneurship	  occurs	  when	  politicians	  take	  the	  initiative	  away	  from	  the	  executive	  branch.64	  This	  study	  takes	  Carter	  and	  Scott’s	  definition	  of	  a	  policy	  entrepreneur	   as	   a	   framework,	   one	   where	   members	   of	   Congress	   ‘seek	   to	  initiate	   action	   on	   the	   foreign	   policy	   issues	   about	   which	   they	   care	   rather	  than	  to	  await	  action	  from	  the	  administration.’65	  Such	  entrepreneurs	  look	  to	  either	   fill	  a	  policy	  vacuum	  or	  they	  seek	  to	  correct	  policy	  to	  their	   liking.	   In	  order	   to	   do	   so,	   they	   use	   a	   variety	   of	   means:	   legislation	   (e.g.	   drafting,	  introducing,	  co-­‐sponsoring	  of	  bills	  and	  amendments),	  roll	  call	  votes,	  policy	  research,	  travel,	  hearings,	  public	  forum,	  articles,	  letters,	  meetings,	  etc.66	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Rebecca	  K.	  C.	  Hersman,	  Friends	  and	  Foes:	  How	  Congress	  and	  the	  President	  
Really	  Make	  Foreign	  Policy	   (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Brookings	   Institution	  Press,	  2000),	  8. 
64	  Activism	  is	  defined	  as	  simply	  taking	  action	  on	  foreign	  policy	  issues,	  even	  if	   it	   is	   simply	   accepting	   an	   administration’s	   request.	   Assertiveness	   is	   the	  pursuit	   of	   policy	   change	   by	   opposing	   or	   altering	   an	   administration’s	  request.	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	   onus	   is	   on	   the	   administration	   to	   forge	   policy,	  before	  members	  of	  Congress	  make	  their	  impact.	  
65	  Ralph	   G.	   Carter	   and	   James	   M.	   Scott,	   Choosing	   to	   Lead:	   Understanding	  
Congressional	   Foreign	   Policy	   Entrepreneurs	   (Durham:	   Duke	   University	  Press,	  2009),	  21-­‐22.	  
66	  See	   David	   R.	   Mayhew,	   America’s	   Congress:	   Actions	   in	   the	   Public	   Sphere,	  
James	  Madison	  through	  Newt	  Gingrich	   (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000),	   Kingdon,	  Agendas,	   and	   Frank	   R.	   Baumgartner	   and	   Bryan	  D.	   Jones,	  
Agendas	  and	  Instability	  in	  American	  Politics	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1993).	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  For	  example,	  Helms	  used	  roll	  call	  votes	  as	  a	  means	  of	  shaping	  political	  narratives	   and	   defining	   friends	   and	   enemies.	   The	   senator	   dismissed	   the	  contextual	   nuances	   of	   votes,	   where	   a	   senator’s	   preferences	   may	   not	  actually	   be	   reflected	   in	   their	   yea	   or	   nay	   vote.	   Instead,	   Helms	   construed	  votes	  as	  definitive	  and	  permanent	  expressions	  of	  policy	  preference.	  Those	  who	   voted	   for	   aid	   to	   Sandinista	   Nicaragua	   in	   1979	   were	   labelled	   pro-­‐Sandinista	   throughout	   the	   1980s,	   while	   senators	  who	   voted	   to	   ratify	   the	  Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   were	   permanently	   described	   as	   capitulators	   to	  Third	   World	   blackmail.	   Such	   narratives	   became	   ingrained	   in	   the	  conservative	  press,	  where	  Helms’	  ability	  to	  put	  his	  colleagues	  in	  restrictive	  policy	   boxes	   helped	   movement	   conservatives	   identify	   both	   allies	   and	  adversaries	   over	   Central	   American	   policy.	   In	   doing	   so,	   Helms	   and	  conservatives	   replicated	   earlier	   liberal	   vote-­‐monitoring	   efforts	   by	   such	  groups	   as	   Americans	   for	   Democratic	   Action	   (ADA),	   who	   had	   used	  congressional	  roll	  call	  votes	  as	  an	  instrument	  by	  which	  to	  assess	  legislators	  since	  the	  1940s.	  	   Helms’	   entrepreneurship	   should	   be	   placed	   within	   the	   context	   of	   a	  long-­‐line	  of	  senatorial	  independence.	  Robert	  David	  Johnson’s	  Congress	  and	  
the	   Cold	  War	   astutely	   points	   out	   the	   historical	   role	   played	   by	   individual	  senators	   in	   articulating	   opposition	   to	   executive	   dominance	   of	   foreign	  policy.	   In	  the	  1970s,	   it	  had	  been	  Steve	  Symington	  who	  had	  revolutionised	  the	  legislative	  challenge	  to	  the	  White	  House	  as	  a	  member	  of	  both	  the	  Senate	  Armed	   Services	   Committee	   and	   the	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee,	   while	  other	   new	   institutionalists	   such	   as	   Ted	   Kennedy	   focused	   attention	   on	  human	   rights	   violations	   committed	   by	   U.S.	   allies	   like	   Chile	   and	   Turkey.	  Earlier,	   Claude	   Pepper	   had	   led	   congressional	   liberals	   in	   opposing	   the	  Truman	   Doctrine	   and	   its	   assistance	   for	   non-­‐democratic	   regimes,	   such	   as	  Greece,	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	  World	  War	   II.	   Even	   further	   back,	   to	   the	   early	  twentieth	   century,	   when	   Congress	  was	   pivotal	   in	   rejecting	   the	   League	   of	  Nations	  and	  forcing	  the	  Wilson	  administration	  to	  shelve	  its	  plans	  to	  deploy	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troops	   in	   revolutionary	   Russia,	   individual	   lawmakers	   had	   mounted	   a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  the	  White	  House	  over	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  world.67	  	  Indeed,	  while	  Johnson	  sees	  such	  a	  historical	  line	  terminating	  in	  1985	  with	   the	   repeal	  of	   the	  Clark	  amendment	  –	  which	  prohibited	  assistance	   to	  anti-­‐communist	  paramilitary	  groups	  in	  Angola	  since	  1976	  –	  Helms’	  record	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  to	  the	  early	  1990s	  indicates	  a	  degree	  of	  continuity.	  The	  senator’s	   challenging	   of	   the	   Reagan	   and	   Bush	   administrations	   over	   their	  Central	  America	  policies,	  and	  his	  noticeable	  success	  in	  both	  Nicaragua	  and	  Panama,	   suggests	   in	   Helms	   there	   is	   a	   lengthier	   line	   of	   senatorial	  independents	  than	  Johnson	  credits.	  	  Helms’	   entrepreneurship	   and	   his	   promotion	   of	   conservative	   foreign	  policy	   raise	   questions	   about	   the	   role	   of	   Congress	   in	   shaping	   Cold	   War	  foreign	   policy.	   It	   is	   a	   contentious	   issue	   among	   scholars.	   Much	   has	   been	  written	   supporting	   the	   view	   of	   an	   assertive	   post-­‐Vietnam	   Congress,	   in	  which	  the	  imperial	  presidency	  was	  challenged	  –	  successfully	  –	   in	  the	  field	  of	   foreign	   policy.	   New	   Institutionalists	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s	  pointed	  to	  the	  growing	  tendency	  for	  the	  legislative	  branch	  to	  exert	  control	  over	   the	   bureaucracy	   of	   foreign	   policy	   –	   for	   example,	   through	   reporting	  mechanisms	  and	  oversight	  procedures.68	  More	  recently,	  Johnson	  painted	  a	  picture	  of	  lawmakers	  intimately	  involved	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  helped	   by	   the	   growing	   influence	   of	   committee	   and	   subcommittee	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67 	  Robert	   David	   Johnson,	   Congress	   and	   the	   Cold	   War	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  xv-­‐xxi.	  
68	  For	   literature	  on	  new	  institutionalism,	  see	  James	  M.	  Lindsay,	  “Congress,	  Foreign	   Policy,	   and	   the	   New	   Institutionalism,”	   International	   Studies	  Quarterly	   38,	   No.	   2	   (June,	   1994):	   281-­‐304,	   Randall	   L.	   Calvert,	  Mathew	  D.	  McCubbins	   and	   Barry	   R.	   Weingast,	   “A	   Theory	   of	   Political	   Control	   and	  Agency	  Discretion,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  33,	  No.	  3	  (August,	  1989):	   588-­‐611,	   and	   Mathew	   D.	   McCubbins	   and	   Thomas	   Schwartz,	  “Congressional	   Oversight	   Overlooked:	   Police	   Patrols	   versus	   Fire	   Alarms,”	  
American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  28,	  No.	  1	  (February,	  1984):	  165-­‐179.	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chairpersons	   and	   ranking	   members	   who	   exerted	   substantial	   leverage	  through	  their	  control	  of	  hearings	  and	  legislative	  procedure.69	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   are	   those,	  most	   notably	   Barbara	  Hinckley,	  who	   see	   a	   foreign	   policy	   contest	   between	   executive	   and	   legislative	  branches	  as	  a	  myth,	  but	  one	  perpetuated	  by	  both	  sides	  because	  it	  is	  in	  their	  shared	  interest	  to	  appear	  active	  and	  engaged	  in	  debate.	  Hinckley	  sees	  both	  the	  press	  and	  the	  public	  as	  ‘co-­‐dependents’	  in	  this	  symbolic	  struggle,	  ‘very	  willing	   consumers	   of	   this	   symbolism.’70	  Hinckley	   is	   especially	   critical	   of	  those	  who	  see	  a	  widely	  contested	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  in	  the	  Reagan	  era,	  and	   blames	   the	   intense	   focus	   –	   by	   both	   Congress	   and	   the	   president	   –	   on	  disagreement	   over	   Nicaragua	   for	   giving	   the	   impression	   of	   a	  much	  wider	  debate.	   ‘Ignoring	   the	   forest,’	   Hinckley	   argues,	   ‘people	   gathered	   in	  fascination	   around	   one	   tree.’ 71 	  Yet	   even	   in	   Nicaragua,	   the	   consistent	  inability	  and	  unwillingness	  of	  apparently	  outraged	  oversight	  committees	  to	  effectively	   discipline	   the	   administration	   for	   bypassing	   the	   law	   in	   its	  secretive	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  operations	  revealed	  the	  hollowness	  of	  this	  heated	  debate.	  	  Helms’	   record	   is	   important	   because	   it	   straddles	   the	   bridge	   between	  these	   two	   conflicting	   perceptions	   of	   Congress	   and	   foreign	   policy	   after	  Vietnam.	   Certainly	   Helms	   faced	   many	   obstacles	   in	   imparting	   meaningful	  change	  on	  foreign	  policy,	  not	  least	  a	  long-­‐term	  bureaucratic	  momentum	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Johnson,	   Congress	   and	   the	   Cold	   War,	   xvii.	   One	   of	   the	   first	   to	   see	   a	  congressional	  activism	  over	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  1980s	  was	  Abraham	  Lowenthal,	  who	   noted	   aid	   to	   El	   Salvador,	   human	   rights	   certification,	   and	  licensing	   of	   Radio	   Martí	   were	   all	   indications	   of	   legislative	   influence.	   See	  Abraham	   F.	   Lowenthal,	   “Ronald	   Reagan	   and	   Latin	   America:	   Coping	   with	  Hegemony	   in	   Decline,”	   Eagle	   Defiant:	   United	   States	   Foreign	   Policy	   in	   the	  
1980s,	  eds.	  Kenneth	  A.	  Oye,	  Robert	  J.	  Lieber,	  and	  Donald	  Rothchild	  (Boston:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1983),	  323.	  
70	  Barbara	  Hinckley,	  Less	  Than	  Meets	  the	  Eye:	  Foreign	  Policy	  Making	  and	  the	  
Myth	  of	  the	  Assertive	  Congress	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994),	  193.	  
71	  Hinckley,	  Less	  Than	  Meets	  the	  Eye,	  153.	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favour	   of	   several	   policy	   agendas	   in	   Central	   America.72	  Nor	   was	   Helms	  emblematic	   of	   an	   endless	   stream	   of	   congressional	   entrepreneurs	   or	  institutional	   activists	   that	   consistently	   and	   successfully	   battled	   the	  executive.	  Carter	  and	  Scott	  find	  Helms	  is	  unique	  in	  their	  data	  analysis:	  the	  most	  prolific	  policy	  entrepreneur	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.73	  Hinckley	  is	  right	  to	   caution	   against	   drawing	   overly	   generalised	   conclusions	   from	   such	  distinctive	  examples.	  	  	   Yet	   it	   is	   nevertheless	   the	   case	   that	   those	   who	   deny	   both	   the	  influence	   of	   individual	   legislators	   and	   a	   bolder	   Congress	   in	   the	   late	   Cold	  War	  ignore	  those,	  like	  Helms,	  who	  did	  successfully	  challenge	  the	  executive	  branch	  on	  its	  international	  agenda.	  The	  senator’s	  use	  of	  the	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	   Committee	   and	   Western	   Hemisphere	   Subcommittee	   to	   frame	  particularly	  important	  matters	  pushed	  certain	  themes	  to	  the	  front	  of	  policy,	  and	  his	  network	  of	  contacts	  allowed	  a	  degree	  of	  independence	  from	  official	  accounts	   and	  administration-­‐filtered	   reports.	  Working	  with	   congressional	  allies,	   friends	   spread	   throughout	   the	  U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   bureaucracy,	   and	  partners	  across	  the	  western	  hemisphere,	  the	  senator	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  fragmented	  nature	  of	   foreign	  policy-­‐making	   to	  exert	  meaningful	   influence	  on	  many	  occasions.	  Rebecca	  Hersman	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘policy	  is	  driven	  more	  by	  like-­‐minded	  individuals	  than	  by	  disciplined	  organizations,	  conflict	  is	   as	  much	   intrainstitutional	   as	   it	   is	   interinstitutional,	   and	   issue	   loyalties	  often	  outweigh	  partisan	  ties	  or	  institutional	  allegiances.’74	  Helms’	  record	  is	  an	  important	  indicator	  of	  the	  accuracy	  of	  this	  assessment.	  	  William	   Schneider,	   in	   assessing	   the	   first	   two	   years	   of	   the	   Reagan	  administration’s	   international	   agenda,	   noted	   conservative	   activist	   Midge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  For	   more	   on	   this	   idea	   of	   bureaucratic	   momentum,	   see	   Irvin	   Destler,	  Leslie	   Gelb,	   and	   Anthony	   Lake,	   Our	   Own	  Worst	   Enemy:	   The	   Unmaking	   of	  
American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1984).	  	  
73	  Carter	  and	  Scott,	  Choosing	  to	  Lead,	  186.	  
74 Hersman,	  Friends	  and	  Foes,	  4. 
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Decter’s	  early	  1981	  complaint	  that	  the	  president	  “seems	  to	  be	  pursuing	  the	  same	  old	  policy	  of	  détente…	  and	  I	   think	   if	  Reagan	  were	  not	   in	  office	  now,	  he’d	   be	   leading	   the	   opposition.”	   Such	   a	   sentiment	   was	   ‘inevitable’,	  according	  to	  Schneider.	  Ideology,	  he	  claimed,	  rarely	  survives	  the	  challenge	  of	   actually	   governing.75	  The	   question	   for	   Helms,	   in	   his	   policies	   toward	  Central	   America,	   was	   whether	   he	   could	   sustain	   ideology,	   as	   modern	  American	   conservatism	   rose	   to	   power	   and	   the	   realities	   of	   government	   in	  the	  late	  Cold	  War.	  	  Methodology	  and	  Sources	  	  In	   researching	   Helms,	   Central	   America,	   and	   conservative	   foreign	  policy,	   several	   collections	   of	   source	   material	   were	   consulted.	   These	  included	   legislative	   and	   executive	   branch	   documentation,	   national	   daily	  newspapers,	   conservative	   periodicals,	   published	   autobiographical	  accounts,	   and	   several	   interviews	   –	   some	   conducted	   by	   the	   author,	   with	  others	   taken	   from	  oral	   history	   archives.	   Together,	   they	   illuminate	  Helms’	  record,	   not	   only	   as	   a	   foreign	   policy	   entrepreneur,	   but	   also	   as	   one	   of	   the	  multitude	   of	   competing	   voices	   of	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	   in	   the	   late	  Cold	  War.	  	  Senator	  Helms	  was	  a	  prolific	  speaker	  in	  the	  Senate,	  and	  his	  comments	  on	  Central	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  were	   frequent	  and	  extensive.	  As	   such,	   the	  richest	  historical	   record	  of	  his	  positions	  on	   foreign	  policy	   in	   the	   late	  Cold	  War	  are	  found	  in	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  and	  transcripts	  of	  congressional	  committee	   hearings	   in	   which	   Helms	   took	   part.	   For	   this	   thesis,	   using	  keyword	  searches	  and	   the	  Record’s	   electronic	   index,	   every	   statement	  and	  item	   of	   legislation	   concerning	   El	   Salvador,	   Nicaragua,	   and	   Panama	   that	  Helms	   introduced	   was	   catalogued	   and	   examined.	   Relevant	   Senate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75 	  William	   Schneider,	   “Conservatism,	   Not	   Interventionism:	   Trends	   in	  Foreign	  Policy	  Opinion,	  1974-­‐1982,”	  in	  Eagle	  Defiant:	  United	  States	  Foreign	  
Policy	   in	   the	   1980s,	   eds.	   Kenneth	   A.	   Oye,	   Robert	   J.	   Lieber,	   and	   Donald	  Rothchild	  (Boston:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1983),	  33.	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committee	   hearings,	   most	   notably	   those	   of	   the	   Senate	   Foreign	   Relations	  Committee	   and	  Western	  Hemisphere	   Subcommittee,	  were	   also	   consulted.	  Finally,	   Helms’	   responses	   to	   his	   colleagues’	   speeches	   and	   legislation	  pertinent	   to	   Central	   America	   were	   scrutinized.	   This	   built	   up	   a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  senator’s	  enduring	  attitudes	  to	  the	  region,	  as	  well	   as	   his	  more	   immediate	   responses	   to	   specific	   events.	   At	   the	   same	  time,	   given	   the	   fractured	   congressional	   landscape	   concerning	   foreign	  policy,	   it	  also	  revealed	  the	  contours	  of	  debate	  among	  conservatives	   in	  the	  Senate	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  movement’s	  foreign	  policy.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   –	   the	   daily	  account	   of	   the	   legislative	   branch’s	   proceedings	   –	   is	   made	   available	   to	  lawmakers	   (and	   their	   staff)	   so	   that	   they	  may	   edit	   their	   remarks	   prior	   to	  publication	  the	  following	  day.	  Thus,	  the	  Record	   is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  verbatim	  transcript	  of	  Helms’	  views,	  or	  of	  congressional	  discussion	  more	  generally.	  While	  keeping	  this	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  the	  case	  that	  what	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Record	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  clearest	  statements	  of	  intent	  provided	  by	  Helms.	  Given	  his	  oft-­‐expressed	  desire	   to	   construct	  a	  permanent	   record	  of	  his	   views	   on	   conservative	   foreign	   policy,	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   is	   the	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  that	  record.	  	  Executive	  branch	  records	  were	  consulted	  at	  the	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  and	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  presidential	  libraries,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  the	  declassified	   collections	   made	   available	   by	   the	   Digital	   National	   Security	  
Archive.	  Material	  at	  the	  presidential	  libraries	  permitted	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  relationships	  between	  Helms	  and	  government	  officials	  –	  whether	  employed	  at	   the	  White	  House	   itself,	  or	   the	  multitude	  of	  agencies	   involved	   in	   foreign	  policy	   –	   and	  helped	   to	   sketch	  out	   the	  networks	  within	  which	   the	   senator	  operated	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   It	   also	   highlighted	   Helms’	   more	   guarded	  insights	   into	   foreign	   policy	   and	   conservatives	   with	   whom	   he	   interacted	  over	  Central	  America,	  given	  that	  much	  of	  the	  correspondence	  between	  the	  senator	  and	  the	  executive	  branch	  was	  not	  aimed	  at	  public	  consumption	  at	  the	  time.	  Finally,	  given	  the	  propensity	  for	  grassroots	  conservative	  groups	  to	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correspond	   with	   the	   White	   House,	   especially	   during	   the	   Reagan	  administration,	  reaction	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  right’s	  international	  agenda	  from	  among	  local,	  less	  high-­‐profile	  conservative	  elements	  can	  be	  located	  in	  the	  presidential	  archives.	  	  The	  Digital	  National	  Security	  Archive,	  which	  has	  individual	  collections	  of	  declassified	  U.S.	  government	  material	  relating	  to	  El	  Salvador,	  Nicaragua,	  and	   Iran-­‐Contra,	   provided	   large	   quantities	   of	   the	   State	   Department	   cable	  traffic	   between	   officials	   in	   Central	   America	   and	   their	   colleagues	   in	  Washington	   D.C.	   Such	   correspondence	   was	   critical	   in	   ascertaining	   when,	  where,	  and	  how	  Helms	  –	  or	  those	  associated	  with	  him	  –	  impacted	  the	  work	  of	   government	   personnel	   on	   the	   ground.	   It	   also	   provided	   an	   insight	   into	  perceptions	   of	   the	   senator	   and	   his	   conservative	   allies	   among	   American	  officials	   and	   regional	   political	   elements.	   The	   networks	   of	   activists	  within	  which	  Helms	  worked	   are	   often	   difficult	   to	   lay	   out	   in	   concrete	   terms,	   but	  given	   that	   State	   Department	   officials	   on	   the	   ground	   in	   Central	   America	  were	   often	   the	   most	   likely	   to	   identify	   pro-­‐Helms	   elements	   among	   local	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  groups,	  the	  lines	  between	  the	  senator	  and	  his	  allies	   in	   the	   region	   are	   made	   more	   tangible	   through	   examining	   these	  sources.	  	  	  Major	  daily	  American	  national	  newspapers,	   including	  The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  Washington	  Post,	   and	   the	   Chicago	  Tribune,	   were	   also	   consulted	   at	  length.	  These	  papers	  played	  a	  considerable	  role	  in	  uncovering	  many	  of	  the	  details	   of	   Central	   America	   policy	   in	   the	   period,	   not	   only	   because	   of	   their	  substantial	  resources	  in	  Washington	  D.C.,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  dispatched	  correspondents	  to	  the	  region	  itself.	  In	  a	  region	  where	  American	  policy	  was	  often	  conducted	  under	  a	  cloak	  of	  secrecy,	  it	  was	  these	  reporters	  –	  many	  of	  whom	  received	  praise	  and	  awards	  for	  their	  reporting	  –	  who	  uncovered	  the	  often-­‐clandestine	  details	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  Helms’	  staff	  was	  adept	  at	   using	   the	   press	   to	   further	   their	   own	   goals,	   and,	   unlike	   the	   senator	  himself,	  often	  spoke	  candidly	   to	  reporters	  about	   the	  goals	  of	  conservative	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  methods	  they	  used	  in	  pursuit	  of	  those	  goals.	  Finally,	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in	   the	   battle	   between	   conservatives	   over	   their	   international	   agenda,	  especially	   during	   the	   Reagan	   administration,	   leaks	   to	   the	   press	   were	  regarded	  by	  many	  in	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  politics	  as	  an	  effective	  method	  for	  gaining	   an	   upper	   hand	   over	   policy	   rivals.	   Intra-­‐conservative	   dissent	   was	  often	  played	  out	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  the	  American	  national	  media.	  	  A	   number	   of	   specifically	   conservative	   media	   collections	   were	   also	  examined.	  The	   two	  principle	  collections	  were	  Human	  Events	   and	  National	  
Review.	   These	   two	   publications,	   as	   the	   dominant	   conservative	   media	  institutions	   of	   the	   period,	   were	   critical	   in	   assessing	   how	   conservatives	  consumed	   and	   transmitted	   their	   ideas	   and	   policy	   suggestions.	   They	  brought	  together	  key	  intellectual	  and	  political	  leaders	  among	  the	  right	  and	  provided	   a	   platform	   for	   their	   views,	   while	   also	   offering	   grassroots	  conservatives	   an	   opportunity	   to	   express	   their	   opinions	   through	   letters’	  pages.	   Indeed,	   conservative	   periodicals	   were	   specifically	   chosen	   because	  they	  helped	  illuminate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Helms’	  attitudes	  resonated	  with	  conservatives	  outside	  the	  high-­‐political	  groups	  he	  often	  associated	  with.	  	  Several	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   for	   this	   project.	   Those	  interviewed	   included	   members	   of	   Congress	   from	   the	   period,	   executive	  branch	  officials,	  and	  congressional	  staffers.	   	  Other	  requests	  for	  interviews,	  including	  those	  sent	  to	  Senator	  Helms’	  aides,	  were	  politely	  declined	  or	  not	  returned.	   Those	   interviewed	   were	   generous	   with	   their	   time	   and	  knowledge,	  but	  often,	  owing	  to	  the	  years	  that	  have	  passed,	  specific	  details	  about	  Helms	  or	  policy	  were	  not	  always	  readily	  forthcoming.	  Nevertheless,	  the	   material	   gathered	   provided	   specific	   details	   in	   several	   instances	   and,	  more	   generally,	   was	   incredibly	   useful	   as	   background	   context	   for	   the	  project.	   The	   Association	   for	   Diplomatic	   Studies	   and	   Training	   oral	   history	  collection	  was	  used	  more	  extensively,	  given	   its	  rich	   first-­‐hand	  accounts	  of	  foreign	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   and	   implementation.	   These	   oral	   histories	  were	  invaluable	  in	  piecing	  together	  the	  network	  of	  contacts	  that	  operated	  in	   pursuit	   of	   conservative	   policy,	   as	   many	   members	   of	   these	   groups	   –	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including	   several	   close	  associates	  of	  Helms	  –	  were	   interviewed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  association’s	  project.	  	  Finally,	   it	  must	   be	  noted	   that	  material	   contained	   at	   the	   Jesse	  Helms	  Center	   in	   Wingate,	   North	   Carolina,	   was	   unavailable	   during	   the	   research	  window	  for	  this	  thesis.	  The	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  senator’s	  papers	  that	  the	  Helms	   Center	   has	   undertaken	   will	   no	   doubt	   prove	   highly	   beneficial	   to	  future	   scholars	   of	   Helms,	   North	   Carolina	   politics,	   and	   modern	  conservatism.	  For	  this	  thesis,	  however,	  access	  to	  the	  Helms	  Center’s	  papers	  was	  not	  critical.	  Consultation	  with	   those	  who	  have	  examined	  the	  archives	  in	   the	   past	   revealed	   that	   foreign	   policy	   material	   was	   not	   especially	  prevalent	   among	   the	   collections	   available.	   Moreover,	   the	   range	   of	   other	  available	  sources	  meant	  that	  building	  up	  a	  picture	  of	  Helms’	  worldview,	  his	  policy	  influence,	  and	  his	  relationships	  with	  other	  policy	  actors	  was	  possible	  without	   the	   Helms	   Center	   archives.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   accessing	   the	  senator’s	   papers	   would	   not	   have	   been	   helpful	   or	   interesting,	   but	   the	  breadth	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  collections	  made	  up	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  the	  senator’s	  personal	  papers.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  sources	  outlined	  here	  reflect	  the	  circles	  within	  which	  Helms	  worked	   in	  pursuit	  of	  his	   goals.	  They	  are	  predominantly	   concerned	  with	  “high”	  or	  “elite”	  level	  politics	  because	  this	  is	  the	  arena	  in	  which	  Helms	  tended	  to	  work	  most	  publicly	  –	  whether	  attempting	  to	  influence	  how	  policy	  was	  articulated	  or	  how	  it	  was	  actually	  implemented.	  Where	  Helms	  and	  his	  associated	  worked	   less	  openly,	   such	  as	   in	   the	  network	  of	   contacts	   spread	  across	  Central	  America,	  the	  ties	  that	  bound	  these	  conservatives	  were	  more	  informal,	  and	  have	  appeared	  to	  produce	  little	  as	  a	  documentary	  trail.	  	   Chapter	  Outline	  	   This	  thesis	  is	  split	  into	  five	  chapters,	  covering	  El	  Salvador,	  Nicaragua,	  and	  Panama	  between	  the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1990s.	  Though	  each	  can	  be	  seen	  as	   a	   specific	   case	   study	   in	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	   agendas	   and	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congressional	   entrepreneurship,	   they	   are	   designed	   to	   be	   read	   together.	  Critical	   themes	   of	   Helms’	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	   –	   democracy	  promotion,	  free-­‐market	  solutions,	  militarised	  anti-­‐communism,	  opposition	  to	   drug	   trafficking	   –	   permeate	   all,	   with	   such	   linkages	   reinforced	   by	   the	  transnational	   nature	   of	   Central	   American	   conflict	   in	   these	   years.	   Taken	  together,	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  consistency	  of	  the	  senator’s	  foreign	   policy	   ideology	   –	   even	   as	   his	   tactics	   evolved	   as	   the	  United	   States	  transitioned	  to	  a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  environment.	  	  Chapter	  one	  examines	  Jesse	  Helms’	  first	  point	  of	  contact	  with	  Central	  America:	  Panama,	  and,	  specifically,	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties.	  It	  illustrates	  how,	  between	  his	  swearing	   in	  as	  a	  senator	   in	  1973	  and	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Carter-­‐Torrijos	  agreements	  in	  1978,	  Helms	  helped	  mould	  and	  sustain	  a	  conservative	   opposition	   dedicated	   to	   rejecting	   any	   transfer	   of	   the	  waterway	  to	  the	  Panamanian	  government.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  senator	  revealed	  the	   tensions	  among	  Republicans	  and	  conservatives	  over	  how	  to	  approach	  international	   affairs	   in	   the	   1970s,	   as	   both	   presidents	   Richard	   Nixon	   and	  Gerald	  Ford	  both	  committed	  the	  United	  States	  to	  new	  Canal	  treaties	  and	  a	  wider	  détente	  strategy.	  	  Chapter	   two	   focuses	   on	   Helms	   and	   Nicaragua	   in	   the	   years	   1979	   to	  1985.	   It	   suggests	   that	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   owed	   its	   existence	   in	   this	  country	  to	  the	  work	  of	  a	  small,	  secretive	  network	  of	  conservative	  activists	  spread	   throughout	   the	   hemisphere	   that	   had	   begun	   to	   develop	   both	   a	  framing	   narrative	   and	   instruments	   of	   implementation	   before	   Ronald	  Reagan	   set	   foot	   in	   the	   White	   House.	   Helms	   and	   his	   staff	   formed	   an	  important	   part	   of	   this	   network,	   building	   early	  momentum	   for	   the	   Contra	  campaign	   that	   ultimately	   defined	   the	   Reagan	   administration’s	   Nicaragua	  policy.	  	  Chapter	   three	   looks	   at	   the	   senator’s	   engagement	   with	   El	   Salvador,	  from	  the	  breakdown	  of	   the	  country’s	  military	   junta	   in	  1979	   to	   the	  United	  Nations-­‐brokered	   peace	   accords	   in	   the	   early	   1990s.	   It	   indicates	   that	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conservative	  unity	   over	  Central	  America,	   seen	   in	   the	  widespread	   support	  for	  the	  Contras	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  opposition	  to	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties,	  did	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  story.	  Movement	  conservatives,	  led	  by	  Helms,	  openly	  broke	  with	  President	  Reagan	  over	   the	  war	   in	  El	  Salvador.	  Despite	   this,	   at	  various	  times,	  Helms’	  relationship	  with	  the	  Salvadoran	  right	  was	  useful	  to	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  in	  exerting	  pressure	  on	  those	  who	  threatened	  to	  escalate	  the	  country’s	  already	  bitter	  conflict.	  	  	   Chapter	  four	  returns	  to	  Nicaragua,	  looking	  at	  how	  the	  senator	  coped	  with	  the	  dramatic	  collapse	  of	  Contra	  policy	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandals,	  the	  Esquipulas	  peace	  accords,	  and	  the	  1990	  election	  defeat	  for	  the	  Sandinistas.	   After	   1986,	   Helms	   and	   movement	   conservatives	   found	  themselves	  progressively	  marginalised	  as	  momentum	  increased	  behind	  the	  regional	  peace	  process.	  As	  with	  El	  Salvador,	   this	  period	   reveals	   strains	   in	  the	  conservative	  movement’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  as	   the	  president	   reluctantly	  embraced	   the	  Esquipulas	  peace	  process.	  This	  chapter	   also	   highlights	   the	   endurance	   of	   conservative	   Cold	   War	   foreign	  policy	  thinking,	  as	  Helms	  maintained	  –	  and	  reinvigorated	  –	  his	  opposition	  to	  the	  Sandinistas	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  their	  1990	  election	  defeat.	  	  Chapter	  five	  also	  returns	  to	  a	  previously-­‐examined	  location,	  this	  time	  Panama.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  period	  in	  which	  Manuel	  Noriega	  occupied	  power	  in	   that	   country,	   the	   chapter	   suggests	   that	   Helms	   was	   capable	   of	  collaborative	  politics,	  even	  with	  those	  with	  whom	  he	  had	  profound	  political	  disagreements.	   It	   outlines	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   Helms	   drew	   upon	   the	  threat	   of	   international	   drug	   trafficking	   and	   the	   United	   States’	   growing	  commitment	  to	  democracy	  promotion	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  an	  anti-­‐Noriega	  coalition	   in	   the	   Senate	   that	   spanned	   the	   ideological	   spectrum.	   However,	  Helms	   never	   deviated	   from	   a	   conservative	   framework	   for	   opposing	  Noriega,	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   lingered	   in	   the	  background,	   behind	   his	   broader	   criticisms	   of	   both	   the	   Reagan	   and	   Bush	  administrations.	  While	  many	  saw	  Operation	  Just	  Cause	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  Noriega	   as	   a	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   intervention,	   Helms	   and	   the	   movement	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conservative	  community	  celebrated	  the	  invasion	  of	  Panama	  as	  a	  definitive	  Cold	  War	  victory.	  	  The	   thesis	   concludes	  with	   an	  overview	  of	  Helms’	   policies	   in	  Central	  America,	   and	   suggests	   directions	   for	   future	   research.	   In	   doing	   so	   it	   will	  summarise	   why,	   to	   conservatives,	   Helms’	   foreign	   policies	   made	   him	   ‘the	  most	  important	  conservative	  of	  the	  last	  25	  years’	  alongside	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  but	  why	  his	  adversaries	  believed	  the	  senator	  ‘did	  more	  harm	  to	  America's	  national	   security	   than	   any	   other	   member	   of	   government	   in	   the	   20th	  century.’76	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Fred	   Barnes,	   “The	   Ascendency	   of	   Jesse	   Helms,”	   Weekly	   Standard,	   11	  August,	   1997,	  http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Protected/Articles/000/000/008/585mqmat.asp,	   accessed,	   22	   June,	   2014,	   and	   author’s	   correspondence	  with	  Robert	  Pastor,	  March,	  2012.	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Panama,	  1972-­‐1981	  	  	   ‘There	  is	  no	  one	  in	  the	  Senate	  who	  has	  worked	  harder	  or	  done	  more	  against	  giving	  away	  this	  canal	  than	  the	  able	  Senator	  from	  North	  Carolina	  (Mr.	  HELMS).’	  –	  Sen.	  Strom	  Thurmond,	  7	  March,	  1978.77	  	  	   That	   Panama,	   and	   the	   Canal	   that	   runs	   through	   it,	   dominated	   Jesse	  Helms’	   first	   foray	   into	   Central	   America	   policy	   in	   the	   1970s	   was	   not	   a	  surprise.	   The	   1977	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties,	   signed	   by	   President	   Jimmy	  Carter	   and	   General	   Omar	   Torrijos,	   Panama’s	   charismatic	   caudillo	   leader,	  were	  a	  watershed	  moment	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  right.	  The	  agreements	  –	   one	   guaranteeing	   the	   neutrality	   of	   the	   waterway,	   and	   the	   right	   of	   the	  United	  States	  to	  defend	  that	  neutrality,	  and	  a	  second	  declaring	  that	  Panama	  would	   take	   control	   of	   the	   Canal	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1999	   –	   invigorated	   the	  conservative	   community	   as	   its	  members	  mounted	   an	   all-­‐out	   campaign	   to	  prevent	   what	   they	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   surrender	   of	   one	   of	   the	   United	  States’	  most	  treasured,	  and	  most	  strategically	  important,	  possessions.	  	  It	   is	  widely	   argued	   in	   scholarship	  on	   the	  post-­‐war	   right,	   and	  on	   the	  Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   themselves,	   that	   the	   critical	   stage	   of	   this	  mobilisation	  occurred	  during	  1977	   and	  1978,	  when	   conservatives	   sought	  to	  persuade	  senators	  to	  block	  ratification	  of	  the	  treaties	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  assault	   on	   Carter’s	   moralistic	   reordering	   of	   American	   policy	   abroad.78	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Strom	   Thurmond	   (SC),	   “Treaty	   Concerning	   The	   Permanent	   Neutrality	  And	  Operation	  Of	  The	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  124	  (1978),	  5779.	  
78 	  The	   ratification	   debate	   takes	   centre	   stage	   in	   Zelizer,	   Arsenal	   of	  
Democracy,	  278-­‐280,	  Adam	  Clymer,	  Drawing	  the	  Line	  at	  the	  Big	  Ditch:	  The	  
Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   and	   the	   Rise	   of	   the	   Right	   (Lawrence:	   University	  Press	   of	   Kansas,	   2008),	   David	   Skidmore,	   “Foreign	   Policy	   Interest	   Groups	  and	   Presidential	   Power:	   Jimmy	   Carter	   and	   the	   Battle	   over	   Ratification	   of	  the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties,”	   Presidential	   Studies	  Quarterly	   23,	   No.	   3,	   The	  Domestic	   and	   Foreign	   Policy	   Presidencies	   (Summer,	   1993):	   477-­‐497,	  Robert	   A.	   Strong,	   “Jimmy	   Carter	   and	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties,”	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Laura	  Kalman,	  who	   recognised	   longer-­‐term	   factors	  behind	   the	   rise	  of	   the	  right	   in	   this	   period,	   still	   tends	   only	   to	   look	   back	   to	   the	   bitter	   intra-­‐Republican	   struggle	   between	   supporters	   of	   President	   Gerald	   Ford	   and	  Ronald	   Reagan	   during	   the	   fight	   to	   secure	   the	   party’s	   presidential	  nomination	  in	  1975	  and	  1976.79	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  Helms’	  opposition	  to	   the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties,	  which	  began	  almost	   as	   soon	  as	  he	   entered	  the	   Senate	   in	   January	   1973,	   underscores	   longer-­‐term	   foundations	   to	   this	  chauvinistic	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	   vision	   toward	   Panama	   and	   the	  world.	   Rather	   than	   emerging	   as	   a	   response	   to	   Jimmy	   Carter’s	   moralistic	  human	  rights	  international	  agenda	  of	  the	  late	  1970s,	  it	  developed	  in	  dissent	  over	  Republican	  détente	  under	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  Henry	  Kissinger.	  	   Yet	   as	  much	   as	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	  were	   a	   contest	   between	  competing	   contemporary	   international	   agendas,	   there	   was	   also	   a	   battle	  over	  history.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	  movement,	  from	  its	  first-­‐wave	  manifestation	   right	   through	   to	   third-­‐wave	   anti-­‐ratification,	   was	   a	   desire	  among	   conservatives	   to	   protect	   an	   exceptionalist	   narrative	   of	   American	  benevolence	   in	   Panama.	   It	   was	   based	   upon	   the	   actions	   and	   legacy	   of	  President	  Theodore	  Roosevelt,	  whose	  role	   in	   the	  origins	  of	   the	  Canal	  was	  lauded	   as	   the	   epitome	   of	   America’s	   generosity	   and	   determined	   strength.	  This	  Rooseveltian	  hagiography	  was	  critical	  to	  Helms’	  idea	  of	  what	  the	  Canal	  meant	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  also	  how	  the	  country	  should	  face	  the	  post-­‐Vietnam	  world.	  	  It	  was	  this	  Rooseveltian	  narrative	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  in	  the	  Isthmus	   that	   Helms	   and	   many	   conservatives	   took	   to	   heart	   in	   their	  understanding	   of	   the	  Canal	   and	   the	   Zone.	   These	  were	  not	   simply	   ‘bricks-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	  21,	  No.	  2,	  Measures	  of	  the	  President:	  Hoover	  to	   Bush	   (Spring,	   1991):	   269-­‐286,	   and	   George	  D.	  Moffett	   III,	  The	  Limits	  of	  
Victory:	   The	   Ratification	   of	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   (Ithaca:	   Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1985).	  
79	  Laura	   Kalman,	  Right	   Star	  Rising:	  A	  New	  Politics,	   1974-­‐1980	   (New	   York:	  London,	  2010),	  167.	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and-­‐mortar’	   strategic	   assets	   that	  were	   integral	   to	   hemispheric	   and	   global	  security	  considerations	  in	  the	  Cold	  War:	  there	  was	  an	  emotional	  resonance	  to	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Canal	  that	  provided	  a	  foundation	  upon	  which	  the	  efforts	  against	   the	   agreements	  were	  built.	  Helms’	   fight	   over	   the	   treaties	  was	  not	  only	  about	  America’s	  current	  and	  future	  power;	  it	  was	  a	  battle	  to	  preserve	  the	  United	  States’	  glorious	  past,	  and	  an	  echo	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  own	  campaign	  to	  defend	  the	  nation’s	  actions	  in	  the	  Isthmus.	  	   Not	  all	  conservatives	  attached	  themselves	  to	  this	  narrative,	  just	  as	  not	  all	  conservatives	  were	  against	  the	  treaties.	  In	  an	  early	  indication	  of	  the	  kind	  of	   splits	   that	   would	   develop	   among	   the	   right	   during	   the	   Reagan	  administration,	   prominent	   members	   of	   the	   conservative	   community,	  including	   William	   F.	   Buckley,	   Jr.	   and	   James	   Burnham,	   argued	   that	   the	  treaties	  served	  the	  United	  States’	  evolving	  national	  security	  goals.80	  Several	  Republicans	  in	  the	  Ford	  administration,	  including	  that	  president	  and	  Henry	  Kissinger,	   were	   also	   willing	   to	   sign	   off	   on	   the	   treaties	   in	   pursuit	   of	  stability.81	  The	  contest	  between	  pragmatism	  and	  principle	  among	  the	  post-­‐war	   right	   that	   had	   surfaced	   with	   respect	   to	   Vietnam,	   China,	   and	   Soviet	  policy	  reared	  its	  head	  in	  Panama	  too.	  	  	  Helms’	  record	  sheds	  light	  on	  those	  who	  made	  up	  the	  core	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	   movement,	   not	   only	   in	   the	   Senate	   but	   also	   among	   conservative	  grassroots	   activists	   and	   media	   organs.	   He	   operated	   within	   a	   cohesive,	  recognisable	  congressional	  anti-­‐Treaties	   lobby,	  and	  enjoyed	  the	  support	  –	  and	   in	   turn	   supported	   –	   a	   distinctive	   group	   of	   non-­‐congressional	  conservative	   actors.	   It	   was	   largely,	   as	   Furgurson	   notes,	   a	   ‘routine,	   above	  board’	   political	   strategy	   for	   Helms	   –	   dependent	   upon	  making	   his	   case	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80 	  See	   James	   Burnham,	   “Panama	   or	   Taiwan?”	   National	   Review,	   16	  September,	   1977,	   1043,	   and	   William	   F.	   Buckley	   Jr.,	   “And	   Finally	   on	  Panama,”	  National	  Review,	  12	  November,	  1976,	  1252-­‐1253.	  
81	  Strong,	  “Jimmy	  Carter	  and	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties,”	  276.	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Senate	  speeches	  and	  campaign	  rhetoric.82	  	  At	  times,	  though,	  foreshadowing	  the	   years	   to	   come,	   the	   senator	   employed	   less	   predictable,	   or	   at	   least	   less	  public,	   measures	   that	   were	   designed	   to	   shore	   up	   support	   among	  conservatives,	  and	  Republicans	  more	  widely,	  for	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	  message.	  The	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties	  thus	  became	  as	  much	  a	  battle	  for	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  GOP	  and	  modern	  conservatism,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  control	  of	  the	  national	  foreign	  policy	  agenda.	  	   The	  Canal	  and	  First	  Wave	  Opposition,	  1972-­‐1975	  	  When	   Jesse	   Helms	  was	   sworn	   in	   as	   a	   senator	   in	   January	   1973,	   the	  United	  States	  had	  already	  made	  significant	  steps	  toward	  renegotiating	  the	  original	   1903	   agreement	   governing	   its	   control	   of	   the	   Canal.	   Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  administration,	  conscious	  of	   intensifying	   instability	   in	   the	  Canal	  Zone	   and	   committed	   to	   alleviating	   social	   and	   economic	   inequality	   there,	  formulated	   a	   new	   framework	   for	   treaties.	   In	   1967,	   the	   U.S.	   agreed	   three	  draft	   treaties	  with	  Panama	   that	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	  a	  more	  equitable	  share	  of	  toll	  revenues	  and,	  critically,	  the	  transfer	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  Zone	  on	  a	  specific	  date.	  	  It	  was	  not	   an	   altogether	   surprising	  decision.	  Momentum	  had	   slowly	  accumulated	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era	  for	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  Panama	  policy,	  as	  successive	   U.S.	   administrations	   recognised	   a	   new	   and	   improved	  relationship	  with	  Panama	  would	  satisfy	  both	  bilateral	  and	  global	  strategic	  imperatives.	   American	   officials	   wanted	   to	   reduce	   tensions	   that	   were	  threatening	   the	   security	   of	   the	   waterway.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   they	   also	  recognised	   that	   showing	   empathy	   for	   the	   concerns	   of	   a	   developing	   (and	  non-­‐aligned)	  nation	  would	  be	  beneficial	  within	  a	  wider	  Cold	  War	  context.	  A	  “hearts	  and	  minds”	  strategy,	  they	  envisioned,	  would	  encourage	  Panama	  to	  shift	   its	  allegiance	  toward	  the	  West,	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  potentially	  persuade	  other	  developing	  nations	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Fergurson,	  Hard	  Right,	  194.	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  Though	  congressional	  discontent,	   led	  by	  the	  inveterate	  Cold	  Warrior	  and	  Pennsylvania	   congressman	  Daniel	   J.	   Flood	   (D-­‐PA),	   doomed	   Johnson’s	  efforts,	   the	   draft	   treaties	   nevertheless	   signified	   a	   new	   stage	   in	   the	  renegotiating	   of	   sovereignty	   by	   the	   executive	   branch.	   President	   Nixon,	  preoccupied	   with	   Vietnam,	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   and	   China,	   accepted	   his	  predecessor’s	  strategy,	  and	  he	  and	  Henry	  Kissinger	  saw	  the	  proposed	  deal	  as	  a	  logical	  addition	  to	  détente.	  Cognisant	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  American	  power	  in	  a	  post-­‐Vietnam	  and	  increasingly	  multi-­‐polar	  world,	  they	  were	  convinced	  that	   the	   key	   to	  maintaining	   international	   influence	  was	   to	   reduce	   foreign	  military	   operations	   and	   secure	   strategic	   agreements	  with	   enemy	   states.83	  Détente	   allowed	   for	   a	   more	   nuanced	   foreign	   policy	   and	   greater	  opportunities	   for	   dialogue	   aimed	   at	   securing	   a	   stable	   international	  system.84	  New	  Panama	  Canal	   agreements	  would	  promote	   this	   stability	  on	  the	  United	  States’	  doorstep.	  	   	  However,	   both	   Nixon	   and	   Kissinger	   were	   unwilling	   to	   relinquish	  control	  of	  the	  waterway	  for	  a	  minimum	  of	  fifty	  years.	  With	  such	  a	  position	  incompatible	   with	   General	   Torrijos’	   definitive,	   and	   symbolic,	   deadline	   of	  2003,	  one	  hundred	  years	  after	  the	  original	  treaty	  was	  signed,	  negotiations	  faltered	   and	   both	   sides	   retreated	   into	   seemingly	   intractable	   positions.85	  Senior	  White	  House	  staff	  ordered	  a	  new	  look	  at	  Panama	  policy	  in	  late	  1972,	  but	  this	  was	  largely	  a	  low-­‐level	  exploratory	  initiative,	  and	  when	  Helms	  was	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  Zelizer,	  Arsenal	  of	  Democracy,	  238-­‐239.	  
84	  John	   Lewis	   Gaddis,	   Strategies	   of	   Containment	   A	   Critical	   Appraisal	   of	  
American	   National	   Security	   Policy	   During	   the	   Cold	   War	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  279.	  
85	  Clymer,	  Drawing	  the	  Line,	  8,	  Gaddis	  Smith,	  The	  Last	  Years	  of	  the	  Monroe	  
Doctrine,	  1945	  –	  1993	   (New	  York:	  Hill	   and	  Wang,	   1994),	   147,	   and	  Walter	  LaFeber,	  The	  Panama	  Canal:	  The	  Crisis	  in	  Historical	  Perspective	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  180.	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sworn	   in	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   New	   Year,	   the	   chances	   for	   new	   agreements	  appeared	  remote.86	  	  The	   existing	   opposition	   to	   new	   treaties	   had	   involved	   congressional	  elites	  like	  Flood	  and	  South	  Carolina	  Senator	  Strom	  Thurmond	  (R-­‐SC),	  but	  it	  was	   the	   conservative	   periodical	   Human	   Events	   around	   which	   first-­‐wave	  opponents	   had	   coalesced.	   The	   magazine	   was	   first	   published	   in	   1944	   by	  Henry	   Regnery,	   a	   World	   War	   II	   isolationist	   who	   had	   joined	   the	   anti-­‐interventionist	  America	  First	  Committee	  before	  its	  disbandment	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor,	   and	   who	   later	   built	   up	   an	   eponymous	   publishing	   company	  specialising	   in	   conservative	   literature.	   The	   company	   published	   William	  Buckley’s	  God	  and	  Man	  at	  Yale	  and	  Russell	  Kirk’s	  A	  Conservative	  Mind,	  two	  of	   the	  most	   important	  works	  of	  modern	   conservatism.	  By	   the	   late	  1950s,	  
Human	  Events	  and	  other	  Regnery	  publications,	  along	  with	  National	  Review	  and	   the	   Manion	   Forum,	   formed	   the	   hub	   of	   post-­‐war	   American	  conservatism.87	  Human	  Events,	   for	  its	  part,	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  helping	  to	   organise	   the	   modern	   mass	   conservative	   movement;	   having,	   as	   Nicole	  Hemmer	   points	   out,	   ‘created,	   backed,	   promoted,	   and	   evaluated	  organizations’	  during	  these	  formative	  years.88	  	  On	   Panama,	   Human	   Events	   was	   a	   focal	   point	   for	   first-­‐wave	  opposition.89	  Regular	   contributors	   to	   its	   commentary	   on	   the	   Canal	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  William	   J.	   Jorden,	   Panama	   Odyssey	   (Austin:	   University	   of	   Texas	   Press,	  1984),	  184.	  
87 	  Nicole	   Hemmer,	   “Messengers	   of	   the	   Right:	   Media	   and	   the	   Modern	  Conservative	  Movement,”	  (Ph.D.	  Diss.,	  Columbia	  University,	  2010),	  109.	  
88	  Hemmer,	  “Messengers	  of	  the	  Right,”	  119.	  
89	  For	  examples,	  see	  Strom	  Thurmond,	  “New	  Panama	  Treaty	  Talks?”	  Human	  
Events,	  15	  November,	  1969,	  22,	  James	  Jackson	  Kilpatrick,	  “Why	  Should	  the	  U.S.	  Yield	  Canal	  Sovereignty?”	  Human	  Events,	  12	  August,	  1967,	  7,	  Durward	  Hall,	  “Canal	  Giveaway,”	  Human	  Events,	  22	  July,	  1967,	  15,	  Donald	  Marquand	  Dozer,	  “Abandonment	  of	  Panama	  Canal	  Would	  Solve	  No	  Problem,”	  Human	  
Events,	   9	   October,	   1965,	   2,	   and	   “The	   Connolly	   Reservation	   Must	   Stand,”	  
Human	  Events,	  1	  September,	  1960,	  392.	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1960s	   included	   congressional	   opinion-­‐leaders	   like	   Strom	   Thurmond	   and	  Daniel	   Flood,	   while	   Tom	   Winter,	   the	   magazine’s	   editor,	   subsequently	  helped	  lead	  the	  New	  Right’s	  intense	  anti-­‐ratification	  initiatives.90	  Professor	  Donald	  M.	  Dozer,	  a	  Latin	  America	  specialist	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California,	  Santa	  Barbara,	  became	  a	  frequent	  writer	  for	  the	  magazine	  from	  the	  1960s	  onwards,	   and	   he	   later	   participated	   as	   one	   of	   many	   hostile	   conservative	  witnesses	  at	  congressional	  hearings	  into	  the	  Carter-­‐Torrijos	  agreements.91	  	  In	  short,	   conservative	  concern	  with	   the	  Canal	  was	  clearly	   far	   from	  a	  new	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  1970s.	  While	  it	  would	  gain	  far	  greater	  prominence	  as	   the	   decade	   went	   on,	   conservative	   oppositionism	   had	   its	   roots	   in	   the	  movement’s	  core	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Buttressing	  this	  faction	  was	   the	   work	   of	   foreign	   policy	   nationalists,	   like	   Flood.	   An	   ‘independent-­‐minded’	   Democrat,	   according	   to	   biographer	  William	   C.	   Kashatus,	   Flood’s	  staunchly	  chauvinistic	  foreign	  policy	  vision	  on	  Panama	  meshed	  with	  that	  of	  the	  growing	  modern	  conservative	  community.92	  Indeed,	  so	  prominent	  was	  Flood’s	   position	   in	   first-­‐wave	   opposition,	   he	   was	   labelled	   “Public	   Enemy	  No.	  1”	  by	  Panamanians.93	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Clymer,	   Drawing	   the	   Line,	   54,	   and	   Adam	   Clymer,	   “Conservatives	   Map	  Drive	  Against	  the	  Canal	  Treaty,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  16	  August,	  1977,	  7.	  
91	  Donald	  Marquand	  Dozer,	   “Abandonment	   of	   Panama	  Canal	  Would	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  No	  Problem,”	  2.	  Dozer,	  along	  with	  a	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  Professor	  Lewis	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   Arizona	   State	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   Committee	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   a	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   U.S.	   Senate,	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   Relations.	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   Canal	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  3:	  Public	  Witnesses,	  10-­‐12,	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  and	  13	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  1978,	  117-­‐200.	  
92 	  William	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   Dapper	   Dan	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   The	   Controversial	   Life	   of	   a	  
Congressional	   Power	   Broker	   (University	   Park:	   Pennsylvania	   State	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  5.	  
93	  Flood’s	  Panama	  policies	  are	  examined	  in	  detail	  in	  Kashatus,	  Dapper	  Dan	  
Flood,	   229	   and	   Sheldon	   Spear,	   Daniel	   J.	   Flood:	   A	   Biography	   –	   The	  
Congressional	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   Economic	   Savior	   and	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  University	  Press,	  2008),	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When	   Helms	   started	   to	   become	   actively	   involved	   in	   Canal	   policy	   it	  was	  as	  part	  of	  this	  already	  relatively	  well-­‐developed	  community	  with	  long-­‐standing	   concerns.	   Six	   months	   into	   his	   Senate	   career,	   on	   19	   July	   1973,	  Helms	   echoed	   their	   concerns	   in	   his	   first	   floor	   speech	   on	   events	   in	   the	  Isthmus.	   Joining	   conservative	   colleagues	   Harry	   F.	   Byrd,	   Jr.	   (I-­‐VA),	   Strom	  Thurmond	   (R-­‐SC),	   James	   Buckley	   (C-­‐NY),	   Clifford	   Hansen	   (R-­‐WY),	   and	  Ernest	  Hollings	  (D-­‐SC)	  in	  their	  condemnation	  of	  negotiations	  with	  Panama,	  Helms	   set	   out	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   his	   opposition	   to	   the	   new	  treaties	   based	   on	   both	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   justifications	   of	   the	  Canal’s	   importance	   to	   the	   nation.	   These	   were	   the	   defence	   of	   U.S.	  sovereignty	   in	   the	   Zone,	   a	   Rooseveltian	   narrative	   of	   the	   Canal’s	  construction,	  congressional	  assertiveness,	  economic	  concerns,	  and	  national	  security	  imperatives.94	  	  On	  the	  first	  of	  these	  issues	  –	  the	  defence	  of	  sovereignty	  –	  Helms	  told	  his	   assembled	   colleagues	   that	   he	   was	   ‘distressed’	   at	   the	   continuation	   of	  negotiations	   based	   upon	   the	   Johnson	   principles	   that	   advocated	   ‘the	  surrender	   of	   U.S.	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   zone’.	   As	   far	   as	   the	   senator	   was	  concerned,	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Zone	   was	   ‘virtually	   territory	   of	   the	   United	  States.	  We	  have	  exercise	  [sic]	  jurisdiction	  there.	  We	  have	  set	  up	  laws	  there.	  Congress	   has	   treated	   the	   Canal	   Zone	   as	   territory.’	   Linking	   this	   to	   a	  declaration	  of	   congressional	  authority	  –	  a	   tactic	  he	   frequently	   resorted	   to	  when	   challenging	   policies	   he	   didn’t	   agree	   with	   –	   Helms	   condemned	   the	  Department	  of	  State	  for	  failing	  to	  consult	  with	  the	  legislature	  about	  efforts	  to	  cede	  sovereignty	  that	  Congress	  had	  acquired.	  As	  such,	  Helms	  concluded,	  ‘the	  negotiations	  are	  unauthorized.’95	  	  This	   first-­‐wave	   oppositionist	   claim	   as	   to	   the	   sovereign	   rights	   of	   the	  United	  States	  was	  questionable,	  given	  the	  peculiar	  language	  of	  the	  original	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “The	   Future	   Of	   The	   Panama	   Canal,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   119	  (1973),	  24751.	  
95	  Helms,	  “The	  Future	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  119	  (1973),	  24751.	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treaty	   that	  allocated	   the	  United	  States	  powers	  as	  if	   it	  were	  sovereign,	  but	  not	   as	   the	   sovereign	   power.96	  Some	   first-­‐wave	   oppositionists	   recognised	  this,	  but	  denied	  its	  relevance.	  Flood	  claimed	  in	  a	  1957	  World	  Affairs	  article	  that	   the	   1903	   treaty	   had	   given	   the	   nation	   powers	   as	   if	   it	  were	   sovereign	  while	   maintaining	   that	   this	   equated	   to	   sovereignty	   itself.97	  It	   is	   possible	  that	  Helms	  understood	  the	  complexities	  of	  this	  issue,	  given	  his	  reference	  to	  the	   Zone	   as	   ‘virtually	   territory	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   [author’s	   italics].	   As	  time	  went	  on,	  however,	  both	  the	  senator	  and	  his	  conservative	  oppositionist	  allies	  would	  offer	  more	  definitive	  claims	  of	  sovereignty.	  	  Helms	   also	   joined	   his	   colleagues	   in	   linking	   the	   negotiations	   to	  contemporary	   international	   affairs.	   ‘The	  United	   States	   cannot	   continue	   to	  pull	  back	  from	  every	  area	  of	  the	  world’,	  the	  senator	  argued.	  It	  was	  one	  thing	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Southeast	  Asia,	  a	  venture	  the	  senator	  had	  disagreed	  with	  to	   begin	  with,	   but	   quite	   another	   to	   retreat	   from	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Zone.	  Indeed,	  the	  distractions	  of	  recent	  months,	  Helms	  argued,	  should	  not	  divert	  Americans	   from	   ‘the	   fact	   that	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   in	   our	  national	   defense	   and	   international	   commerce.98	  It	   was	   an	   implicit	   jab	   at	  Nixon	   and	   Kissinger’s	   agenda,	   as	   the	   two	   orchestrated	   a	   retreat	   from	  Vietnam	  and	  outreach	  to	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Noticeably,	  Helms	  appealed	  to	  history	  in	  his	  remarks.	  ‘The	  canal	  is	  an	  historic	  American	  achievement,’	  the	  senator	  stated,	  ‘both	  in	  its	  construction	  and	   its	   operations.	   It	   is	   unique	   in	   history	   for	   a	   nation	   to	   have	   such	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96 	  David	   McCullough,	   The	   Path	   Between	   the	   Seas:	   The	   Creation	   of	   the	  
Panama	  Canal,	  1870-­‐1914	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1977),	  393,	  and	  LaFeber,	  Panama	  Canal,	  217-­‐220.	  
97	  Daniel	  J.	  Flood,	  “Panama	  Canal	  Zone:	  Constitutional	  Domain	  of	  the	  United	  States,”	  World	  Affairs	  121,	  No.	  3	  (Fall,	  1958):	  74-­‐77.	  
98 	  Sandra	   Scanlon	   has	   pointed	   to	   the	   splits	   within	   the	   conservative	  movement	  over	  the	  withdrawal	  from	  Vietnam.	  While	  the	  movement	  largely	  supported	   President	   Nixon’s	   bombing	   campaign,	   Vietnamisation	   was	  disputed	  on	  the	  right.	  Scanlon,	  “The	  Conservative	  Lobby,”	  255	  –	  276.	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accomplishment.’99	  Such	  comments	  repeated	  existing	  first-­‐wave	  arguments	  that	  had	  used	  history	  as	  a	  defence	  of	  U.S.	  sovereignty	  and	  control,	  but	  from	  now	   on,	   Helms	   would	   be	   one	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   and	   frequent	  articulators	  of	   this	  Rooseveltian	  narrative	  of	  U.S.-­‐Panamanian	  relations.100	  The	   story	   depicted	   the	   Canal’s	   origins	   and	   decades	   of	   subsequent	   U.S.	  control	   as	   prominent	   examples	   of	   the	   nation’s	   benevolence	   and	  exceptionalism,	   as	   part	   of	   what	   Hogan	   describes	   as	   ‘a	   version	   of	   history	  that	  most	  Americans	  wished	   to	  believe’.101	  It	  was	  drawn	  directly	   from	   the	  ideals	  of	  Theodore	  Roosevelt,	  who	  had	  constructed	  a	  glorious	  record	  of	  his	  achievements	   in	   the	   Isthmus	  as	   a	   justification	   for	  his	   actions	   there	   at	   the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.102	  	  Roosevelt	  was	  enormously	  proud,	  and	  utterly	  unrepentant,	  about	  his	  conduct	   during	   the	   acquisition	   of	   the	   Panama	   Canal.	   ‘By	   far	   the	   most	  important	  action	  I	  took	  in	  foreign	  affairs	  during	  the	  time	  I	  was	  President,’	  he	   stated	   in	   his	   autobiography,	   ‘related	   to	   the	   Panama	   Canal.’	   His	  justifications	   for	   these	   policies	   in	   the	   Isthmus	   following	   from	   two	  interrelated	   issues:	   a	   rejection	   of	   Colombian	   sovereignty	   and,	  simultaneously,	  a	  desire	  to	  promote	  U.S.	  power.	  In	  order	  to	  satisfy	  the	  first	  requirement,	  the	  president	  publicly	  attacked	  Colombia’s	  record	  as	  a	  stable	  democratic	   government.	   He	   noted	   that	   for	   fifty-­‐three	   years	   prior	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Helms,	  “The	  Future	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  119	  (1973),	  24751.	  
100	  William	  L.	   Furlong	   and	  Margaret	   E.	   Scranton,	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Foreign	  
Policymaking:	   the	   President,	   the	   Congress,	   and	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	  (Boulder:	  Westview,	  1984),	  135-­‐136.	  
101	  Hogan,	  The	  Panama	  Canal,	   137.	  Hogan	   offers	   an	   excellent	   overview	   of	  the	  contest	  between	  histories,	  in	  The	  Panama	  Canal,	  135-­‐156.	  
102	  For	  more	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal,	  see	  John	  Major,	   Prize	   Possession:	   The	   United	   States	   and	   the	   Panama	   Canal,	   1903	   –	  
1979	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  and	  McCullough,	  The	  
Path	  Between	   the	  Seas.	   There	   are	   also	   useful	   introductions	   to	   Roosevelt’s	  strategy	   in	   LaFeber,	   Panama	   Canal,	   and	   J.	   Michael	   Hogan,	   The	   Panama	  
Canal	   in	   American	   Politics:	   Domestic	   Advocacy	   and	   the	   Evolution	   of	   Policy	  (Carbondale:	  Southern	  Illinois	  University	  Press,	  1986).	  
	   52	  
1903	   treaty,	   Colombia	   (and	   its	  predecessor	  New	  Granada)	  had	  been	   ‘in	   a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux’	  owing	  to	  multiple	   ‘disturbances’.	  The	  frequency	  and	  intensity	   of	   these	   ‘revolutions,	   rebellions,	   insurrections,	   riots,	   and	   other	  outbreaks’	  had	  only	  gotten	  worse	  as	  the	  twentieth	  century	  began	  and	  as	  a	  result,	   according	   to	   Roosevelt,	   Colombia	   had	   proven	   itself	   completely	  unable	  to	  keep	  order	  in	  the	  region.	  Roosevelt	  also	  noted	  that	  Colombia	  was	  in	   the	   hands	   of	   ‘an	   irresponsible	   alien	   dictator’.	   In	   questioning	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Colombian	  government	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  maintain	  peace	  in	  the	  Isthmus,	  Roosevelt	  explicitly	  rejected	  its	  right	  to	  control	  the	  Canal.103	  	  To	   explain	   the	  projection	  of	  U.S.	   power	   over	   the	   Isthmus,	  Roosevelt	  relied	  upon	   two	   justifications:	   historical	   precedent	   and	   the	  United	   States’	  civilising	   mission.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   former,	   the	   president	   noted	   that	  between	   1856	   and	   1902,	   U.S.	   troops	   had	   been	   forced	   to	   land	   upon	   the	  Isthmus	  a	  total	  of	  six	  times	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  lives	  and	  the	  property	  of	  its	   inhabitants.104	  In	   intervening	   in	   the	   present	   crisis	   that	   threatened	   the	  canal,	   the	  U.S.	  was	   simply	   continuing	   in	   a	   long	   tradition	  of	   peacekeeping.	  The	   second	   explanation	   was	   stated	   less	   equivocally,	   but	   in	   Roosevelt’s	  actions	   one	   could	   discern	   the	   consequences	   of	   his	   1899	   assertion	   that	  ‘Every	  expansion	  of	  a	  great	  civilized	  power	  means	  a	  victory	  for	  law,	  order,	  and	  righteousness.’105	  If	  Colombia	  could	  not	  be	  trusted	  to	  control	  the	  Canal	  and	  protect	  the	  people	  of	  the	  area,	  it	  was	  only	  natural	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	   assume	   that	   responsibility.	   The	   result	   would	   surely	   be	   a	   more	  stable,	  more	  prosperous	  and	  ultimately	  more	  civilised	  Isthmus.	  	  Roosevelt’s	  dispatch	  of	  gunboats	  to	  the	  Panama	  coast	  and	  landing	  of	  American	  troops	  on	  the	  Isthmus	  was	  therefore	  in	  line	  with	  his	  corollary	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Theodore	   Roosevelt,	   An	   Autobiography	   (New	   York:	   Charles	   Scribner’s	  Sons,	  1929),	  512	  –	  519.	  
104	  Ibid.,	  517.	  
105	  Theodore	  Roosevelt,	  The	  Strenuous	  Life:	  Essays	  and	  Addresses	   (Mineola:	  Dover	  Publications,	  Inc.,	  2009),	  14.	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the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  which	  stated	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  the	  right	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  a	  Latin	  American	  nation	  in	  the	  event	  of	  instability	  and	  turmoil.106	  Though	   there	   is	   debate	   over	   whether	   the	   Roosevelt	   Corollary	  constituted	   a	   limitation	   of	   U.S.	   influence	   in	   the	   region	   or	   the	   logical	  extension	  of	   the	  president’s	  Big	  Stick	   foreign	  policy	  philosophy,	   the	  result	  in	  this	  case	  was	  to	  generate	  an	  atmosphere	  in	  which	  the	  U.S.	  could	  acquire	  the	  Canal	  with	  as	  little	  trouble	  as	  possible.107	  Undermining	  Colombia	  in	  the	  canal	   negotiations	   by	   supporting	   the	   Panamanian	   rebels	   provided	  Roosevelt	  with	   the	  result	  he	  desired	  –	  a	  cross-­‐Isthmus	  waterway	  that	  not	  only	   secured	   the	   economic	   benefits	   of	   safe	   passage	   for	  American	   vessels,	  but	  which	   contributed	   significantly	   to	   the	   national	   security	   of	   the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  international	  prestige	  in	  an	  era	  of	  great	  power	  rivalry.	  	  These	  rousing	  justifications	  for	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  Isthmus	  were	  further	  bolstered	  by	  Roosevelt’s	  stirring	  praise	  for	  the	  American	  engineers	  and	  labourers	  who	  subsequently	  completed	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal.	   These	   individuals	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   victorious	   soldiers,	   the	  president	   later	  commented,	  and	  he	  praised	  the	  work	  of	  American	  doctors	  for	  their	  efforts	  to	  rid	  Panama	  of	  a	  myriad	  of	  tropical	  diseases.108	  Moreover,	  Roosevelt	   proclaimed,	   the	   actions	  of	   these	  Americans	   –	   and	   therefore,	   by	  close	  connection,	  his	  own	  actions	  –	  had	  made	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place:	  ‘they	  have	  made	   not	   only	   America	   but	   the	  whole	  world	   their	   debtors	   by	  what	  they	  have	  accomplished.’109	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  LaFeber,	  Panama	  Canal,	  44.	  
107 	  See	   Richard	   H.	   Collin,	   Theodore	   Roosevelt’s	   Caribbean:	   The	   Panama	  
Canal,	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  and	  the	  Latin	  American	  Context	   (Baton	  Rouge:	  Louisiana	   State	   University	   Press,	   1990)	   for	   a	   sympathetic	   analysis	   of	   the	  president’s	   policy	   in	   the	   region,	   and	   Serge	   Ricard,	   “The	   Roosevelt	  Corollary,”	  Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	   36,	   No.	   1,	   Presidential	   Doctrines	  (March,	   2006)	   for	   a	   stinging	   criticism	   of	   Roosevelt’s	   Corollary	   and	   its	  intentions.	  
108	  Roosevelt,	  An	  Autobiography,	  528.	  
109	  Ibid.,	  529.	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   The	  essential	  themes	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  account	  would	  permeate	  Helms’	  commentary	  on	  the	  Canal	  over	  the	  coming	  years.	  In	  his	  appeals	  to	  protect	  U.S.	   sovereignty	   and	  project	  American	   strength,	   and	   in	   his	   denigration	   of	  Panamanian	  power	   and	   stability,	   the	   senator	  would	   implicitly	   re-­‐animate	  Roosevelt’s	  own	  words	  for	  a	  new	  era.	  Helms	  would	  also	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  passionate	   defenders	   of	   that	   president’s	   conduct	  when	   advocates	   of	   new	  treaties	   suggested	  America’s	   actions	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	  were	  deceitful	  and	  a	  cause	  for	  current	  tensions	  in	  the	  Isthmus.	  	   Just	  as	  important	  as	  the	  substance	  of	  Helms’	  first	  Senate	  Canal	  speech	  was	  its	  timing.	  The	  senator	  entered	  the	  debate	  over	  Panama	  policy	  in	  July,	  in	   the	  wake	   of	   two	   critical	   events.	   The	   first	  was	   a	   special	  meeting	   of	   the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  in	  Panama	  in	  March.	  Torrijos,	  frustrated	  by	  the	  Nixon	  administration’s	  intransigence,	  had	  sought	  to	  internationalise	  the	  Canal	   issue	  as	  a	  means	  of	   forcing	   the	  United	  States	   to	   re-­‐engage	  with	   the	  talks. 110 	  Before	   the	   court	   of	   world	   opinion,	   Panamanian	   diplomats	  condemned	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  colonial	  and	  imperial	  oppressor,	  and	  pleaded	  with	  the	  international	  community	  for	  support.	  	  	   Angered	   by	   the	   Panamanian	   rhetoric,	   American	   officials	   vetoed	   a	  strongly	  supported	  U.N.	  resolution	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Panamanian	  position	  on	  the	   Canal.111	  Diplomats	   and	   political	   observers	   feared	   Panama’s	   strategy	  had	   damaged	   already	   fragile	   congressional	   sympathies	   for	   any	   new	  treaties.112	  The	   second,	   linked	   to	   the	   U.N.	  meeting,	  was	   press	   speculation	  that	  veteran	  diplomat	  and	  former	  ambassador	  to	  South	  Vietnam	  Ellsworth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Moffett	  III,	  Limits	  of	  Victory,	  38,	  	  
111	  Thirteen	   member	   states	   voted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   resolution,	   with	   only	  Britain	   abstaining.	   Richard	   Severos,	   “U.S.	   in	   U.N.	   Council	   Vetoes	   Panama	  Canal	  Resolution,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  22	  March,	  1973,	  1.	  
112	  Frank	   Blatchford,	   “Costly	   Propaganda	   Triumph?:	   U.S.	   Senate	   backlash	  seen	   on	   Panama	   Canal	   treaty,”	  Chicago	  Tribune,	   25	  March,	   1973,	   40,	   and	  “Futility	  in	  Panama,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  24	  March,	  1973,	  32.	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Bunker	  was	   about	   to	   be	   named	   chief	   negotiator	   for	   the	   United	   States.113	  Anti-­‐Treaties	  campaigners	  feared	  that	  the	  appointment	  would	  commit	  the	  United	  States	  to	  a	  fresh	  effort	  at	  breaking	  the	  negotiating	  deadlock.114	  	  Looking	   back	   from	   1978,	  Walter	   LaFeber	   deemed	   the	   furore	   at	   the	  United	   Nations	   the	   ‘nadir’	   in	   relations	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Panama.115	  However,	  as	  scholarship	  on	  the	  treaties	  has	  noted,	  Torrijos’	  gambit	  paid	  off,	  forcing	   Henry	   Kissinger	   to	   revaluate	   U.S.	   policy.116	  William	   Jorden,	   the	  Department	   of	   State’s	   lead	   official	   on	   the	   negotiations	   and	   soon	   to	   be	  named	  ambassador	  to	  Panama,	  recognised	  the	  U.N.	  meeting	  was	  a	  tipping	  point.	  Where	  previously	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  had	  been	  preoccupied	  with	  Vietnam,	  China,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  he	  now	  recognised	  the	  potential	  for	  an	   outburst	   of	   violence	   in	   the	   nation’s	   own	   backyard. 117 	  Bunker’s	  appointment	  was	  designed	  to	  restart	  the	  stalled	  negotiations,	  and	  head	  off	  any	  potential	  instability	  in	  Panama.	  	  Helms’	  decision	  to	  hold	  back	  until	  rumours	  of	  Bunker’s	  appointment	  surfaced	  highlighted	  a	  recurring	  theme	  in	  the	  senator’s	  approach	  to	  Central	  American	   policy.	   While	   he	   could	   be	   proactive	   in	   driving	   an	   issue	   to	   the	  centre	   of	   congressional	   and	   national	   attention,	   he	   was	   also	   astute	   in	  capitalising	   on	   windows	   of	   opportunity	   that	   other	   actors	   created.	   While	  such	  windows	  are	  often	  predictable	  –	  Kingdon	  cites	  the	  scheduled	  renewal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  “Capital	  Briefs,”	  Human	  Events,	  14	  July,	  1973,	  2,	  and	  “Bunker	  Is	  Expected	  to	  Get	  Panama-­‐Negotiations	  Post,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  30	  June,	  1973,	  14.	  
114	  Harry	   Byrd	   Jr.,	   leading	   the	   senators’	   colloquy,	   referred	   to	   the	   media	  reports	   in	  his	  opening	  comments.	  Harry	  F.	  Byrd	   Jr.	   (I-­‐VA),	   “The	  Future	  Of	  The	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  119	  (1973),	  24746.	  
115	  LaFeber,	  The	  Panama	  Canal,	  180.	  
116	  Major,	  Prize	  Possession,	  342,	  Moffett	  III,	  Limits	  of	  Victory,	  38,	  Furlong	  and	  Scranton,	  The	  Dynamics	   of	   Foreign	  Policymaking,	   34,	   and	   Jorden,	  Panama	  
Odyssey,	  197.	  
117	  Jorden,	  Panama	  Odyssey,	  197.	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of	  a	  programme	  as	  an	  example	  –	   they	  can	   just	  as	  easily	  be	  unforeseen.118	  The	  U.N.	  meeting	  and	  subsequent	  speculation	  about	  Bunker’s	  role	  were	  an	  unexpected	  but	  timely	  opportunity	  for	  Helms	  and	  congressional	  first-­‐wave	  opposition	   leaders	   to	   speak	   out	   about	   their	   concerns	   in	   light	   of	   the	  intensifying	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  Canal.	  	   Gradually	   the	   senator	   linked	   Panama	   to	   the	   détente	   strategy	   that	  Helms	   and	   conservatives	   so	   vigorously	   opposed.	   On	   3	   May,	   in	   remarks	  explaining	   the	   move	   toward	   negotiations	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   U.N.	  meeting,	  Nixon	   told	  Congress	   that	  Panama	  policy	  would	  now	  be	  a	  part	  of	  détente:	  	  The	  world	  has	  changed	  radically	  during	  the	  70	  years	  this	  treaty	  has	   been	   in	   effect.	   Latin	   America	   has	   changed.	   Panama	   has	  changed.	  And	  the	  terms	  of	  our	  relationship	  should	  reflect	  those	  changes	  in	  a	  reasonable	  way.119	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  president	  signalled	  to	  the	  American	  people	  that	  sovereignty	  and	   control	   in	   the	   Zone	   was	   no	   longer	   the	   shibboleth	   it	   had	   once	   been.	  Growing	  conservative	  activism	  on	  Panama	  was	  thus	  not	  simply	  a	  reflection	  of	   the	  perception	  of	  a	  shifting	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Panama,	   but	   also	   a	   consequence	   of	   unease	   at	   the	   inclusion	   of	   Isthmus	  policy	  in	  the	  larger	  re-­‐orientation	  of	  the	  nation’s	  global	  security	  strategy.	  	  As	  well	  as	  speaking	  out	  in	  Congress,	  Helms	  was	  the	  sole	  co-­‐sponsor	  of	  Strom	   Thurmond’s	   proposal	   for	   renewed	   investment	   in	   the	   Canal.	  Development,	   oppositionists	   expected,	   would	   undercut	   both	   the	   political	  and	  economic	  case	  for	  constitutional	  reform.	  In	  the	  New	  Year,	  Helms	  wrote	  to	  Bunker	  privately	   to	   assert	   his	   opposition	   to	   any	   compromise	  over	  U.S.	  sovereignty.	   The	   correspondence	   subsequently	   made	   its	   way	   onto	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Kingdon,	  Agendas,	  165.	  
119	  Jorden,	  Panama	  Odyssey,	  199.	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pages	   of	   Human	   Events. 120 	  And,	   in	   March	   and	   again	   a	   year	   later,	   he	  sponsored	  the	  so-­‐called	  Thurmond	  Resolutions,	  which	  expressed	  majority	  Senate	  support	  for	  continuing	  US	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  Zone.121	  Scholarship	  on	  Panama	   policy	   quite	   rightly	   notes	   that	   the	   1974	   Thurmond	   resolution	  marked	  a	  critical	  acceleration	  of	  efforts	  to	  oppose	  the	  negotiations.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  enough	  senators	  had	  recorded	  opposition	  to	  the	  negotiations	  to	  prevent	  their	  ratification.122	  The	  second	  Thurmond	  resolution,	  a	  year	  later	  and	  with	  more	   signatures	   than	   the	   1974	   version,	   showed	   that	   there	  was	  now	  a	  significant	  constituency	  in	  the	  Senate	  for	  congressional	  assertiveness	  over	  Panama	  policy.123	  	  On	  a	  bilateral	  level,	  Helms’	  support	  for	  the	  Thurmond	  resolutions	  was	  based	  on	  Helms’	  resistance	  to	  any	  deviation	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	   nations	   as	   set	   out	   in	   the	   original	   1903	   treaty.	   It	   also	   signalled	   an	  expanded	  commitment	  to	  the	  sovereignty	  argument,	  as	  mention	  of	  ‘virtual’	  sovereignty	   disappeared	   from	   the	   senator’s	   message.	   Yet	   Helms’	  sponsorship	  of	  the	  Thurmond	  legislation	  had	  a	  wider	  resonance,	  because	  it	  complemented	   his	   increasingly	   venomous	   criticism	   of	   Henry	   Kissinger’s	  international	   diplomacy.	   Panama	   policy	   was	   but	   one	   example	   of	  Kissingerian	  policies	  which	   ‘gives	  us	  a	  paper	  peace	  and	  disguises	   the	  real	  power	   relationship	   in	   the	   world’,	   Helms	   said,	   as	   part	   of	   his	   growing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120 	  “Bunker	   Confirms	   ‘Loss’	   of	   Canal	   Sovereignty,”	   Human	   Events,	   26	  January,	  1974,	  4.	  
121	  “S.	   Res.	   301:	   Resolution	   relating	   to	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   U.S.	   owned	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criticism	  of	   the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  the	  détente	   to	  which	  Kissinger	  was	  pursuing.124	  	  If	  Helms	  was	  not	   being	   credited	  with	   overall	   leadership	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Treaties	  lobby	  by	  commentators	  at	  the	  time,	  then	  he	  was	  at	  the	  very	  least	  contributing	   to	   themes	   that	  would	   pervade	   –	   cynics	  might	   say	   saturate	   –	  the	  debate	  for	  the	  next	  three	  years.	  Helms	  criticised	  Panama	  for	  resorting	  to	   threats	   and	   intimidation.	   He	   blamed	   the	   Department	   of	   State	   for	  encouraging	   this	   behaviour,	   and	   rebuked	   the	   department	   for	   failing	   to	  consult	  Congress	  about	  its	  policy	  toward	  the	  Canal.	   Just	  as	  Thurmond	  had	  done,	   Helms	   advised	   the	   State	   Department	   to	   reconsider	   its	   present	  approach	  given	  the	  extent	  of	  Senate	  support	  for	  Thurmond’s	  resolutions.125	  	  Helms’	  comments	  reflected	  early	  arguments	  by	  conservatives	  that	  the	  negotiations	   were	   being	   conducted	   away	   from	   congressional	   oversight.	  However,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   senator	   genuinely	   believed	   the	   Senate	  should	  be	  consulted	  is	  difficult	  to	  discern.	  The	  senator’s	  perspective	  on	  the	  executive-­‐legislative	   balance	   in	   foreign	   policy	   depended	   greatly	   on	   the	  policy	   in	  question,	  and	  his	  relationship	   to	   it.	  His	  suggestion	   that	   the	  State	  Department	   follow	   Senate	   resolutions	  was	  more	   likely	   a	   reflection	   of	   his	  suspicion	  of	   the	  department’s	  position,	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  use	  all	   leverage	  available	  to	  force	  the	  department	  to	  reconsider	  its	  strategy.	  	  Helms’	  Senate	  Panama	  policy	  from	  1973	  through	  1975	  was	  ineffective	  in	   halting	   momentum	   toward	   new	   treaties:	   at	   no	   point	   did	   his	   efforts	  inhibit	  the	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  administrations	  in	  their	  negotiations.	  However,	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as	  critics	  of	  Barbara	  Hinckley’s	  passive	  Congress	  theory	  have	  noted,	  there	  are	   often	   longer-­‐term	   ramifications	   to	   congressional	   assertiveness.126	  By	  promoting	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   executive	   was	   disregarding	   the	   Senate’s	  constitutional	   prerogatives,	   Helms	   helped	   construct	   a	   more	   competitive	  relationship	  between	  Congress	  and	  the	  White	  House.127	  It	  was	  this	  growing	  congressional	   discontent,	   combined	   with	   growing	   fears	   of	   an	   insurgent	  conservative	   campaign	   in	   the	   upcoming	   Republican	   primaries,	   which	  persuaded	   Gerald	   Ford	   to	   steer	   clear	   of	   the	   Canal	   as	   an	   issue	   through	  1975.128	  	  Meanwhile,	   Helms’	   opposition	   to	   both	   the	   Nixon	   and	   Ford	  administrations’	   Panama	   policy	   helped	   establish	   his	   credentials	   as	   a	  reliable	   conservative	   internationalist.	  William	   Link	   points	   out	   that	  Helms	  took	  oppositional	  positions	  on	  a	  range	  of	  issues	  during	  the	  1970s	  in	  order	  to	   promote	   himself	   as	   a	   prominent,	   consistent	   voice	   on	   behalf	   of	  conservatives.129 	  Panama	   policy	   was	   an	   early	   example	   of	   the	   way	   he	  combined	  outspoken	  attacks	  with	  a	  legislative	  strategy	  designed	  to	  craft	  a	  substantive	  record	  of	  tangible	  resistance	  to	  policies	  regarded	  as	  anathema	  to	  his	  conservative	  constituency.	  	  Despite	   the	   longevity	   of	   first-­‐wave	   opposition,	   the	   Panama	   Canal	  issue	   had	   yet	   to	   develop	   into	   an	   electoral	   issue	   among	   grassroots	  conservatives.	  Helms’	  opposition	   to	   the	  Panama	  policies	  of	   the	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  administrations	  was	  important	  in	  efforts	  to	  correct	  this,	  and	  was	  part	  of	   a	   vociferous	   but	   largely	   isolated	   attack	   by	   the	   partisan	   conservative	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press	   and	   a	   handful	   of	   congressional	   issue-­‐leaders.	   In	   1976,	   however,	  Helms	  would	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  turning	  the	  Canal	  question	  into	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  debate.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  helped	  launch	  Ronald	  Reagan	  toward	  the	  presidency,	  promoted	  his	  own	  position	  as	  one	  of	  American	  conservatism’s	  most	   celebrated	   leaders,	   and	   began	   more	   than	   a	   decade	   and	   a	   half	   of	  prolific	  foreign	  policy	  activism	  in	  Central	  America.	  	   Helms,	  Reagan	  and	  Second	  Wave	  Opposition,	  1976	  	  In	  The	  Reagans:	  A	  Political	   Portrait,	   long-­‐time	   Reagan	   adviser	   Peter	  Hannaford	   recalled	   a	   late	   October	   1974	   discussion	   between	   the	   future	  president	  and	   Jesse	  Helms	   in	  a	  Charlotte	  hotel	  shortly	  before	  Reagan	  was	  due	  to	  speak	  at	  a	  fundraiser	  for	  the	  senator:	  	  We	  had	  about	  twenty	  minutes	  to	  wait	  in	  his	  suite	  before	  leaving	  for	  the	  auditorium	  where	  the	  dinner	  was	  to	  be	  held.	  Helms	  and	  Reagan	   were	   talking	   about	   various	   issues	   when	   the	   senator	  mentioned	  that	  he	  was	  disturbed	  that	  the	  Ford	  administration	  was	  permitting	  near-­‐secret	  negotiations	  to	  go	  forward	  between	  the	   United	   States	   and	   Panama	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   eventually	  turning	   the	   canal	   over	   to	   Panama.	   The	   governor	   expressed	  surprise	  at	  this	  and	  said	  he	  wanted	  to	  look	  into	  it.	  	  According	   to	   Hannaford,	   this	   was	   the	   first	   time	   Ronald	   Reagan	  encountered	  the	  Canal	  as	  an	  issue.130	  	  In	   the	   months	   that	   followed,	   Reagan	   took	   a	   closer	   interest	   in	   the	  Canal.	   As	   an	   increasing	   proportion	   of	   his	   mail	   began	   to	   criticise	   the	  negotiations,	  he	  began	  to	  talk	  more	  frequently	  in	  public	  on	  the	  subject.	  He	  condemned	   the	   negotiations	   in	   conversation	   with	   Republican	   and	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conservative	   groups,	   even	   going	   as	   far	   as	   to	   repeat	   an	   assertion	   Helms	  made	  in	  April	  1975	  that	  Kissinger	  planned	  to	  unilaterally	  turn	  over	  control	  of	   the	   Zone’s	   emergency	   and	   postal	   services	   to	   Panama.131	  By	  mid-­‐1975,	  Reagan	  was	  commenting	  publicly	  on	  the	  Canal	  issue	  in	  speeches	  around	  the	  country	  and	  his	  various	  syndicated	  columns.132	  When	  he	  chose	  to	  challenge	  Ford	  for	  the	  1976	  Republican	  presidential	  nomination,	  Reagan	  did	  so	  with	  a	  growing	  sense	  of	  the	  Canal’s	  importance	  to	  conservatives	  disgruntled	  by	  the	   president’s	   commitment	   to	   the	   foreign	   policies	   of	   his	   predecessor.	  Second-­‐wave	  opposition	  emerged	  because	  of	  it,	  as	  anti-­‐Treaties	  elites	  and	  a	  newly	  vocal	   grass-­‐roots	   community	   coalesced	  around	  Reagan’s	   candidacy	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  stop	  new	  treaties.	  	  After	   a	   disappointing	   showing	   in	   the	   early	   Republican	   primaries,	  however,	   the	   Canal	   issue	   appeared	   unlikely	   to	   rescue	   Reagan	   from	   an	  ignominious	  withdrawal	   from	   the	   race.	   His	   faltering	   campaign	   limped	   to	  North	  Carolina	   in	  March	  with	  prominent	  Republicans	  publicly	  urging	  him	  to	  abandon	  his	  efforts	  and	  unify	  behind	  Ford.133	  What	  happened	  next	  was	  both	   a	   testament	   to	   Helms’	   political	   savvy,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	  foreign	  policy	  narrative	  the	  senator	  and	  his	  movement	  conservative	  allies	  had	   constructed	   around	   the	   Canal.	   Under	   the	   guidance	   of	   Helms	   and	   his	  political	  adviser	  Tom	  Ellis,	  Reagan	  emerged	  from	  the	  Tar	  Heel	  state	  with	  a	  shock	  primary	  victory.	  Helms’	  Congressional	  Club	  –	  a	  model	  of	  New	  Right	  effectiveness	   in	   voter	   registration,	   fund-­‐raising,	   and	   media	   savvy	   –	   gave	  Reagan	   significant	   advantages	   over	   a	   Ford	   campaign	   tethered	   to	   the	  ineffective	   and	   disorganised	   Republican	   establishment	   in	   North	   Carolina.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Helms	  and	  Ellis	  pushed	  Reagan	  toward	  a	  much	  stronger	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conservative	  message	  on	  the	  campaign	  trail.134	  Fundamental	  to	  this	  vision	  was	  a	  more	  chauvinistic,	  robust	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  resonated	  with	  voters	  increasingly	  disenchanted	  with	  détente.135	  	  An	   important	   part	   of	   the	   Helms-­‐Ellis	   strategy	   was	   to	   encourage	  Reagan	   to	   regularly	   cite	   the	  Panama	  Canal	   negotiations	   as	   an	   example	   of	  the	  failure	  of	  détente.136	  	  Though	  this	  wasn’t	  the	  first	  time	  Reagan	  used	  the	  Canal	  on	  the	  campaign	  trail,	  it	  marked	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	   anti-­‐Treaties	   campaign. 137 	  Reagan’s	   telegenic	   appeal	   ensured	   the	  themes	  that	  Helms	  had	  been	  talking	  about	  for	  the	  previous	  two	  years	  took	  on	  greater	  resonance	  with	  voters,	  and	  the	  Canal	  played	  a	  significant,	  even	  decisive,	   role	   in	   the	   primary:	   polls	   indicated	   that	   Republican	   voters	   had	  voted	  for	  Reagan	  out	  of	  growing	  fears	  over	  détente	  and	  a	  perceived	  decline	  in	  the	  nation’s	  prestige,	  in	  Panama	  and	  across	  the	  globe.138	  Ford	  supporters	  understood	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  moment,	  acknowledging	  that	  opposition	  to	  the	  treaties	  had	  now	  permeated	  the	  Republican	  electorate.	  “Our	  only	  real	  weakness”,	  said	  one	  Ford	  backer,	  “was	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  they	  used	  that	  to	  sneak	  through	  the	  net.	   It	  wasn’t	  organization,	   it	  was	  Sally	   Jones,	  sitting	  at	  home,	  watching	  Ronald	  Reagan	  on	   television	  and	  deciding	   that	   she	  didn’t	  want	  to	  give	  away	  the	  Panama	  Canal.”139	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For	  Helms,	  the	  primary	  established	  his	  position	  as	  the	  dominant	  force	  in	   the	   North	   Carolina	   Republican	   Party	   and	   as	   a	   national	   conservative	  leader.140	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  senator’s	  work	  helped	  push	  the	  Canal	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  national	  debate	  over	  détente	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  South	  Vietnam’s	  collapse.141	  It	   was	   in	   North	   Carolina	   that	   the	   Canal	   emerged	   as	   the	   issue	  that	  would,	  as	  Natasha	  Zaretsky	  contends,	   crystallise	   the	  debate	  over	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1970s.142	  	  Helms	   now	   sought	   to	   capitalise	   on	   this	   momentum.	   In	   May,	   with	  Reagan	   continuing	   to	   press	   the	   Canal	   issue	   in	   his	   resurgent	   campaign,	  Helms	   took	   to	   the	   Senate	   floor	   to	   condemn	   the	   capture	   of	   an	   American	  yacht,	   Sea	   Wolf,	   by	   Panamanian	   defence	   forces	   operating	   within	   the	  territorial	   waters	   of	   the	   Zone.	   The	   senator	   presented	   the	   seizure	   of	   Sea	  
Wolf	  as	  the	  most	  obvious	  example	  to	  date	  of	  the	  fatal	  flaws	  in	  the	  nation’s	  Canal	   policy	   and	   an	   instance	   of	   American	   weakness,	   attacking	   Ford	   and	  Kissinger	   for	   authoring	   a	   foreign	  policy	  of	   surrender	   and	   retreat.143	  What	  made	  Sea	  Wolf	   so	   important	  was	   that	   the	   issue	  belonged	  solely	   to	  Helms.	  The	   senator	  picked	  up	  on	   information	  provided	  by	   a	   small	   section	  of	   the	  Panamanian	   press,	   and	   his	   staff	   corroborated	   the	   report	   through	   a	  knowledgeable	  government	   source.144	  When	   the	   senator	   rose	   to	   speak	  on	  the	   Senate	   floor	   on	   28	   May,	   he	   not	   only	   possessed	   a	   greater	   level	   of	  knowledge	  about	  Sea	  Wolf	  than	  just	  about	  anyone	  in	  the	  country,	  let	  alone	  Congress,	   but	   he	   could	   also	   present	   himself	   as	   a	   credible	   conduit	   for	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information	   coming	   from	   Panama.	   As	   a	   means	   of	   demonstrating	   issue	  leadership,	  this	  was	  a	  significant	  advantage.145	  	  Helms’	   Sea	   Wolf	   narrative	   pushed	   three	   connected	   strands	   of	   the	  conservative	  anti-­‐Treaties	  argument.	  Firstly,	  he	  focused	  on	  the	  violation	  of	  territory	   and	   sovereignty	   by	   an	   aggressive,	   devious	   Panamanian	  government	   (implicitly	   re-­‐iterating	   Roosevelt’s	   attacks	   on	   Colombian	  behaviour	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century).	  The	  senator	  described	  the	  apprehension	  of	  the	  yacht	  as	  an	  act	  of	  state-­‐sponsored	  piracy,	  ‘well	  within	  the	   10-­‐mile	   wide	   sea	   corridor	   and	   within	   the	   3-­‐mile	   limit	   of	   the	   Canal	  Zone.’	  The	  ship	  used	  to	  execute	  the	  seizure,	  he	  claimed,	  had	  waited	  without	  running	  lights	  inside	  U.S.	  territory	  before	  opening	  fire	  on	  the	  Sea	  Wolf	  with	  heavy	  arms.	  Moreover,	   it	  detained	  the	  yacht	  and	   its	  crew	  in	  violation	  of	  a	  Balboa	  court	  order	  permitting	  the	  vessel	  to	  sail	  back	  to	  the	  U.S.	  	  	  Panama’s	  actions,	  Helms	  told	  his	  colleagues,	  demonstrated	  the	  folly	  of	  negotiations	   with	   a	   government	   that	   ‘does	   not	   recognize	   the	   basic	  principles	   of	   international	   law.’	   Moreover,	   the	   Torrijos	   government	   had	  protected	   a	   former	   American	   citizen,	   now	   an	   officer	   in	   the	   Panamanian	  Defence	  Forces,	  entangled	  in	  a	  protracted	  legal	  dispute	  over	  an	  outstanding	  repair	   bill	   for	   the	   yacht. 146 	  Panama,	   through	   collusion	   between	   the	  judiciary,	  defence	  forces,	  and	  private	  citizens,	  had	  condoned	   ‘an	  unseemly	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  referred	  to	  information	  that	  this	  former	  U.S.	  citizen	  had	  sought	  to	  claim	   ownership	   of	   the	   Sea	  Wolf	   through	   fraudulently	   obtained	   registry	  documents.	  The	  Panamanian	  court’s	  decision	  to	  authorise	  an	  illegal	  change	  in	  registry	  of	  the	  vessel	  was	  indicative,	  according	  to	  Helms,	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conflict	   of	   interest	   for	   personal	   profit…	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   U.S.	  sovereignty.’147	  	  The	   senator	   used	   the	   Sea	   Wolf	   affair	   to	   exert	   pressure	   on	   the	  Department	  of	  State.	  Helms	  accused	  the	  foreign	  service	  of	  endangering	  the	  lives	   of	   American	   citizens	   by	   failing	   to	   comprehend	   the	   potential	  ramifications	   of	   the	   Sea	   Wolf’s	   legal	   troubles.	   He	   reserved	   special	  condemnation	   for	   Ambassador	   William	   Jorden,	   whom	   he	   charged	   with	  negligence	  and	  incompetence	  for	  failing	  to	  prevent	  the	  incident.	  Jorden	  and	  the	   State	  Department’s	   ignorance	   of	   the	   unfolding	   legal	   controversy	   over	  the	  repair	  bill,	  Helms	  claimed,	  precipitated	  the	  illegal	  seizure	  of	  the	  yacht,	  and	  allowed	  Panama	  to	  directly	  –	  and,	  apparently,	  successfully	  –	  challenge	  U.S.	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  Canal	  Zone.148	  	  Helms	   also	   argued	   that	   the	   department’s	   inability	   to	   engage	   in	  constructive	   talks	   over	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   vessel	   prior	   to	   its	   seizure	  undermined	   their	   credibility	   as	  negotiators	  over	   the	  Canal.	   State’s	   lack	  of	  awareness,	  Helms	  argued,	  called	  into	  question	  ‘its	  capability	  to	  negotiate	  in	  good	   faith	   on	   the	   more	   basic	   issues.’	   In	   questioning	   the	   department’s	  competence,	  the	  senator	  tied	  Sea	  Wolf	  to	  the	  wider	  conservative	  narrative	  of	   an	   ineffective	   foreign	   service	   regularly	   outwitted	   by	   opponents	   across	  the	  negotiating	  table.	  Moreover,	  Helms	  charged	  the	  State	  Department	  with	  conducting	   diplomacy	   in	   secret,	   away	   from	   public	   and	   congressional	  scrutiny,	   allowing	   it	   to	   carry	   out	   its	   policies	   of	   surrender	   and	   retreat	  without	   challenge.	   The	   lack	   of	   a	   formal	   public	   protest	   over	   the	   yacht	  suggested,	   in	   the	   senator’s	   mind,	   that	   State	   did	   not	   wish	   to	   assert	   U.S.	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  matter.	  Such	  an	  approach,	  Helms	  argued,	  ‘undercuts	  not	  only	  any	  negotiations,	  but	  even	  our	  present	  status.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  occasion	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for	   secret	  diplomacy.	  This	   is	  an	  occasion	   for	   firmness	  and	  balance.	   Secret	  diplomacy	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  weakness	  and	  a	  sign	  of	  withdrawal.’149	  	   Helms’	   charge	   that	   Kissinger,	   and	   also	   President	   Ford,	   bore	  responsibility	   for	   this	   echoed	   the	   wider	   conservative	   critique	   of	   a	   grand	  strategy	   mired	   in	   moral	   and	   physical	   weakness.	   The	   Sea	   Wolf	   became	  emblematic	  of	  the	  decline	  in	  American	  power	  and	  prestige.	  Helms	  grandly	  declared:	  	  When	   a	   U.S.-­‐flag	   ship	   can	   be	   captured	   in	   waters	   where	   we	  undisputedly	  exercise	  sovereign	  power,	  and	  the	  action	  is	  done	  with	  impunity,	  then	  the	  whole	  conduct	  of	  our	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  West	  is	  in	  doubt.150	  	  Helms	  had	  the	  room	  to	  launch	  such	  a	  broad,	  stinging	  criticism	  of	  the	  Ford	  administration	  because	  he	  didn’t	  have	   to	   resolve	   the	  Sea	  Wolf	  case.	   Reminiscent	   of	   John	   F.	   Kennedy’s	   manipulation	   of	   the	  Eisenhower	   administration’s	   Cuba	   policy	   during	   the	   1960	   election	  campaign,	   Helms	   ignored	   the	   fact	   that	   not	   only	   had	   the	   State	  Department	  delivered	   an	  oral	   protest,	   but	   that	   stronger	   action	  was	  not	   taken	   at	   the	   specific	   request	   of	   the	   yacht’s	   owners.151	  Just	   as	  Richard	  Nixon,	  as	  the	  sitting	  Vice	  President,	  had	  been	  constrained	  by	  the	  practicalities	  of	  governing	  while	  Kennedy	  was	  free	  to	  throw	  out	  accusations,	   so	   too	   did	   the	   Ford	   administration	   appear	   vulnerable	  only	   because	   officials	   had	   to	   conduct	   quiet,	   behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  diplomacy	  in	  pursuit	  of	  U.S.	  interests.	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  Senator	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Helms	   once	   remarked	   that	   it	   was	   “a	   lot	   easier	   to	   throw	   a	  grenade	   than	   it	   is	   to	  catch	  one”,	  and	   there	  was	  no	  doubting	   that	  he	  pursued	   this	   aggressive	   “bomb-­‐throwing”	   style	  of	   criticism	  because	  he	  was	  looking	  to	  score	  points	  off	  Sea	  Wolf,	  rather	  than	  manage	  the	  situation	   effectively.152	  The	   yacht	   thus	   became	   a	   demonstration	   of	  the	   dynamics	   of	   conservatism	   when	   out	   of	   power.	   In	   later	   years,	  especially	  during	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  this	  approach	  would	  be	  tested	  by	  the	  reality	  of	  governing.	  	  At	   this	   point,	   however,	   the	   senator	   did	   not	   have	   to	   be	  concerned	   with	   political	   reality,	   as	   was	   evident	   in	   his	   subsequent	  proposal	   that	   President	   Ford	   not	   only	   cease	   negotiations	   over	   the	  Canal,	  but	  also	  reactivate	  the	  Naval	  Special	  Services	  Squadron	  so	  as	  to	   reassert	   U.S.	   sovereignty	   and	   rights	   of	   free	   passage	   through	   the	  Canal.	  The	  Sea	  Wolf	  incident	  was	  patently	  never	  going	  to	  threaten	  the	  momentum	   of	   negotiations,	   and	   the	   historical	   connotations	   of	  deploying	  U.S.	  battleships	  in	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  Caribbean	  were	  highly	  provocative	  in	  a	  region	  previously	  accustomed	  to	  American	  gunboat	  diplomacy.	   Indeed,	   it	  had	  been	  the	  Naval	  Special	  Services	  Squadron	  that	   served	  as	   the	  spear	   tip	  of	  U.S.	  military	  power	   in	   the	  Caribbean	  during	   the	   1920s,	   pursuing	   political	   stability	   and	   expanded	   capital	  markets	   through	   both	   the	   threat	   and	   application	   of	   American	  intervention.153	  In	  advocating	  a	  renewed	  naval	  presence	  in	  the	  area,	  Helms	  was	  calling	  for	  a	  return	  to	  policies	  that	  had	  partly	  stoked	  the	  resentment	   and	   tension	   that	   underpinned	   Panama’s	   current	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   York:	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   Peter	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   (New	  York:	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   Lars	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  U.S.	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  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	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  125-­‐315,	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  Gaddis	  Smith,	  The	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  –	  1993	  (New	  York:	  Hill	  and	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  1994),	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demands	  –	  but	  which	  fitted	  in	  with	  the	  glorification	  of	  Rooseveltian	  power	  projection	  in	  the	  western	  hemisphere.	  	   Having	  witnessed	  Ford’s	  approval	  ratings	  increase	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Mayaguez	   incident	   in	  May	  1975,	   in	  which	   the	  president	  deployed	  U.S.	  forces	   to	   rescue	   the	   crew	  of	   an	  American	   transport	   ship	   captured	   by	   the	  Cambodian	   Khmer	   Rouge,	   Helms	   may	   have	   expected	   his	   proposals	   to	  appeal	  to	  populist	  sentiment.154	  The	  senator	  had	  previously	  tied	  Mayaguez	  to	  Panama,	  commenting	  only	  days	  after	   the	  military	  operation	   to	   free	   the	  captured	   cargo	   vessel	   that	   such	   a	   response	   was	   applicable	   to	   the	   Canal	  Zone.	   ‘We	  have	   learned	  how	  important	   it	   is	   to	  stand	  up	  for	  our	  rights,’	  he	  told	  senators,	  ‘and	  we	  should	  do	  so	  in	  the	  Canal	  Zone.’155	  Helms’	  dismay	  at	  Ford’s	   inaction	   in	   the	  Sea	  Wolf	   case	  perhaps	   reflected	  his	   frustration	   that	  the	  president	  seemed	  unwilling	   to	  demonstrate	  decisive	   leadership	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  Mayaguez.156	  	  	  Though	   Helms	   saw	   Sea	   Wolf	   as	   a	   critical	   component	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Treaties	   campaign,	   it	   was	   not	   a	   widely-­‐held	   sentiment	   among	  conservatives.	  No	  other	  member	  of	  Congress	   commented	  on	   the	   incident,	  and	  while	  Helms	  successfully	  generated	  national	  media	  interest	  in	  the	  case,	  this	   quickly	   dissipated	  when	   the	   Ford	   administration	   quickly	   and	   quietly	  secured	   the	   yacht’s	   release.	   A	   late-­‐night	   White	   House	   press	   statement	  confirmed	  the	  matter	  was	  closed,	  and	  attention	  drifted	  to	  other	  matters.157	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  (December,	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  Events,	   24	  May,	  1975,	  1,	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   Lou	   Cannon,	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   Action	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   Friends,	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  Washington	  
Post,	  16	  May,	  1975,	  A1.	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A	  month	  later,	  after	  Sea	  Wolf	  returned	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Helms	  tried	  in	  vain	   to	   renew	  pressure	   on	   the	   Ford	   administration	   by	   noting	   statements	  made	  by	  the	  yacht’s	  master	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  no	  longer	  protect	  naval	  traffic	  entering	  or	  exiting	  the	  Canal.	  Such	  words,	  Helms	  argued,	  ‘bear	  an	  ominous	  ring	  for	  the	  future	  of	  our	  leadership	  and	  power.’158	  But	  this	  had	  no	  appreciable	  impact	  on	  either	  Congress	  or	  the	  media.	  	   The	   entrepreneurial	   streak	   that	   characterised	  Helms’	   foreign	   policy	  was	  now	  deployed	  in	  pursuit	  of	  this	  more	  confrontational	  Cold	  War	  vision.	  	  Enjoying	  the	  support	  of	  movement	  conservatives	  delighted	  by	  the	  senator’s	  work	   on	   behalf	   of	   Ronald	   Reagan	   in	   the	   North	   Carolina	   primary,	   Helms	  endeavoured	  to	  alter	  the	  Republican	  Party’s	  Panama	  Canal	  policy	  during	  its	  1976	  national	  convention.159	  Helms’	  plank	  proposed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  not	  “give	  up	  that	  which	  is	  ours”	  nor	  permit	  any	  efforts	  to	  “relinquish	  United	   States	   sovereignty	   and	   control”	   in	   the	   Zone. 160 	  Offering	   a	  conservative	   plank	   on	   Panama	   represented	   one	   element	   of	   a	   wider	  campaign	  by	  Tom	  Ellis	   to	  persuade	  conservative	  Ford	  delegates	   to	  switch	  to	   Reagan.161	  Helms,	   Ellis,	   and	   a	   faction	   of	   New	   Rightists	   –	   including	   the	  senator’s	  aides	  Jim	  Lucier	  and	  John	  Carbaugh,	  North	  Carolina	  academic	  and	  future	  senator	   John	  East,	  and	  Rep.	  Philip	  Crane’s	  administrative	  assistant,	  Rich	  Williamson	  –	  wanted	   ‘“red	  meat”’,	  as	  Hannaford	  recalled,	   in	  an	  effort	  to	  split	  the	  platform	  committee	  and	  weaken	  Ford’s	  support	  base.162	  Just	  as	  in	   North	   Carolina,	   however,	   John	   Sears	   feared	   that	   Helms	   and	   his	   allies	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risked	   marginalising	   centrist	   Republicans.163	  Sears	   did	   not	   want	   a	   bitter	  platform	   fight	   that	   might	   damage	   Reagan’s	   chances	   of	   securing	   enough	  votes	   for	   the	   nomination.164	  Senior	   Reagan	   advisers	   were	   thus	   careful	   to	  maintain	   their	   distance	   from	   the	   more	   provocative	   elements	   of	   Helms’	  proposal.165	  	  	  Though	  a	   relatively	  minor	  difference,	   it	  nevertheless	   indicated	  early	  tensions	  between	  the	  pragmatists	  that	  surrounded	  Ronald	  Reagan	  and	  the	  movement	   conservatives,	   led	   by	  Helms,	  who	   also	   sought	   to	   influence	   the	  future	   president.	  When	  Reagan	   entered	   the	  Oval	   Office,	   these	   differences	  intensified,	   as	   Helms’	   commitment	   to	   an	   unyielding	   conservative	   Central	  American	   policy	   clashed	   with	   the	   strategy	   of	   those	   concerned	   with	  constructing	  workable	  policies.	  Helms	  would	   come	   to	   lament	   elements	  of	  President	   Reagan’s	   policies,	   and	   while	   he	   consistently	   blamed	   their	  differences	  on	  Reagan’s	  advisers,	  he	  nevertheless	  admitted	  that	  ‘I	  could	  not	  compromise	  principle’	  even	  for	  a	  cherished	  friendship.166	  	  	  Thus,	   although	   it	   appeared	   insignificant	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	  bitter	  intra-­‐party	  fight	  being	  waged	  in	  1976,	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Helms	  Group’s	  foreign	  policy	  platform	  –	  including	  its	  tough	  language	  on	  Panama	  –	  augured	  poorly	   for	   the	   senator’s	   influence	   in	   the	   Reagan	   inner	   circle.	   Indeed,	   the	  limitation	  of	  Helms’	   influence	  was	  amply	  demonstrated	  by	   the	   fate	  of	   the	  Panama	   proposals.	   Sears	   did	   not	   completely	   marginalise	   Helms	   and	   his	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allies,	   but	   when	   the	   foreign	   policy	   showdown	   with	   the	   Ford	   forces	  occurred,	   Reagan’s	   team	   quietly	   sacrificed	   Helms’	   Panama	   language	   in	  exchange	  for	  a	  series	  of	  concessions	  from	  the	  Ford	  camp.167	  	  When	   the	   final	  Republican	  Party	   platform	  was	   revealed,	   the	   section	  on	   Panama	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   reaffirmation	   of	   the	   Ford	   administration’s	  current	  framework	  for	  negotiations:	  	  The	   present	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaty	   provides	   that	   the	   United	  States	  has	  jurisdictional	  rights	  in	  the	  Canal	  Zone	  as	  "if	  it	  were	  the	  sovereign."	  The	  United	  States	   intends	  that	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  be	  preserved	   as	   an	   international	   waterway	   for	   the	   ships	   of	   all	  nations.	   This	   secure	   access	   is	   enhanced	   by	   a	   relationship	   that	  commands	   the	   respect	   of	   Americans	   and	   Panamanians	   and	  benefits	  the	  people	  of	  both	  countries.	  In	  any	  talks	  with	  Panama,	  however,	   the	   United	   States	   negotiators	   should	   in	   no	  way	   cede,	  dilute,	  forfeit,	  negotiate	  or	  transfer	  any	  rights,	  power,	  authority,	  jurisdiction,	   territory	   or	   property	   that	   are	   necessary	   for	   the	  protection	   and	   security	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   entire	  Western	  Hemisphere.168	  	  When	  the	  robust	  language	  was	  stripped	  away,	  the	  platform	  provided	  sufficient	   political	   cover	   for	   the	   president	   to	   transfer	   any	   ‘rights,	   power,	  authority,	  jurisdiction,	  territory	  or	  property’	  he	  saw	  fit,	  as	  long	  as	  he	  could	  justify	  it	   from	  a	  national	  and	  international	  security	  perspective.169	  Though	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167 	  “Conservatives	   Show	   Strength	   At	   GOP	   Platform	   Hearings,”	   Human	  
Events,	   21	   August,	   1976,	   5,	   Jules	   Witcover,	   “Reagan	   Forces	   and	   Helms’	  ‘Rebels’	  Get	  Together,”	  Washington	  Post,	  12	  August,	  1976,	  A6,	  and	  Clymer,	  
Drawing	  the	  Line,	  37.	  
168	  Republican	   Party	   Platforms,	   "Republican	   Party	   Platform	   of	   1976,"	   18	  August,	  1976,	  online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  
Presidency	   Project	   accessed	   26	   February,	   2013,	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25843.	  
169	  Clymer,	  Drawing	  the	  Line,	  38.	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conservatives	   lauded	   the	   Helms	   Group	   for	   its	   efforts,	   the	   national	  Republican	  Party	   remained	  wedded	   to	   the	  Kissingerian	   framework	   in	   the	  Isthmus.170	  	  Of	   course,	   the	   fact	   that	   Ford	   was	   nominated	   for	   the	   Republican	  presidential	  candidacy	  was	  the	  bitterest	  pill	  of	  all.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  senator	  and	   his	   allies	   left	   the	   convention	   believing	   they	   had	   secured	   the	   Party’s	  official	   condemnation	   of	   both	   the	   tone	   and	   substance	   of	   Ford’s	   current	  foreign	  policies.	  In	  language	  titled	  ‘Morality	  In	  Foreign	  Policy’,	  inserted	  as	  a	  preamble	  to	  the	  foreign	  policy	  plank,	  the	  Republican	  Party	  declared:	  
Ours	   will	   be	   a	   foreign	   policy	   which	   recognizes	   that	   in	  international	   negotiations	   we	   must	   make	   no	   undue	  concessions;	   that	   in	   pursuing	   detente	   we	   must	   not	   grant	  unilateral	   favors	  with	  only	  the	  hope	  of	  getting	  future	  favors	  in	  return.	  	  
Agreements	  that	  are	  negotiated,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  signed	  in	  Helsinki,	  must	   not	   take	   from	   those	  who	   do	   not	   have	   freedom	  the	  hope	  of	  one	  day	  gaining	  it.	  	  
Finally,	   we	   are	   firmly	   committed	   to	   a	   foreign	   policy	   in	  which	  secret	  agreements,	  hidden	  from	  our	  people,	  will	  have	  no	  part.171	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  “Republicans	  Ok	   Platform	  Repudiating	   Ford	   Policy,”	  Human	  Events,	   28	  August,	  1976,	  3.	  For	  other	  examples	  of	  praise	  for	  Helms	  from	  the	  magazine,	  see	   “Conservatives	   Show	   Strength	   At	   GOP	   Platform	   Hearings,”	   5,	   “Ford	  Bows	   to	   Kissinger	   Rebuke,”	   Human	   Events,	   28	   August,	   1976,	   3,	   and	  “Delegates	  Failed	  to	  Follow	  Their	  Conservative	  Instincts,”	  Human	  Events,	  28	  August,	  1978,	  1.	  
171	  Republican	   Party	   Platforms,	   "Republican	   Party	   Platform	   of	   1976,"	   18	  August,	  1976,	  online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  
Presidency	   Project,	   accessed	   26	   February,	   2013.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25843.	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Though	   the	   language	   did	   not	  mention	   Panama	   specifically,	   as	   Helms	   had	  desired	   when	   advising	   on	   the	   section’s	   content,	   it	   was	   a	   targeted	  repudiation	  of	  Ford	  and	  Kissinger.172	  The	  president	  and	  his	  advisers	  knew	  it,	  and	  Ford	  later	  recalled:	  
When	  I	  read	  the	  plank,	  I	  was	  furious.	  It	  added	  up	  to	  nothing	  less	  than	   a	   slick	   denunciation	   of	   Administration	   foreign	   policy.	  Kissinger	   wanted	   me	   to	   take	   on	   the	   Reaganites.	   They	   were	  trying	   to	   humiliate	   us	   publicly,	   he	   said,	   and	   we	   shouldn’t	   let	  them	  get	  away	  with	  it.173	  
Persuaded	   by	   his	   political	  managers	   that	   losing	   the	   floor	   fight	   over	  the	   ‘Morality’	   plank	   would	   scuttle	   his	   chances	   of	   the	   nomination,	   Ford	  relented.	   The	  Helms	  Group	  had	  wanted	   a	   floor	   fight	   for	   this	   very	   reason,	  and	  they	  were	  outraged	  when	  attempts	  to	  force	  a	  roll-­‐call	  vote	  on	  the	  plank	  were	  denied	  by	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  convention.	  Ellis,	  having	  lost	  his	  voice	  from	   strenuous	   discussions	   during	   the	   week,	   attempted	   to	   call	   on	   John	  Rhodes,	   chair	   of	   the	   convention,	   to	   force	   a	   vote	   from	   the	   floor.	  Rhodes,	   a	  Ford	  ally,	   ignored	  Helms’	  adviser.	  To	  add	  insult	  to	   injury	  for	  the	  senator’s	  group,	   it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	   John	  Sears	  ordered	  Ellis’	  microphone	  to	  be	   shut	   off	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   floor	   fight	   conservatives	   so	   badly	  desired.174	  For	   Helms,	   it	   was	   an	   early	   experience	   of	   the	   leverage	   to	   be	  gained	   from	   placing	   allies	   within	   the	   structures	   of	   decision-­‐making,	   and	  considering	  his	  later	  approaches	  to	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Central	  America,	  it	  was	  a	  lesson	  he	  took	  to	  heart.	  	  While	  Helms	  failed	  in	  his	  efforts	  to	  redirect	  Republican	  policy	  on	  the	  Canal,	   increased	   attention	   on	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   waterway	   pushed	   it	   to	   the	  centre-­‐stage	   of	   the	   national	   political	   scene.	   During	   the	   1976	   presidential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Hannaford,	  The	  Reagans,	  130-­‐131,	  and	  Clymer,	  Drawing	  the	  Line,	  37.	  
173	  Ford,	  A	  Time	  To	  Heal,	  398.	  
174	  Hannaford,	  The	  Reagans,	  133-­‐134.	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election,	  political	  commentators	  observed	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  popular	   interest	   in	   the	  Canal	   and,	  magnified	  by	   riots	   in	   the	   Isthmus	   in	  September,	  the	  issue	  became	  central	  to	  the	  foreign	  policy	  debate	  between	  Ford	  and	  his	  Democratic	  challenger,	  Jimmy	  Carter.175	  Both	  candidates	  were	  responding	   to	   fears,	   long	   stoked	   by	   conservatives,	   about	   the	   failures	   of	  détente	   and	   the	   implications	   for	   American	   prestige	   and	   security	   should	  new	   treaties	   be	   signed.	   Ford	   and	   Carter	   shifted	   noticeably	   to	   the	   right,	  looking	   to	   protect	   themselves	   against	   accusations	   that	   they	   were	  undermining	   the	   nation’s	   historical	   legacy	   and	   its	   current	   status	   as	   a	  superpower.176	  Thus	  did	  Helms	  aid	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	   ‘Republican	  center’	  in	   the	   1970s,	   as	   Ford	   became	  more	   hawkish	   on	   the	   Canal:	   continuing	   to	  insist	   on	   negotiations,	   but	   increasingly	   strident	   about	   the	   necessity	   of	  maintaining	   control.177 	  Carter,	   while	   striking	   at	   the	   immorality	   of	   the	  nation’s	  recent	  history	  of	  international	  relations,	  nevertheless	  asserted	  that	  as	  president	  he	  would	  commit	  to	   ‘complete	  control	  or	  practical	  control’	  of	  the	   Canal	   in	   perpetuity.	   It	   was	   an	   assertion	   that	   drew	   significant	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  Henry	   L.	   Trewhitt,	   who	  moderated	   the	   foreign	   policy	   debate	   between	  the	  candidates,	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  had	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  most	  of	  the	  correspondence	  he	  had	  received	  on	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  prior	  to	   the	   debate.	   “Transcript	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Debate	   Between	   Ford	   and	  Carter,“	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  7	  October,	  1976,	  36.	  The	  national	  daily	  media	  began	   to	  cite	   the	  Canal	  as	  one	   issue	   that	  demonstrated	  a	  clear	  separation	  between	  Ford	  and	  Carter.	  Coverage	  of	  the	  Panamanian	  riots	  did	  not	  make	  front-­‐pages,	  but	  it	  nevertheless	  focused	  attention	  on	  the	  Isthmus	  during	  the	  election	  season.	   Joanne	  Omang,	   “National	  Guard	  Quells	  Student	  Protest	   in	  Panama,”	  Washington	  Post,	  21	  September,	  1976,	  A16,	  “Our	  riots	  U.S.	  fault	  -­‐-­‐	  Panama,”	   Chicago	   Tribune,	   18	   September,	   1976,	   3,	   and	   “G.I.	   and	   2	  Employees	   of	   U.S.	   Held	   By	   Panama	   for	   Stirring	  Disorders,”	  The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  18	  September,	  1976,	  40.	  The	  media	  picked	  on	  the	  Canal	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	   issues	   raised	   by	   the	   foreign	   policy	   debate	   between	   Ford	   and	   Carter.	  Bernard	   Gwertzman,	   “Some	   Major	   Differences,”	   The	   New	   York	   Times,	   8	  October,	  1976,	  19.	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  Hogan,	  Panama	  Canal,	  86.	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  Zelizer,	  Arsenal	  of	  Democracy,	  269.	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consternation	  from	  the	  Panama	  government	  but	  some	  cheer	  to	  residents	  of	  the	  Zone.178	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  Canal	  was	  a	  decisive	  issue	  in	  the	  1976	  election	  is	  debatable.	   LaFeber	   contends	   that,	   as	   with	   the	   majority	   of	   foreign	   policy	  issues	  in	  American	  electoral	  history,	  the	  Canal	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  voters.179	  Conservatives	   were	   certainly	   unimpressed	   with	   both	   candidates’	  comments,	  despite	  the	  apparent	  hardening	  of	  their	  rhetoric.	  Human	  Events	  summarised	  the	  right’s	  pessimism	  when	  it	  declared	  ‘Americans	  Are	  Losers	  In	   Second	   Debate’,	   and	   chastised	   both	   men	   for	   not	   proclaiming	   an	  unequivocal	   commitment	   to	   U.S.	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   Zone. 180 	  Though	  movement	   conservatives	   tended	   to	   favour	   Ford,	   the	   magazine’s	   support	  was	  only	  ever	  lukewarm.181	  	  	   The	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties,	  1977-­‐1978	  	  Had	   Jimmy	   Carter	   maintained	   his	   ambiguous	   attitude	   toward	   the	  negotiations,	   Helms	   and	   his	   movement	   conservative	   allies	   would	   likely	  have	   required	   a	   different	   foreign	   policy	   issue	   to	   mobilise	   against	   liberal	  internationalism.	   Arms	   limitations	   talks	   (SALT	   II)	   or	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   B-­‐1	  bomber	  would	  perhaps	  have	  been	  the	  most	  likely	  candidates,	  but	  the	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  178	  It	  was,	   as	  with	   a	   number	   of	   Carter’s	   election	   statements	   on	   the	  Canal,	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   to	   ascertain	  his	   genuine	   commitment.	  He	   subsequently	   vacillated	  on	  the	  timeframe	  of	  his	  commitment,	  declaring	  that	  he	  would	  not	  give	  up	  control	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   future.’	   “Transcript	  of	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  Affairs	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   and	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  The	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  Times,	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   1976,	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  See	  also	  Joanne	  Omang,	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  Panama,”	  Washington	  Post,	   8	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   1976,	  A14,	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   “Panama	  Says	  Carter	  Raises	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  The	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  York	  Times,	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   lamented	   that	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   policy	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   doesn’t	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recognised	   that	   technical	   issues	   like	   these	   did	   not	   have	   the	   emotional	  impact	  of	   the	  Canal.	   It	  was	  Carter’s	  decision	  to	  prioritise	  new	  agreements	  with	  Panama	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  transfer	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  his	  inclusion	  of	  the	   treaties	   as	   part	   of	   his	   wider	   framework	   of	   a	   moralistic	   liberal	  internationalism,	   that	   encouraged	   Helms	   and	   his	   allies	   to	   intensify	   their	  existing	  anti-­‐Treaties	  efforts.182	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  began	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  a	  campaign	   that	   made	   a	   significant	   contribution	   to	   the	   triumph	   of	   the	  Reaganite	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  in	  1980.	  	   On	  18	   January	  1976,	  Helms	  wrote	   to	  Carter,	   assuring	   the	  president-­‐elect	   that	  he	  would	  work	  with	  him	   ‘in	  any	  way	  possible	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	  our	   nation…	   nothing	  would	   please	  me	  more	   than	   to	   see	   you	   become	   the	  best	   President	   the	  United	   States	   has	   ever	   had.’183	  The	   senator	   recognised	  that	   a	   shared	   southern,	  Baptist	  upbringing	  and	  Navy	   service	  held	  out	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   bridge	   across	   the	   ideological	   divide.184 	  Perhaps,	   given	  Carter’s	   oscillating	   rhetoric	   on	   the	   Canal	   during	   the	   election	   campaign,	  Helms	   also	   hoped	   that	   the	   new	   president	   would	   adhere	   to	   the	   more	  aggressive	   defence	   of	   American	   interests	   in	   the	   Zone	   that	   Carter	   had	  promised.	  	  In	   mid-­‐January	   1977,	   however,	   only	   days	   before	   his	   inauguration,	  Carter	  informed	  Congress	  that	  he	  would	  make	  new	  treaties	  with	  Panama	  a	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   York:	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   and	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   109-­‐111,	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   Zbigniew	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   Power	   and	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   (New	   York:	   Farrah	   Straus	   Giroux,	   1983),	  134.	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priority	   for	   his	   administration.185	  He	   was	   increasingly	   conscious	   of	   the	  Canal’s	  status	  as	  a	   ‘diplomatic	  cancer’,	  not	  only	   for	  relations	  with	  Panama	  but	   also	   for	   the	   United	   States’	   reputation	   in	   the	   Third	   World	   more	  generally. 186 	  The	   president	   was	   looking	   to	   create	   a	   more	   open	   and	  equitable	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  developing	  nations.	  This	  would	  be	  posited	  along	  North-­‐South	  lines,	  instead	  of	  the	  traditional	  East-­‐West	  axis	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  Carter	  hoped	  to	  improve	  the	  standing	  of	  those	  nations	  previously	  relegated	  to	  a	  peripheral,	  often	  subservient,	  role	  in	  that	  conflict.	  Transferring	   the	   Canal	   to	   Panama	   would	   be	   a	   critical	   first	   step	   in	   this	  strategy.	   The	   schism	   between	   this	   worldview	   and	   that	   of	   Helms	   was,	   in	  part,	  why	   the	   senator	   later	   concluded	   that,	   ‘Over	   the	   years,	   Jimmy	  Carter	  and	   I	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   people	   can	   start	   from	   similar	   places	   and	  arrive	  at	  very	  different	  destinations.’187	  	   As	   his	   national	   security	   adviser	   Zbigniew	   Brzezinski	   later	   recalled,	  with	   the	   negotiations	   at	   a	   critical	   stage	   and	   intelligence	   assessments	  suggesting	   an	   escalation	   in	   regional	   instability	   should	   the	   discussions	  collapse,	  Carter’s	  advisers	  were	  convinced	  that	  agreeing	  new	  treaties	  with	  Panama	   was	   a	   strategic	   necessity.188	  In	   response,	   Helms	   acted	   swiftly	   to	  launch	   opening	   salvos	   against	   the	   new	   administration’s	   Panama	   policy.	  Pressing	  on	  from	  first	  and	  second	  wave	  opposition,	  the	  senator	  opened	  up	  a	   new	   front	   by	   criticising	   the	   big	   business	   connections	   of	   American	  negotiator	   Sol	   Linowitz.	   Helms	   argued	   that	   Linowitz’s	   directorships	  with	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  Times,	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  1977,	  1,	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  Don	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   Canal,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  13	  January,	  1977,	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   (London:	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Marine	  Midland	  Bank	  and	  Pan	  American	  Airways	  were	  significant	  conflicts	  of	   interest.	   These	   two	   corporations,	   Helms	   noted,	   had	   made	   large	  investments	   in	   Panama	   aimed	   at	   supporting	   the	   financially	   precarious	  Torrijos	  government.	  Panama	  had	  been	  a	  welcoming	  host	  for	  international	  business	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   era,	   largely	   thanks	   to	   a	   series	   of	   beneficial	   tax	  reforms,	  but	   it	   faced	  an	  unsecure	   financial	   future	   in	   the	  1970s	  because	  of	  trade	   deficits	   fuelled	   by	   the	   OPEC	   oil	   shock	   and	   Torrijos’	   large-­‐scale	  domestic	   capital	   investment.189	  Helms	   believed	   Linowitz,	   in	   representing	  both	   corporate	   supporters	   of	   Torrijos	   as	   well	   as	   the	   United	   States	  government,	   was	   an	   unsuitable	   negotiator:	   any	   treaties	   brought	   about	  through	  his	  mediation	  would	  be	  ‘fatally	  flawed.’190	  	  Helms’	   attack	   on	   Linowitz	   was	   a	   part	   of	   a	   concerted	   effort	   by	  conservatives	   to	   personalise	   the	   anti-­‐Treaties	   narrative	   by	   blending	   the	  perceived	  flaws	  in	  the	  U.S.	  negotiating	  team	  with	  those	  of	  the	  new	  treaties	  themselves.	   Only	   the	   month	   before	   Helms’	   criticism	   of	   Linowitz,	  conservative	   media	   outlets	   had	   denounced	   the	   other	   senior	   American	  representative	   in	   the	   treaty	   talks,	  Ellsworth	  Bunker,	   for	  his	   long-­‐standing	  connection	   to	   Henry	   Kissinger.191	  Linowitz	   himself	   had	   also	   previously	  found	  himself	   the	   subject	  of	   conservative	   ire.	   Spruille	  Braden,	   a	   favourite	  diplomat	  among	  the	  post-­‐war	  right	  because	  of	  his	  strong	  anti-­‐communist,	  interventionist	   philosophy,	   had	   ridiculed	   Linowitz’s	   Latin	   American	  commission	   by	   telling	   Human	   Events	   readers	   that	   the	   ambassador	   had	  ‘little	   experience	   or	   knowledge	   of	   the	   nations	   to	   the	   south	   of	   us.’192	  The	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  growth	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same	   publication	   also	   accused	   Linowitz	   of	   being	   a	   foreign	   agent	   for	  Salvador	   Allende’s	   leftist	   Chilean	   government.193 	  Helms	   continued	   this	  pattern,	   reinforcing	   the	   perception	   among	   grassroots	   conservatives	   that	  the	   treaties	   were	   being	   introduced	   by	   government	   officials	   who	   were	  ignorant,	  dangerously	  leftist,	  or	  both.	  	  Yet	  while	  much	  of	  this	  criticism	  of	  Linowitz	  (and	  Bunker)	  reflected	  a	  consensus	  among	  conservatives	  that	  Carter’s	  negotiators	  were	  bastions	  of	  détente,	   there	  was	   also	   a	   sense	   among	  Helms	   and	   the	   conservative	   anti-­‐Treaties	   lobby	  that	  Linowitz	  was	  representative	  of	  a	  growing	  challenge	  to	  the	   accepted	   norms	   of	   foreign	   policy.	   Conservatives	  were	   concerned	   that	  the	  Carter	  administration’s	  managerialist	  approach,	  partly	  reflected	  in	  the	  president’s	   faith	   in	   transnational	   banking	   and	   finance	   as	   instruments	   of	  American	   power,	   neglected	   traditional	   concepts	   of	   strength	   derived	   from	  physical	   manifestations	   of	   power	   (which,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Panama,	   meant	  territory). 194 	  Suggestions	   that	   the	   multinational	   business	   and	   banking	  community	  was	  exerting	   influence	  on	   the	  Panama	  Canal	  negotiations	  was	  therefore	  seized	  upon	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  dangerous	  usurpation	  of	  the	  nation’s	  Cold	  War	  objectives	  –	  in	  doing	  so,	  conservatives	  also	  implicitly	  re-­‐animated	  Roosevelt’s	   own	   criticism	   of	   moneyed	   interests	   as	   a	   factor	   in	   foreign	  policy.195	  	  Fuelling	   this	   concern	  was	   the	   fusionist,	   pristine	   capitalist	   economic	  framework	  that	  formed	  one	  of	  the	  core	  principles	  of	  Helms’	  conservatism.	  The	  senator	  understood	  the	  pursuit	  of	  corporate	  wealth	  to	  be	  subordinate	  to	   wider	   moral	   responsibilities,	   and	   in	   Panama	   he	   saw	   a	   financial	  community	   abrogating	   its	   moral	   responsibility	   to	   support	   American	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national	   security	   in	   favour	   of	   securing	   profit	   and	   shareholder	   success.196	  Thus,	  like	  those	  traditionalist	  conservatives	  –	  Russell	  Kirk,	  Richard	  Weaver,	  and	   Robert	   Nisbet	   –	   who	   attacked	   the	   Vanderbilt,	   Carnegie,	   Rockefeller,	  and	   Morgan	   economic	   titans	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   for	   their	   single-­‐minded	   pursuit	   of	   wealth,	   the	   senator	   criticised	   his	   era’s	   financial	  institutions	  for	  their	  neglect	  of	  the	  public	  good	  over	  the	  Canal.197	  Banks	  like	  Marine	  Midland	  had	  provided	  extensive	  loans	  to	  the	  Torrijos	  government,	  he	   said,	   ‘to	   prop	   up	   an	   incompetent	   dictatorial	   regime’	   in	   return	   for	   ‘a	  haven	   for	   the	   banks	   to	   expand	   their	   international	   operations.’	   Having	  reached	   their	   lending	   limits,	   the	   banks	   believed	   that	   a	   rumoured	   annual	  $40	  million	  payment	  to	  Panama	  included	  in	  the	  new	  treaties	  would	  provide	  the	  funds	  to	  repay	  their	  previous	  loans:	  	  is	  it	  beyond	  reason	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  banking	  fraternity	  involved	   in	   Panama	   are	   looking	   to	   the	   proposed	   surrender	   of	  U.S.	   sovereignty	   and	   territory	   in	   the	   Canal	   Zone	   as	   a	   way	   of	  propping	   up	   the	   Torrijos	   regime	   and	   providing	   increased	  revenues	   to	   his	   government?	   Is	   it	   not	   fair	   to	   ask	  whether	   the	  short	  range	  interests	  of	  those	  financial	  institutions	  might	  not	  be	  subordinated	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  States?’198	  	   Moreover,	   his	   pristine	   capitalist	   ideals,	   similar	   in	   some	   ways	   to	  Jefferson’s	   agrarian	   republicanism,	   lauded	   physical	   produce	   and	   local	  structures	   over	   the	   intangible	   corporate	   economic	   assets	   such	   as	   stocks	  and	   bonds	   and	   the	   institutions	   that	   traded	   them.199 	  This	   suspicion	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196 	  Helms,	   Empire	   for	   Liberty,	   xxii.	   Helms	   continued	   to	   express	   this	  sentiment	   toward	   Cold	   War	   and	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   foreign	   policy.	   Helms,	  
Empire	  for	  Liberty,	  91-­‐102,	  and	  Susan	  F.	  Rasky,	   ‘What	  Is	  Good	  for	  Security	  May	  Be	  Bad	  for	  Business,’	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  18	  October,	  1987,	  222.	  
197	  Himmelstein,	  To	  The	  Right,	  45-­‐53	  and	  Allitt,	  The	  Conservatives,	  97-­‐98.	  
198	  Helms,	  “Sol	  Linowitz:	  Banker	  And	  Treaty	  Negotiator	  –	  A	  Conflict?”	  Cong.	  
Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  4805	  –	  4809.	  
199	  Himmelstein,	  To	  The	  Right,	  47.	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opaque	  concentrations	  of	  economic	  power	  fed	  into	  the	  charges	  levelled	  by	  Helms	  and	  conservatives	  that	   the	   international	  banking	  community	  was	  a	  secretive	   and	   influential	   partner	   in	   the	   Carter	   administration’s	   decision-­‐making	  process.200	  	  	  Exacerbating	   the	   situation	   for	   Helms	   was	   his	   perception	   that	   the	  administration	   had	   deliberately	   subverted	   congressional	   oversight	   of	  Linowitz’s	   appointment	   by	   nominating	   him	   to	   a	   temporary,	   six-­‐month	  term.	   The	   mandatory	   confirmation	   process	   did	   not	   cover	   short-­‐term	  appointments,	   and	   Helms	   argued	   that	   the	   Department	   of	   State	   had	   used	  this	  fact	  to	  avoid	  an	  embarrassing	  investigation	  into	  Linowitz’s	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	   ‘The	   American	   people	   deserve	   to	   know	   how	   he	   will	   avoid	   a	  conflict,’	   the	   senator	   told	   his	   colleagues.201 	  Over	   time,	   this	   accusation	  transformed	  into	  part	  of	  the	  senator’s	  attack	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  treaties	  process.	  ‘What	  kind	  of	  ratification	  process	  is	  it,’	  Helms	  later	  argued,	  ‘when	  the	  Executive	  bypasses	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  it,	  namely,	  the	  advice	  and	  consent	   to	  Ambassadors	  about	   to	  undertake	  a	  major	  negotiation?’	  Stating	  that	  ‘usurpation	  and	  irresponsibility	  lead	  to	  seizure	  of	  power	  and	  tragedy’,	  the	   senator	   cited	   Linowitz’s	   situation	   as	   exemplary	   of	   an	   administration	  ‘which	  has	  constantly	  refused	  to	  abide	  by	   its	  constitutional	  authority,	  and	  has	  failed	  to	  take	  the	  Congress	  into	  its	  confidence	  about	  actions	  which	  are	  solely	  in	  the	  field	  of	  congressional	  prerogative	  anyway.’202	  	  The	   senator’s	   accusations	   gained	   significant	   traction	   among	  conservatives,	  and	  he	  was	  lauded	  by	  right-­‐wing	  media	  for	  introducing	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  Moffett,	  Limits	  of	  Victory,	  175.	  
201	  Helms,	  “Sol	  Linowitz:	  Banker	  And	  Treaty	  Negotiator	  –	  A	  Conflict?”	  Cong.	  
Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  4805	  –	  4806.	  
202	  U.S.	  Senate,	  Committee	  on	  the	  Judiciary.	  Subcommittee	  on	  Separation	  of	  Powers,	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaty	  (Disposition	  of	  U.S.	  Territory),	  Part	  1,	  22	  July,	  1977,	  216.	  
	   82	  
issue	  into	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	  campaign.203	  Linowitz	  would	  later	  recall	  seeing	  his	   effigy	   hanged	  during	   conservative	   protests	   on	  Constitution	  Avenue	   in	  Washington	  D.C.204	  Administration	  officials	  rejected	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  was	  undue	   corporate	   influence	   on	   Linowitz	   in	   the	   negotiations,	   but	   within	   a	  month	  he	  had	  quietly	   resigned	   from	  his	  position	  at	  Marine	  Midland	  Bank	  and	  stepped	  back	  from	  aspects	  of	  the	  negotiations	  that	  covered	  any	  subject	  linked	   to	   Pan	   America. 205 	  The	   senator	   claimed	   credit	   for	   Linowitz’s	  resignation,	   though	   tempered	   this	   self-­‐congratulation	   by	   claiming	   ‘public	  pressure’	  had	  forced	  the	  issue.206	  	  	  Conservatives	   believed	   the	   Linowitz	   banking	   connection	   dovetailed	  with	  public	  fears	  that	  national	  policy	  was	  being	  subverted	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  eastern	  Establishment	  and	  its	  representatives	  in	  finance	  and	  politics.	  The	   banking	   issue	  was	   ‘“a	   sexy	   issue”’,	   Richard	   Viguerie	   declared.	   ‘“It’s	   a	  populist	   issue.	   	   And	   here’s	   a	   populist	   president	   who	   is	   going	   to	   bail	   out	  David	   Rockefeller.”’207	  Rep.	   George	   Hansen,	   who	   led	   on	   the	   issue	   in	   the	  House,	  asked	  his	  colleagues	  if	  it	  was	  Linowitz’s	  job	  ‘to	  get	  quick	  agreement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  Human	  Events	  quickly	  picked	  upon	  the	  senator’s	  remarks,	  passing	  them	  along	  to	  its	  readership	  and	  noting	  Helms	  –	  and	  George	  Hansen	  in	  the	  House	  –	   had	   been	   ‘stirring	   up	   a	   squall’	   with	   the	   accusations.	   “Capital	   Briefs,”	  
Human	  Events,	  12	  March,	  1977,	  2.	  
204	  Neil	  Lewis,	  “Sol	  M.	  Linowitz	  dies	  at	  91;	  Businessman	  and	  Diplomat,”	  The	  
New	  York	  Times,	  19	  March,	  2005,	  A13.	  
205	  Graham	  Hovey,	  “Linowitz	  Gives	  Up	  Post	  at	  Marine	  Bank,”	  The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  18	  March,	  1977,	  82,	  and	   John	  F.	  Berry,	   “Panama	  Treaty	  Negotiator	  Quits	  N.Y.	  Bank	  Board,”	  Washington	  Post,	  19	  March,	  1977,	  A6.	  
206	  Jesse	  Helms	   (NC),	   “Article	   IV,	   Section	  3,	  Restrains	  U.S.	  Negotiations	  On	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  24884,	  and	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Bring	  Escobar	  To	  The	  United	  States;	  Let’s	  See	  Who	  Stands	  Where,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  32996.	  
207	  Moffett,	  Limits	  of	  Victory,	  175.	  Helms	  had	  already	  stoked	  fears	  about	  the	  extent	   of	   Rockefeller’s	   influence	   back	   in	   1974	   when	   he	   condemned	   the	  vice-­‐president	   for	   using	   his	   wealth	   to	   construct	   ‘a	   network	   of	   political	  dependency.’	   Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “The	   Rockefeller	   Nomination,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	  120	  (1974),	  34320.	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to	   quickly	   shore	   up	   the	   revenue	   and	   asset	   picture	   of	   the	   Torrijos	  government?’	   ‘Why	   should	   the	   United	   States	   give	   up	   the	   Canal’,	   Hansen	  asked,	   ‘for	   a	   set	   of	   Linowtiz	   [sic]’	   to	   profiteer	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   its	  citizens?208	  Barry	   Goldwater	   (R-­‐AZ)	   told	   the	   Senate	   that	   ‘our	   large	   banks	  and	  international	  banks	  have	  a	  lot	  more	  to	  do	  with	  this	  treaty	  than	  meets	  the	  eye.’209	  Helms’	  February	  1977	  banking	  comments	  were	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  contributions	  he	  made	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	  campaign.	  	  While	  Linowitz,	  Bunker,	  and	  the	  banks	  represented	  a	  new	  facet	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	   argument,	   Helms	   maintained	   his	   focus	   on	   those	   principles	  that	   had	   long	   unified	   the	   opposition.	   In	   the	   weeks	   after	   his	   criticism	   of	  Linowitz,	  the	  senator	  rounded	  on	  those	  who	  argued	  the	  United	  States	  could	  continue	   to	   control	   the	   Canal	   even	   without	   sovereignty.	   Drawing	   on	   the	  opinions	   of	   Hanson	   W.	   Baldwin,	   a	   noted	   anti-­‐Treaties	   campaigner	   and	  former	   military	   editor	   of	   The	   New	   York	   Times,	   Helms	   argued	   that	  ‘surrender	   of	   U.S.	   sovereignty	   over	   the	   Canal	   Zone	  means	   loss	   of	   control	  over	   the	   Panama	   Canal.’	   A	   combination	   of	   ‘courage	   and	   caution’	   was	  required	   in	  dealing	  with	   the	  current	  situation	   in	   the	   Isthmus,	  he	  said,	  but	  the	  simple	   fact	  was	   that	   ‘the	  United	  States	   is	  a	  great	  and	  powerful	  Nation	  and	  Panama	  is	  small	  and	  weak.’210	  	  Helms’	   assertions	   of	   national	   superiority,	   and	   appeals	   to	   the	  sovereignty	   argument,	   became	   both	  more	   frequent	   and	  more	   strident	   in	  the	   third	   wave	   of	   opposition.	   They	   emphasised	   the	   Rooseveltian	  understanding	   of	   the	   Canal’s	   role	   in	   America’s	   past,	   present,	   and	   future.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  George	   Hansen	   (ID),	   “Sol	   Linowitz	   –	   A	   Study	   In	   Conflicts	   Of	   Interest,”	  
Cong.	   Rec.	   28923	   –	   28926.	   Hansen	   continued	   this	   theme	   late	   in	   1977.	  George	   Hansen	   (ID),	   “Carter’s	   Canal	   Treaties	   –	   A	   Bail	   Out	   For	   The	   Big	  Banks,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  39756-­‐39758.	  
209	  Barry	   Goldwater	   (AZ),	   “Treaty	   Concerning	   The	   Permanent	   Neutrality	  And	  Operation	  Of	  The	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  124	  (1978),	  3058.	  
210	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “U.S.	  Canal	  Zone	  And	  Panama	  Canal:	  Control	  Without	  Sovereignty	  Is	  Double-­‐Speak,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  9447.	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Repeatedly	   describing	   the	   transfer	   of	   authority	   as	   ‘handing	   over’	   the	  waterway,	  or	  as	  a	   ‘surrender’	  and	   ‘give-­‐away’	   reminded	  Americans	  of	   the	  core	   claims	   made	   by	   Roosevelt	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   century.211	  It	   not	   only	  challenged	   the	   Carter	   administration’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   Hay–Bunau-­‐Varilla	  Treaty,	  but	  also	  the	  manner	   in	  which	  they	  sold	  new	  treaties	  to	  the	  public.	  	  It	   also	   defended	   Roosevelt	   from	   a	   line	   of	   criticism	   that	   had	   been	  frequently	   directed	   toward	   the	   president	   in	   his	   own	   time.	   Many	   of	  Roosevelt’s	   political	   contemporaries	   were	   sceptical	   of	   his	   claim	   to	   have	  negotiated	  complete	  sovereignty	  for	  the	  United	  States	  over	  the	  Canal	  Zone.	  His	   Secretary	   of	   War,	   William	   Howard	   Taft,	   for	   example,	   was	   a	   notable	  dissenter.	   His	   conclusion	   in	   a	   letter	   to	   Roosevelt	   that	   Panama	   retained	  "titular	  sovereignty"	  in	  the	  Isthmus	  underpinned	  the	  arguments	  of	  those	  in	  the	  1970s	  who	  understood	  U.S.	  control	  as	   founded	  on,	  at	  best,	  a	  muddled	  understanding	   of	   the	   Hay–Bunau-­‐Varilla	   Treaty	   –	   or,	   at	   worst,	   a	  deliberately	   deceptive	   interpretation.	  212	  Zbigniew	   Brzezinski,	   responding	  to	  William	  Rogers	  of	   the	  anti-­‐Treaties	  American	  Legion,	  channeled	  Taft	   in	  succinctly	  pointing	  out:	  ‘We	  do	  not	  have	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  Canal	  or	  the	  Zone	   and	   never	   have.	   The	   Treaty	   of	   1903	   gives	   us	   rights,	   power,	   and	  authority	   to	   exercise	   as	   if	  we	  were	   sovereign,	   not	   as	   the	   sovereign.’213	  In	  defending	   sovereignty,	   Helms	   guarded	   and	   prolonged	   Roosevelt’s	  intentions	  for	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Panama.	  	   Moreover,	   Helms	   struck	   back	   against	   those	   who	   suggested	   that	   his	  country	   had	   acted	  with	   impropriety	   in	   1903	   or	   in	   subsequent	   years.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211 	  For	   examples,	   see	   Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “The	   Panama	   Canal	   Can	   Be	  Defended,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   123	   (1977),	   17096,	   Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Treaty	  Concerning	   The	   Permanent	   Neutrality	   And	   Operation	   Of	   The	   Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  124	  (1978),	  7170,	  and	  Helms,	  Here’s	  Where	  I	  Stand,	  109.	  
212	  LaFeber,	  Panama	  Canal,	  35.	  
213	  Letter,	   Zbigniew	   Brzezinski	   to	   William	   Rogers,	   27	   July,	   1977,	   FO	   3-­‐1/Panama	  Canal	  8/1/77	  –	  8/15/77,	  Box	  FO16,	  WHCF	  –	  Subject	  File,	  JCL.	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United	  States,	   the	  senator	  argued,	  had	  operated	  and	  maintained	  the	  Canal	  ‘with	   honor	   and	   integrity’	   and	  with	   ‘utmost	   efficiency	   and	   service	   to	   the	  world.’214	  It	   was	   a	   fabrication,	   concocted	   by	   the	   media,	   that	   there	   was	  anything	   shameful	   or	   regrettable	   about	  U.S.	   action	   in	  Panama.215	  In	  doing	  so,	   Helms	   stood	   up	   for	   a	   president	   who,	   in	   his	   own	   time,	   had	   suffered	  similar	  accusations.	  216	  Roosevelt’s	  own	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Elihu	  Root,	  had	  gone	   as	   far	   as	   to	   quietly	   reproach	   the	   president	   for	   perceived	   lapses	   in	  integrity	   over	   the	   episode. 217 	  Seventy	   years	   later,	   Helms	   played	   an	  important	   role	   in	   an	   anti-­‐treaties	   campaign	   that	   continually	   and	  emphatically	  defended	  Roosevelt’s	  conduct.218	  	   	  In	   mid-­‐June	   1977,	   Helms	   also	   joined	   with	   Senators	   Thurmond,	  McClellan,	  and	  Harry	  Byrd,	   Jr.	   in	  writing	   to	  Carter	   to	  support	   four	   retired	  naval	   chiefs	   of	   staff	   who	   told	   the	   president	   that	   negotiators	   should	   be	  instructed	  ‘to	  retain	  full	  sovereign	  control’	  over	  the	  Canal	  and	  the	  Zone.	  The	  waterway,	  the	  former	  chiefs	  declared,	  was	  ‘as	  important,	  if	  not	  more	  so,	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  Helms,	  “Treaty	  Concerning	  The	  Permanent	  Neutrality	  And	  Operation	  Of	  The	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  124	  (1978),	  7170.	  
215	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Accuracy	   In	   Media	   Corrects	   New	   York	   Times	   On	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  10522.	  
216	  One	  of	  the	  most	  vocal	  opponents	  was	  Senator	  John	  Tyler	  Morgan	  (D-­‐Al.).	  See	  “Morgan	  is	  mad	  about	  Panama,”	  Atlanta	  Constitution,	  3	   January,	  1904,	  b7,	   “Panama	   Issue	   Made,”	   The	   New	   York	   Times,	   5	   January,	   1904,	   1,	   and	  “Morgan	   Wants	   Panama,”	   The	   New	   York	   Times,	   21	   January,	   1904,	   5,	   for	  instances	   of	   Morgan’s	   outspoken	   attacks	   on	   the	   president’s	   conduct.	  Senator	  Charles	  A.	  Culberson	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  describe	  the	  incident	  as	  ‘“the	  most	  disgraceful	  diplomatic	  episode	  in	  all	  the	  annals	  of	  America.”’	  “Attacks	  the	  President,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  11	  January,	  1904,	  2.	  
217	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Elihu	  Root	  infamously	  remarked	  to	  Roosevelt	  during	  a	  Cabinet	  meeting	  ‘“You	  have	  shown	  that	  you	  were	  accused	  of	  seduction	  and	  you	   have	   conclusively	   proved	   that	   you	  were	   guilty	   of	   rape.”’	  Major,	  Prize	  
Possession,	  58.	  
218	  Phillip	   M.	   Crane,	   Surrender	   in	   Panama:	   The	   Case	   Against	   the	   Treaty	  (Ottawa:	  Green	  Hill	  Publishers,	   Inc,	  1978),	  5-­‐12,	   and	  Clymer,	  Drawing	  the	  
Line,	  65-­‐67.	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the	  United	  States	  than	  ever.’219	  Describing	  these	  individuals	  as	   ‘among	  the	  greatest	   living	   naval	   strategists	   today,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   experience	   and	  judgement’,	   Helms	   and	   his	   colleagues	   hoped	   that	   ‘you	   [Carter]	   will	   find	  such	   action	   wholly	   consistent	   with	   our	   national	   interest	   and	   will	   act	  accordingly.’220	  	  Helms	  regarded	  the	  letter	  from	  the	  retired	  chiefs	  as	  a	  decisive	  blow	  to	  the	   argument	   that	   sovereignty	   in	   the	   Zone	   was	   no	   longer	   a	   military	  necessity.	   On	   30	   June,	   in	   remarks	   on	   the	   Senate	   floor,	   he	   expressed	   his	  confidence	  in	  the	  analysis	  provided	  by	  these	  retired	  officers:	  	  In	   a	   period	   when	   armchair	   diplomats	   and	   guilt-­‐burdened	  journalists	   are	  pronouncing	   the	   canal	  undefendable	   and	  of	  no	  strategic	   value,	   the	   voices	   of	   those	   distinguished	   public	  servants,	  who	  have	  given	  their	  lives	  and	  careers	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  our	  Nation,	  rise	  together	  to	  attest	  the	  value	  –	  even	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  value	  –	  of	  the	  canal	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  this	  Nation	  and	  the	  free	  world.	  	  The	  nation,	  Helms	  told	  his	  colleagues,	   ‘has	  no	  reservoir	  of	  experience	  and	  judgment	  concerning	  naval	  strategy	  more	  valuable	  to	  us	  than	  this	  group	  of	  men.’221	  	  Carter’s	   response	  was	   less	   revealing	   for	   its	   content	   than	   its	   brevity.	  The	  president	  noted	  that,	  while	  he	  respected	  the	  military	  judgement	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219 	  Letter,	   Robert	   B.	   Carney,	   Arleigh	   A.	   Burke,	   George	   Anderson,	   and	  Thomas	   H.	   Moorer	   to	   President	   Carter,	   8	   June,	   1977,	   folder	   “FO	   3-­‐1/Panama	  Canal	  8/30/77,”	  Box	  FO16,	  WHCF	  –	  Subject	  File,	  JCL.	  
220	  Letter,	   Strom	   Thurmond,	   John	   L.	   McClure,	   Jesse	   Helms,	   and	   Harry	   F.	  Byrd	   Jr.	   to	  President	  Carter,	   15	   June,	   1977,	   folder	   “FO	  3-­‐1/Panama	  Canal	  8/30/77,”	  Box	  FO16,	  WHCF	  –	  Subject	  File,	  JCL.	  
221	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Former	  Chiefs	  Of	  Naval	  Operations	  Ask	  President	  To	  Retain	  Sovereignty	  In	  Panama	  Canal	  Zone,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  123	  (1977),	  21923.	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chiefs,	   and	   agreed	   that	   the	   Canal	   ‘retains	   strategic	   and	   commercial	  importance	   for	   the	   United	   States’,	   the	   chances	   of	   preserving	   ‘un-­‐fettered	  access	   to	   the	   canal’	   were	   ‘poor’	   without	   alterations	   to	   the	   status	   quo.222	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  Carter’s	  national	  security	  adviser,	  had	  informed	  those	  in	  charge	  of	  drafting	  the	  response	  that	  responding	  in	  detail	  to	  Helms	  was	  a	  waste	   of	   time.	   In	   handwritten	   annotations	   to	   a	   memo	   on	   the	   topic,	  Brzezinski	   wrote,	   ‘I	   think	   the	   letter	   should	   be	   only	   a	   paragraph	   and	   the	  arguments	  saved	  for	  more	  worthwhile	  targets’.223	  	  It	   was	   an	   early	   indication	   that	   the	   senator’s	   strident	   criticism	  rendered	   him	   largely	   irrelevant	   to	   a	  White	   House	   seeking	   to	   court	  more	  moderate	   senators	   in	   its	   quest	   for	   ratification.	   In	   December,	   Carter’s	  political	  advisers	  made	  it	  abundantly	  clear	  that	  Helms	  would	  not	  figure	  in	  the	   administration’s	   strategy	  on	   the	   treaties.	  Helms,	   they	   surmised,	   along	  with	   Senators	   Allen,	   Harry	   Byrd	   Jr.,	   Stennis,	   Bartlett,	   Curtis,	   Dole,	   Garn,	  Hansen,	   Hatch,	   Laxalt,	   McClure,	   Scott,	   Thurmond,	   Tower,	   and	   Wallop,	  ‘would	   support	   [the	   treaties]	   only	   with	   amendments	   unacceptable	   to	  Panama	  or	  would	  not	  support	  under	  any	  condition’.	  The	  recommendation	  was	   blunt:	   ‘No	   further	   contact	   planned.’224	  Alongside	   Carter’s	   diary	   entry	  for	   9	   August,	   in	   which	   he	   described	   Helms	   as	   one	   of	   a	   handful	   of	   Canal	  ‘nuts’,	  Brzezinski’s	   earlier	   assessment	   indicated	   that	   even	  before	   the	  new	  treaties	   had	   been	   signed,	   the	   senator	   was	   considered	   undeserving	   of	  attention	  from	  the	  administration.225	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	  Letter,	   President	   Carter	   to	   Jesse	   Helms,	   20	   July,	   1977,	   folder	   “FO	   3-­‐1/Panama	  Canal	  8/30/77,”	  Box	  FO16,	  WHCF	  –	  Subject	  File,	  JCL.	  
223	  Memo,	  Robert	  A.	  Pastor	  to	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  13	  July,	  1977,	  folder	  “FO	  3-­‐1/Panama	  Canal	  8/30/77,”	  Box	  FO16,	  WHCF	  –	  Subject	  File,	  JCL.	  
224	  Memo,	   Douglas	   J.	   Bennett,	   Jr.,	   Robert	   Beckel,	   and	   Robert	   Thomson	   to	  Hamilton	   Jordan	   and	   Frank	   Moore,	   1	   December,	   1977,	   folder	   “FO	   3-­‐1/Panama	  Canal	  11/1/77	  –	  1/20/81,”	  Box	  FO15,	  WHCF	  –	  Subject	  File,	  JCL.	  
225	  Carter,	  Keeping	  Faith,	  159.	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Helms’	   reliance	   on	   retired	   officers	   stemmed	   from	   conservative	  suspicion	   that	   the	   administration	  was	   stifling	   honest	   analysis	   among	   the	  active	  military	   leadership.	  Accusations	  of	  a	  duplicitous,	  or	  at	   least	  gagged,	  military	   became	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   senator’s	   narrative,	   and	   fuelled	  acrimonious	  exchanges	  during	  the	  ratification	  debate.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  senator	   used	   the	   letter	   sent	   by	   the	   chiefs	   themselves	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	  subsequent	  attacks	  on	   the	  current	  military’s	   judgement	  over	   the	  Canal.226	  ‘We	  all	  know	  that	  officers	  on	  active	  duty	  are	  under	  obligation	  to	  give	  their	  military	   advice	   based	   upon	   the	   given	   circumstances’,	   he	   remarked	   in	  October.	  ‘If	  their	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  has	  already	  made	  a	  political	  decision,	  they	  must	   shape	   their	   advice	   to	   the	   given	   circumstances,	   and	  make	   their	  military	   proposals	   accordingly.’	   They	  were	   not	   ‘any	   less	   loyal	   than	   other	  Americans’,	   but	   had	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   other	   issues.	   The	   former	  chiefs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  been	  ‘an	  inspiration’	  to	  the	  American	  people	  and	  former	  officers,	  too,	  in	  their	  courage	  in	  coming	  forward.227	  	  	  If	  a	   large	  part	  of	  the	  conservative	  anti-­‐Treaties	  campaign	  was	  based	  on	  a	  broad	  faith	  in	  the	  historical	  generosity	  of	  American	  actions	  in	  the	  Zone,	  so	   too	   did	   another	   critical	   issue	   in	   Helms’	   efforts	   emerge	   out	   of	   a	   wider	  national	   sentiment.	   The	   senator’s	   interest	   in	   Panama’s	   involvement	   in	  hemispheric	   drug	   trafficking	   was	   one	   facet	   of	   a	   growing	   national	   furore	  over	  the	  impact	  of	  drugs	  on	  U.S.	  society.	  Carter	  described	  the	  drugs	  issue	  as	  ‘an	  entirely	  new	  attack’	  on	  the	  treaties,	  but	  opponents	  of	  negotiations	  had	  already	   used	   allegations	   about	   the	   Torrijos	   government’s	   complicity	   in	  international	  drug	  smuggling	  to	  undermine	  negotiations	  with	  Panama.228	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  Daniel	  Flood	  had	  used	  Helms’	   letter	   in	  his	  own	  remarks	  on	  30	   June	   to	  express	   his	   concern	   that	   current	   officers	   were	   being	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1972,	   Rep.	   John	   Murphy	   (D-­‐NY)	   had	   launched	   an	   investigation	   into	  connections	   between	   senior	   officials	   in	   the	   Panamanian	   government	   and	  hemispheric	   narcotics	   smuggling.	   His	   report	   concluded	   that	   General	  Torrijos’	  brother,	  Moises	  Torrijos,	  and	  Panama’s	  foreign	  minister	  Juan	  Tack	  were	   intimately	   involved	   in	   large-­‐scale	   drug	   trafficking	   through	   Panama.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Panamanian	  governments	  declared	  the	  allegations	  to	  be	   unfounded,	   but	   anti-­‐Treaties	   campaigners	   seized	   upon	   the	   findings	   as	  evidence	   of	   the	   corrupt,	   unstable,	   and	   immoral	   character	   of	   the	  Panamanian	  government.229	  	  The	   issue	   resurfaced	   in	   Autumn	   1977	   when	   Helms	   and	   the	   Senate	  Steering	  Committee	  as	  well	  as	  fiery	  House	  conservatives	  Robert	  Dornan	  (R-­‐CA)	  and	  Robert	  Lagomarsino	  (R-­‐CA)	  wrote	  individually	  to	  the	  Department	  of	   Justice	  demanding	  information	  about	  the	  Torrijos	  family’s	   links	  to	  drug	  trafficking.	  Robert	  Pastor,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council’s	  primary	  expert	  on	  Latin	  America,	  was	  so	  concerned	  about	  the	  potential	  fallout	  from	  the	  public	  disclosure	   of	   what	   he	   had	   been	   told	  was	   an	   ‘extremely	   sensitive’	  Moises	  Torrijos	   indictment	   that	   he	   advised	   the	   Justice	   Department	   to	   avoid	  handing	   over	   any	   information.	   Particularly	   concerned	   about	   Dornan	  exploiting	   the	   issue	   to	   destroy	   the	   treaties,	   Pastor	  warned	   his	   contact	   at	  Justice	   that	   the	   congressman	   ‘would	   probably	   do	   anything	   to	   see	   them	  defeated.’230	  	  	  Pastor	  was	   astute	   in	   recognising	   the	   drugs	   issue	   posed	   dangers	   for	  the	   administration.	   Even	   before	   it	   was	   formally	   discussed	   in	   the	   Senate,	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  Inquiry	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  of	  Panama	  Government,”	   The	   New	   York	   Times,	   16	   March,	   1972,	   14,	   Jack	   Anderson,	  “Drug	   Report	   Names	   Panamanians,”	   Washington	   Post,	   Times	   Herald,	   14	  March,	   1972,	   B13,	   and	   Karen	   DeYoung	   and	   Marlise	   Simons,	  Washington	  
Post,	  “Panama	  Embittered	  by	  Drug	  Allegations,”	  13	  November,	  1977,	  A27.	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Human	  Events	   informed	   its	   readers	   in	   October	   1977	   that	   concerns	   about	  hemispheric	   drug	   trafficking	   through	   Panama	   ‘just	   might	   mean	   the	  permanent	   defeat	   of	   the	   canal	   treaties.’231	  M.	   Stanton	  Evans,	   a	   bellwether	  for	  Helmsian	  positions	  on	  Central	  America	  throughout	  the	  period,	  followed	  up	   with	   a	   November	   piece	   that	   declared	   drugs,	   and	   an	   apparent	   White	  House	  cover-­‐up,	  ‘threaten	  to	  blow	  the	  lid	  of	  an	  already	  explosive	  debate	  on	  the	  Panama	  Canal.’232	  	  	  Under	  concerted	  pressure	   from	  conservatives	   led	  by	  Helms	  and	  Bob	  Dole	   (R-­‐KS),	   the	  White	   House	   agreed	   to	   release	   classified	   intelligence	   on	  the	  drugs	  issue	  to	  the	  Senate	  Select	  Intelligence	  Committee.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	   New	   Year,	   with	   Dole	   tenaciously	   following	   up	   on	   the	   issue,	   the	  administration’s	  allies	  in	  the	  Senate	  reluctantly	  agreed	  to	  a	  special	  hearing	  on	   the	   drugs	   question.233	  Carter	   later	   blamed	  Dole	   and	  Helms	   for	   leading	  the	  calls	  for	  this	  closed	  session,	  which	  occurred	  behind	  closed	  doors	  during	  the	  Senate	  debate	  on	  the	  Neutrality	  Treaty.234	  	  	  The	   session	   provided	   a	   chance	   for	   Helms	   and	   congressional	  conservatives	  to	  persuade	  colleagues	  of	  the	  substance	  and	  relevance	  of	  the	  drugs	  allegations.	  Yet	  from	  the	  outset,	  Helms	  adopted	  a	  confrontational	  and	  inflexible	   approach.	   Having	  worked	   in	   harmony	  with	   fellow	   anti-­‐Treaties	  senators	   from	  his	   first	  days	   in	   the	  Senate,	  he	  now	  confounded	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  alike	  with	  a	  display	  of	  procedural	  intransigence	  that	  began	  with	  his	  objection	  to	  the	  numbers	  of	  staff	  present	  who	  supported	  the	  new	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   Evans,	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Events,	  28	  January,	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  7,	  M.	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  Evans,	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   14	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   “This	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  7	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  3.	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Canal	  agreements.	   Indeed,	  by	  casting	   the	  sole	  dissenting	  vote	  on	  granting	  the	   privilege	   of	   the	   floor	   to	   staff	   members,	   Helms	   set	   about	   delaying	   a	  hearing	  he	  had	  himself	  long	  sought.235	  	  It	   was	   a	   tactic	   that	   baffled	   those	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   treaties,	   but	   also	  several	   sympathetic	   conservatives.	   Those	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   Senate’s	  intelligence	   committee,	   including	   Barry	   Goldwater,	   criticised	   Helms	   for	  threatening	   to	   deny	   the	   chamber	   the	   expertise	   of	   knowledgeable	  staffers.236	  When	  Helms	  switched	  tactics	  and	  began	  complaining	  about	  the	  presence	   of	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee	   aides,	   Goldwater	   expressed	  bewilderment.	  ‘I	  cannot	  see	  what	  effect	  that	  will	  have	  on	  our	  disclosure	  of	  secret	   material	   regarding	   the	   Torrijos	   family’,	   the	   Arizona	   conservative	  said.	  ‘I	  honestly	  cannot	  follow	  the	  Senator.	  He	  knows	  that	  he	  and	  I	  are	  not	  too	  far	  apart	   in	  the	  same	  camp.’237	  Bob	  Dole	  agreed,	  stating	   it	  was	  vital	   to	  have	  knowledgeable	  staff.238	  For	  those	  wanting	  to	  hear	  more	  on	  the	  drugs	  issue,	   like	   South	   Carolina	   Democrat	   Ernest	   Hollings,	   Helms’	   strategy	  was	  depriving	  the	  Senate	  of	  valuable	  discussion	  time.	  ‘Let	  us	  get	  on	  with	  Omar,	  and	   hear	   something	   about	   him’,	   Hollings	   demanded.	   ‘We	   have	   been	  wrangling	  about	  rules,	  rules,	  and	  staff;	  we	  are	  going	  to	  kill	  the	  day	  here.’239	  	  Critics,	   both	   then	   and	   later,	   often	   accused	   the	   senator	   of	   a	   knowing	  contrarianism.	  240	  Helms	   understood	   that	   an	   intimate	   knowledge	   of	   the	  Senate’s	   rulebook	  was	   vital	   in	  maximising	   leverage	   on	   a	   particular	   issue.	  Knowing	  when	  and	  how	   to	  push	  back	  against	   the	  majority,	  which	  he	  had	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learned	   from	   studying	   those	   he	   considered	   the	   great	   parliamentarians	   of	  his	  era,	  was	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  his	  approach	  toward	  Central	  America	  policy	  over	   the	   next	   decade.241	  In	   this	   case,	   his	   colleagues	   failed	   to	   appreciate	  Helms’	   ploy	   was	   not	   designed	   to	   obstruct	   the	   hearing	   so	   much	   as	   gain	  greater	   access	   to	   the	   Senate’s	   information.	   To	   bring	   the	   delay	   to	   an	   end,	  Helms’	   colleagues	   agreed	   to	   have	   his	   senior	   foreign	   policy	   assistant,	   Jim	  Lucier,	  attend	  the	  hearing,	  thereby	  drawing	  the	  senator’s	  private	  staff	  more	  closely	  into	  the	  process.242	  	  	  Lucier,	   described	   as	   the	   senator’s	   ‘intellectual	   director’,	   had	   strong	  connections	  to	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	  community,	  not	  least	  through	  his	  previous	  employment	  in	  Strom	  Thurmond’s	  office	  and	  academic	  contributions	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  Canal’s	  future.243	  There	  were	  strong	  objections	  to	  Lucier’s	  inclusion	   given	   he	   lacked	   the	   appropriate	   security	   authorisation,	   but	  Robert	   Byrd	   was	   forced	   by	   Helms’	   inflexibility	   to	   grant	   Lucier	   floor	  privileges	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  he	  sign	  the	  necessary	  waivers.244	  	  	  More	  puzzling	  to	  those	  who	  expected	  Helms	  to	  play	  a	  vocal	  part	  in	  the	  hearings	  was	   the	  senator’s	  almost	  complete	  absence	   from	  the	  subsequent	  discussion.	  The	  senator,	  his	  congressional	  allies,	  and	  the	  conservative	  press	  described	  the	  session	  as	  persuasive	  and	   incriminating.	  Human	  Events	   told	  its	  readers	  that	  ‘many	  believe	  the	  information	  that	  surfaced	  cannot	  help	  the	  administration,	   and	   may	   eventually	   jettison	   the	   treaties’,	   and	   devoted	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considerable	   attention	   to	   Helms’	   comments	   that	   the	   links	   between	   the	  Torrijos	   government	   and	   drug	   trafficking	   were	   much	   stronger	   than	  suggested	  by	  the	  declassified,	  but	  redacted	  report.245	  Yet	  with	  the	  exception	  of	   a	   brief	   interjection	   on	   classified	   intelligence	   sources,	   Helms	   did	   not	  contribute	  to	  the	  closed	  session.246	  Indeed,	  he	  was	  not	  even	  present	  for	  the	  second	   part	   of	   the	   hearings,	   and	   relied	   on	   Bob	   Dole	   to	   follow	   up	   on	   the	  covert	  sources.247	  	  Helms’	   disengagement	   derived	   from	   his	   opposition	   to	   the	   closed	  format	   of	   the	   hearing,	   and	   his	   wider	   aversion	   to	   secretive	   deliberations	  within	  government.	  The	  American	  people,	  he	  declared,	  ‘are	  entitled	  to	  hear	  what	  may	  be	  said	  here.’248	  He	  warned	  his	  colleagues	  on	  the	  day	  before	  the	  closed	  session	  that	  such	  hearings	   limited	  the	  public’s	  ability	   to	   form	  their	  own	   conclusions	   on	   matters	   of	   policy,	   and	   presented	   himself	   as	   the	  guardian	   of	   open	   democracy.249	  It	   was	   a	   continuation	   of	   his	   criticism	   of	  secretive	  Kissingerian	   diplomacy,	  which	   he	   believed	   had	   undermined	   the	  morality,	  accountability,	  and	  responsibility	  of	  previous	  administrations.	  In	  fact,	   Helms	   went	   further	   this	   time,	   drawing	   a	   comparison	   to	   the	  controversial	  investigation	  into	  President	  Kennedy’s	  assassination:	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We	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   fruits	   of	   the	   Warren	   Commission	   the	  distrust	  and	  uncertainty	  which	  such	  procedure	  breeds	  when	  it	  is	   applied	   to	   deeply	   felt,	   emotional	   issues.	   There	   must	   be	   no	  hint	  of	  coverup,	  no	  suggestion	  that	  secrecy	  has	  been	  imposed	  to	  silence	  politically	  damaging	  revelations.250	  	  In	  the	  post-­‐Watergate	  and	  post-­‐Vietnam	  era,	  as	  well	  as	   in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  highly	   publicised	   Church	   hearings	   into	   CIA	   misconduct,	   the	   senator’s	  charges	   played	   on	   the	   theme	   of	   a	   government	   divorced	   from,	   and	   even	  pitted	   against,	   the	   American	   people. 251 	  Ironically,	   it	   was	   just	   such	   a	  sentiment,	  alongside	  a	  renewed	  conservative	  moralistic	  and	  religious	  zeal,	  that	  partly	  explained	  Carter’s	  successful	  1976	  presidential	  campaign.252	  	  Helms,	  however,	  found	  little	  sympathy	  in	  the	  Senate.	  Many	  supported	  a	  selected	  release	  of	  non-­‐sensitive	  findings	  about	  drugs	  in	  Panama,	  but	  only	  Helms	  consistently	  sought	  full	  disclosure,	  and	  his	  zeal	  irritated	  even	  those	  within	   the	   anti-­‐Treaties	   community.	   Jake	   Garn	   (R-­‐UT),	   as	   ardent	   an	  opponent	  of	  the	  new	  treaties	  as	  there	  was	  in	  the	  Senate,	  surely	  had	  Helms	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  reflected	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  drugs	  debate	  that:	  	   I	  would	  particularly	  caution	  my	  colleagues	  who	  opposed	  these	  treaties	  not	  to	  be	  so	  zealous	  in	  attempts	  to	  defeat	  them	  that	  we	  start	  revealing	  any	  possibility	  of	  sources	  and	  methods.	  I	  would	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like	   to	   see	   the	   treaties	   defeated,	   but	   not	   in	   any	   way	   that	  endangers	  the	  security	  of	  this	  country.253	  	  The	   senator’s	   populist	   sentiments	   on	   the	   drugs	   issue	   were	   closely	  associated	  with	  his	  concerns	  about	  the	  domestic	  impact	  of	  illegal	  narcotics.	  In	   remarks	   immediately	   following	   the	   closed	   sitting,	   he	   attacked	   those	  colleagues	   who	   considered	   the	   drugs	   issue	   irrelevant:	   ‘tell	   that	   to	   the	  people	   of	   the	  United	   States,	   and	  mothers	   and	   fathers	  whose	   children	   are	  hooked	  on	  heroin.	  Do	  not	  just	  say	  it	  here	  in	  this	  Senate	  Chamber.	  Tell	  it	  to	  the	   parents.	   Tell	   it	   to	   the	   addicts	   themselves.’	   The	   link	   between	   Panama	  and	  drug	  trafficking,	  the	  senator	  concluded,	   ‘is	  the	  most	  relevant	  thing	  we	  can	   talk	   about.’254 	  He	   repeated	   these	   sentiments	   to	   journalists	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  secret	  session.255	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  drugs	  question	  proved	  little	  more	  than	  a	  sideshow	  to	  the	  treaties	  debate.	  Its	  failure	  to	  unify	  conservatives	  was	  partly	  responsible	  for	  its	  reduced	  visibility.	  James	  Burnham,	  who,	  alongside	  William	  Buckley,	  represented	   the	   core	   of	   the	   conservative	   community	   in	   favour	   of	   new	  agreements	   with	   Panama,	   concluded	   that	   those	   emphasising	   the	   drugs	  question	  were	  simply	  manipulating	  the	  agenda	  for	  their	  own	  benefit.256	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  insufficient	  engagement	  from	  those	  senators	  who	  attended	  the	  sessions	  on	  drug	  trafficking	  rendered	  the	  issue	  inert.	  Despite	  the	  pleas	  of	  Helms	  and	  his	  allies,	  there	  was	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  matter	  among	  those	  who	  would	  ultimately	  decide	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  treaties.	  The	  ratification	  debate	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would	   instead	  be	   fought	  over	  ground	  that	  Helms	  had	   laid	  out	  over	  nearly	  seven	  years	  of	  anti-­‐Treaties	  activism.	  	  	  Helms’	  vote	  in	  the	  ratification	  process	  for	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties	  was	  never	   likely	   to	  be	  courted	  by	   the	  Carter	  administration.	  Knowing	   full	  well	   that	   the	   senator	  was	   resolutely	   opposed	   to	   the	   treaties,	   unless	   they	  contained	   amendments	   unacceptable	   to	   Panama,	   the	   president	   and	   his	  advisers	  did	  not	  waste	  time	  or	  political	  capital	  attempting	  to	  curry	  Helms’	  favour	  during	  the	  intense	  scramble	  for	  votes.	  Instead,	  the	  president	  and	  his	  advisers	  devoted	   their	  efforts	   to	   those	  senators	  who	  remained	  undecided	  and	  open	  to	  persuasion.	  This	  was	  a	  recurring	   limitation	  on	  Helms’	   impact	  on	   Central	   America	   policy:	   where	   legislation	   was	   closely	   contested,	   with	  swing	  votes	  acting	  as	  the	  critical	  determinant	  in	  whether	  a	  bill	  would	  pass	  the	   Senate,	   Helms	   was	   seldom	   courted	   by	   administrations	   who	   almost	  always	  knew	  which	  side	  of	  an	  issue	  his	  vote	  would	  be	  cast	  for.	  	   	  	  	   Nor	   did	   Helms	   fundamentally	   change	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   debate	  during	   the	   ratification	   debate.	   The	   previous	   waves	   of	   anti-­‐treaties	  sentiment	  crafted	  the	  narrative	  for	  opponents	  of	  the	  agreements,	  and	  while	  they	  spoke	  with	  increasing	  fervour	  as	  the	  date	  of	  the	  vote	  drew	  ever	  closer,	  more	   often	   than	   not	   the	   issues	   were	   those	   long	   articulated	   and	   long	  contested.	  The	  debate	  was	   certainly	  historic	   in	   length	  and	  outreach	  –	   ten	  weeks	   in	   total,	   from	  8	  February	   to	  18	  April,	  broadcast	  on	  National	  Public	  Radio	  –	  but	  it	  was	  strikingly	  repetitious.257	  	  	   However,	   the	   ratification	   debate	   was	   the	   final	   surge	   in	   the	   anti-­‐treaties	   campaign,	   and,	   for	   Helms,	   it	   represented	   the	   moment	   when	   the	  intensity	  of	  his	  message	  reached	  its	  peak.	  This	  was	  particularly	  evident	  in	  his	   recounting	  of	   the	  Rooseveltian	  narrative,	   to	  which	  he	  devoted	  himself	  as	   the	   debate	   wore	   on.	   ‘[M]any	   things	   about	   these	   debates	   have	   been	  dismaying	   to	   many	   Americans,’	   Helms	   told	   his	   colleagues	   as	   the	   Senate	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discussed	  the	  treaties,	   ‘none	  more	  so	  than	  various	  implications	  impugning	  the	   conduct	   of	   President	   Theodore	   Roosevelt	   in	   connection	   with	   the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  land	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal.’	  Referring	  to	  Roosevelt’s	  Fear	  God	  and	  Take	  Your	  Own	  Part,	  Helms	  declared	  the	  former	  president	   had	   warned	   future	   generations	   about	   how	   to	   respond	   when	  faced	  with	  decisions	  like	  those	  presently	  before	  the	  Senate:	  ‘You	  had	  better	  look	   after	   the	   United	   States.	   You	   had	   better	   look	   after	   the	   free	   world.’	  Summing	  up	  his	  ideal	  for	  policy	  in	  Panama,	  the	  senator	  succinctly	  declared	  that	  ‘I	  wish	  we	  had	  a	  Teddy	  Roosevelt	  today.’258	  	  	   His	  debate	   rhetoric	  was	  not	   the	  only	  means	  of	   giving	  his	  message	  a	  final	   push.	   Several	   amendments	   that	   were	   designed	   to	   reinforce	   the	  substance	  of	  themes	  long	  presented	  by	  opponents	  of	  the	  agreements	  acted	  as	  beacons	   for	   the	  conservative	  agenda	   in	  Panama,	  and	  more	  generally	   in	  foreign	   policy.	   Among	   the	   senator’s	   attempted	   additions	   to	   the	   treaties	  were	   amendments	   that	   called	   for	   a	   continued	   American	   presence	   at	   the	  Galeta	  Island	  military	  facility,	  the	  right	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  unilaterally	  intervene	   in	   order	   to	   defend	   the	   Canal,	   and	   the	   toll-­‐free	   transit	   of	   U.S.	  warships	  and	  their	  support	  craft.259	  	  	   	   To	   supporters	   of	   the	   treaties,	  Helms’	   amendments	  were	  dismissed	  as	  little	  more	  than	  uninformed,	  pernicious	  “bomb	  throwing”.	  Responding	  to	  the	  Galeta	  Island	  amendment,	  which	  Helms	  described	  as	  critical	  if	  the	  U.S.	  was	   to	   maintain	   its	   top-­‐secret	   SOSUS	   anti-­‐submarine	   listening	   network,	  Frank	  Church	   acerbically	   concluded,	   ‘When	   I	   first	   heard	   about	   the	  Galeta	  facility	   the	   descriptions	   of	   it	   were	   so	   lurid	   that	   I	   thought	   we	  must	   have	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  9	   to	  Panama	  Canal	  Neutrality	  Treaty,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  124	  (1978),	  6548.	  
	   98	  
installed	  on	  this	  island	  the	  most	  secret	  and	  advanced	  of	  all	  possible	  devices,	  on	   which	   the	   very	   life	   of	   the	   Republic	   might	   hinge.’	   Instead,	   as	   Church	  noted,	  the	  Navy	  had	  assessed	  the	  base	  as	  strategically	  unnecessary.260	  	  John	  Culver,	  the	  Iowa	  Democrat,	  concluded	  the	  issue	  was	  ‘a	  red	  herring	  pickled	  in	  misinformation	  and	  seasoned	  with	  scare	  tactics.’261	  	  	  	   Yet	   the	   accuracy,	   or	   success,	   of	   the	   senator’s	   amendments	   was	  beside	  the	  point.	  Their	  worth	  was	  in	  acting	  as	  waypoints	  for	  conservatives,	  who	  could	  identify	  movement	  advocates	  in	  Congress	  by	  the	  votes	  attached	  to	  each	  amendment.	  They	  also	  served	  as	  another	  means	  of	  articulating	  the	  foreign	   policy	   vision	   that	   Helms	   and	   conservatives	   represented,	   using	  specific	  issues	  as	  a	  way	  of	  identifying	  their	  larger	  concerns	  (and	  proposing	  solutions	   –	   however	   untenable	   these	   might	   be).	   It	   was	   through	   these	  amendments,	  along	  with	   the	  more	  general	  rhetoric	  during	   the	  ratification	  debate,	   that	   Helms	   solidified	   his	   reputation	   as	   a	   leading	   movement	  conservative.	  	   After	   frenetic	   efforts	   to	   secure	   the	   necessary	   votes	   for	   the	  agreements,	  Jimmy	  Carter	  succeeded	  in	  passing	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties.	  Yet	  it	  was,	  as	  George	  Moffett	  summarised,	  one	  of	  the	  great	  Pyrrhic	  victories	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy.262	  Carter	  won	  the	  battle	  for	  Panama,	  but	  lost	  the	  war	   over	   the	   nation’s	   foreign	   policy.	   	   Administration	   figures	   consoled	  themselves	   by	   declaring	   that	   the	   treaties	   righted	   a	   historical	   wrong,	  alleviated	  regional	  insecurity,	  and	  demonstrated	  national	  character.263	  The	  American	   public,	   however,	   saw	   the	   new	   agreements	   as	   emblematic	   of	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broader	  policy	  failures	  at	  home	  and	  abroad,	  and	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	  election	  in	   1980	   signified	   the	   end	   of	   Carter’s	   hopes	   of	   constructing	   a	   new	  Democratic	   national	   security	   strategy. 264 	  Reagan’s	   more	   aggressively	  Manichean	   anti-­‐communism,	   albeit	   tempered	   in	   the	   future	   by	   a	   political	  pragmatism	   that	   frustrated	   Helms	   and	   movement	   conservatives,	   would	  define	  the	  foreign	  policy	  environment	  of	  the	  1980s.265	  	  Political	   commentators	   and	   scholars	   recognise	   the	   critical	   role	   that	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties	   played	   in	  Reagan’s	   successful	   1980	   campaign.	  Jesse	  Helms’	  role	  has	  been	  correctly	  placed	  within	  a	  broader	  conservative	  coalition	   on	   Panama	   policy,	   but	   a	   close	   examination	   of	   his	   record	   on	   the	  Canal	  sheds	  further	  light	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  post-­‐war	  conservative	  foreign	  policy.	   Instead	   of	   being	   a	   product	   of	   a	   post-­‐Vietnam	   breakdown	   in	   a	  supposed	  national	  foreign	  policy	  consensus,	  Helms’	  opposition	  to	  the	  Canal	  Treaties	   emerged	   from	   a	   chauvinistic,	   outward-­‐looking	   conservative	  foreign	   policy	   agenda	   already	   present	   in	   the	   first-­‐wave	   oppositionism	   of	  the	   late	   1950s	   to	   early	   1970s.	   A	   short-­‐1970s	   framework	   explains	   the	  intensification	   of	   conservative	   activism	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   that	   decade,	  but	  it	  neglects	  this	  pre-­‐existing	  sentiment.	  	  Not	  all	  members	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  right	  embraced	  Helms’	  conservative	  vision	   for	   Panama.	   Though	   modern	   conservatives	   found	   unity	   in	   their	  opposition	  to	  President	  Carter’s	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  also	   revealed	   the	   propensity	   for	   conservatives	   to	   split	   over	   practicalities.	  
National	   Review’s	   spearheading	   of	   pro-­‐Treaties	   conservatism,	   and	   to	   a	  lesser	   extent	   Barry	   Goldwater’s	   wavering	   position	   throughout	   the	   Canal	  debate,	   indicated	   that	   conservatives	   did	   not	   find	   it	   easy	   to	   reconcile	  differences	   while	   in	   opposition.	   It	   was	   to	   be	   a	   harbinger	   of	   future	  disagreements	  among	  conservatives	  when	  in	  power.	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The	  senator’s	  Panama	  policy	  also	  revealed	  important	  elements	  of	  his	  approach	   to	   policy	   entrepreneurship,	   although	   his	   strategy	   during	   the	  Canal	  negotiations	  was	  not	  entirely	  one	  of	  daring	  individualism	  in	  the	  face	  of	   overwhelming	   opposition.	   Unlike	   in	   subsequent	   years,	   the	   senator	  primarily	  operated	  within	  a	  larger	  network	  of	  congressional	  conservatives,	  and	  worked	   (nearly	   always)	   in	   harmony	  with	   the	   group’s	   objectives	   and	  tactics	  in	  mind.	  	  	  Still,	   some	   particulars	   do	   emerge.	   Firstly,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   Helms	  perceived	  the	  exchange	  of	  accurate	  and	  relevant	  information	  to	  be	  a	  critical	  component	  of	  a	  successful	  policy	  strategy.	  For	  the	  senator,	  public	  remarks	  –	  whether	  in	  the	  Senate,	  on	  the	  campaign	  trail,	  or	  through	  the	  media	  –	  were	  a	  vital	  means	  of	  shaping	  public	  perceptions	  on	  a	  given	  issue.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  networks	  of	   information	  among	  non-­‐governmental	   actors	  were	  becoming	  easier	   to	   construct	   and	   sustain,	   owing	   to	   rapid	   developments	   in	   mass	  communication	   and	   travel,	   Helms	   helped	   challenge	   three	   successive	  administrations	  and	  their	  official	  narrative	  on	  the	  Panama	  Canal.	  He	  did	  so	  by	   drawing	   on	   ideas	   and	   evidence	   collected	   from	   a	   wider	   network	   of	  conservative	  anti-­‐Treaties	  campaigners.266	  Matthews	  accounts	  for	  this	  kind	  of	   test	   of	   administration	   information	   dominance	   as	   a	   post-­‐Cold	   War	  phenomenon,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  during	  the	  Panama	  debates	  in	  the	  1970s	  an	  organised	   and	   highly	   effective	   challenge	   to	   official	   narratives	  was	   testing	  the	  traditional	  deference	  afforded	  to	  government	  accounts.267	  	  	  Secondly,	   Helms’	   Panama	   campaign	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   training	  ground	  for	  his	  later	  efforts	  to	  craft,	  alter,	  or	  resist	  foreign	  policy	  initiatives.	  These	  were	  not	  frequent,	  nor	  did	  they	  succeed	  in	  altering	  the	  objectives	  of	  policy.	   This	   would	   seem	   to	   validate	   Hinckley’s	   argument	   that	   Congress	  finds	   it	  difficult	   to	  resist	   long-­‐term	  policy	  momentum.	  Yet	  each	   legislative	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act	   not	   only	   enhanced	   the	   senator’s	   position	   within	   the	   conservative	  movement,	   it	   also	   affected	   the	  broader	   foreign	  policy	   environment	   of	   the	  1970s.	   In	   the	   longer	   term,	  Helms’	   tactics	  contributed	  to	   the	  congressional	  assertiveness	  that	  forced	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  to	  move	  negotiations	  away	  from	  Congress	   and	   the	   public,	   and	   which	   in	   turn	   weakened	   Carter’s	   ability	   to	  implement	   his	   own	   policy	   vision.	   They	   also	   played	   on	   ideas	   of	   executive	  secrecy,	   and	   ultimately	   helped	   to	   forge	   the	   view	   of	   Carter	   as	   a	   weak,	  ineffective	  leader.	  	  Robert	   Strong,	   in	  his	   sympathetic	   analysis	  of	  Carter’s	   foreign	  policy,	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  president	  suffered	  because	  a	  number	  of	  his	  international	  policies	   were	   either	   unpopular	   (such	   as	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties)	   or	  became	  caught	  up	  in	  long-­‐standing	  controversies	  (for	  example,	  détente	  and	  the	  Middle	  East).268	  What	  Helms	  achieved	  in	  Panama	  was	  to	  combine	  these	  two	   forces,	   to	   successfully	   incorporate	   long-­‐standing	   populist	   concerns	  about	   the	   surrender	   of	   a	   historical	   legacy	   in	   Panama	  with	   contemporary	  apprehension	  over	   the	   re-­‐ordering	  of	  Cold	  War	  priorities.	  The	  Canal	   thus	  became	  a	  political	  hindrance	  to	  Carter	  (as	  well	  as	  Nixon	  and	  Ford)	  because	  Helms	  helped	   to	  move	   the	   issue	  beyond	   the	   confines	   of	   bilateral	   Panama	  policy	   and	   into	   the	   wider	   framework	   of	   the	   nation’s	   national	   security	  agenda	  in	  the	  1970s.	  	  He	  did	  so	  by	  demonstrating	  issue	  leadership,	  all	  the	  way	  through	  the	  decade.	   Other	   congressional	   figures	   spoke	   more	   frequently	   on	   the	   Canal	  (Flood,	  Thurmond,	  Murphy,	  for	  example),	  but	  it	  was	  widely	  recognised	  by	  advocates	   and	   opponents	   alike	   that	   the	   senator	   excelled	   in	   framing	   the	  debate.	  Cyrus	  Vance,	  attempting	  to	  explain	  the	  nation’s	  political	  sentiments	  shifted	  rightwards	  as	  the	  1970s	  closed,	  argued	  it	  was:	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more	   a	   reflection	   of	   national	   frustration	   and	   anger	   at	   the	  growing	   complexity	   and	   intractability	   of	   political,	   economic,	  and	   social	   issues	   than	   it	   was	   the	   product	   of	   an	   anxiety	  generated	   by	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   that	   saw	   them	   as	   a	  symbol	  of	  national	  “decline.”269	  	  Like	  many	  others	   in	   the	  administration,	  Vance	  underestimated	   the	  power	  of	  the	  Canal,	  and	  of	  its	  relevance	  to	  conservatives.	  Jesse	  Helms	  did	  not.	  By	  recognising	   and	   crafting	   public	   perceptions	   throughout	   the	   decade,	   the	  senator	   made	   a	   vital	   contribution	   to	   the	   narrative	   of	   resurgence	   that	  Ronald	   Reagan	   would	   lead	   on	   as	   the	   United	   States	   approached	   Central	  America	  policy	  in	  the	  1980s.	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Nicaragua,	  1979-­‐1984	  	  	   During	  the	  eight	  years	  of	  his	  presidency,	  Ronald	  Reagan	  made	  a	  vocal	  commitment	  to	  the	  rollback	  of	  perceived	  communist	  expansion	  around	  the	  world.	   This	   strategy,	   dubbed	   the	   “Reagan	   Doctrine”	   by	   Charles	  Krauthammer,	   underpinned	   the	   U.S.	   response	   to	   several	   foreign	   policy	  crises	   that	   Reagan	   encountered	   as	   president.270	  In	   Nicaragua,	   the	   Reagan	  Doctrine	   was	   used	   to	   justify	   the	   expenditure	   of	   hundreds	   of	   millions	   of	  dollars	   to	   support	   Contra	   forces	   engaged	   in	   a	   bitter	   civil	  war	   against	   the	  leftist	   Sandinista	   government.	   The	   war	   against	   the	   Sandinistas,	   who	  ascended	  to	  power	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1979	  Nicaraguan	  Revolution	  that	  toppled	   the	   right-­‐wing,	   authoritarian	   government	   of	   Anastasio	   Somoza	  Debayle,	  would	  be	  the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  most	  publicised,	  and	  most	  polarising,	  foreign	  policy	  initiative.271	  	   The	   president’s	   commitment	   to	   the	   Contra	   cause	   has	   been	   well	  documented. 272 	  Yet	   authorship	   of	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	   Nicaragua	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Krauthammer,	  “The	  Reagan	  Doctrine.” 
271	  The	   literature	   on	   U.S.	   policy	   in	   Nicaragua	   during	   the	   late	   Cold	  War	   is	  extensive.	   See	   Roy	   Gutman,	   Banana	   Diplomacy:	   The	   Making	   of	   American	  
Policy	   in	   Nicaragua,	   1981-­‐1987	   (New	   York:	   Simon	   &	   Schuster,	   1998),	  Robert	   Kagan,	  A	  Twilight	   Struggle:	   American	  Power	   and	  Nicaragua,	   1977-­‐
1990	   (London:	  Free	  Press,	  1996),	  Theodore	  Draper,	  A	  Very	  Thin	  Line:	  The	  
Iran-­‐Contra	  Affairs	   (New	  York:	  Hill	  &	  Wang,	   1991),	   R.	   Pardo-­‐Maurer,	  The	  
Contras,	   1980-­‐1989:	   A	   Special	   Kind	   of	   Politics	   (New	   York:	   Praeger,	   1990),	  Robert	  A.	  Pastor,	  Condemned	  to	  Repetition	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	   1988),	   and	   E.	   Bradford	   Burns,	   At	   War	   in	   Nicaragua:	   The	   Reagan	  
Doctrine	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Nostalgia	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1987).	  
272 	  The	   president	   consistently	   extolled	   the	   virtues	   of	   the	   rebels.	   For	  examples,	  see	  “Question-­‐and-­‐Answer	  Session	  With	  Reporters	  on	  Domestic	  and	   Foreign	   Policy	   Issues,	   4	   May,	   1983,”	   The	   Public	   Papers	   of	   President	  
Ronald	   W.	   Reagan,	   Ronald	   Reagan	   Presidential	   Library,	   accessed	   18	  November,	   2012,	  http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/50483d.htm,	  “Radio	   Address	   to	   the	   Nation	   on	   United	   States	   Assistance	   for	   the	  Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,	   22	  March,	   1986,”	  The	  Public	  Papers	  of	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belonged	   not	   only	   to	   the	   president	   and	   his	   senior	   advisers,	   but	   also	   to	   a	  wide	   network	   of	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   individuals	   across	   the	   Americas.	   Helms	  served	  as	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  this	  community,	  and	  his	  links	  to	  such	  figures	  as	  Jeane	   Kirkpatrick,	   Oliver	   North,	   John	   Carbaugh,	   Nat	   Hamrick,	   Gerardo	  Schamis,	   and	   Lewis	   Tambs,	   as	   well	   as	   his	   framing	   of	   the	   Contra	   cause	  contributed	   substantially	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   policy	   toward	   Nicaragua.	  Though	   Helms’	   level	   of	   engagement	   in	   the	   hemispheric	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  fluctuated,	  he	  remained	  involved	  from	  the	   initial	  response	  to	  the	  1979	  revolution	  through	  to	  the	  final	  stages	  of	  the	  Contra	  programme	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  	  	  Helms’	   success	   was	   partly	   a	   product	   of	   the	   wider	   context	   of	   post-­‐Vietnam	  congressional	  resurgence,	  and	  further	  Cold	  War	  discord	  between	  supporters	   of	   détente	   and	   those	   conservatives	   preaching	   a	   more	  militarised	   international	   agenda,	   that	   created	   spaces	   for	   individual	  lawmakers	   to	   influence	   policy.273	  Helms	   located	   and	   took	   advantage	   of	  these	   spaces	  more	   effectively	   than	  many	   of	   his	   congressional	   colleagues,	  and	   he	   recognised	   the	   importance	   of	   committee	   assignments,	   personnel	  appointments,	   and	   legislation	   in	   achieving	   influence.	   Crucially,	   he	   also	  astutely	   perceived	   that	   he	   could	   gain	   more	   say	   in	   foreign	   policy	   by	   also	  working	   outside	   these	   more	   traditional	   avenues.	   Thus	   he	   permitted	  independence	   among	   staff,	   and	   connected	   with	   many	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  contacts	  across	  the	  hemisphere	  who	  provided	  information	  as	  well	  as	  access	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
President	  Ronald	  W.	  Reagan,	  Ronald	  Reagan	  Presidential	  Library,	  accessed	  17	   October,	   2012,	  http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/32286a.htm,	   and	  “Address	  to	  the	  Nation	  on	  Aid	  to	  the	  Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,	  2	  February,	   1988,”	   The	   Public	   Papers	   of	   Ronald	  W.	   Reagan,	   Ronald	   Reagan	  Presidential	   Library,	   accessed	   16	   October,	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This	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  senator	  achieved	  continuous	  success.	  His	  reputation	  for	  intransigence	  and	  obstructionism	  often	  left	  him	  with	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  allies	  during	  many	  of	  the	  debates	  over	  Nicaragua.	  Likewise,	  his	  polemical	  articulation	  of	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  policy	  was	  frequently	  at	  odds	  with	  a	   public	   that	   oscillated	   between	   indifference	   and	   hostility	   toward	   the	  Contras.	  These	  difficulties	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  senator	  from	  influencing	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	   in	  Nicaragua,	  and	   in	   fact	  served	  to	  highlight	  the	   fact	   that	  Helms	   was	   often	   more	   effective	   when	   operating	   outside	   the	   traditional	  avenues	   of	   influence	   available	   to	   lawmakers	   within	   a	   democratically-­‐elected	   government.	   His	   use	   of	   less	   obvious	   policy	   conduits	   explains	   his	  largely	   obscured	   role	   within	   U.S.	   policy	   toward	   Nicaragua,	   but	   by	  examining	   the	   combination	   of	   such	   approaches	   with	   his	   more	   public	  initiatives,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  Helms	  was	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  anti-­‐Sandinista	   community	   that	   helped	   forge	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	  Nicaragua.	  	   Somoza	  and	  the	  Sandinistas,	  1979-­‐1980	  	  	   For	   more	   than	   forty	   years,	   the	   Somoza	   family	   dominated	  Nicaragua’s	   political	   life.	   Beginning	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1930s,	   when	   the	   United	  States	   removed	   its	   marines	   from	   the	   country	   and	   promoted	   Anastasio	  Somoza	  García	  to	  head	  the	  National	  Guard,	  the	  family	  occupied	  the	  highest	  levels	   of	   power	   in	   Nicaragua.	   Somoza	   García’s	   fraudulent	   election	   to	  president	  in	  1937	  started	  decades	  of	  Somocista	  rule	  in	  which	  Somocismo,	  a	  system	   of	   an	   intense	   anti-­‐communism	   and	   commitment	   to	   free-­‐market	  capitalism,	  protected	  the	  family’s	  power	  and	  promoted	  an	  internal	  stability	  that	  appealed	  to	  a	  United	  States	   in	  search	  of	  Cold	  War	  hemispheric	  allies.	  Yet	  its	  authoritarian	  power	  structures	  relied	  on	  a	  repressive	  state	  security	  apparatus,	  while	  the	  economy’s	  foundations	  were	  undermined	  by	  rampant	  corruption	  that	  filled	  the	  Somozas’	  personal	  fortunes.	  	  	   In	  the	  1970s,	  when	  Somoza	  García’s	  second	  son,	  Anastasio	  Somoza	  Debayle,	   led	   the	   country,	   discontented	   Nicaraguans	   from	   across	   the	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political	   spectrum	   challenged	   Somocismo.	   Somoza’s	   embezzlement	   of	  international	  aid	  relief	  following	  a	  major	  earthquake	  in	  1972	  intensified	  the	  opposition,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  1978	  murder	  of	  Pedro	  Joaquín	  Chamorro,	  editor	  of	   the	   opposition	   newspaper	  La	  Prensa,	   that	   sparked	   a	   national	   uprising.	  The	   Frente	   Sandinista	   de	   Liberación	   Nacional	   (FSLN,	   or	   Sandinistas),	   a	  communist	   revolutionary	   movement	   founded	   in	   1961,	   spearheaded	  military	   attacks	   across	   Nicaragua	   in	   support	   of	   the	   rebellion.	   The	  Sandinistas	   emerged	   as	   the	   dominant	   faction	   within	   the	   forces	   arrayed	  against	   Somoza	   and,	   after	   their	   successful	   “Final	  Offensive”	   in	   1979,	   took	  control	  of	  Nicaragua’s	  post-­‐Somoza	  government.274	  	  	   It	   was	   this	   offensive	   that	   first	   caused	   Helms	   to	   concentrate	   on	  Nicaragua.	   His	   relatively	   late	   entrance	   reflected	   a	   degree	   of	   conservative	  complacency	  about	  Somoza’s	  future.	  Through	  a	  skilful	  manipulation	  of	  the	  disjointed	  diplomatic	  strategy	  being	  pursued	  by	  the	  White	  House,	  by	  1979	  Somoza	   had	   marginalised	   moderate	   opponents	   and	   left	   Carter	   with	   no	  seemingly	   credible	   alternative	   to	   Somocismo.	   Thus,	   while	   conservatives	  remained	  wary	   in	  early	  1979,	   they	  nevertheless	  believed	  Somoza	  and	  his	  National	  Guard	  had	  successfully	  headed	  off	  the	  worst	  of	  the	  crisis.275	  	  	  	   When	  renewed	  instability	  imperilled	  the	  Somoza	  government	  in	  the	  spring,	   Helms	   adopted	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   rhetorical	   strategy	   that	   largely	  reflected	   the	   conservative	   consensus	   on	   both	   Nicaragua	   and	   Carter’s	  approach	  to	  American	  foreign	  policy	  more	  broadly.	  Firstly,	  though	  offering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  274	  For	   histories	   of	   Nicaragua	   during	   the	   Somoza	   dynasty,	   see	   Andrew	  Crawley,	   Somoza	   and	   Roosevelt:	   Good	   Neighbour	   Diplomacy	   in	   Nicaragua,	  
1933-­‐1945	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   2007),	   Thomas	   W.	   Walker,	  
Nicaragua:	   Living	   in	   the	   Shadow	   of	   the	   Eagle	   (Boulder:	   Westview	   Press,	  2003),	   Paul	   Coe	   Clark,	   The	   United	   States	   and	   Somoza,	   1933-­‐1956:	   A	  
Revisionist	   Look	   (Westport:	   Praeger,	   2002),	   Michael	   D.	   Gambone,	  
Eisenhower,	  Somoza,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Nicaragua,	  1953-­‐1961	   (Westport:	  Praeger,	   1997),	   and	   Knut	  Walter,	  The	  Regime	  of	  Anastasio	   Somoza,	   1936-­‐
1956	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1993).	  
275	  Martin	   Arostegui,	   “Central	   America’s	   Guerrillas	   Aren’t	   Robin	   Hoods,”	  
Human	  Events,	  31	  March,	  1979,	  11.	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a	   muted	   acknowledgement	   of	   Somoza’s	   failings,	   Helms	   defended	   the	  Nicaraguan	  government	  and	  its	  record	  as	  an	  American	  ally.	   	  Secondly,	  the	  senator	   dismissed	   any	   suggestion	   that	   the	   insurrection	   was	   a	   populist,	  indigenous	   rebellion	  by	   focusing	  on	   the	   Sandinistas’	   human	   rights	   record	  and	  their	  links	  to	  international	  communism.	  	   First	  and	  foremost,	  Helms	  saw	  a	  Somocista	  Nicaragua	  as	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Three	  years	  before	  the	  crisis	  of	  1979,	  the	  senator	  had	  lauded	  Nicaragua	   as	   being	   among	   those	   Latin	   American	   countries	   ‘traditionally	  friendly	  toward	  the	  U.S.’276	  At	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Nicaraguan	  Revolution,	  the	  senator	   again	   emphasised	   the	   historic	   alliance	   between	   the	   two	   nations.	  Writing	   to	   President	   Carter	   in	   June,	   Helms	   joined	   several	   conservative	  senators	   in	   noting	   it	   was	   ‘beyond	   question’	   that	   Nicaragua	   had	   been	  ‘unfailingly	  friendly	  and	  cooperative’	  toward	  the	  U.S.277	  	  	  This	   argument	   was	   a	   foreign	   policy	   shibboleth	   among	   American	  conservatives.	   Like	   the	   Iranian	   Shah,	   facing	   his	   own	   internal	   crisis	   at	   the	  time,	  Somoza’s	  Nicaragua	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  bastion	  of	  pro-­‐American	  sentiment	  in	   a	   world	   threatened	   by	   advancing	   international	   communism.	   James	   C.	  Roberts,	   former	   executive	   director	   of	   the	   American	   Conservative	   Union,	  called	   Somoza	   ‘an	   ardent	   fan	   of	   the	   United	   States’.278	  M.	   Stanton	   Evans	  spoke	   with	   approval	   of	   Nicaragua’s	   pro-­‐U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   and	   its	   free-­‐enterprise	   economy.279	  Patrick	  Buchanan,	   the	   firebrand	   commentator	   and	  former	   Nixon	   aide,	   commended	   Somoza	   as	   a	   dependable	   friend	   of	   the	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United	   States.280	  Other	   conservatives	   defended	   Nicaragua	   as,	   variously,	   a	  ‘relatively	   mild	   authoritarian	   state	   friendly	   to	   the	   United	   States’	   and	   ‘a	  major	  anti-­‐Marxist	  bastion’	  in	  the	  region.281	  	   While	   he	   understood	   the	   benefits	   of	   Somocista	   Nicaragua,	   Helms	  was	   not	   ignorant	   of	   its	   faults.	   The	   Somoza	   government,	   Helms	   conceded,	  had	   its	   ‘demerits’.282	  ‘I	   am	   sure	   that	   if	   I	   were	   a	   Nicaraguan,	   living	   in	  Nicaragua,’	   he	   told	   the	   Senate,	   ‘I	   would	   find	  much	   to	   criticize.’283	  Nor,	   he	  claimed,	   did	   he	   especially	   care	   whether	   Somoza	   himself	   continued	   as	  Nicaragua’s	  leader.	  Unlike	  members	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Somoza	  lobby	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  –	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  ‘Dirty	  Thirty’	  –	  the	  senator	  had	  no	  long-­‐standing	  friendship	  with	  the	  dictator.284	  ‘I	  hold	  no	  brief	   for	  President	  Somoza’,	   Helms	   argued,	   echoing	   the	   sentiment	   of	   other	   conservatives,	  notably	   Pat	   Buchanan,	   who	   recognised	   the	   dangers	   of	   too	   close	   an	  association	  with	  the	  beleaguered	  dictator.285	  	   Nevertheless,	   Helms	   did	   not	   fall	   within	   that	   category	   of	  conservatives	   who	   actually	   did	   criticise	   several	   specific	   aspects	   of	   the	  Somoza	   government.	   William	   Buckley,	   who	   had	   also	   differed	   with	   the	  senator	   over	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties,	   readily	   acknowledged	   Somoza’s	  corruption	  and	  propensity	   to	  bomb	  urban	  population	  centres	   in	  response	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to	   internal	   opposition. 286 	  	   Even	   Jeane	   Kirkpatrick,	   the	   Georgetown	  professor	   of	   political	   science	   and	   outspoken	   neoconservative	   whose	  November	   1979	   article	   “Dictatorships	   and	   Double	   Standards”	   would	  become	   a	   seminal	   text	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   modern	   conservative	   foreign	  policy,	  described	  a	   ruler	  whose	   fortune	  was	   ‘no	  doubt	  appropriated	   from	  general	  revenues’	  and	  whose	  people	  ‘only	  intermittently	  enjoyed	  the	  rights	  accorded	  to	  citizens	  in	  the	  Western	  democracies’.287	  	  Instead,	   Helms’	   inability	   to	   specifically	   condemn	   the	   Somoza	  government	   fitted	   into	   that	   thinking	   best	   exemplified	   by	   Human	   Events’	  belated	  and	  ambiguous	  acknowledgement	  that	  Somoza	  ‘may	  have	  been	  an	  unappetizing	   ruler	   from	   certain	   points	   of	   view,	   and	   not	   all	   of	   them	   left-­‐wing’.288	  Such	  flaws,	  however,	  were	  not	  that	  important	  in	  the	  grand	  scheme	  of	   things	   for	  Helms,	   given	   the	  benefits	  of	  Somocismo	  to	   the	  United	  States.	  When	  Helms	  told	  the	  American	  public	  he	  held	  ‘no	  brief’	  for	  the	  dictator,	  he	  did	   so	   under	   the	   proviso	   that	   ‘I	   do	   hold	   a	   brief	   for	   stability,	   order,	   and	  freedom.’289	  	  	  For	  Helms,	  whatever	  Somoza’s	  flaws,	  Nicaragua’s	  current	  government	  embodied	   these	   three	   pillars.	   Helms	   saw	   a	   leader	   ‘legitimately	   elected,	  under	   a	   Constitution	   that	   is	   perfectly	   adequate’	   who	   provided	   ‘a	   stable	  political	   structure’	   for	   his	   country.290	  Somoza	   ‘represented	   no	   ideology’,	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and	   worked	   within	   ‘a	   legal	   framework,	   a	   constitutional	   structure	   with	  significant	   elements	   of	   democracy,	   economic	   progress,	   and	   political	  stability.’	   This	   produced	   a	   system	   of	   ‘institutional	   structures	   that	   were	  fundamentally	   sound’,	   especially	   when	   compared	   to	   neighbouring	  countries	  and	  others	  in	  the	  Third	  World.291	  Like	  congressman	  John	  Murphy,	  who	   remarked	   to	   senior	   State	   Department	   officials	   that	   ‘“I	   know	   what	  democracy	   is,	   and	   Somoza	   practises	   democracy”’,	   Helms	   believed	  Nicaragua	  to	  be	  a	  functioning	  democratic	  state.292	  	  Nicaragua’s	  democratic	  credentials	  were	  hardly	  a	  matter	  of	  consensus	  among	   conservatives.	   Those	  who	   joined	  Helms	   in	   regarding	   Somoza	   as	   a	  legitimate	   leader	   broke	   with	   the	   analysis	   of	   Kirkpatrick	   who,	   in	  “Dictatorships	   and	   Double	   Standards”,	   reminded	   Americans	   that	   Somoza	  had	  never	  achieved	  a	  popular	  mandate.	  The	  Nicaraguan,	  she	  wrote,	  had	  not	  deemed	  it	  necessary	  to	  ‘submit…	  to	  searching	  tests	  of	  popular	  acceptability’	  and	   his	   government	   ‘had	   never	   rested	   on	   popular	   will.’293	  Instead	   of	   the	  more	   affirming	   narrative	   of	   electoral	   freedom	   set	   out	   by	   the	   senator,	  Kirkpatrick	   concluded	   that	   Nicaraguans	   stoically	   accepted	   the	   familiar	  socio-­‐economic	   and	   political	   inequalities	   of	   the	   Somocista	   system	   ‘as	  children	   born	   to	   untouchables	   in	   India	   acquire	   the	   skills	   and	   attitudes	  necessary	  for	  survival	  in	  the	  miserable	  roles	  they	  are	  destined	  to	  fill.’294	  	  Instead,	   Helms	   relied	   upon	   accounts	   he	   received	   from	   former	   U.S.	  ambassador,	  Turner	  B.	  Shelton.	  The	  ambassador	  was	  a	  remarkably	  flawed	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source	  for	  evaluating	  the	  democratic	  foundations	  of	  Nicaraguan	  politics.	  A	  political	  appointee	  by	  President	  Nixon	  on	  account	  of	  his	  fundraising	  efforts	  and	   close	   association	  with	   Nixon’s	   friend	   Bebe	   Rebozo,	   Shelton	   horrified	  the	  State	  Department	  by	  refusing	  to	  allow	  the	  U.S.	  residence	  to	  be	  used	  as	  an	  operations	  base	  and	  emergency	  accommodation	  during	  the	  relief	  effort	  following	  the	  1972	  earthquake.	  His	  sycophantic	  devotion	  to	  Somoza	  led	  the	  embassy’s	  political	  section	  chief	  to	  label	  Shelton	  ‘a	  terrible	  ambassador’,	  so	  enamoured	   with	   the	   Nicaraguan	   president	   that	   he	   ‘literally	   worshipped’	  him.295	  Helms	   may	   also	   have	   been	   influenced	   by	   an	   array	   of	   material	   in	  conservative	   publications	   of	   the	   time,	   lauding	   almost	   every	   aspect	   of	  Nicaraguan	  society.	  	  Content	   with	   this	   rosy	   picture	   of	   Nicaragua’s	   social,	   economic,	   and	  democratic	   structures,	  Helms	  maintained	   that	  while	   the	   continuation	  of	   a	  Somoza	   government	   was	   acceptable,	   a	   post-­‐Somoza	   regime	   that	  maintained	  the	  current	  system	  was	  also	  satisfactory.	  ‘I	  call	  upon	  President	  Somoza’,	   Helms	   told	   the	   Senate	   in	   mid-­‐June,	   ‘to	   resist	   any	   untoward	  pressure,	  from	  the	  United	  States	  or	  from	  other	  nations,	  to	  step	  down	  unless	  it	   can	   be	   assured	   that	   a	   structure	   of	   free	   government,	   one	   that	   is	  demonstrably	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people,	  will	  follow	  and	  maintain	  full	  political,	  property,	  and	  human	  rights.’	  Indeed,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  Somoza	  had	  ‘constantly	  shown	   himself	   open	   to	   peaceful	   change,	   provided	   that	   such	   change	   does	  not	  leave	  a	  political	  vacuum.’296	  	  	  Coming	   on	   the	   day	   a	   bipartisan	   group	   of	   senators	   condemned	  Somoza’s	   government	   for	   the	  murder	   of	   ABC	   journalist	  William	   Stewart,	  executed	  by	  the	  Nicaraguan	  National	  Guard	  while	  covering	  the	  revolution,	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the	   senator’s	   comments	   were	   especially	   eye-­‐catching.297	  The	   faith	   Helms	  placed	  in	  his	  sources,	  and	  in	  right-­‐wing	  governments	  across	  Latin	  America,	  suggests	  he	  was	   sincere	   in	   this	   line	  of	   argument.	   Yet	   there	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	   dressing	   his	   support	   for	   Somoza,	   or	   at	   least	   the	   structures	   of	  
Somocismo,	  in	  a	  constitutionalist	  argument	  certainly	  helped	  at	  a	  time	  when	  support	  for	  Somoza	  was	  increasingly	  politically	  unpalatable.	  	  If	   Helms	   disagreed	  with	   Kirkpatrick	   on	   democracy	   in	   Nicaragua,	   he	  was	   in	   complete	   agreement	  with	   her,	   and	   conservatives	   of	  many	   stripes,	  about	  the	  illegitimacy	  of	  revolution.	  There	  was	  ‘absolutely	  no	  evidence	  that	  conditions	  in	  Nicaragua	  are	  so	  bad	  that	  they	  justify	  a	  violent	  revolution	  to	  effect	  reform’,	  he	  argued.	  The	  war	  was	   ‘not	  being	  supported	  indigenously’	  but	   was	   ‘plainly	   receiving	   its	   strongest	   support	   from	   Cuba,	   Panama,	   and	  Costa	   Rica.’298	  Kirkpatrick	   used	   “Dictatorships	   and	   Double	   Standards”	   to	  raise	   the	   same	   point.	   She	   noted	   Somoza	   was	   ‘succumbing	   to	   arms	   and	  soldiers’	  rather	  than	  popular	  will	  and	  that	  the	  Sandinistas	  received	  ‘a	  great	  many	   arms	   from	   other	   non-­‐Nicaraguans’.299	  Other	   conservatives	   pressed	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   (1979),	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   Durenberger	  (MN),	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  Cong.	  Rec.	  125	   (1979),	  15866-­‐15867,	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  Dale	  Bumpers	   (AR),	   “Saving	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  Somoza”,	  Cong.	  Rec.	  125	  (1979),	  15868-­‐15869.	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   “The	   Importance	   of	   Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	   125	   (1979),	   15867-­‐15868.	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home	   this	   argument,	   pointing	   out	   the	   apparent	   links	   between	   the	  Sandinistas	  and	  the	  international	  “communist-­‐terrorist”	  front.300	  	  Conservative	  criticism	  of	  the	  White	  House	  belied	  the	  fact	  that	  neither	  wanted	  a	  Sandinista	  victory.	  The	  State	  Department	  recognised	  early	  on	   in	  the	   Nicaraguan	   Revolution	   that	   the	   Sandinistas	   were	   supported	   by	  external,	   communist	   agencies,	   and	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  Viron	  Vaky	  had	  warned	   the	   administration	   in	   late	   1978	  ‘we	   should	   avoid	   their	   gaining	   the	   upper	   hand.’301	  Throughout	   1979,	   as	  Helms	   chastised	   Carter	   for	   his	   policies	   of	   ‘cold	   hostility’	   toward	   Somoza	  that	   amounted	   to	   ‘indirect	   support	   of	   the	   guerrillas’,	   the	   administration	  manoeuvred	   to	   head	   off	   a	   post-­‐Somoza	   Sandinista	   government. 302	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Cyrus	  Vance	  urged	  the	  Organization	  of	  American	  States	  to	   authorise	   a	  multinational	   peace-­‐keeping	   force	   ostensibly	   to	   retain	   law	  and	   order,	   but	   with	   the	   additional	   benefit	   of	   countering	   FSLN	   military	  gains.	   Zbigniew	   Brzezinski,	   meanwhile,	   called	   for	   unilateral	   American	  intervention	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  Sandinista	  victory.303	  	   In	   the	   end,	   Carter	   and	   his	   advisers	   were	   unable	   to	   achieve	   the	  removal	   of	   Somoza	   while	   also	   heading	   off	   a	   Sandinista	   victory.	   In	   the	  aftermath	   of	   the	   revolution,	   the	   Sandinistas	   emerged	   as	   the	   dominant	  political	   force	   in	   Nicaragua.	   Initially,	   the	   new	   government	   in	   Managua	  tempered	   its	   public	   hostility	   toward	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   Sandinistas	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   5,	   Belden	   Bell.	   See	   also,	   Arostegui,	   “Central	   America’s	   Guerrillas	  Aren’t	   Robin	   Hoods,”	   10,	   and	   “PLO	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Human	  Events,	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  Memorandum	   of	   Conversation,	   U.S.	   Policy	   to	   Nicaragua,	   4	   September,	  1978,	   folder	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   36,	   Zbigniew	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  Letter,	   Senators	   Jesse	   Helms,	   Strom	   Thurmond,	   James	   McClure,	   Orrin	  Hatch,	  Gordon	  Humphrey,	   and	  Roger	   Jepson	   to	  President	  Carter,	  21	   June,	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  –	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  –	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  47,	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  CO114,	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proclaimed	   they	   would	   seek	   amicable	   relations	   with	   their	   northern	  neighbour,	   largely	   out	   of	   an	   urgent	   need	   for	   financial	   assistance	   to	  reconstruct	   Nicaragua’s	   shattered	   economy.	   The	   Carter	   administration	  believed	   granting	   such	   aid	   would	   force	   the	   Sandinistas	   to	   maintain	   a	  moderate	   stance	   and	   deter	   any	   further	   gravitation	   toward	   Cuba	   and	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	   ‘“The	  Sandinistas	  are	  wearing	  a	  moderate	  mask,”’	   one	  State	  Department	  official	  told	  William	  LeoGrande	  at	  the	  time.	  ‘“Our	  job	  is	  to	  nail	  it	  on.”’304	  	   To	  achieve	  this	  goal,	  the	  State	  Department	  drafted	  the	  Special	  Central	  American	   Assistance	   Act	   of	   1979.	   It	   contained	   $75	  million	   for	   Nicaragua	  and	   received	   bipartisan	   support	   in	   the	   Senate.	   Ed	   Zorinsky,	   Democratic	  chairman	   of	   the	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee’s	   Western	   Hemisphere	  Subcommittee,	  championed	  the	  bill	  and	  criticised	  House	  conservatives	  who	  had	  attached	  strict	  conditions	  to	   the	  aid.	   ‘Do	  we	  wish	  to	  suck	  our	   thumbs	  and	  sit	  it	  out,	  or	  do	  we	  wish	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  game	  and	  play	  to	  win?’	  he	  asked	  colleagues	  during	  debate	  on	   the	  matter.305	  Moderate	  Republicans,	   such	  as	  Richard	  Lugar	  (R-­‐IN)	  and	  David	  Durenberger	  (R-­‐MN),	  agreed.	  ‘I	  continue	  to	  believe	   that	   the	   situation	   in	   Nicaragua	   is	   not	   hopeless’,	   Lugar	   said	   in	  support	  of	  the	  package.	  ‘The	  country	  has	  not	  yet	  become	  a	  Marxist	  state.’306	  Durenberger	   was	   more	   emphatic.	   ‘If	   we	   do	   nothing…	   we	   guarantee	  increasing	  degrees	  of	  Soviet	  and	  Cuban	  influence	  and	  we	  face	  the	  certainty	  of	  failure.’307	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   (NE),	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   American	   Assistance	   Act	   Of	   1979,”	  
Cong.	  Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  11646.	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  Richard	  Lugar	  (IN),	  “Special	  Central	  American	  Assistance	  Act	  Of	  1979,”	  
Cong.	  Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  11649.	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  David	  Durenberger	   (MN),	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Helms,	  however,	  disputed	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  engage	  constructively	  with	  the	  Sandinistas.	  Their	  intractable	  Marxism	  and	  connections	   to	   international	   communism	   undermined	   any	   chance	   of	  reconciliation.	   ‘I	   fear	   that	   we	   are	   paying	   $75	   million	   virtually	   to	   lock	  Nicaragua	  into	  the	  Socialist	  camp	  of	  Fidel	  Castro’,	  he	  told	  colleagues	  on	  the	  Foreign	   Relations	   Committee,	   ‘and	   we	   are	   being	   asked	   to	   bail	   out	   the	  Sandinistas	   and	   to	   ease	   their	   consolidation	  of	   power	  with	  Cuban	   support	  and	  all	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  it.’308	  When	  the	  bill	  came	  before	  the	  full	  Senate,	  Helms	  was	  similarly	  emphatic.	  ‘This	  Senator	  does	  not	  understand’,	  he	  said,	  ‘how	  it	  can	   be	   successfully	   contended	   that	  we	   are	   going	   somehow	   to	   stave	   off	   a	  Communist	   takeover	   –	   which	   already	   is	   a	   fait	   accompli	   –	   by	   subsidizing	  communism	  by	  sending	  the	  Sandinistas	  $75	  million.’309	  	  	   Helms’	  reaction	  was	   in	  keeping	  with	  those	  earliest	  members	  of	   the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   who	   pointed	   to	   the	   rapid	   “Cubanisation”	   of	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  Sandinistas’	  apparent	  ideological	  rigidity	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	   country’s	   inescapable	   communist	   future.310	  Helms,	   using	   his	   growing	  network	   of	   contacts	   in	   the	   region,	   inserted	   new	   details	   into	   this	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   narrative.	   For	   example,	   citing	   information	   furnished	   by	   a	  ‘distinguished’,	   albeit	   anonymous,	   American	   that	   he	   had	   personally	  commissioned	   to	   report	  on	  Nicaragua,	  Helms	   claimed	  between	  1,000	  and	  1,200	   Cuban	   ‘doctors’	   and	   ‘probably	   as	   many	   as	   2,000’	   Cuban	   teachers	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   Review,	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   Review,	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were	   already	   in	   Nicaragua.	   Indicating	   that	   several	   of	   these	   Cubans	   had	  already	   been	   killed	   in	   violent	   clashes	   with	   peasants,	   Helms	   added	   that	  Castro’s	   government	   was	   siphoning	   off	   U.S.	   relief	   supplies	   by	   flying	   the	  materiel	  out	  of	  Managua	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.311	  	  	   Despite	  denials	  from	  senior	  administration	  officials	  –	  testifying	  before	  the	   Senate	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Warren	  Christopher,	  U.S.	  ambassador	  to	  Nicaragua	  Lawrence	  Pezzullo,	  and	  deputy	  assistant	  secretary	  of	  state	  John	  Bushnell	  all	  denied	  Helms’	  Cuban	  charges	  –	  the	   senator	   mounted	   a	   persistent	   campaign	   to	   stop	   the	   funding	   for	  Nicaragua. 312 	  He	   was	   the	   solitary	   dissenting	   vote	   when	   the	   Foreign	  Relations	  Committee	  voted	  to	  send	  the	   legislation	  to	  the	  Senate	   floor,	  and	  was	  one	  of	   thirty-­‐five	   senators	   to	  vote	  against	   final	  passage	  of	   the	  bill.	   In	  between,	   Helms	   tried	   a	   series	   of	   legislative	   manoeuvres	   to	   undermine	  administration	  policy.	  He	  first	  attempted	  to	  amend	  the	  legislation	  to	  reduce	  the	  funding	  to	  $35	  million,	  before	  subsequently	  demanding	  that	  the	  entire	  bill	   be	   re-­‐submitted	   to	   the	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee	   on	   account	   of	  changes	  made	  by	   the	  House.313	  Rebuffed,	   the	  senator	   then	  demanded	  that	  the	   assistance	   be	   made	   conditional	   on	   the	   Sandinistas	   accepting	   a	  constitution	   that	  mirrored	   the	  United	  States’	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	   ‘For	   the	   life	  of	  me’,	   he	   argued,	   ‘I	   cannot	   see	   …	   what	   infirmity	   it	   does	   to	   this	   piece	   of	  legislation	  to	  spell	  out	  what	  we	  expect	  of	  the	  people	  in	  other	  countries,	  the	  regimes	   in	   other	   countries,	   which	   are	   asking	   for	   enormous	   sums	   of	   the	  taxpayers’	  money.’314	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  311	  Helms	  refused	   to	   identify	  his	   source,	   though	  he	   indicated	  he	  would	  be	  willing	   to	   divulge	   the	   individual’s	   name	   to	   Frank	   Church,	   chair	   of	   the	  committee.	   U.S.	   Senate,	   Committee	   on	   Foreign	   Relations,	   S.	   2010,	   7	  December,	  1979,	  91.	  
312	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  S.	  2010,	  7	  December,	  1979,	  95-­‐95,	  and	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  Nominations	  of	  H.	  Carl	  McCall	  [and	  Three	  
Others;	  Sundry	  Other	  Business],	  13	  December,	  1979,	  51-­‐52.	  
313	  Helms,	  “Special	  Central	  American	  And	  Caribbean	  Security	  Assistance	  Act	  Of	  1979,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  1083-­‐1087,	  and	  Ibid.,	  11655.	  
314	  Ibid.,	  11669.	  
	   117	  
	  It	   was	   an	   opinion	   that	   the	   senator	   consistently	   maintained	   in	   his	  approach	   to	   foreign	   aid,	   echoing	   Carter’s	   use	   of	   economic	   leverage	   to	  influence	   human	   rights	   policies	   in	   other	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   but	   it	  would	  take	  an	  ironic	  twist	  in	  the	  next	  decade	  as	  he	  repeatedly	  emphasised	  conditions	  to	  be	  imposed	  upon	  the	  Sandinistas	  in	  return	  for	  not	  providing	  aid	   to	   the	   Contras.	   At	   this	   stage,	   with	   aid	   to	   the	   new	   government	   in	  Managua	  enjoying	  bipartisan	  support	  in	  Washington,	  Helms’	  proposal	  met	  with	   hostility.	   Lugar	   ascribed	   its	   introduction	   to	   ‘a	   certain	   degree	   of	  mischief’	   on	   the	   part	   of	   Helms,	   and	   suggested	   it	   was	   an	   obvious	   killer	  amendment.315	  Ed	  Zorinsky	  was	  more	  scathing.	  ‘In	  my	  estimation,’	  he	  said,	  ‘this	   amendment	   pretends	   to	   test	   the	   Americanism	   of	  myself	   and	  my	   99	  colleagues.	  How	  dare	  we	  vote	  against	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights?’316	  	  Helms’	  amendment	  was	  a	  test.	  Both	  the	  American	  Conservative	  Union	  and	  the	  American	  Security	  Council	  cited	  the	  tabling	  motion	  against	  Helms’	  proposal	   as	   a	   benchmark	   vote	   in	   their	   annual	   ratings	   indices,	   while	   the	  Senate	   roll	   call	   vote	   on	   passing	   the	   aid	   bill	   was	   published	   in	   Human	  
Events.317	  It	   not	   only	   demonstrated	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   cause	   in	   modern	   conservative	   thought,	   but	   also	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network’s	   interest	   in	   using	   legislation	   as	   a	   means	   of	   defining	  allies	  and	  opponents.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  315	  Lugar,	  “Special	  Central	  American	  Assistance	  Act	  Of	  1979,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  11666.	  
316	  Zorinsky,	  “Special	  Central	  American	  Assistance	  Act	  Of	  1979,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  11669.	  
317	  “1980	  ACU	  Senate	  Vote	  Descriptions,”	  ACU	  Ratings	  of	  Congress,	  accessed	  30	   July,	   2013,	  http://www.conservative.org/ratingsarchive/uscongress/1980/desc_sen.html,	   “Rollcalls:	   Nicaragua	   Aid,”	   Human	   Events,	   31	   May,	   1980,	   4,	   and	  “American	   Security	   Council	   Rates	   Congress,”	   Human	   Events,	   4	   October,	  1980,	  12.	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Helms	   consistently	   used	   the	   aid	   package	   as	   a	  means	   of	   staking	   out	  policy	  positions.	  Speaking	  on	  his	  effort	  to	  reduce	  funding	  to	  Nicaragua,	  the	  senator	   stated	   that,	   ‘If	   I	   do	   nothing	   else	   with	   this	   amendment,	   Mr.	  President,	  tabled	  though	  it	  may	  be,	  I	  will	  at	   least	  have	  put	  this	  Senator	  on	  record	  about	  the	  condition	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  Nicaragua	  today.’318	  His	  motion	  to	  resubmit	  the	  bill	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee	  came	  out	  of	  his	  desire	  ‘to	  have	  a	  test	  vote	  on	  this	  thing’,	  while	  a	  final	  vote	  on	  the	  bill	  ‘suits	  me,	  just	  so	  I	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  vote	  no.’319	  	   After	   the	   Sandinistas	   reneged	   on	   several	   promises	   concerning	  democratic	   plurality	   and	   freedom	   of	   speech	   made	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	   of	   the	   revolution,	   Helms	   consistently	   used	   the	   aid	   vote	   to	  criticise	  colleagues	  who	  had	  maintained	  the	  Nicaraguan	  government	  could	  be	   trusted.	   For	   Helms,	   roll	   call	   votes	   were	   a	   matter	   of	   historical	   record,	  which,	   for	   the	   senator	   at	   least,	   helpfully	   obscured	   the	   nuances	   of	   his	  colleagues’	   decision-­‐making.	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   Helms	   had	   a	   record	   of	  Daniel	  Patrick	  Moynihan	  voting	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  aid,	  despite	  the	  New	  York	  Democrat	  tempering	  his	  support	  with	  concern	  about	  potential	  abuse	  of	  the	  legislation.320	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   consensus	   was	   in	   favour	   of	   sending	   aid	   to	  Nicaragua.	   Moderate	   Republicans,	   as	   noted,	   were	   sympathetic	   to	   the	  request,	  and	  conservatives	  were	  divided.	  Unlike	  Helms,	  some	  on	  the	  right	  supported	  the	  Carter	  administration’s	  argument	  that	  assistance	  could	  be	  an	  instrument	   to	  dissuade	   the	   Sandinistas	   from	  moving	   closer	   to	   the	   Soviet-­‐Cuban	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  Howard	  E.	  Vander	  Clute,	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	  the	  Veterans	  of	  Foreign	  Wars,	  told	  Congress	  to	  give	  the	  Sandinistas	  ‘a	  real	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  Helms,	   “Special	   Central	   American	   Assistance	   Act	   Of	   1979,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  1086.	  
319	  Ibid.,	  11655-­‐11656	  
320	  Daniel	   Patrick	  Moynihan	   (D-­‐NY),	   “Special	   Central	  American	  Assistance	  Act	  Of	  1979,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  11673.	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policy	   choice’,	   while	   National	   Review	   argued	   that,	   while	   a	   remote	  possibility,	   aid	   ‘might	   buy	   the	   revolution	   off.’321	  Roger	   Fontaine,	   Ronald	  Reagan’s	   Latin	   America	   specialist	   and	   later	   head	   of	   the	  National	   Security	  Council’s	  Latin	  America	  section	  between	  1981	  and	  1983,	  best	  summarised	  this	   strand	   of	   conservative	   thinking	   when	   he	   testified	   before	   the	   Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee.	  ‘I	  am	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  distaste	  for	  helping	  a	  Marxist	  or	  semi-­‐Marxist	  regime’,	  he	  said,	  but	  	   …	   without	   any	   aid	   or	   very	   small	   aid	   programs,	   I	   think	   what	  would	   happen	   would	   be	   inevitable,	   that	   we	   would	   have,	   as	   I	  said	  before,	  a	   fullblown	  Marxist	   regime	  very	  quickly.	  With	   the	  aid	  we	  still	  may	  end	  up	  with	  the	  same	  result.	  But	  I	  am	  willing	  to	  gamble	   on	   $75	   million,	   or	   even	   a	   couple	   of	   hundred	   million	  dollars,	   on	   the	   chance,	   a	   reasonably	   good	   chance,	   that	   that	  could	  be	  prevented.322	  	   Fontaine’s	   support	   for	   the	   administration	   and	   constructive	  engagement	   with	   the	   Sandinistas	   would	   not	   last.	   Within	   a	   year,	   he	   and	  several	  other	  staunchly	  anti-­‐communist	  members	  of	  the	  Council	   for	  Inter-­‐American	   Security	   authored	   “A	   New	   Inter-­‐American	   Policy	   for	   the	  Eighties”,	   a	   conservative	   blueprint	   for	   Latin	   America	   policy	   which	  condemned	   Carter’s	   approach	   and	   advocated	   a	   renewed	   anti-­‐communist	  crusade	   in	   the	   Americas.	   Helms’	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   activities	   in	   the	   final	  months	  of	  the	  Carter	  administration	  became	  a	  part	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  effort	  by	   conservative	   intellectuals,	   policy	   advocacy	   groups,	   and	   media	  publications.323	  There	  was	  no	  denying	   that	  many	  of	   these	  hard-­‐liners	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  321	  U.S.	   Senate,	   Committee	   on	   Foreign	   Relations,	  Nomination	   of	   Robert	   E.	  
White,	  of	  Massachusetts,	  To	  Be	  Ambassador	  to	  El	  Salvador.	  Other	  Committee	  
Business,	   21	   February,	   1980,	   40,	   and	   National	   Review,	   “Nicaraguan	  Dominoes,”	  7	  March,	  1980,	  268.	  
322	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  S.	  2010,	  6	  December,	  1979,	  16-­‐34.	  
323	  Kirkpatrick’s	  essay	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  who	  brought	  her	   into	   his	   presidential	   campaign	   team,	   and	   subsequently	   his	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arrived	  later	  than	  Helms	  at	  the	  conclusion	  the	  Sandinistas	  were	  among	  the	  most	   dangerous	   national	   security	   threats	   facing	   the	   United	   States	   at	   this	  time.	  	  Though	  this	  network	  applauded	  Helms	  for	  fighting	  the	  Nicaragua	  aid	  programme,	   the	   senator’s	   efforts	   lacked	   traction	   because	   of	   resistance	  among	  the	  Republican	  establishment.324	  The	  party’s	  policy	  experts	  were	  so	  wary	   of	  Nicaragua	   as	   a	   topic	   that	   they	   urged	   attendees	   at	   the	   GOP’s	   July	  1980	  convention	  to	  avoid	  making	  it	  an	  issue.325	  Helms	  ignored	  this	  advice,	  and	  made	  a	  substantial	  change	  to	  its	  policy	  stance	  on	  Nicaragua	  during	  the	  convention.	  After	  the	  full	  platform	  was	  voted	  on,	  the	  Republican	  candidate	  for	   the	   presidency	   faced	   running	   on	   a	   platform	   of	   regime	   change	   in	  Nicaragua.	  The	  GOP,	  the	  foreign	  policy	  plank	  stated:	  	  	   deplore	  the	  Marxist	  Sandinista	   take-­‐over	  of	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  Marxist	   attempts	   to	   destabilize	   El	   Salvador,	   Guatemala,	   and	  Honduras.	  We	   do	   not	   support	  United	   States	   assistance	   to	   any	  Marxist	   government	   in	   this	   hemisphere	   and	   we	   oppose	   the	  Carter	   Administration	   aid	   program	   for	   the	   government	   of	  Nicaragua.	   However,	   we	   will	   support	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	  Nicaraguan	   people	   to	   establish	   a	   free	   and	   independent	  government.326	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  authors	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  Santa	  Fe	  Document	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  the	  Reagan	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  too.	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   W.	   Hepple,	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   American	   Geopolitics	   and	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  American	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  Right,”	  Les	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  Unpublished	  Papers,	  University	  of	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  School	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   accessed	   20	   October	   2012,	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  Events,	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  1980,	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  “Republican	  Party	  Platform	  of	  1980,	  15	  July	  1980,”	   online	   by	   Gerhard	   Peters	   and	   John	   T.	   Woolley,	   The	   American	  
Presidency	   Project,	   accessed	   1	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  It	   was	   no	   coincidence	   that	   the	   language	  was	   strikingly	   similar	   to	   Helms’	  previous	   protests	   against	   the	   Sandinistas.327	  He	   had	   personally	   drawn	   up	  the	   first	   two	   sentences.	   The	   final	   sentence,	   however,	   was	   absent	   from	  Helms’	  original	  proposal	   and	  had	  been	  vetted	  neither	   in	   the	  official	   read-­‐through	  process	  nor	  by	  the	  full	  platform	  committee.	  It	  originated	  with	  one	  of	  Helms’	   senior	   foreign	  policy	   staffers,	   John	  Carbaugh,	  who	  succeeded	   in	  bypassing	  the	  convention	  protocols	  to	  win	  its	  inclusion.	  	   That	   Carbaugh	   introduced	   the	   language	   is	   significant.	   Advocacy	   of	  anti-­‐communist	   counter-­‐revolution	   was	   a	   fundamental	   element	   of	   what	  later	   became	   known	   as	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine,	   but	   neither	   Reagan	   nor	   his	  senior	  advisers	  took	  part	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  this	  platform	  plank.	  Instead,	  a	   member	   of	   Helms’	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   moulded	   this	   early	  articulation	   of	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine.	   Furthermore,	   the	   link	   between	  Carbaugh’s	  language	  –	  which	  he	  later	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  statement	  of	   intent	   to	   remove	   the	  Sandinistas	   from	  power	  –	  and	  subsequent	  Contra	  activities	   suggests	   that	   Helms’	   aide,	   and	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   in	  general,	  sought	  an	  active	  implementation	  of	  their	  doctrine.328	  	   Carbaugh,	   who	   had	   a	   reputation	   for	   staunch	   conservatism,	   political	  activism,	  and	  effective	  networking,	  used	  the	  convention	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	   increase	   the	   size	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network. 329 	  He	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  For	   examples	   of	   the	   senator’s	   reaction	   to	   the	   Sandinistas,	   see	   Helms,	  “The	  Importance	  of	  Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  125	  (1979),	  15867-­‐15869,	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “The	  Resignation	  of	  President	  Somoza,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  125	  (1979),	  18947-­‐18948,	   and	   Helms,	   “Special	   Central	   American	   and	   Caribbean	  Security	  Assistance	  Act	  of	  1979,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  125	  (1980),	  1083-­‐1090.	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  Gutman,	  Banana	  Diplomacy,	  19-­‐21.	  
329	  Carbaugh’s	   gained	   particular	   notoriety	   for	   his	   efforts	   to	   publicise	   the	  presence	   of	   the	   Soviet	   combat	   brigade	   in	   Cuba	   in	   1979,	   and	   for	   his	  attendance	  at	  the	  Rhodesia	  talks	   in	  London	  in	  the	  same	  year	  which	  led	  to	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accompanied	   Nat	   Hamrick,	   a	   North	   Carolinian	   businessman	   with	   strong	  ties	  to	  the	  Somoza	  dynasty,	  and	  Gerardo	  Schamis,	  an	  Argentinean	  diplomat	  attending	  on	  behalf	  of	  General	  Roberto	  Viola,	  around	  the	  convention.330	  The	  Argentinean	   connection	   indicated	   the	   growing	   transnational	   character	   of	  the	   network,	   as	   U.S.	   anti-­‐communists	   dissatisfied	   with	   Carter’s	   apparent	  ineffectiveness	  in	  combating	  leftist	  expansion	  in	  the	  hemisphere	  sought	  out	  regional	  allies	  with	  similar	  sentiments.	  It	  also	  highlighted	  Carbaugh’s	  desire	  to	  ally	  with	  groups	  with	  anti-­‐communist	  paramilitary	  experience.331	  	   At	   this	   time,	   in	  Nicaragua,	  anti-­‐communist	  paramilitary	  groups	  were	  beginning	   to	   coalesce	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   fight	   back	   against	   the	   Sandinistas.	  Many	  bands	  of	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  rebels	  emerged	  out	  of	  private	  conflicts	  and	  rivalry	  in	  isolated	  rural	  areas,	  but	  the	  movement	  also	  included	  indigenous	  Miskito	   fighters	   opposed	   to	   the	   Sandinistas’	   plans	   for	   their	   communities	  and	   former	   anti-­‐Somoza	   activists	   who	   had	   disavowed	   the	   Sandinista	  government	   as	   it	   began	   to	   govern.	   There	   was	   also	   a	   large	   collection	   of	  former	   National	   Guardsmen,	   who	   had	   fled	   in	   the	   waning	   days	   of	   the	  Somoza	   regime.	  Robert	  Kagan,	   sympathetic	   to	   the	  Reagan	  administration,	  argues	  the	  largest	  group	  among	  this	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  Contra	  movement	  was	  the	   Miskito	   population:	   thus	   presenting	   the	   force	   as	   a	   bottom-­‐up	  insurrection	   from	   within	   Nicaraguan	   society. 332 	  Yet	   an	   American	  framework	   for	   the	   growing	   insurrection	   was	   now	   inserted,	   as	   Carbaugh	  and	   Hamrick	   introduced	   Schamis	   to	   several	   Reagan	   advisers,	   including	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  accusations	  of	  his	  improper	  interference	  in	  the	  negotiation	  process.	  Though	  there	   were	   arguments	   over	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   charges,	   his	   skill	   in	  networking	  was	  indisputable:	  he	  secured	  a	  personal	  meeting	  with	  Margaret	  Thatcher.	  Kathy	  Sawyer,	   “Two	  Helms	  Point	  Men:	  Locking	  Horns	  With	  The	  Liberals,”	  Washington	  Post,	  27	  November,	  1979,	  A2.	  
330 	  General	   Viola	   would	   become	   Argentina’s	   president	   in	   March	   1981.	  Gutman,	  Banana	  Diplomacy,	  22.	  	  
331	  For	   details	   on	   the	   Argentine	   strategy	   to	   fight	   communism	   in	   Central	  America,	   see	   Ariel	   C.	   Armony,	  Argentina,	   The	  United	   States,	   and	   the	   Anti-­‐
Communist	   Crusade	   in	   Central	   America,	   1977	   –	   1984	   (Athens:	   Ohio	  University	  Press,	  1997).	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  Kagan,	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  Twilight	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Reagan’s	   chief-­‐of-­‐staff	   when	   California	   governor	   and	   future	   Attorney	  General,	   Ed	   Meese.333	  This	   growing	   American	   role,	   alongside	   the	   robust	  anti-­‐communist	   rhetoric	   from	   Reagan’s	   campaign,	   led	   right-­‐wing	   Latin	  American	  governments	  to	  believe	  with	  increasing	  confidence	  that	  a	  Reagan	  election	   victory	   would	   yield	   much	   greater	   support	   for	   regional	   anti-­‐communist	  operations.334	  	   Thus,	   even	   prior	   to	   Reagan’s	   presidential	   election	   victory	   and	   his	  subsequent	   efforts	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Contras,	   an	   emerging	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  alliance	   had	   set	   in	   motion	   efforts	   to	   create	   an	   aggressive	   policy	   of	  assistance	  for	  anti-­‐communist,	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  groups	  in	  Nicaragua.	  Given	   their	   role	   in	   these	   activities,	   and	   the	   striking	   similarities	   between	  their	   initial	   endeavours	   and	   the	   subsequent	   reality	   of	   the	   Contra	  programme,	  Helms	  and	  Carbaugh	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  having	  an	  important	  influence	   on	   early	   manifestations	   of	   a	   doctrine	   that	   would	   be	   intimately	  linked	  with	  Reagan	  over	  the	  next	  eight	  years.	  	  The	  Helms-­‐Reagan	  Doctrine,	  1980-­‐1984	  	   Reagan’s	   election	   to	   the	   presidency	   in	   1980	   gave	   Helms	   a	   greater	  voice	   in	   Nicaragua	   policy.	   The	   election	   of	   a	   Republican	   majority	   in	   the	  Senate	   on	   the	   coattails	   of	   Reagan’s	   landslide	   victory,	   and	   the	   growth	   in	  stature	  of	  conservatism	  within	  the	  national	  party,	  elevated	  Helms’	  position	  in	   the	   GOP.	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   new	   Republican	   majority,	   he	   was	  promoted	   to	   chairman	   of	   the	   Senate	   Committee	   on	   Foreign	   Relations’	  Western	   Hemisphere	   Subcommittee.	   This	   allowed	   him	   to	   oversee	  Nicaragua	  policy,	  convening	  hearings	  on	  issues	  that	  mattered	  most	  to	  him,	  utilising	  key	  witnesses	   to	   advocate	  his	  policies,	   and	   framing	   the	   situation	  from	   a	   more	   prominent	   pulpit.	   Helms	   would	   not	   only	   enjoy	   a	   front-­‐row	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333	  Gutman,	  Banana	  Diplomacy,	  22.	  
334	  Armony,	   Argentina,	  64,	   and	   Michael	   Barnes,	   interview	   with	   author,	   6	  August,	  2013.	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view	   of	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	   Nicaragua,	   he	  would	  have	  more	  opportunities	  to	  shape	  it.	  	  	   The	   first	   of	   these	   opportunities	   occurred	   during	   the	   transition	   and	  immediate	   post-­‐inaugural	   period,	   when	   Helms	   and	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  worked	  to	  remould	  the	   foreign	  policy	  bureaucracy	   in	   favour	  of	  a	  more	   hospitable	   environment	   for	   hard-­‐line	   policy	   in	   Nicaragua	   (and	  Central	   America	  more	   generally).	   Led	   by	   John	   Carbaugh	   and	  made	   up	   of	  several	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   activists,	   including	   Roger	   Fontaine,	   a	   transition	  team	   was	   sent	   into	   the	   State	   Department’s	   Bureau	   of	   Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	   (ARA)	   during	   the	   changeover	   period.	   Their	   goal,	   according	   to	  Carbaugh,	  was	   to	   ‘“take	  an	   inventory	  of	   the	  major	  outstanding	   issues	  and	  the	   people	   and	   approaches	   being	   used	   to	   deal	   with	   them	   so	   this	  information	  will	  be	  available	  to	  the	  decision	  makers	  on	  Reagan’s	  staff.”’335	  	  Carbaugh	   was	   keen	   at	   the	   time	   to	   stress	   the	   conciliatory	   tone	   and	  substance	   of	   the	   team’s	  work.	   Arguing	   that	   there	  was	   only	   disagreement	  over	  three	  to	  five	  per	  cent	  of	  Carter’s	  foreign	  policies,	  he	  told	  John	  Goshko	  of	   the	  Washington	  Post	   that	   ‘“We	  have	   to	  be	  careful	   to	   look	  at	   the	  human	  factor	  and	  see	  where	  these	  people	  are	  coming	  from.	  They’re	  people	  who,	  in	  effect,	  gave	  birth	  to	  a	  baby	  and	  who	  have	  raised	  it	   lovingly	  for	   four	  years.	  Now	  we	  can’t	  just	  throw	  their	  baby	  out	  with	  the	  bathwater.”’	  There	  had	  to	  be	   ‘“some	   continuity”’,	   he	   added,	   and	   ‘“where	   change	   is	   unavoidable,	   it	  should	  be	  gradual	  wherever	  possible.”’	  Nevertheless,	  when	   the	  governing	  party	  changed,	  ‘“there	  has	  to	  be	  a	  change	  of	  people	  and	  policies.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	   State	  Department	  must	  be	   stamped	  with	  Reagan’s	   imprimatur.	  That’s	  the	  bottom	  line.”’336	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  John	  M.	  Goshko,	  “Transitions	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  Washington	  
Post,	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  November,	  1980,	  A12.	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  “Transition’s	  Carbaugh	  Alarms	  State	  Dept.,”	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State	   Department	   personnel,	   however,	   recalled	   a	   rather	   different	  atmosphere.	  Robert	  B.	  Morley,	  part	  of	  ARA’s	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Planning	  and	  Coordination,	  later	  described	  his	  experiences	  with	  the	  transition	  team:	  	  They	  not	  only	  talked	  to	  me	  about	  policy	  issues,	  they	  questioned	  me	   closely	   about	   the	   roles	   and	   behavior	   of	   front	   office	  personnel,	   the	   Deputy	   Assistant	   Secretaries	   and	   Assistant	  Secretary.	   Morale	   deteriorated.	   People	   concluded	   that	   those	  who	  had	   carried	   out	   the	  policies	   of	   the	  Carter	  Administration	  would	  have	  their	  careers	  destroyed.	  They	  were	  right.337	  	  David	  Newsom,	  a	  senior	  State	  Department	  official,	  agreed.	  Those	  linked	  to	  Carter’s	   policies	   were	   ‘severely	   penalized’	   for	   their	   work.	   Individuals	   ‘at	  lower	   levels,’	   he	   said,	   ‘people	   like	   Jim	   Cheek,	   who	   worked	   on	   Latin	  American	  affairs,	  people	  who	  had	  gotten	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  Jesse	  Helms,	  never	  recovered	  during	  the	  Reagan	  years.’338	  	  	  	   Pressure	  from	  this	  team,	  and	  conservatives	  more	  generally,	  led	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	   Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  William	  Bowdler	   and	  deputy	   assistant	   secretary	   James	  Cheek.	  Only	  days	   after	   the	  inauguration,	  Robert	  White,	  ambassador	  to	  El	  Salvador,	  was	  removed	  from	  his	   post,	   followed	   shortly	   afterwards	   by	   Lawrence	   Pezzullo	   in	  Nicaragua.	  Yet	   personnel	   change	   was	   not	   the	   only	   item	   on	   the	   transition	   team’s	  agenda.	  A	  report	  prepared	  for	  the	  White	  House	  after	  Carbaugh’s	  interviews	  with	   ARA	   staff	   advocated	   a	   renewed	   emphasis	   on	   the	   role	   of	   Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  for	  controlling	  regional	  policy.	  Carbaugh	   and	   the	   team	   concluded	   that	   the	   National	   Security	   Council,	  especially	   Robert	   Pastor,	   had	   exerted	   an	   unnecessary	   and	   unacceptable	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  Robert	  B.	  Morley,	  interview	  with	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  23	  July,	  1997,	  
ADST.	  
338	  David	   D.	   Newsom,	   interview	   with	   Charles	   Stuart	   Kennedy,	   17	   June,	  1991,	  ADST.	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degree	   of	   influence	   on	   Latin	   America	   policy	   during	   the	   Carter	  administration.	  Given	  the	  suggestion	  at	  the	  time	  that	  Carbaugh,	  supported	  by	  Helms,	  was	  looking	  to	  head	  ARA	  under	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  this	  may	  well	  have	  reflected	  an	  attempt	  to	  concentrate	  policy	  influence	  in	  their	  own	   hands.339	  Of	   course,	   in	   time,	   there	  would	   be	   a	   certain	   irony	   in	   these	  complaints.	   It	  was	  the	  excessive	  latitude	  afforded	  to	  members	  of	  Reagan’s	  National	   Security	   Council	   that	   produced	   the	   Iran-­‐Contra	   scandals	   and	  consequent	  collapse	  of	  the	  Contra	  programme.	  	   So	  pervasive	  was	  Carbaugh’s	  influence	  during	  the	  transition	  that	  one	  State	   Department	   official,	   when	   asked	   about	   the	   Reagan	   administration’s	  policies	   for	   Latin	   America	   shortly	   after	   the	   president’s	   inauguration,	  replied,	  ‘“Why	  don’t	  you	  ask	  John	  Carbaugh	  –	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  running	  things	  around	   here.”’ 340 	  Carbaugh’s	   actions	   indicated	   a	   hubris	   that	   Richard	  Neustadt	  has	  identified	  as	  a	  common	  characteristic	  of	  several	  presidential	  transitions	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   era.	   Incoming	   staff	   can	   suffer	   from	  a	   sense	   of	  invulnerability	   intoxicated	   by	   their	   campaign	   victory:	   ‘“they”	   couldn’t,	  wouldn’t,	   didn’t,	   but	   “we”	   will’,	   as	   Neustadt	   pithily	   summarises. 341 	  In	  conjunction	  with	   campaign	  momentum	  and	  partisan	  division	   that	  Martha	  Joynt	  Kumar	  sees	  as	  important	  contributing	  factors	  in	  transition	  hostility	  –	  and	   in	   this	   case	   magnified	   by	   the	   notable	   ideological	   split	   between	   the	  Carter	   and	   Reagan	   teams	   –	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   Carbaugh	   and	   those	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  John	   Bushnell,	   interview	   with	   Charles	   Stuart	   Kennedy,	   21	   July,	   1998,	  
ADST,	   John	  Maclean,	   “Banker	   is	   likely	  choice	   for	  Haig’s	  assistant,”	  Chicago	  
Tribune,	  10	  February,	  1981,	  B6,	  and	  Goshko,	  “Transition’s	  Carbaugh	  Alarms	  State	  Dept.,”	  A12.	  
340	  Barry	   Rubin,	   Secrets	   of	   State:	   The	   State	   Department	   and	   the	   Struggle	  
Over	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  220.	  
341	  Richard	  E.	  Neustadt,	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidents:	  The	  
Politics	  of	  Leadership	  from	  Roosevelt	  to	  Reagan	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1990),	  248.	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around	  him	  displayed	  an	  aggressive	  and	  sweeping	  approach	  to	  institutional	  reform	  within	  ARA.342	  	  Building	   an	   institutional	   environment	   conducive	   to	   a	   hard-­‐line	  Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	   Nicaragua	   was	   not	   only	   dependent	   on	   removing	  individuals	  perceived	   to	  be	  obstacles.	   It	   required	   the	   introduction	  of	  new	  people	   deemed	   sufficiently	   conservative	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  strategy	   envisioned	  by	  Helms	   and	   the	  network.	  As	  Human	  Events	   argued,	  ‘there	  is	  no	  way	  he	  [Reagan]	  can	  clean	  out	  40	  years	  of	  accumulation	  in	  the	  Augean	  stables	  without	  a	  massive	  effort	   to	  saturate	   the	  bureaucracy	  with	  people	  of	  his	  own	  philosophical	  bent.’343	  	  Unlike	   the	   removal	   of	   personnel	   from	  ARA,	   in	  which	  Helms	   and	  his	  network	   appeared	   to	   have	   significant	   influence,	   introducing	   individuals	  into	  senior	  foreign	  policy	  positions	  offered	  more	  significant	  obstacles.	  For	  a	  start,	  choosing	  Cabinet	  level	  nominations	  was	  well	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  senator.	   It	   was	   Reagan’s	   ‘kitchen	   cabinet’	   of	   wealthy	   businessmen	   and	  California	   advisers	   who	   advised	   the	   new	   president	   on	   Cabinet	   level	  appointees,	  while	  a	  separate	  group	  of	  aides,	  alongside	  Vice	  President-­‐elect	  George	   H.	  W.	   Bush,	   Ed	  Meese,	   James	   Baker,	  Mike	   Deaver,	  William	   Casey,	  and	   E.	   Pendleton	   James	  worked	   on	   the	   final	   decision	   for	   each	   post.	   Only	  Senator	   Paul	   Laxalt,	   Reagan’s	   closest	   friend	   in	   the	   Senate,	   provided	   any	  congressional	  input.344	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  Martha	   Joynt	   Kumar,	   “Opportunities	   and	   Hazards:	   The	   White	   House	  Interview	   Program,”	   (White	   House	   2001	   Project,	   1998),	   9-­‐10,	   quoted	   in	  Kurt	   M.	   Campbell	   and	   James	   B.	   Steinberg,	   Difficult	   Transitions:	   Foreign	  
Policy	   Troubles	   at	   the	   Outset	   of	   Presidential	   Power	   (Washington,	   D.C.:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2008),	  162.	  
343	  “Despite	   Some	   Aberrations:	   Reagan	   Presidency	   Asserting	   Rightward	  Course,”	  Human	  Events,	  14	  February,	  1981,	  1.	  
344	  Carl	   M.	   Brauer,	   Presidential	   Transitions:	   Eisenhower	   Through	   Reagan	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  228.	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Moreover,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  State	  Department	  personnel,	  which	  was	  largely	  a	  matter	  of	  executive	  preference	  (though	  constrained	  by	  the	  foreign	  service	  code),	  placing	  individuals	  into	  senior	  positions	  required	  a	  careful	  traverse	  of	  the	  Senate	  confirmation	  process.	  This,	  as	  Gary	  Andres	  notes,	   is	  a	  particularly	  complex	   journey,	  given	   the	  overlapping	  spheres	  of	  policy,	   politics,	   and	   procedure	   inherent	   in	   the	   process.345	  In	   the	   post-­‐war	  period,	   the	   chamber	   had	   shown	   an	   increasing	  willingness	   to	   assert	   itself	  over	  Cabinet	  and	  sub-­‐Cabinet	  nominations,	  and	  the	  delay,	  or	  even	  outright	  rejection,	  of	  executive	  appointments	  was	  a	  more	  common	  occurrence	  as	  a	  result.	   346 	  When	   seeking	   to	   disrupt	   policy	   or	   register	   disapproval	   of	  executive	   strategy,	   Helms	   was	   happy	   to	   embrace	   this	   assertiveness.	  However,	   in	  seeking	   to	  construct	  a	  movement	  conservative	   foreign	  policy	  bureaucracy,	   the	   senator	   and	   his	   allies	   found	   it	   a	   formidable	   obstacle	   to	  their	  efforts.	  	  	  Nowhere	  was	  this	  more	  apparent	  than	  with	  the	  failed	  nomination	  of	  Ernest	   Lefever	   to	   replace	   Patricia	   Derian	   as	   head	   of	   human	   rights	   at	   the	  State	   Department.	   Lefever,	   a	   prominent	   neoconservative	   and	  member	   of	  the	  anti-­‐détente	  group,	  the	  Committee	  on	  the	  Present	  Danger,	  who	  stressed	  the	  relationship	  between	   Judeo-­‐Christian	  morality	  and	   foreign	  policy,	  had	  been	  picked	  as	  a	  sop	  to	  conservatives	  who	  feared	  Alexander	  Haig	  had	  failed	  to	  promote	  conservatives	  to	  senior	  State	  Department	  positions.	  Helms	  was	  seen	   by	   State	   Department	   officials	   as	   Lefever’s	   biggest	   supporter	   on	   the	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   J.	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   ““The	  Contemporary	  Presidency”:	   Parties,	   Process,	   and	  Presidential	  Power:	  Learning	  from	  Confirmation	  Politics	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Senate,”	  
Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	  32,	  No.	  1	  (March,	  2002),	  147.	  
346	  Norman	  Ornstein	  and	  Thomas	  Donilon	  point	  out	  that	  during	  when	  John	  F.	   Kennedy	   was	   elected,	   196	   top-­‐level	   foreign	   policy	   posts	   were	   filled	  within	   two	   and	   a	   half	  months	   of	   his	   inauguration.	   Thirty-­‐two	  years	   later,	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  786	  nominees	   took,	  on	  average,	   almost	  nine	  months	   to	   take	  up	   their	   positions.	   Norman	   Ornstein	   and	   Thomas	   Donilon,	   “The	  Confirmation	  Clog,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  79,	  No.	  6	  (November-­‐December,	  2000),	  88.	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Senate	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee.347	  Meanwhile,	  Human	  Events	   lauded	  the	   nominee	   because	   he	   ‘is	   not	   going	   to	   use	   his	   post	   to	   bring	   down	   the	  regimes	  of	  stable,	  pro-­‐American	  governments	  whose	  human	  rights	  policies	  are	   less	   harsh	   than	   the	   totalitarian	   forces	   battling	   to	   replace	   those	  governments.’ 348 	  National	   Review	   argued	   that	   if	   Lefever	   failed	   to	   be	  confirmed,	   ‘the	   liberal-­‐radical	   Hive	   will	   have	   recouped	   some	   of	   its	  losses.’349	  	  Yet	  a	  furore	  over	  Lefever’s	  links	  to	  Nestlé,	  then	  under	  examination	  for	  its	   marketing	   of	   infant	   formula	   in	   the	   Third	   World,	   as	   well	   as	   intense	  scepticism	   over	   his	   commitment	   to	   human	   rights,	   led	   the	   Senate	   Foreign	  Relations	   Committee	   to	   reject	   his	   nomination.350	  Helms	   was	   one	   of	   only	  four	   members	   to	   support	   Lefever,	   numbers	   that	   were	   insufficient	   to	  overcome	  a	  dramatic	  display	  of	  institutional	  opposition	  to	  the	  conservative	  favourite.	   The	   administration’s	   reluctance	   to	   fight	   on	   Lefever’s	   behalf	  exacerbated	   existing	   conservative	   concern	   at	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	  Reagan	   administration	   had	   begun	   its	   first	   term.	   Picking	   up	   on	   dismay	  exhibited	  by	  New	  Right	   leaders	   like	  Richard	  Viguerie	  and	  Howard	  Philips,	  
National	   Review	   reported	   that	   patience	   with	   Reagan	   ‘is	   already	  exhausted.’351	  	   The	   majority	   of	   Reagan’s	   diplomatic	   picks	   were	   successfully	  confirmed,	   however.	   Jeane	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  Scott	   Cohen,	   interview	   with	   Charles	   Stuart	   Kennedy,	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   June,	   1990,	  
ADST.	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  “Battle	   Heats	   Up	   Over	   Levefer	   Nomination,”	   Human	   Events,	   18	   April,	  1981,	  3.	  
349	  “The	  Lefever	  Sting,”	  National	  Review,	  3	  April,	  1981,	  333.	  
350	  Jerry	  Wayne	   Sanders,	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   of	   Crisis:	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  Press,	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   In	   Senate,	   Lefever	   Pulls	   Out	   As	   Rights	  Nominee,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  6	  June,	  1981,	  1.	  
351	  “For	  the	  Record,”	  National	  Review,	  20	  February,	  1981,	  20.	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new	  ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  by	  81	  votes	  to	  zero,	  while	  Alexander	  Haig,	  President	  Nixon’s	  post-­‐Watergate	  chief-­‐of-­‐staff	  and	  Reagan’s	  nominee	  for	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   passed	   the	   Senate	   93-­‐6.	   Helms	   and	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  community	  largely	  greeted	  these	  appointments	  with	  praise.	  The	  senator	  described	  Kirkpatrick	  as	  ‘an	  extraordinary	  person’	  and	  a	  perfect	  fit	  for	   the	   era	   of	   national	   renewal	   promised	   by	   the	   new	   president,	   while	  
Human	   Events	   called	   the	   appointment	   a	   ‘shrewd’	   move	   to	   woo	   hawkish	  Democrats.352	  Helms	  was	   also	   supportive	   of	   Haig,	   ‘vigorously’	   supporting	  the	   former	  NATO	  commander’s	  nomination,	   and	   sharing	   the	   sentiment	  of	  Neal	  Freeman	  in	  National	  Review	   that	  Reagan	  was	   lucky	  to	  have	  a	  man	  of	  Haig’s	   qualities.353	  The	   general,	   Helms	   said,	   would	   be	   ‘his	   own	   man	   as	  Secretary	  of	  State’,	  and	  would	  ‘not	  permit	  the	  Department	  to	  be	  taken	  over	  by	   any	   second-­‐level	   advisers,	   or	   anyone	   on	   the	   outside.’354	  Indeed,	   it	  was	  partly	   because	   Helms	   believed	   Haig	   would	   appoint	   conservatives	   to	  second-­‐tier	  State	  posts	  that	  Human	  Events	  offered	  its	  own	  support	   for	  the	  new	  Secretary	  of	  State.355	  	  	   Haig	   had	   been	   a	   close	   associate	   of	   Henry	   Kissinger	   and	   served	   as	  Richard	   Nixon’s	   post-­‐Watergate	   chief-­‐of-­‐staff,	   and	   perhaps	   it	   was	  surprising	   that	  Helms	  supported	  an	   individual	  closely	  associated	  with	   the	  architects	   of	   détente.	   After	   all,	   the	   senator	   blocked,	   or	   flat-­‐out	   rejected,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  352	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “United	   Nations,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   127	   (1981),	   1239,	   and	  “Reagan	  Signals	  Shift	  in	  U.S.-­‐Third	  World	  Policy,”	  Human	  Events,	  3	  January,	  1981,	  3.	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  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Department	   Of	   State,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	  127	   (1981),	   616-­‐617,	  and	  Neal	  Freeman,	  “Transition	  Fever,”	  National	  Review,	  12	  December,	  1980,	  1498.	  
354	  Helms,	  “Department	  Of	  State,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  127	  (1981),	  616-­‐617.	  
355	  	  “Haig’s	  Performance	  Pleases	  Hawks,”	  Human	  Events,	  34	  January,	  1981,	  1,	  and	  “How	  Hawkish	  is	  Haig?”	  Human	  Events,	  27	  December,	  1980,	  8.	  Other	  conservatives	   were	   less	   sure	   on	   the	   appointment.	   M.	   Stanton	   Evans,	   for	  example,	  noted	  Haig’s	  association	  with	  Kissinger,	  and	  pointed	  out	  how	  little	  was	   known	   about	   the	   new	   secretary’s	   foreign	   policy	   views.	   M.	   Stanton	  Evans,	   “Some	   Questions	   for	   Alexander	   Haig,”	  Human	   Events,	   17	   January,	  1981,	  5.	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several	   prominent	   nominees	   who	   he	   saw	   as	   too	   closely	   associated	   with	  Haig	   or	   détente-­‐era	   Cold	   War	   policies.	   Helms	   subjected	   Richard	   Burt,	  Chester	   Crocker,	   and,	   critically,	   the	   incoming	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	  for	   Inter-­‐American	   Affairs,	   Tom	   Enders,	   all	   of	   whom	   were	   seen	   as	   Haig	  allies,	   to	   lengthy	   delays	   in	   their	   confirmation	   process. 356 	  Indeed,	   the	  senator	   was	   one	   of	   only	   two	   individuals	   to	   vote	   against	   Caspar	  Weinberger’s	   confirmation	   as	   Secretary	   of	   Defense.	   (The	   other	   was	   his	  North	  Carolina	  and	  conservative	  colleague,	   John	  East.)	  Weinberger,	  Helms	  argued,	  was	  too	  fiscally	  restrictive	  and	  enamoured	  with	  détente’s	  strategic	  arms	  limitation	  discussions	  to	  fully	  embrace	  the	  military	  spending	  required	  to	  re-­‐assert	  American	  power.357	  	  	   Later	  assessments	  of	  Haig’s	  role	  in	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  flaws	  in	  the	  appointment.	  The	  general,	  it	  is	  widely	  argued,	  was	   too	   incendiary	   in	   his	   policy	   pronouncements,	   overly	   abrasive	   in	   his	  management	  style,	  and	  closely	  associated	  with	  Kissinger	  to	  work	  effectively	  with	   the	   White	   House.358	  To	   Helms,	   however,	   Haig	   was	   the	   kind	   of	   no-­‐nonsense	   anti-­‐communist	  who	  would	   rescue	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   from	   the	  ‘bipartisan	  folly’	  of	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  He	  certainly	  did	  not	  rubber-­‐stamp	  Haig’s	   appointment	   out	   of	   loyalty	   to	   Reagan,	   as	   his	   treatment	   of	  Weinberger	   demonstrated.	   Rather,	   ignoring	   Haig’s	   prior	   association	  with	  détente,	  Helms	   ‘vigorously’	  supported	  Haig’s	  nomination	   in	  the	  belief	   that	  the	  new	  Secretary	  of	  State	  would	  reassert	  the	  United	  States’	  position	  as	   ‘a	  beacon	  of	  hope	  for	  the	  millions	  of	  people	  around	  the	  world	  who	  are	  today	  oppressed	  by	  communism.’359	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356 	  Burt	   was	   nominated	   as	   director	   of	   the	   Bureau	   of	   Politico-­‐Military	  Affairs,	   Crocker	   as	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   African	   Affairs.	   Rubin,	  
Secrets	  of	  State,	  207-­‐208.	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  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Department	  of	  Defense,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  127	  (1981),	  554-­‐557.	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  Rubin,	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  of	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359	  Helms,	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  Cong.	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  (1981),	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   Organisational	  change	  is	  common	  in	  all	  societies,	  as	  Frederick	  Mosher	  points	   out	   in	  his	   review	  of	   presidential	   transitions	   and	   the	   foreign	  policy	  process.	   Yet	   such	   change,	   he	   continued,	   tends	   to	   be	   ‘less	   pervasive,	   less	  intensive…	   and	   less	   frantic’	   than	   those	   of	   American	   presidential	  transitions. 360 	  Several	   scholars	   have	   pointed	   to	   the	   pitfalls	   of	   frantic	  presidential	   transitions,	   including	   Kumar,	   who	   argued	   that	   hostile	  transitions	   could	   lead	   to	   a	   loss	   of	   institutional	  memory	   and	   training.	   She	  suggests	   policy	   and	   organisational	   effectiveness	   can	   be	   achieved	   by	  maintaining	  individuals	  from	  the	  previous	  administration,	  thus	  ensuring	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  continuity.361	  	  	  Helms’	   goal,	   however,	   was	   not	   to	   produce	   a	   smooth	   transition	   and	  certainly	  not	  any	  continuity	  with	  the	  Carter	  administration.	  He	  did	  not	  seek	  the	  bipartisanship	  that	  Roger	  Porter	  sees	  as	  vital	  during	  transitions.362	  He	  sought	  a	  clean	  break,	  however	  disruptive,	   from	  the	   foreign	  policies	  of	   the	  past.	   He	   engineered	   personnel	   change	   that	   undermined	   potential	   policy	  and	   knowledge	   continuation	   by	   removing	   those	   associated	   with	   Carter’s	  Central	   American	   framework.	   Instead,	   he	   backed	   ideological	   partisans	  whose	   appeal	   lay	   precisely	   in	   their	   lack	   of	   knowledge	   and	   sympathy	   to	  previous	  policies.	  	  	   Following	   on	   from	   their	   success	   at	   the	   convention,	   buoyed	   by	   the	  election	  of	  a	  conservative	  to	  the	  White	  House,	  and	  now	  boosted	  by	  a	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  360	  Frederick	  C.	  Mosher,	   “Presidential	  Transitions	   and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  The	  American	  Experience,”	  Public	  Administration	  Review	  45,	  No.	  4	  (July-­‐August,	  1985),	  468.	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  Martha	   Joynt	   Kumar,	   “Opportunities	   and	   Hazards:	   The	   White	   House	  Interview	   Program,”	   (White	   House	   2001	   Project,	   1998),	   9-­‐10,	   quoted	   in	  Campbell	  and	  Steinberg,	  Difficult	  Transitions,	  162.	  
362 	  Roger	   Porter,	   “Of	   Hazards	   and	   Opportunities:	   Transitions	   and	   the	  Modern	   Presidency,”	   Presidential	   Power	   Revisited	   Conference,	  Woodrow	  Wilson	   Center,	   Washington,	   1996,	   quoted	   in	   Campbell	   and	   Steinberg,	  
Difficult	  Transitions,	  153.	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sympathetic	  senior	   foreign	  policy	  staff,	   the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  began	  to	   push	   harder	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   emerging	   Contra	   movement.	   Their	   first	  major	   success	   was	   the	   suspension	   of	   aid	   to	   Nicaragua,	   which	   Reagan	  agreed	   to	   on	   1	   April	   1981,	   following	   an	   intensive	   lobbying	   campaign	   by	  conservatives	   both	   within	   and	   outside	   the	   administration. 363 	  Helms	  contributed	   by	   calling	   the	   arrest	   of	   the	   Nicaraguan	   Human	   Rights	  Commission’s	  president	  in	  February,	  along	  with	  the	  administration’s	  white	  paper	   on	   El	   Salvador,	   grounds	   for	   an	   immediate	   suspension	   of	   aid:	   ‘the	  presumption	   should	   be	   that	   this	   is	   not	   an	   isolated	   phenomenon,	   but	   is	  rather	  an	  example	  of	  systematic	  violation	  of	  those	  rights	  [human	  rights	  and	  free	  press].’364	  	   Alongside	   these	   more	   public	   initiatives,	   Helms’	   contacts	   worked	  behind	   the	   scenes	   to	   influence	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   Contra	   leadership.	  Multiple	   rebel	   factions	   had	   emerged	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Revolution,	  ranging	   from	   disaffected	   ex-­‐Sandinistas	   to	   groups	   of	   former	   National	  Guardsmen,	  but	  Carbaugh	  and	  Hamrick	  agreed	  with	  Schamis	   that	  Colonel	  Enrique	   Bermudez	   Varela	   was	   the	   best	   candidate	   for	   the	   role	   of	   overall	  commander. 365 	  Bermudez’s	   previous	   position	   in	   Washington	   D.C.	   as	  Somoza’s	  military	  attaché,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  reputation	   for	   integrity	  and	  hard	  work,	   insulated	  him	   from	  accusations	  of	   complicity	   in	   Somoza’s	   excesses.	  His	   post-­‐Somoza	   role	   as	   leader	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   15th	   September	  Legion,	  meanwhile,	  buttressed	  his	  military	  credibility	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	   those	  seeking	  a	  paramilitary	  solution	  to	  the	  Sandinista	  problem.	  	  	  	  Their	   success	   in	   promoting	   Bermudez	   was	   a	   testament	   to	   the	  advantages	  of	  the	  informal	  networking	  that	  Helms	  and	  his	  allies	  practiced.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  363	  Edward	  Walsh,	   “U.S.	  Economic	  Aid	   to	  Nicaragua	   Is	  Suspended	  but	  May	  Be	  Resumed,”	  Washington	  Post,	  2	  April,	  1981,	  A2.	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  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “The	   Arrest	   And	   Trial	   Of	   The	   President	   Of	   The	  Nicaragua	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	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  (1981),	  2802.	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  Contras,	  2,	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They	  used	  their	  growing	  network	  of	  contacts	  to	  press	  hard	  in	  the	  transition	  period	   for	   General	   Viola	   to	   visit	   the	   U.S.,	   and	   were	   rewarded	   when	   the	  Argentinean	   journeyed	   to	   Washington	   in	   March	   1981.	   Viola’s	   visit,	  according	   to	   Hamrick,	   confirmed	   the	   burgeoning	   alliance	   between	  Argentina	   and	   the	   U.S.	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Contras.	   The	   following	   month,	  Carbaugh	  and	  Hamrick	  accompanied	  prominent	  Nicaraguan	  exile	  Francisco	  Aguirre	   to	  Buenos	  Aires.	  There	   they	  met	  with	  Colonel	  Mario	  Davico,	  who	  commanded	  Argentinean	  operations	   in	  Central	  America.366	  Between	   them	  they	  arranged	  the	  specifics	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Argentina	  in	   the	   Contra	   programme,	   and	   in	   the	   following	   days	   Bermudez	   himself	  visited	  Argentina	  and	  secured	  its	  leaders’	  blessings.367	  	   The	   network’s	   size	   and	   influence	   were	   revealed	   in	   December	   1982	  when	   Hector	   Frances,	   who	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   defector	   from	   Argentina’s	  Intelligence	   Battalion	   601,	   named	   Hamrick	   as	   one	   of	   a	   number	   of	  individuals	   involved	   in	   operations	   to	   overthrow	   the	   Sandinistas.	   Frances	  testified	   that	   Hamrick	   had	   been	   working	   with	   right-­‐wing	   Argentineans,	  Hondurans,	   and	  Costa	  Ricans	   to	   support	   the	  Contras.	  Frances’	   statements	  also	  suggested	  that	  Helms	  was	  being	  used	  to	  build	  influence	  and	  contacts	  in	  Washington	   for	   those	  who	   supported	   the	   rebels.	   Hamrick	  was	   said	   to	   be	  ‘“opening	   doors”’	   in	   the	   U.S.	   capital,	   and	   though	   it	   was	   unclear	   as	   to	  whether	  Helms	  was	  aware	  of	  this,	  Hamrick’s	  personal	  association	  with	  the	  senator	  was	  regarded	  as	  an	  important	  element	  of	  his	  influence.368	  	   Frances’	   claims	   suggest	   that	   not	   only	   were	   Helms’	   staffers	   actively	  involved	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Contras	   prior	   to	   Reagan’s	   November	  1981	  authorisation	  of	  formal,	  and	  legal,	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  movement,	  but	  that	   the	   network’s	   influence	   was	   expanding	   along	   with	   its	   membership.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  366	  Christopher	  Dickey,	  “Argentine	  Defector	  Tells	  Of	  Multinational	  Plots	  For	  Sandinistas’	  Ouster,”	  Washington	  Post,	  2	  December,	  1982,	  A22.	  
367	  Gutman,	  Banana	  Diplomacy,	  50-­‐53	  and	  Armony,	  Argentina,	  64.	  
368	  Dickey,	  “Argentine	  Defector,”	  A22.	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These	   results	   were	   not	   inconsequential,	   as	   Bermudez’s	   promotion	  demonstrated.	   Furthermore,	   those	   involved	   in	   the	  network	   testified	   as	   to	  the	   importance	   of	   Helms’	   men.	   In	   addition	   to	   Frances’	   assertions	   about	  Hamrick,	  Schamis	  noted	  Carbaugh’s	  ‘“serious”’	  commitment	  to	  the	  cause.369	  The	   reports	   suggest	   that	   a	   senior	   aide	   to	   a	  United	   States	   senator	  worked	  alongside	   private	   American	   citizens	   in	   covert	   actions	   against	   a	   foreign	  government,	  thus	  violating	  the	  1799	  Logan	  Act	  that	  prohibited	  private	  U.S.	  citizens	  from	  engaging	  in	  acts	  or	  communications	  with	  representatives	  of	  a	  foreign	   government	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   influencing	   the	   United	   States’	  foreign	  policy.370	  	  With	  his	  staff	  assisting	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  more	  coherent	  paramilitary	  strategy	   during	   the	   summer	   of	   1981,	   it	   appeared	   surprising	   that	   the	  senator	  offered	  private	  encouragement	  for	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  (ARA)	  Tom	  Enders’	  attempts	  to	  broker	  a	  diplomatic	  rapprochement	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Sandinistas	  during	  this	  period.	   Approached	   by	   Enders	   about	   a	   six-­‐month	   diplomatic	   campaign	  aimed	   at	   reducing	   tensions	   between	   the	   two	   nations,	   the	   senator	   replied	  that	   the	   assistant	   secretary	   could	   have	   one	   year.	   ‘“If	   you	   can	   get	   them	   to	  negotiate	  in	  good	  faith,”’	  Helms	  told	  Enders,	  ‘“you	  can	  give	  it	  a	  try.”’371	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  Gutman,	  Banana	  Diplomacy,	  51.	  
370	  Carbaugh	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  Logan	  Act,	  having	  written	  his	  master’s	  thesis	   on	   the	   legislation.	   Sawyer,	   “Two	   Helms	   Point	   Men,”	   A2.	   Ironically,	  Senator	   Barry	   Goldwater	   would	   accuse	   liberal	   senators	   of	   conducting	  unauthorised	  foreign	  policy	  during	  the	  acrimonious	  debate	  over	  Contra	  aid	  in	   April	   1985,	   while	   the	   president’s	   National	   Security	   Adviser	   Robert	  McFarlane	  later	  referred	  to	  ‘private	  diplomacy’	  by	  members	  of	  Congress	  as	  damaging	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   Reagan’s	   Central	   America	   policy.	   Barry	   Goldwater	   (AZ),	  “Funds	   for	   Supporting	  Military	   or	   Paramilitary	   Operations	   in	   Nicaragua,”	  
Cong.	   Rec.	   131	   (1985),	   8837,	   and	   Letter,	   Robert	   C.	   McFarlane	   to	  Representative	   Newt	   Gingrich,	   3	   May,	   1984,	   ID229013,	   CO114	   BOX	   136	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  Ronald	  Reagan	  Library	  (hereafter	  RRL).	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The	   irony	   for	  Helms	  was	   that	   the	  April	   cut	   off	   in	   aid	  he	  had	   sought	  prompted	   Enders’	   decision	   to	   seek	   a	   last-­‐ditch	   compromise	   aimed	   at	  averting	  a	  covert	  paramilitary	  strategy	  in	  Nicaragua.	  The	  senator’s	  support	  for	   negotiations	   was	   not	   entirely	   incompatible	   with	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  network’s	   increasingly	   belligerent	   approach.	   Enders’	   plan	  was	   backed	   by	  some	  pro-­‐Contra	  elements	  as	  a	  means	  of	  insulating	  the	  White	  House	  from	  criticism	  that	  it	  had	  not	  sought	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  with	  the	  Sandinistas.372	  By	   offering	   his	   own	   support	   for	   a	   negotiated	   settlement,	   Helms	   insured	  himself	  against	   similar	  criticism.	  He	  also	  helped	   the	   long-­‐term	  viability	  of	  the	   Contra	   programme.	   The	   senator	   and	   others	   in	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  could	  claim	  in	  later	  years	  that	  diplomacy	  had	  been	  tried,	  but	  that	  the	  Contras	  were	  the	  only	  instrument	  remaining.	  	  Helms’	  prominent	  position	  in	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  alliance	  was	  evident	  from	  Enders’	  contact.	  As	  the	  assistant	  secretary	  told	  Roy	  Gutman	  in	  a	  1985	  interview,	   ‘“I	   didn’t	   want	   to	   be	   accused	   of	   hiding	   something	   from	   him	  [Helms].”’373	  Whether	  Enders	  was	  alluding	  to	  possible	  consequences	  for	  his	  career	   or	   for	   the	   initiative	   is	   not	   clear.	   Given	   the	   senator’s	   propensity	   to	  side-­‐line	   officials	   who	   operated	   beyond	   his	   tolerance	   –	   a	   phenomenon	  referred	  to	   in	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  during	  subsequent	  years	  as	  a	   ‘Dick	  Viets’	  problem,	  on	  account	  of	  Helms’	  stubborn	  resistance	  to	  Viets’	  posting	  as	  ambassador	  to	  Portugal,	  and	  one	  ably	  demonstrated	  in	  his	  approach	  to	  Robert	  White	  during	  this	  period	  –	  Enders	  might	  have	  been	  conscious	  of	  the	  personal	  ramifications	  of	  keeping	  Helms	  in	  the	  dark.374	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374	  Richard	   N.	   Viets,	   interview	   by	   Charles	   Stuart	   Kennedy,	   6	   April,	   1990,	  
ADST.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Helms’	  opposition	  in	  the	  Viets	  case	  was	  not	  on	  account	  of	   policy	  or	   ideological	   disagreements,	   but	   rather	  on	   the	  basis	   of	  the	   senator’s	   concerns	   over	   possible	   financial	   impropriety	   by	   the	  ambassador.	   Jack	   Anderson	   and	   Joseph	   Spear,	   “Helms’	   Eye	   on	   Foreign	  Service	  Liberals,”	  Washington	  Post,	  18	  August,	  1987,	  E13.	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In	   addition,	   given	   that	   Enders’	   initiative	   did	   not	   have	   the	  wholehearted	  backing	  of	  prominent	  anti-­‐Sandinistas	  in	  the	  administration,	  such	  as	  CIA	  Director	  William	  Casey,	  U.N.	  ambassador	  Jeane	  Kirkpatrick,	  and	  then	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  State	  William	  Clark,	  further	  irritating	  hard-­‐liners	  by	  concealing	  the	  plan	  from	  Helms	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  seen	  by	  Enders	  as	  a	  significant	  risk.375	  	  	  Support	   for	   the	   Enders	   plan	   did	   not	   mean,	   however,	   that	   Helms	  backed	   a	   moderate	   Nicaragua	   policy.	   Indeed,	   even	   as	   Enders	   negotiated	  with	   the	   Sandinistas,	   Helms	   worked	   to	   undercut	   Senator	   Ed	   Zorinsky’s	  legislation	  to	  ensure	  aid	  to	  Nicaragua’s	  private	  sector	  was	  not	  used	  for	  any	  other	   purpose	   beyond	   supporting	   this	   sector	   of	   the	   country’s	   economy.	  Though	  Zorinsky’s	   legislation	  had	   the	   support	  of	   the	  White	  House,	  Helms	  disagreed	   with	   the	   Agency	   for	   International	   Development’s	   (AID)	  assessment	   that	   companies	   in	   Nicaragua	   could	   be	   considered	   private	  despite	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  Sandinistas	  could	  claim	  a	  49	  per	  cent	  stake	  in	  their	  ownership.	  Helms	  also	  told	  President	  Reagan	  that	   the	  Sandinistas	  would	   never	   permit	   American	   aid	   to	   get	   to	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   begin	  with.376	  Meanwhile,	   he	   believed	   AID	   had	   failed	   to	   adequately	   account	   for	  missing	  funds	  from	  the	  previous	  year’s	  budget.377	  	  	  	  Despite	   White	   House	   support	   for	   the	   Zorinsky	   amendment,	   Helms	  portrayed	   his	   action	   as	   a	   Reaganite	   position.	   He	   questioned	   why	   the	  administration	   was	   sending	   taxpayers’	   money	   to	   the	   Sandinistas,	   and	  argued,	  without	  supporting	  evidence,	   that	   the	  real	  purpose	  of	   the	   funding	  was	   to	   buttress	   policy	   in	   case	   ‘developments	   in	  Nicaragua	  might	   find	   the	  Sandinistas	   out	   of	   power,	   or	   renouncing	   its	   aggressive	   pro-­‐Marxist	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  LeoGrande,	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376	  Letter,	   Senator	   Jesse	   Helms	   to	   President	   Reagan,	   22	   October,	   1981,	  ID045334,	  CO114,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	  
377 	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “International	   Security	   And	   Development	   Act	   Of	  1981,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  127	  (1981),	  24489	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program.’378	  	   Whether	   Helms	   was	   coyly	   referring	   to	   the	   nascent	   Contra	  movement	   is	   unclear,	   but	   he	   evidently	   believed	   that	   sending	   money	   to	  Nicaragua	   undermined	  President	  Reagan’s	   overall	   strategy.	   It	  would	   only	  give	   the	   Sandinistas	   time	   to	   consolidate	   their	   control	   and	   expand	   the	  Nicaraguan	  military.	   As	   he	   bluntly	   reminded	  Reagan	   in	   a	   letter	   two	   days	  after	  the	  vote,	  ‘Neither	  you	  nor	  I	  wants	  to	  help	  the	  Sandinistas’.379	  	  Helms’	   words	   could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   an	   implicit	   warning	   to	   the	  president.	  Helms	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  see	  any	  slip	   in	  the	  administration’s	  anti-­‐Sandinista	   strategy,	   and	   with	   Enders	   pursuing	   a	   negotiated	   settlement	  track,	   the	   senator’s	   letter	   reminded	  Reagan	   that	  policy	   should	  not	  depart	  from	  conservative	  principles.	  This	  was	  clear	  from	  Helms’	  comments	  in	  the	  same	   letter	   regarding	   the	   recent	   arrest	   of	   several	   prominent	   Nicaraguan	  businessmen	   only	   hours	   after	   the	   aid	   package	   passed	   the	   Senate.	   The	  incident,	  Helms	  told	  Reagan,	  was	   ‘a	  direct	  slap	  at	  our	  attempt	  to	  keep	  the	  forces	  of	  freedom	  alive	  in	  Central	  America,	  and	  a	  repudiation	  of	  your	  own	  personal	   commitment	   to	   the	   principle	   that	   development	   in	   that	   region	  must	   come	   from	   within,	   most	   principally	   through	   the	   private	   sector.’380	  Helms	   felt	   strongly	   enough	   to	   send	   the	   same	   message	   to	   Vice	   President	  Bush,	  personally	  annotating	  his	  letter	  to	  tell	  the	  vice	  president,	  ‘George:	  we	  simply	  must	  try	  to	  stop	  this	  sort	  of	  thing.’381	  	   The	  White	  House	  was	  keen	  to	  allay	  the	  senator’s	  fears	  that	  Nicaragua	  policy	   might	   be	   slipping.	   Though	   Helms	   did	   not	   receive	   a	   reply	   from	  Reagan,	   State	   Department	   officials	   drafted	   a	   response	   from	   the	   vice	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president	   confirming	   the	   administration’s	   condemnation	   of	   both	   the	  arrests	   and	   Nicaragua’s	  military	   build-­‐up.	   ‘Frankly,	   Senator	   Helms,’	   Bush	  wrote,	   ‘our	  patience	  with	   the	  Nicaraguan	  Government	   is	  wearing	   thin.’382	  Helms	   was	   not	   alone	   among	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   in	   receiving	  assurances	  from	  the	  administration.	  Howard	  Phillips,	  executive	  director	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Caucus,	  was	   told	   in	  May	  1982	   that	  statements	  by	  senior	  officials	   ‘made	   it	   very	   clear	   that	   the	   Reagan	   Administration	   is	   gravely	  concerned’	   by	   Sandinista	   actions,	   and	   there	   could	   not	   be	   ‘meaningful	  improvement’	  in	  relations	  ‘while	  those	  matters	  are	  unresolved.’383	  	  	  Despite	  failing	  to	  defeat	  the	  amendment,	  Helms	  demonstrated	  that	  he	  would	   exercise	   close	   scrutiny	  of	  Nicaragua	  policy.	  His	   actions	  maintained	  pressure	   for	   a	   hard-­‐line	   Nicaragua	   policy.	   The	   senator	   also	   showed	   few	  qualms	  about	  putting	  words	  into	  the	  president’s	  mouth,	  and	  appeared	  keen	  to	  limit	  any	  non-­‐militarised	  component	  of	  the	  evolving	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  in	  Nicaragua.	  Finally,	  in	  his	  criticism	  of	  the	  arrest	  of	  private	  sector	  leaders	  in	  Nicaragua,	  and	  especially	   in	  his	  comments	  portraying	  their	  detention	  as	  a	  blow	  to	  freedom,	  the	  senator	  emphasised	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  free	  market	  to	  his	  definition	  of	  that	  freedom.	  	   1981	   had	   thus	   far	   been	   a	   successful	   year	   for	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  network,	   and	   Helms	   and	   his	   staff	   maintained	   this	   momentum.	   Carbaugh	  travelled	  to	  Honduras	  in	  late	  November	  to	  observe	  that	  country’s	  election	  and	   attend	   election	   night	   festivities	   at	   the	   U.S.	   ambassador’s	   residence.	  Along	   with	   several	   individuals	   from	   the	   aggressively	   anti-­‐communist	  American	   Security	   Council,	   Carbaugh	   met	   with	   U.S.	   ambassador	   John	  Negroponte	   and	   a	   senior	   Honduran	   officer,	   Colonel	   Gustavo	   Álvarez	  Martínez.	   The	   Honduran	   had	   been	   an	   active	   participant	   in	   the	   Contra	  movement,	   unofficially	   backing	   groups	   of	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   rebels	   in	   1980	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and	   meeting	   with	   CIA	   Director	   William	   Casey	   in	   early	   1981	   to	   offer	  Honduran	   assets	   to	   the	   cause.384	  Christopher	   Dickey	   of	   the	   Washington	  
Post,	   attending	   the	  party	  at	   the	  ambassador’s	  house,	  believed	  Negroponte	  and	   Álvarez	   ‘could	   as	   easily	   have	   been	   celebrating	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	  war.’385	  	   More	   publicly,	   Helms	   used	   his	   chairmanship	   of	   the	   Western	  Hemisphere	   Subcommittee	   to	   convene	   hearings	   on	   Sandinista	   human	  rights	   abuses.	   The	   hearings	   emerged	   from	   Helms’	   personal	   contacts	   in	  Central	  America,	  and	  demonstrated	  the	  influence	  of	  his	  networking	  on	  the	  political	  discourse	  in	  Washington.	  Helms	  had	  spoken	  with	  members	  of	  the	  clergy	   and	   other	   observers	   in	   Nicaragua	   that	   had	   informed	   him	   of	  Sandinista	   attacks	   on	   Miskito	   communities	   in	   the	   east.	   Helms	   decried	  ‘repeated’	   incursions	   into	   Indian	   territory	  and	  painted	  a	  disturbing	   image	  of	   the	   Sandinistas	   ‘burning	   entire	   villages	   to	   the	   ground,	   burning	   people	  alive,	   burying	   them	   alive’.	   It	   was,	   the	   senator	   believed,	   ‘a	   systematic,	  thorough,	   and	   sustained	   program	   of	   extermination.’386	  As	   chair,	   Helms	  called	  on	  Elliot	  Abrams,	   the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	   the	  Bureau	  of	  Human	   Rights	   and	   Humanitarian	   Affairs	   and	   a	   key	   member	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   in	   his	   own	   right.	   Abrams	   also	   offered	   a	   harsh	  indictment	  of	  Sandinista	  behaviour,	  adding	  to	  the	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  Helms	   and	   the	   administration	   that	   the	   Contras	   were	   an	   instrument	   of	  human	  rights	  promotion.387	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   Sandinistas	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   As	   well	   as	   offering	   the	   opportunity	   to	   voice	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   claims,	  such	  occasions	  also	  acted	  as	  networking	  opportunities	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  In	  this	  case,	   the	  prominent	  Miskito	   leader	  Steadman	  Fagoth	  Muller	  attended	  the	  hearings,	  ostensibly	  to	  see	  how	  Washington	  was	  reacting	  to	  the	  alleged	  atrocities.	  Fagoth	  Mueller	  was	  himself	  a	  Contra	  leader,	  with	  close	  ties	  to	  the	  Nicaraguan	  exile	  community	  in	  Miami	  and	  the	  U.S.	  military	  in	  Honduras.388	  Thus	   the	   hearings	   demonstrated	   the	   dynamics	   of	   Helms’	   network.	   The	  senator	   received	   information	   from	   the	   network,	   and	   then	   used	   this	  information	   to	   convene	   hearings.	   These	   hearings	   in	   turn	   influenced	   the	  political	   discourse	   in	   Washington,	   adding	   to	   the	   growing	   tendency	   for	  Contra	   advocates	   to	   co-­‐opt	   the	   language	   of	   human	   rights	   as	   part	   of	   their	  framework	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  in	  Nicaraguan	  policy.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  Helms	  reinforced	  what	  Carl	  Bon	  Tempo	  has	  described	  as	  the	   ‘centrist-­‐conservative	   alternative’	   human	   rights	   framework	   that	  developed	   in	   the	   1970s.	   This	   vision,	   crafted	  with	   considerable	   assistance	  from	   administration	   figures	   like	   Kirkpatrick	   and	   Abrams,	   as	   well	   as	  sympathetic	   NGOs	   such	   as	   Freedom	  House,	   reflected	   a	   neo-­‐conservatism	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   (London:	  Verso,	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   Bourgois,	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   Miskitu	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  Nicaragua,”	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  Perspectives	  8,	  No.	  2,	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   (Spring,	   1981):	   22-­‐39.	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   an	  overview	   of	   the	   literature	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   Dennis,	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   Miskito-­‐Sandinista	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that	   saw	   human	   rights	   within	   wider	   Cold	   War	   considerations.389	  Helms	  adopted	   the	   mantra	   of	   human	   rights	   in	   conjunction	   with	   democracy	  promotion,	   a	   common	   adjustment	   for	   conservatives	   in	   an	   era	   when	   the	  political	  right	  brought	  the	  two	  processes	  together	  to	  form	  a	  single	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.390	  	  	   Though	   conservatives	   were	   forging	   common	   ground	   over	   using	   a	  human	  rights	  formula	  in	  their	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  rhetoric,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Falklands	  War	   in	  April	  1982	  exposed	   fractures	   in	   the	  movement’s	   foreign	  policy,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  wider	  transnational	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  network.	  Latin	  American	   militaries	   reacted	   negatively	   to	   Reagan’s	   support	   for	   Britain	  during	   the	   conflict.391	  Gustavo	   Álvarez	   Martínez	   accused	   Washington	   of	  betraying	   its	   allies	   and	   ignoring	   the	   Monroe	   Doctrine. 392 	  With	   a	   rift	  between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   its	   regional	   allies	   threatening	   to	   undermine	   the	  Contra	   programme,	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   sought	   to	   stabilise	   the	  situation.	   Carbaugh	   travelled	   to	   Miami	   and	   met	   with	   conservative	   allies,	  such	   as	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   exile	   José	   Francisco	  Cardenal	   and	   the	   head	   of	   the	  Argentine	   Contra	   support	   programme	   Oswaldo	   Ribeiro,	   in	   order	   to	  reassure	  the	  Hondurans	  and	  Argentines	  that	  the	  latter	  were	  still	  very	  much	  wanted	   as	   partners.393 	  Jeane	   Kirkpatrick,	   Reagan’s	   Ambassador	   to	   the	  United	   Nations	   and	   a	   reliable	   ally	   of	   Helms,	   drew	   criticism	   from	   British	  officials	  for	  attending	  a	  function	  at	  the	  Argentine	  embassy	  in	  Washington	  as	  the	   invasion	   commenced	   and	   subsequently	   suggesting	   that	   Argentine	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actions	   did	   not	   amount	   to	   outright	   aggression,	   given	   doubts	   over	   the	  sovereignty	   of	   the	   Falklands. 394 	  Her	   efforts,	   according	   to	   the	   British,	  suggested	  a	  duplicitous	  U.S.	  policy	  that	  differed	  in	  private	  from	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Alexander	  Haig’s	  public	  policy.395	  	   Meanwhile,	   Helms	   offered	   vocal	   support	   to	   the	   Argentines.	   He	   was	  the	  lone	  dissenting	  vote	  on	  a	  29	  April	  Senate	  resolution	  that	  declared	  that	  the	   U.S.	   ‘cannot	   stand	   neutral’	   and	   would	   seek	   ‘to	   achieve	   the	   full	  withdrawal	  of	  Argentine	  forces’.	  Helms	  presented	  himself	  as	  a	  hemispheric	  voice,	   stating	   that	   ‘I	   hope	   no	   nations	   in	   Central	   or	   South	   America	   will	  interpret	  this	  as	  being	  a	  slap	  in	  the	  face.’396	  	  	  Later	   in	   the	  conflict,	   especially	  after	   the	  sinking	  of	   the	  Belgrano	   and	  
H.M.S.	   Sheffield,	   when	   some	   conservatives	   began	   to	   express	   more	   open	  discontent	  about	  U.S.	  support	  for	  Britain,	  the	  senator	  was	  heralded	  for	  his	  early	   criticism	   of	   the	   administration’s	   abandonment	   of	   neutrality.	   John	  McLaughlin,	  a	  former	  adviser	  to	  President	  Nixon	  and	  a	  strong	  advocate	  of	  rigid	   neutrality	   during	   the	   Falklands	  War,	   wrote	   in	  National	   Review	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  394	  Jane	   Rosen,	   “Haig’s	   internal	   feuding	   aggravates	   US	   rift	   with	   Britain,”	  
Guardian,	  7	  June,	  1982,	  2,	  Steven	  Rattners,	  “U.S.	  Handling	  of	  Falkland	  Crisis	  Stirs	  Deep	  Resentment	   in	  Britain,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  17	  April,	  1982,	  1,	  and	  Ray	  Moseley,	   “America’s	   ‘even	  hand’	  not	  Britons’	   cup	  of	   tea,”	  Chicago	  
Tribune,	   16	   April,	   1982,	   A8.	   Also	   in	   attendance	   at	   the	   event	   were	   Elliot	  Abrams	   and	   U.S.	   Ambassador	   to	   the	   Organisation	   of	   American	   States	   J.	  William	  Middendorf	   II.	   Middendorf	   was	   particularly	   close	   to	   Helms’	   aide	  Deborah	  DeMoss,	  who	  was	   like	   an	   ‘adopted	  daughter’	   to	   the	   ambassador	  and	   who	   frequently	   visited	   his	   offices.	   Jim	   Anderson,	   United	   Press	  
International,	   7	   April,	   1982,	   and	   Robert	   Drexler,	   interview	   by	   Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  19	  March,	  1996,	  ADST.	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  Policy	  (New	  York:	  MacMillan	  Publishing	  Company,	  1984),	  269.	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  Margot	  Hornblower,	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  With	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  Washington	  
Post,	   30	   April,	   1982,	   A24.	   Helms	   remained	   a	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   supporter	   of	   the	  Argentine	   perspective	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   the	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   In	   1987	   he	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   that	   the	  British	   ambassador’s	   ‘arrogance’	   and	   refusal	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   negotiate	   had	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  the	   conflict.	   Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	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many	  who	  had	  quietly	  shared	  Helms’	  fears	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  hostilities	  were	  heralding	  the	  senator	  as	  ‘prescient’.397	  Yet	  while	  that	  publication	  advocated	  a	   greater	   consideration	   of	   U.S.	   interests	   in	   Latin	   America,	   Smith	  Hempstone,	  writing	  in	  Human	  Events,	  declared	  the	  United	  States	  ‘must	  side	  with	   the	   British’	   out	   of	   ‘equity	   and	   self-­‐interest’.398	  The	  magazine	   offered	  little	  commentary	  on	  events	  in	  the	  South	  Atlantic,	  suggesting	  it	  had	  failed	  to	  fully	  reconcile	  competing	  imperatives.	  	  Carbaugh	   claimed	   that	   it	  was	   his	   influence,	   rather	   than	  Helms’	   own	  perspective,	  which	  prompted	  the	  senator	  to	  defend	  Argentina,	  and	  argued	  he	   had	   used	  Helms	   to	   sustain	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   various	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   elements	   within	   Latin	   America.399	  However,	   he	   was	   probably	  overstating	  his	  influence.	  Helms	  was	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  the	  threat	  to	  anti-­‐Sandinista	   policies	   posed	   by	   the	   Falklands	   War. 400 	  The	   senator’s	  support	   for	   the	   Contras	   was	   based	   on	   unwavering	   anti-­‐communist	  principles,	   and	  on	  principle,	  he	  declared	   in	  his	  memoir,	  one	  should	  never	  yield.401	  Helms’	   bold	  move	   in	   openly	   opposing	   the	   president	   reflected	   his	  prioritisation	  of	  the	  Contras	  and	  demonstrated	  that	  even	  when	  Reagan	  was	  willing	   to	   temporarily	   forego	   his	   eponymous	   doctrine	   in	   favour	   of	   other	  considerations,	  others	  pressed	  ahead	  regardless.	  	   This	   intractable	   commitment	   to	   the	  Contras	  was	   increasingly	   out	   of	  step	  with	  both	  congressional	  and	  public	  opinion,	  and	  the	  programme	  began	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  John	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   28	   May,	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   also	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   a	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  1982,	  467.	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to	  run	  into	  turbulence.	  Media	  reports	  questioning	  the	  size	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  CIA’s	   programme	   elicited	   concern	   among	   lawmakers,	   and,	   in	   response	   to	  the	   negative	   headlines,	   Congress	   passed	   legislation	   in	   December	   1982	  which	  explicitly	  prohibited	  the	  U.S.	  from	  providing	  aid	  that	  would	  be	  used	  for	  overthrowing	  the	  Sandinistas.402	  	  	  The	  Boland	  Amendment	  was	   the	   start	   of	   sixteen	  months	   of	   damage	  control	  for	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  that	  culminated	  in	  early	  1984	  with	  a	  public	  furore	  over	  the	  CIA’s	  mining	  of	  Nicaraguan	  harbours	  the	  previous	  winter.	  It	  also	  offered	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Helms	  to	  more	  fully	  articulate	  his	  own	  perspective	  on	   the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	   in	  Nicaragua.	  Helms	  condemned	  the	  Boland	  Amendment	  and	  those	  who	  voted	  for	  it,	  arguing	  that	  Congress	  was	   negligent	   in	   the	   fight	   against	   communist	   expansion	   in	   Central	  America. 403 	  Yet	   he	   could	   not	   stop	   the	   legislation,	   largely	   because	  Republican	   leaders,	   fearful	  of	  Rep.	  Tom	  Harkin’s	  (D	  –	  IA)	  more	  restrictive	  alternative,	   pragmatically	   accepted	   Boland’s	   language.404	  Many	   members	  sympathetic	   to	   the	   president’s	   policy	   also	   justified	   their	   vote	   for	   the	  amendment	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   the	   legislation	   was	   meaningless,	   since	  Reagan	  had	  never	  proclaimed	   that	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  aimed	  at	   removing	   the	  Sandinistas.405	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  amendment,	  faced	  with	  an	  increasingly	  hostile	  Congress,	  Helms	  sought	  to	  build	  support	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  by	  linking	  a	   weakened	   anti-­‐communist	   strategy	   in	   Central	   America	   to	   domestic	  concerns.	   In	   March	   1983,	   citing	   correspondence	   from	   Nat	   Hamrick,	   the	  senator	   argued	   that	   twenty	   million	   refugees	   would	   flood	   into	   the	   U.S.	   if	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  April,	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events	   in	   Central	   America	   continued	   on	   their	   present	   course.406	  A	  month	  later,	   in	   a	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee	  meeting	   on	  Nicaragua	   policy,	   the	  senator	   repeated	   the	   claim.407 	  When	   the	   Senate	   debated	   immigration	  reform	   in	   May,	   Helms	   was	   even	   more	   dramatic.	   The	   United	   States	   was	  facing	   a	   potential	   ‘explosion	   of	   “feet	   people”’,	   he	   warned,	   because	   of	  continued	  ‘Soviet	  expansionism’	  in	  Central	  America.408	  	  	   If	  Helms	  was	  seeking	  to	  shore	  up	  conservative	  support	  for	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	   in	   Nicaragua,	   referring	   to	   a	   possible	   immigration	   crisis	   was	   a	  logical	   tactic.	   Conservatives,	   particularly	   those	   in	   the	   Sun	   Belt,	   feared	   a	  surge	   of	   illegal	   immigrants	   that	   would	   intensify	   the	   existing	   pattern	   of	  Latino	   immigration	   into	   the	   area. 409 	  From	   what	   Christopher	   Dickey	  describes	   as	   ‘deep-­‐seated,	   Ventura	   County,	   California,	   conservatism’,	  several	   disciples	   of	   which	   served	   in	   the	   Reagan	   administration,	   to	   right-­‐wing	   Floridians	   wary	   of	   unchecked	   immigration	   because	   of	   the	   recent	  Mariel	  boatlift	   from	  Cuba,	  southern	  conservatives	   looked	  with	  trepidation	  at	  an	  immigrant	  threat	  to	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  fabric	  of	  their	  region.410	  	  Yet	   Helms’	   commentary	  was	   not	   aimed	   solely	   at	   conservatives,	   nor	  even	  southerners.	  His	  allusion	  to	  an	  impending	  immigration	  boom	  spoke	  to	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  (1983),	  12365.	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  Lyman	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  James	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   Politics	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   Place,	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  Michelle	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   and	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a	   growing	   national	   anti-­‐immigration	   sentiment	   in	   the	   early	   1980s.411	  In	  particular,	  growing	  numbers	  of	  Latin	  America	  migrants	  had	  contributed	  to	  what	  Leo	  Chavez	  describes	  as	  a	  Latino	  threat	  narrative,	  in	  which	  members	  of	   this	  group	  were	  deemed	  an	  especially	  high	  risk	  to	  the	  nation’s	  security	  and	   Anglo-­‐American	   homogeneity. 412 	  Helms	   deployed,	   and	   reinforced,	  several	  linguistic	  tropes	  that	  Otta	  Santa	  Ana	  sees	  as	  critical	  to	  the	  language	  of	   the	   immigration	   debate,	   including	   the	   depiction	   of	   immigrants	   as	   a	  water-­‐based	   threat	   (‘floods’)	   and	   as	   a	   damaging	   physical	   force	   on	   the	  national	   body	   (‘explosion’).413	  In	   doing	   so,	   Helms,	   as	   Stephen	   Macekura	  notes,	   was	   influential	   in	   shaping	   ‘normative	   definitions	   of	   “American”’	   –	  those	   who	   could	   be	   legally	   and	   culturally	   assimilated	   into	   the	   United	  States.414	  	  	  	  Helms	  used	  this	  pervasive	  fear	  to	  justify	  aid	  to	  the	  Contras	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  In	  1987,	  for	  example,	  Helms	  told	  Senate	  colleagues	  that:	  	  They	  [Central	  Americans]	  will	  walk	  north.	  They	  will	  come	  into	  our	   country,	   seeking	   and	   yearning	   for	   freedom	   –	   people	  who	  cannot	   speak	  English,	  who	  have	  no	   jobs	  or	  home,	  or	   anything	  else	  except	  that	  yearning	  for	  freedom.	  They	  will	  go	  on	  welfare,	  they	  will	  impact	  upon	  our	  schools	  and	  other	  institutions…	  The	  American	   people	   should	   consider	   the	   impact	   of	   that…	   if	   this	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  Temple	  University	  Press,	  2004,	  155,	  and	  Daniel	   J.	  Tichenor,	  
Dividing	   Lines:	   The	   Politics	   of	   Immigration	   Control	   in	   America	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  242.	  	  
412	  Leo	  R.	  Chavez,	  The	  Latino	  Threat:	  Constructing	  Immigrants,	  Citizens,	  and	  
the	  Nation	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  23	  
413	  For	   a	  discussion	  on	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   Latino	   immigration,	   see	  Otto	   Santa	  Ana,	   Brown	   Tide	   Rising:	   Metaphors	   of	   Latinos	   in	   Contemporary	   American	  
Public	  Discourse	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas,	  2002).	  
414	  Stephen	   Macekura,	   “For	   Fear	   of	   Persecution”:	   Displaced	   Salvadorans	  and	  U.S.	   Refugee	   Policy	   in	   the	   1980s,”	   Journal	  of	  Policy	  History	   23,	   No.	   3,	  (2011),	  364.	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Nation	  does	  not	  stand	  by	  those	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  fight	  and	  die	  for	  freedom	  in	  Central	  America.’415	  	   Helms’	   strategy	   was	   assisted	   by	   the	   high	   issue	   salience	   of	  immigration,	   and	   its	   ability	   to	   foster	   unlikely	   consensus	   among	   domestic	  constituencies	  in	  the	  United	  States.416	  As	  such,	  it	  held	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  major	   re-­‐orientation	  of	   domestic	   attitudes	   toward	   the	  Reagan	  Doctrine,	  shifting	   emphasis	   away	   from	   its	   polarising	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   framework	  toward	  an	  anti-­‐immigration	  consensus.	  As	  LeoGrande	  notes	   in	   relation	   to	  the	  sudden	  mass	  Cuban	  migration	  wave	  of	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  rapid	  influx	  of	  disaffected	  Cubans	  into	  southern	  Florida	  not	  only	  mobilised	  that	  region’s	  opinion	  but	  also	   that	  of	  a	  wider	  American	  public	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  immigration.	  President	  Clinton’s	  policy	  responses	  were	  constrained	  by	  this	  reaction:	   level	   two	   domestic	   concerns,	   to	   use	   Putnam’s	   two-­‐level	   game	  theory,	   took	   priority,	   because	   he	   had	   to	   consider	   the	   wider	   (anti-­‐immigration)	  public’s	  reaction	  and	  not	  just	  the	  views	  of	  anti-­‐Castro	  émigrés	  in	  Florida	  who	  favoured	  an	  open	  door	  policy	  toward	  Cuba.417	  	  In	  Nicaragua,	  therefore,	  immigration	  concerns	  were	  potentially	  highly	  useful	   for	   reinforcing	   the	   shaky	   foundation	   of	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine.	   As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  415	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Disapproval	  Of	  Certain	  Assistance	  To	  The	  Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  6084.	  
416	  Tichenor,	  Dividing	  Lines,	  35.	  
417	  William	  M.	   LeoGrande,	   “From	  Havana	   to	  Miami:	   U.S.	   Cuba	   Policy	   as	   a	  Two-­‐Level	   Game,”	   Journal	   of	   Interamerican	   Studies	   and	  World	   Affairs	   40,	  No.	   1	   (Spring,	   1998),	   79.	   Putnam’s	   two-­‐level	   theory	   posits	   that	  international	  leaders	  face	  ‘two	  “tables”,	  one	  representing	  domestic	  politics	  and	   the	   other	   international	   negotiation.	   Diplomatic	   tactics	   and	   strategies	  are	  constrained	  simultaneously	  by	  what	  other	  states	  will	  accept	  and	  what	  domestic	   constituencies	   will	   ratify.’	   Andrew	   Moravcsik,	   “Introduction:	  Integrating	   International	   and	   Domestic	   Theories	   of	   International	  Bargaining,”	   in	   Double-­‐Edged	   Diplomacy:	   International	   Bargaining	   and	  
Domestic	   Politics,	   eds.	   Peter	   B.	   Evans,	   Harold	   K.	   Jacobson,	   and	   Robert	   D.	  Putnam	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1993),	  4.	  Putnam	  outlined	  his	  argument	  in	  “Diplomacy	  and	  Domestic	  Politics:	  The	  Logic	  of	  Two-­‐Level	  Games,”	  International	  Organization	  42,	  No.	  3	  (Summer,	  1998):	  427-­‐460.	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Robert	   Pastor	   points	   out	   in	   his	   own	   two-­‐level	   analysis	   of	   the	   Reagan	  administration’s	   Nicaragua	   policy,	   which	   can	   be	   extended	   to	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  more	  generally,	  the	  administration	  failed	  to	  persuade	  a	  domestic	  constituency,	  at	   least	  during	  the	  Boland	  period,	   that	  the	  Contras	  were	   legitimate	   freedom	   fighters	   helping	   to	   overcome	   an	   unfriendly	  government.418	  Without	  an	  accommodation	  with	  its	  level	  two	  constituents,	  the	  network’s	  policy	   faltered	  and	  Boland’s	   legislation	  was	  enacted.	  Helms	  looked	   to	   fix	   this	  by	  reshaping	   the	  Contras,	   remoulding	   them	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  pre-­‐emptive	   border	   control	   force	   that	   would	   contain	   immigration	   at	   its	  source	  by	  destroying	  the	  communist	  repression	  behind	  mass	  migration	  of	  Central	   Americans.	   If	   it	   were	   successful,	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policy	  constituencies	   could	   conceivably	   find	   a	   common	   ground,	   potentially	  making	  Contra	  aid	  far	  more	  viable.	  	   Part	   of	   the	   reason	   why	   the	   senator	   incorporated	   Central	   America	  into	  his	  immigration	  narrative	  was	  the	  primary	  role	  played	  by	  Congress	  in	  shaping	   immigration	   policy	   in	   this	   period.	   1983	   not	   only	   saw	   legislative	  restriction	  on	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  in	  Nicaragua,	  but	  it	  also	  marked	  a	  new	  round	  of	  political	  struggle	  on	  Capitol	  Hill	  over	  immigration	  reform.	  Reagan	  had	  not	  given	  the	  issue	  significant	  priority,	  and	  his	  senior	  advisers,	  divided	  over	  the	  issue,	  struggled	  to	  formulate	  a	  coherent	  message	  from	  those	  policy	  suggestions	   the	  president	  did	  give.419	  Led	  by	  Alan	  Simpson	   (R-­‐WY)	   in	   the	  Senate	   and	  Ramano	  Mazzoli	   (D-­‐KY)	   in	   the	  House,	   Congress	   thus	   took	   the	  reins.	   The	   policy	   window	   resulting	   from	   the	   absence	   of	   executive	  leadership,	  further	  widened	  by	  the	  salience	  of	   immigration	  concern	  to	  the	  public	  and	  the	  rising	  instability	  in	  Central	  America,	  meant	  that	  the	  senator	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  418	  Robert	   Pastor,	   “The	   United	   States	   and	   Central	   America:	   Interlocking	  Debates,”	   in	   Double-­‐Edged	   Diplomacy:	   International	   Bargaining	   and	  
Domestic	   Politics,	   eds.	   Peter	   B.	   Evans,	   Harold	   K.	   Jacobson,	   and	   Robert	   D.	  Putnam	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1993),	  325.	  
419	  Thomas	  R.	  Maddux,	  “Ronald	  Reagan	  and	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  Immigration,	  1981,”	  Pacific	  Historical	  Review	   74,	   No.	   2	   (May,	   2005),	   197-­‐198.	   See	   also	  Nicholas	   Laham,	   Ronald	   Reagan	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Immigration	   Reform	  (Westport:	  Praeger,	  2000).	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had	   an	   opportunity	   to	   shape	   immigration	   policy	   and	   foreign	   affairs	  simultaneously.	  	  	   Helms	   continued	   to	   believe	   that	   only	   an	   aggressive	   paramilitary	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  would	  prevent	  wider	  disorder	  in	  the	  hemisphere,	   hence	   his	   defence	   of	   the	   administration	   when	   Congress	  learned	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  mining	  operation	  in	  early	  1984.	  He	  lauded	  those	  who	  he	  felt	  were	  ‘working	  for	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  Nicaraguan	  people	  and	  of	  all	   the	  people	   in	   the	   region’	   and	  declared	   that	   ‘whatever	   role,	   if	   any,	  may	  have	  been	  played	  by	  U.S.	   officials	   should	  not	  blind	  us	   to	   the	   fundamental	  truth	  that	  what	  we	  should	  do	  is	  applaud.’420	  	  The	   problem	   for	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   alliance	  was	   that	   the	   damaging	  publicity	   from	   the	   mining	   scandal	   added	   to	   the	   growing	   concern	  surrounding	   the	   president’s	   Contra	   policy.	   Helms’	   defence	   of	   the	   mining	  operation	  strengthened	  his	  image	  as	  a	  consistent	  advocate	  of	  paramilitary	  engagement	   with	   the	   Sandinistas,	   and	   provided	   a	   welcome,	   if	   isolated,	  point	  of	  support	   for	   the	  Reagan	  administration	  during	  a	  period	  of	   intense	  difficulty,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  highlighted	  the	  growing	  distance	  between	  his	   views	   on	   Nicaragua	   and	   those	   of	   a	   general	   public	   that	   was	   largely	  opposed	  to	  Contra	  aid.	  421	  	  Reagan’s	   first	   term	   saw	   a	   determined	   effort	   by	   the	   network	   to	  develop,	   and	   maintain,	   a	   viable	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   army.	   Helms	   provided	  outspoken	  and	  sustained	  support	  for	  the	  programme,	  defining	  the	  issue	  in	  stark,	   Manichean	   terms.	   Meanwhile,	   lower	   profile	   members	   of	   the	  community	   worked	   diligently	   to	   develop	   the	   regional	   anti-­‐communist	  alliance	  that	  supported	  the	  Contras.	  This	  tendency	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  hard-­‐line	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  420	  Jesse	  Helms	   (NC),	   “Miscellaneous	  Tariff,	   Trade,	  And	  Customs	  Matters,”	  
Cong.	  Rec.	  130	  (1984),	  8531-­‐8532.	  
421	  Bowen,	   “Presidential	   Action,”	   797;	   Richard	   Sobel,	  The	   Impact	  of	  Public	  
Opinion	  on	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  Since	  Vietnam	   (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  111.	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element	   of	   hemispheric	   anti-­‐communism	  generated	   a	   vicious	   circle,	   since	  the	  policies	  being	  advocated	  –	  and	  implemented	  –	  reduced	  the	  chances	  of	  constructive	  engagement	  with	  a	  Congress	  that	  was	  sharply	  divided	  over	  the	  Contra	   issue.	   As	   Ted	   Draper	   concludes	   in	   his	   examination	   of	   the	   Iran-­‐Contra	  affairs,	  it	  was	  this	  hard-­‐line	  group	  –	  ‘people	  with	  their	  own	  agenda’,	  as	   he	   terms	   it	   –	   who	   ultimately	   created	   the	   scandal.422	  Helms	   and	   his	  network,	   working	   on	   their	   own	   agenda,	   played	   an	   integral	   role	   in	  heightening	  the	  contentious	  political,	  and	  policy,	  environment	  from	  which	  Iran-­‐Contra	  would	  emerge.	  	   In	   late	   1984,	   Congress	   passed	   the	   second	   Boland	   Amendment,	  explicitly	   terminating	   all	   Contra	   aid.	   By	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   following	   year,	  legislators	  had	  voted	  to	  renew	  humanitarian	  aid,	  authorising	  $27	  million	  to	  sustain	   the	   rebels	   pending	   the	   restoration	   of	   military	   support.	   The	   next	  year,	   Reagan	   achieved	   even	   greater	   success,	   securing	   $100	   million	   in	  military	  funding	  for	  the	  Contras.	  The	  appropriation	  of	  so	  large	  a	  quantity	  of	  unrestricted	  aid	  –	  designed	  to	  provide	  the	  Contras	  with	  an	  arsenal	  capable	  of	  defeating	  the	  Sandinistas	  –	  marked	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  in	  Nicaragua.	  Within	  months,	  however,	   the	  policy	  would	  be	  ruined	  by	   the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  affair.	  It	  was	  during	  these	  years	  that	  Helms	  demonstrated	  both	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  dangers	  of	  partisan	  policy	  entrepreneurship.	  	   The	   passage	   of	   the	   second	   Boland	   Amendment	  was	   a	   low-­‐point	   for	  Reagan’s	   Contra	   policy.	   As	  with	   the	   first	   Boland	   Amendment,	   Helms	  was	  unable	  to	  stop	  the	  legislation.	  He	  could	  not	  resist	  the	  potent	  combination	  of	  congressional	   anger	   at	   executive	   branch	   unilateralism,	   lack	   of	   public	  support	  for	  the	  Contras,	  and	  Republican	  willingness	  to	  sacrifice	  aid	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  funding	  of	  popular	  domestic	  programmes	  during	  an	  election	  year.423	  Hard-­‐line	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   figures	   in	   Washington,	   notably	   William	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  422	  Draper,	  Very	  Thing	  Line,	  25.	  
423	  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  343	  –	  345	  and	  Arnson,	  Crossroads,	  178	  –	  180.	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Casey,	  Oliver	  North,	   and	   John	  McFarlane,	   had	  been	   aware	   of	   the	   growing	  resentment	   towards	  Contra	  policy,	   and	  during	   the	  preceding	  months	  had	  taken	  steps	  to	  ensure	  a	  sustainable	  flow	  of	  aid	  to	  the	  rebels.424	  Though	  such	  efforts	   were	   still	   legal	   at	   this	   point,	   the	   search	   for	   alternative	   funding	  planted	   the	   seeds	   for	   Iran-­‐Contra.	   Helms	   had	   no	   direct	   link	   to	   these	  initiatives,	   though	   John	  Carbaugh	  was	   tied	   to	   the	   scheme.	   Carbaugh,	  who	  was	   fired	  by	  Helms	   in	  1982	   for	  ethics	  violations	  relating	   to	   the	  misuse	  of	  funds	  for	  travel,	  was	  named	  as	  a	  prospective	  member	  of	  an	  advisory	  board	  for	  a	  new	  tax-­‐exempt	  corporation	  through	  which	  funds	  to	  the	  Contras	  could	  be	   moved. 425 	  Carbaugh	   was	   also	   listed	   in	   North’s	   schedule	   for	   26	  September	   1984.426	  Though	   there	   is	   no	   mention	   of	   the	   content	   of	   their	  meeting,	   the	   likelihood	   of	   it	   concerning	   efforts	   to	   continue	   Contra	  assistance	  was	  substantial	  given	  the	  previous	  actions	  of	  both	  participants.	  It	   was	   during	   this	   period	   that	   North	   embarked	   upon	   his	   plan	   to	   secure	  secret,	  third	  party	  funding	  for	  the	  Contras;	  an	  endeavour	  that	  paid	  off	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  second	  Boland	  Amendment,	  but	  which	  would	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  a	  catastrophic	  collapse	  of	  the	  Contra	  programme.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  424	  Theodore	  Draper,	  in	  his	  exhaustive	  account	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandals,	  points	  to	  summer	  1984	  as	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  administration	  began	  to	  seek	   out	   private	   funding	   for	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   rebels.	   Casey,	   as	   CIA	  Director,	  McFarlane,	  as	  National	  Security	  Adviser,	  and	  North,	   the	  National	  Security	   Council’s	   point	  man	   for	   the	  Contras,	  were	   intimately	   involved	   in	  this	  process.	  Draper,	  A	  Very	  Thin	  Line,	  37.	  
425 	  [Proposal	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   501(c)(3)	   Tax-­‐Exempt	   Non-­‐Profit	  Corporation	  to	  Raise	  and	  Transfer	  Funds	  to	  the	  Contras],	  Project	  Proposal,	  c.	  1	  March,	  1984,	  DNSA.	  
426 	  [North	   Schedule	   for	   September	   26,	   1984],	   Non-­‐Classified,	   North	  Schedule,	  26	  September,	  1984,	  DNSA.	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El	  Salvador,	  1979-­‐1992	  	  	  	  In	  October	  1979,	  El	  Salvador’s	  ruling	   junta	  was	  ousted	   in	  a	  coup	   led	  by	   a	   young,	   reformist	   faction	   of	   the	   nation’s	   armed	   forces.	   Barely	   three	  months	  later,	  in	  January	  1980,	  another	  coup	  brought	  a	  new	  government	  to	  power.	  Violence	  soared,	  as	  Marxist	   insurgents,	  El	  Salvador’s	  armed	  forces,	  and	   brutal	   paramilitary	   death	   squads	   from	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   political	  spectrum	   fought	   for	   control	   of	   the	   small,	   impoverished	   Central	   American	  nation.	   At	   the	   start	   of	   1981,	   the	   insurgency,	   recently	   united	   under	   the	  banner	  of	  the	  Farabundo	  Martí	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  (FMLN),	  launched	  a	   “Final	   Offensive”	   to	   seize	   control	   of	   the	   state,	   in	   imitation	   of	   the	  Sandinistas	  in	  Nicaragua.	  The	  offensive	  failed,	  and	  for	  the	  next	  twelve	  years	  the	  government	  of	  El	  Salvador	  and	  the	  FMLN	  engaged	   in	  a	  bitter	  struggle	  settled	  only	  when	  a	  U.N.	  mediated	  peace	  process	  brought	  the	  war	  to	  a	  close.	  	  	   During	   the	   entire	   conflict,	   as	   well	   as	   those	   months	   immediately	  preceding	   the	   civil	   war	   itself,	   the	   United	   States	   looked	   to	   stabilise	   a	  Salvadoran	   government	   that	   consistently	   proved	   incapable	   of	   decisively	  countering	   the	  FMLN.	  The	  Carter	  administration	   initially	   sought	   to	  use	  El	  Salvador	  as	  a	  test	  case	  for	  its	  human	  rights	  policy,	  but	  relented	  in	  the	  face	  of	   FMLN	   advances.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   his	   presidency,	   Carter	   had	   authorised	  renewed	  military	  aid,	  further	  distancing	  himself	  from	  two	  of	  the	  oft-­‐stated	  frameworks	  for	  his	  foreign	  policy:	  détente	  and	  moralism.	  President	  Reagan	  maintained	   this	   approach,	   but	   drastically	   increased	   the	   size	   of	   the	   aid.	  Between	  1981	  and	  1988,	   the	  United	  States	  provided	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  for	  El	  Salvador’s	  military,	  but	  failed	  to	  turn	  the	  Salvadoran	  army	  into	   one	   capable	   of	   winning	   the	   civil	   war.	   George	   Bush’s	   administration	  adopted	  a	  more	  pragmatic	   framework,	   and	  embraced	   the	   internationally-­‐
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mediated	   peace	   process	   that	   emerged	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   as	   a	   means	   of	  drawing	  an	  end	  to	  the	  divisive	  issue	  of	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  El	  Salvador.427	  	  	   For	   Jesse	   Helms,	   all	   this	  was	   utterly	   insufficient.	   From	   early	   1980	  until	  the	  peace	  accords,	  he	  consistently	  opposed	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  He	   had	   no	   patience	   for	   the	   Carter	   administration’s	   policies,	   and	   little	   for	  President	  Reagan’s.428	  Military	  assistance	  was	  too	  small,	  and	  the	  economic	  reforms	   demanded	   by	   the	   United	   States	   in	   return	   for	   security	   aid	   were	  barely	  distinguishable	  from	  socialism.	  Helms	  accepted	  his	  differences	  with	  the	  Carter	  administration,	  but	  he,	  like	  other	  movement	  conservatives,	  was	  baffled	   by	   the	   Reagan	   administration’s	   approach	   to	   El	   Salvador.	   His	  criticism	   of	   the	   administration,	   albeit	   couched	   in	   anti-­‐CIA	   and	   State	  Department	   rhetoric,	   exposed	   deep	   misgivings	   among	   movement	  conservatives	   about	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   Reagan	   was	   implementing	   a	  conservative	  foreign	  policy	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  	  	   The	   senator’s	   distinctive	   policy	   vision	   was	   illustrated	   in	   his	  dogmatic	   approach	   to	   two	   critically	   important	   figures	   in	   the	   Salvadoran	  policy	   landscape:	   U.S.	   Ambassador	   Robert	   White	   and	   the	   right-­‐wing	  Salvadoran	  political	  leader,	  Major	  Roberto	  D’Aubuisson.	  Helms	  used	  White	  as	  a	  prop	  in	  a	  broader	  assault	  on	  the	  Carter	  administration’s	  policies,	  which	  the	   senator	   depicted	   as	   overly	   pre-­‐occupied	   with	   human	   rights	  considerations.	  Despite	  Carter’s	  noticeable	   shift	   in	   the	   final	  months	  of	  his	  presidency	   toward	   a	   more	   militarised	   approach,	   Helms	   consistently	  presented	  White’s	  more	  radically	  reformist	  views	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  Assisted	  by	   the	  prominent	   role	  played	  by	   the	  American	  ambassador	   in	  El	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  427	  For	  more	  on	  El	  Salvador’s	  civil	  war,	  see	  Hugh	  Byrne,	  El	  Salvador’s	  Civil	  
War:	   A	   Study	   of	   Revolution	   (Boulder:	   Lynne	   Rienner,	   1996),	   William	  Stanley,	  The	  Protection	  Racket	   State:	  Elites	  Politics,	  Military	  Extortion,	   and	  
Civil	  War	  in	  El	  Salvador	  (Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  and	  Raymond	   Bonner,	  Weakness	   and	  Deceit:	   U.S.	   Policy	   and	   El	   Salvador	   (New	  York:	  Times	  Books,	  1984).	  
428	  Link,	  Righteous	  Warrior,	  245.	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Salvador	  during	  this	  period,	  Helms’	  fight	  over	  policy	  became,	  in	  essence,	  a	  conflict	  between	  himself	  and	  Ambassador	  White.	  	  	   D’Aubuisson,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  was	  Helms’	  most	   important	  ally	  –	  Salvadoran	   or	   American	   –	   in	   the	   campaign	   to	   ensure	   a	   sufficiently	  conservative	  policy.	  D’Aubuisson,	   a	   former	   Salvadoran	   intelligence	  officer	  turned	   political	   candidate	   for	   the	   right-­‐wing	  ARENA	  party,	  was	   abhorred	  by	   almost	   all	   American	   officials	   during	   the	   period.	   He	   was	   closely	  associated	  with	   the	   extreme	   right’s	   death	   squad	   campaign,	   and	  American	  policy-­‐makers	   saw	   his	   political	   career	   as	   a	   means	   of	   legitimising	   the	   far	  right’s	   repressive	   anti-­‐communist	   strategy	   and	   perpetuating	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   status	   quo.	   Helms,	   however,	   isolated	   from	   the	   Reagan	  administration,	  embraced	  D’Aubuisson’s	  politics	  precisely	  because	  of	  these	  factors.	   Though	   D’Aubuisson’s	   rise	   to	   political	   prominence	   directly	  challenged	   American	   policy,	   the	   senator	   consistently	   championed	   the	  Salvadoran’s	  cause.	  	  	   D’Aubuisson,	   however,	  was	   an	   isolated	   ally	   for	   the	   senator.	  Unlike	  policy	  in	  Nicaragua	  during	  the	  same	  period,	  Helms	  could	  not	  build	  a	  broad	  network	  of	  conservative	  policy	  advocates	  and	  activists.	  The	  Carter,	  Reagan,	  and	   Bush	   administrations	   largely	   maintained	   their	   commitment	   to	  moderate	   political	   forces	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   and	   this	   hampered	   the	   senator’s	  ability	   to	   enlist	   administration	   insiders	   as	   part	   of	   his	   policy	   efforts.	  Movement	  conservative	  allies	  like	  Human	  Events	  and	  several	  congressional	  conservatives	  helped	  sustain	  Helms’	  narrative	  for	  El	  Salvador	  up	  to	  a	  point,	  but	  altering	  policy	  was	  difficult	  when	  the	  bureaucracy	  was	  largely	  hostile	  to	  the	  senator’s	  preferences.	  	  ‘A	  torch	  tossed	  in	  a	  pool	  of	  oil’:	  Helms	  and	  the	  Carter	  Administration	  	  For	  Helms,	  El	  Salvador	  emerged	  as	  an	  important	  foreign	  policy	  issue	  when	   it	  began	   to	  destabilise	   in	  1979	  and	  early	  1980.	  Prior	   to	   this,	  as	  had	  been	   the	   case	   in	   Nicaragua	   under	   Somoza	   rule,	   the	   senator	   paid	   little	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attention	   to	   a	   reliable	   anti-­‐communist	   ally.	   The	   emergence	   of	   a	   unified	  communist	   guerrilla	   front	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   another	   Sandinista-­‐esque	  revolution	  in	  Central	  America,	  however,	  caught	  Helms’	  attention.	  When	  the	  Special	   Central	   American	   and	   Caribbean	   Security	   Assistance	   Act	   came	  before	  the	  Senate	  in	  January	  1980,	  Helms	  argued	  that	  El	  Salvador	  should	  be	  the	   ‘primary	   recipient’	   of	   aid	   in	   the	   region	  because	   of	   the	   threat	   it	   faced.	  Praising	  El	  Salvador	  for	  its	  long	  history	  of	  friendship	  with,	  and	  support	  for,	  the	  United	   States,	  Helms	   argued	   that	   assistance	   for	   the	   Central	  American	  nation	   should	   be	   increased	   to	   $20,000,000	   –	   funded,	   as	   previously	  discussed,	   by	   a	   significant	   reduction	   in	   the	   Carter	   administration’s	   aid	  package	  for	  the	  new	  Sandinista	  government	  in	  Nicaragua.429	  	  	  Helms’	   amendment	   reflected	   the	   American	   right’s	   regional	   threat	  assessment	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Somoza	  government’s	  ouster.	  For	  six	   months,	   since	   the	   intensification	   of	   the	   Nicaraguan	   crisis,	   movement	  conservatives	   had	   predicted	   El	   Salvador’s	   imminent	   collapse	   should	   the	  Carter	   administration	   maintain	   its	   existing	   course. 430 	  Prioritising	   El	  Salvador	   as	   a	   beneficiary	   of	   American	   aid	  was	   intended	   to	   assuage	   these	  fears,	   and	   emphasised	   Helms’	   personal	   interest	   in	   re-­‐ordering	   policy	   in	  Central	   America	   to	   better	   reflect	   a	   conservative	   analysis	   of	   the	   region’s	  problems.	  	  Helms’	   plan	   was	   not	   without	   support	   from	   those	   outside	   the	  movement	   conservative	   base.	   Ed	   Zorinsky	   (D-­‐NE),	   chair	   of	   the	   Western	  Hemisphere	  Subcommittee	   and	  a	   frequent	   target	  of	   conservative	   ire,	   said	  that	  he	  would	  have	  had	  sympathy	  for	  both	  Helms’	  analysis	  and	  his	  proposal	  had	   it	  not	   simultaneously	   curtailed	   the	  administration’s	  Nicaragua	  policy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  429	  Helms,	  “Special	  Central	  American	  And	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Nicaragua’s	  current	  needs,	  Zorinsky	  said,	  were	   the	   issue	  at	  hand.431	  Given	  the	  wider	   support	   in	   the	   Senate	   for	  Carter’s	   conciliatory	   tone	   toward	   the	  Sandinistas,	  Helms’	  amendment	  suffered	  a	  substantial	  defeat,	  61-­‐26.432	  	  	  The	   senator’s	   January	   remarks	   reinforced	   the	   view	   that	   the	  preservation	  of	  stability	  was	  his	  fundamental	  objective	  for	  American	  policy	  in	   Central	   America.	   Stability	   ‘is	   the	   prime	   U.S.	   interest	   there.	   All	   other	  considerations	   are	   secondary’,	   he	   argued.	   ‘When	   internal	   stability	   is	  restored	   in	   each	   country,	   then,	   and	   only	   then,	   can	   the	   United	   States	   talk	  with	   its	   friends	   about	   other	   internal	   problems	  which	   have	   human	   rights	  implications.’ 433 	  Yet	   while	   he	   and	   conservatives	   lambasted	   the	   Carter	  administration	   for	  prioritising	  human	  rights,	  Helms’	  position	  was	  actually	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  the	  White	  House	  than	  either	  party	  admitted.	  Conscious	  of	  El	   Salvador’s	   mounting	   instability,	   the	   White	   House	   studiously	   avoided	  pleas	   from	   the	   State	   Department’s	   human	   rights	   bureau	   that	   it	   continue	  restricting	  military	  aid.434	  For	  all	   the	  president’s	   talk	  of	  human	  rights,	   the	  traditional	   Cold	   War	   imperatives	   of	   national	   security	   re-­‐emerged	   as	   the	  driving	  force	  behind	  policy.435	  	  Thus,	  the	  difference	  between	  Helms	  and	  the	  administration	  was	  not	  a	  matter	   of	   strategy	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   but	   tactics.	   Helms’	   $20,000,000	   aid	  proposal	   was	   four	   times	   that	   requested	   by	   Carter,	   and	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administration,	  he	  did	  not	  use	  the	  language	  of	  human	  rights	  as	  pressure	  on	  El	   Salvador’s	   military	   to	   conduct	   a	   publicly	   palatable	   counterinsurgency	  operation.	   The	   greatest	   difference	   in	   tactics,	   however,	   stemmed	   from	   the	  Carter	   administration’s	   choice	   of	   Robert	   E.	   White	   as	   ambassador	   in	   El	  Salvador.	   Helms’	   vision	   of	   stability	   for	   the	   country	   –	   a	   robust	   anti-­‐communist	   counterinsurgency	   strategy	   alongside	   the	   preservation	   of	  existing	  socio-­‐economic	  structures	  –	  clashed	  with	  White’s	  preferences	   for	  economic	   and	   political	   reform.	   In	  White,	   Helms	   found	   a	   nemesis	   against	  which	   he	   could	   rally	   conservatives	   in	   support	   of	   a	  more	  militarised	   anti-­‐communist	  strategy.	  	  White	   was	   a	   long-­‐serving	   Latin	   Americanist	   in	   the	   Foreign	   Service,	  having	  served	  in	  various	  posts	  in	  the	  region	  for	  eighteen	  years	  prior	  to	  his	  appointment	   in	   El	   Salvador.	   Though	   he	   had	   been	   identified	   as	   a	  replacement	   for	   Frank	   Devine	   in	   late	   1979,	   the	   desire	   for	   a	   more	  experienced	  hand	   saw	   the	   interim	   appointment	   of	   James	  Cheek.436	  At	   the	  start	   of	   1980,	   as	   the	   Carter	   administration	   looked	   to	   construct	   a	   viable,	  sustainable	   political	   centre	   in	   order	   to	   break	   the	   oligarchy’s	   hold	   on	   El	  Salvador’s	  political	  life,	  White’s	  name	  was	  put	  forward	  as	  an	  individual	  who	  might	  be	  able	  to	  persuade	  the	  junta	  to	  pursue	  socio-­‐economic	  reform.437	  	  Helms	  was	   aghast	   at	   the	   decision.	  White’s	   nomination,	   he	   declared,	  was	   ‘like	   a	   torch	   tossed	   in	   a	   pool	   of	   oil.’438	  For	   almost	   a	   month	   Helms	  worked	   to	   block	   the	   ambassador’s	   confirmation.	   He	   initially	   delayed	   the	  process	   by	   filing	   an	   extensive	   series	   of	   questions	   for	   the	   ambassador	  concerning	   both	   El	   Salvador	   and	   the	  wider	   regional	   context.439	  Extensive	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questioning	  of	  a	  nominee	  was	  a	  common	  tactic	  for	  Helms,	  allowing	  him	  to	  seek	  out	  a	  candidate’s	  positions	  but	  also	  add	  to	  the	  apprehension	  of	  those	  who	  came	  under	  his	  spotlight.440	  Next,	  he	  voted	  against	  White’s	  nomination	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee,	  with	  only	  Richard	  Lugar	  joining	  in	  this	  show	   of	   dissent. 441 	  When	   the	   full	   Senate	   assembled	   to	   vote	   on	   the	  nomination,	  Helms	  not	  only	  led	  the	  opposition	  with	  a	  lengthy	  denunciation	  of	   White’s	   career,	   ideology,	   and	   character,	   but	   he	   sought	   to	   block	   the	  Democratic	  leadership’s	  attempt	  to	  expedite	  the	  confirmation	  by	  bringing	  it	  to	   the	   head	   of	   the	   legislative	   calendar.	   Despite	   these	   efforts,	   Helms	   was	  isolated,	  and	  White	  was	  dispatched	  to	  his	  post	  with	  overwhelming	  Senate	  support.	  Only	  Helms	  and	  sixteen	  other	  conservative	  senators	  voted	  against	  the	  nomination.442	  	  Helms’	   campaign	   against	   White	   was	   more	   than	   just	   a	   matter	   of	  personality	   politics.	   It	   represented	   an	   attempt	   to	   wrest	   control	   of	   the	  bureaucracy	   away	   from	   those	   perceived	   by	   conservatives	   as	   dangerous	  liberal	  activists	  –	  even,	  to	  some,	  insidious	  communist	  sympathisers.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  served	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  what	  Helms	  and	  the	  movement	  stood	   for	   in	  El	   Salvador,	   and	   showed	  once	   again	   the	   senator’s	   continuing	  desire	   to	  place	  his	   colleagues	  on	   the	   record	  on	   terms	  defined	  by	  his	  own	  provocative	  rhetoric.	  	  Diplomats	   were	   wary	   of	   written	   questions	   during	   the	   confirmation	  process.	   Ambassador	   Denis	   Lamb	   recalled	   that	   those	   from	   Helms	   could	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involve	   ‘serious	   jeopardy’.443	  White,	  who	   later	   became	   accustomed	   to	   the	  senator’s	   attempts	   to	   trap	   him	   through	   what	   he	   once	   described	   as	  ‘disingenuous’	   queries,	   was	   subjected	   to	   a	   series	   of	   confrontational	   and	  leading	   questions.444	  Like	   his	   preference	   for	   constructing	   rigidly	   defined	  legislation	   choices	   that	   framed	   Senate	   debate	   on	   his	   terms,	   Helms’	  questions	   drew	   White	   onto	   ground	   chosen	   by	   the	   senator.	   He	   sought	  answers	   that	   forced	   the	   ambassador	   into	   either	   confirming	   the	  conservative	  narrative	  over	  El	  Salvador	  or	  expressing	  support	   for	  policies	  and	  nations	  that	  Helms	  saw	  as	  inimical	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  interests.	  	  Helms	  was	  keen	  for	  White	  to	  validate	  the	  conservative	  narrative	  of	  a	  crisis	   driven	   by	   external	   communist	   intervention,	   particularly	   from	  Nicaragua,	   Panama,	   and	   Cuba.	  He	   pressed	   the	   ambassador	   on	   the	   role	   of	  these	   nations	   in	   supporting	   the	   insurgency,	   and	   queried	   why	   White	  appeared	  to	  dismiss	  reports	  of	  foreign	  influence	  on	  the	  guerrillas.445	  When	  not	   buttressing	   the	   case	   for	   aggressive	   communist	   expansion	   in	   El	  Salvador,	  Helms	  questioned	  White’s	   faith	   in	   the	   reforms	  promised	  by	   the	  Carter	   administration	   and	   junta	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   especially	   those	   which	  American	   conservatives	   believed	   to	   have	   destroyed	   El	   Salvador’s	  previously	  burgeoning	  economy.	  To	  counter	   the	  emerging	   consensus	   that	  El	   Salvador	   required	   reform,	   Helms	   queried	   the	   success	   of	   nations	   he	  believed	   had	  worked	  within	   similar	   frameworks	   (and	   he	   included	   a	   less-­‐than-­‐subtle	  criticism	  of	  communist	  revolutionary	  priorities	  in	  the	  process):	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28.	   What	   is	   the	   estimated	   per	   capita	   income	   in	   Nicaragua	  today?	  What	  was	  the	  estimated	  per	  capita	  income	  in	  Nicaragua	  two	  years	  ago?	  (in	  constant	  dollars)	  	  29.	   What	   was	   Cuba’s	   relative	   economic	   position	   based	   on	  standards	   of	   living	   in	   Latin	   America	   in	   1958?	  What	   is	   Cuba’s	  relative	  standard	  of	  living	  in	  Latin	  America	  today?	  	  What	   do	   you	   attribute	   this	   decline	   to?	   What	   does	   it	   suggest	  concerning	  the	  marxist	  economic	  model	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  raising	  the	   living	   standards	   of	   people	   in	   Latin	  America?	  What	  does	   it	  suggest	   concerning	   the	   willingness	   of	   marxist	   leaders	   to	  allocate	   budgetary	   resources	   to	   exporting	   revolution	   at	   the	  expense	  of	  the	  living	  standard	  of	  people?446	  	  White’s	   responses	   led	   Helms	   to	   condemn	   the	   ambassador	   as	   a	  ‘divisive	   force’	   and	   ‘an	   ideologue’,	   ill	   suited	   for	   a	   country	   in	   need	   of	   an	  American	  ambassador	  with	   ‘reason	  and	  compassion’	  who	  might	   ‘heal	   that	  country’s	   wounds	   [and]	   bring	   its	   divisions	   back	   together	   again.’447	  Such	  rhetoric	  was	   a	   thin	  disguise.	   It	  was	  not	   that	  White	  was	   an	   ideologue,	   but	  rather	  than	  he	  epitomised	  an	  ideology	  alien	  to	  the	  senator.	  Their	  clash	  was	  a	  product	  of	   their	  contrasting	  opinions	  on	  the	  causes	  of	   the	  crisis	  and	  the	  best	  course	  to	  solve	  it.	  Even	  at	  the	  most	  basic	  level	  they	  disagreed	  on	  how	  to	  describe	   the	  situation.	  When	  White	   told	  Helms	   that	  he	  hoped	  civil	  war	  might	  be	  avoided,	  Helms	  responded	  by	  pointing	  out	  every	  analysis	  showed	  the	   country	   to	   be	   already	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   civil	  war.	   ‘Nothing’,	   Helms	   told	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White,	  ‘is	  gained	  by	  trying	  to	  pretend	  that	  the	  nation	  is	  not	  under	  attack	  by	  a	  bitter	  and	  irreconcilable	  ideology.’448	  	  On	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  insurgency,	  the	  senator	  described	  the	  class-­‐based	  analysis	  that	  the	  ambassador	  allegedly	  adhered	  to	  as	  a	  ‘crude	  caricature’.	  It	  was	   a	   ‘mythology’	   put	   forward	   by	   ‘rabblerousers’	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   Helms	  claimed,	  and,	  indicating	  support	  for	  the	  oligarchs	  and	  economic	  elites	  of	  the	  country,	  argued	  ‘is	  not	  going	  to	  win	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  very	  men	  with	  the	  capital	  and	  expertise	  necessary	  to	  put	  El	  Salvador	  back	  into	  working	  order.’	  In	   place	   of	   White’s	   ‘tedious	   rhetoric	   of	   class	   warfare’	   and	   support	   for	  ‘murky	   proposals	   to	   turn	   El	   Salvador’s	   economic	   system	   sharply	   toward	  socialism’,	   Helms	   proposed	   policies	   he	   heard	   discussed	   every	   day	   in	   the	  Senate:	   ‘capital	   formation,	   job	   creation,	   reinvestment,	   and	   private	  enterprise.’449	  	  Helms	   therefore	   made	  White’s	   nomination	   a	   symbolic	   vote	   over	   El	  Salvador	   policy,	   and	   even	   the	   basic	   tenets	   of	   American	   democracy.	   ‘We	  have	   to	  decide	  whether	  we	  believe	   in	  our	  own	  system’,	   he	   argued	  on	   the	  Senate	  floor.	  ‘If	  any	  Senator	  thinks	  that	  socialism	  is	  the	  answer,	  then	  he	  will	  vote	  for	  Ambassador	  White’,	  Helms	  stated.	  ‘If	  he	  thinks	  that	  another	  Cuba,	  or	   another	   Nicaragua,	   is	   the	   answer,	   then	   let	   him	   tell	   that	   to	   his	  constituents	   by	   voting	   for	   Mr.	   White.’450	  Helms	   stated	   clearly	   that	   his	  purpose	  was	  to	  put	  his	  colleagues’	  views	  on	  record,	  as	  much	  for	  the	  future	  as	   for	   the	   present.	   ‘I	   am	   on	  my	   feet	   in	   an	   empty	   Senate	   Chamber	   today,	  making	   a	   record	   –	   because,	   a	   few	   years	   from	   now,	   I	   think	   I	   shall	   be	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somewhat	  comforted	  to	  look	  back	  and	  say,	  “Well,	  I	  tried.	  I	  tried	  to	  warn	  my	  colleagues.”’451	  	  Helms’	   admission	   about	   his	   lack	   of	   audience	   says	   much	   about	   the	  importance	   he	   attached	   to	   building	   a	   record	   of	   policy	   positions,	   and	   the	  symbolic	  nature	  of	  speeches	  in	  the	  Senate.	  As	  Hill	  and	  Hurley	  note,	  general	  policy	  speeches	  by	  senators	  provide	  signals	  to	  their	  constituents	  and	  policy	  groups,	  making	  them	  part	  of	   their	   ‘preservation	  of	  self.’452	  In	  this	  case,	   far	  from	  persuading	  his	   fellow	  legislators,	  Helms	  simply	  constructed	  a	  record	  of	  his	  personal	  commitment	  to	  a	  conservative	  position.	  His	  argument	  that	  at	   least	   ‘I	   tried’	   was	   a	   good	   example	   of	   this	   self-­‐preservation	   process	   at	  work.	  	  It	  was	  Helms’	  effort	  to	  construct	  a	  record	  of	  his	  views	  that	  makes	  his	  Senate	  speech	  opposing	  White	  of	  critical	   importance	   in	  understanding	  his	  perspective	  on	  both	  El	  Salvador	  and	  international	  instability	  in	  the	  period.	  Helms	   saw	   an	   established	   order	   under	   threat	   from	   ‘middle-­‐class	  intellectuals	  who	  have	  substituted	  ideology	  for	  reality’,	  backed	  by	  ‘training,	  arms,	  and	   tactics	  provided	  by	  organized	   international	  movements.’453	  The	  tenets	  of	  Salvadoran	  life	  that	  Helms	  believed	  critical	  to	  any	  well-­‐run	  society	  –	  the	  free-­‐market,	  private	  property,	  existing	  structures	  of	   law	  and	  order	  –	  were	  threatened	  by	  the	  implementation	  of	  ‘ideology	  over	  economics.’	  In	  an	  echo	  of	  his	  defence	  of	  the	  Somoza	  government,	  Helms	  acknowledged	  some	  weaknesses	   in	   the	   Salvadoran	   leadership:	   ‘I	   have	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	  leadership	  of	  El	  Salvador	  has	  about	   the	  same	  proportion	  of	  miscreants	  as	  would	  be	  found	  in	  any	  sample	  of	  human	  beings	  in	  any	  country	  anywhere	  in	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the	  world’.454	  	  However,	  he	  did	  not	  hold	  to	  the	  view,	  widely	  held	  by	  both	  his	  contemporaries	   and	   later	   historians,	   that	   it	   was	   the	   established	   alliance	  between	   the	   country’s	   agro-­‐elites	   and	   military	   that	   had	   exploited	   a	  population	  to	  its	  breaking	  point.455	  	  It	   would	   be	   a	   mistake,	   however,	   to	   see	   Helms’	   actions	   only	   as	  symbolic.	  This	  was	  a	  real	  effort	  to	  control	  the	  levers	  of	  influence.	  Delaying	  White’s	  confirmation	  was	  designed	  to	  force	  the	  administration	  to	  withdraw	  the	   nomination.	   Reports	   reached	  Robert	   Pastor,	   Latin	  America	   expert	   for	  the	  NSC,	  that	  John	  Carbaugh	  was	  reportedly	  set	  to	  travel	  to	  El	  Salvador	  to	  persuade	   the	  governing	   junta	   that	  White	   should	  be	  declared	  persona	  non	  grata	   even	   before	   his	   confirmation.	   By	   delaying	   the	   vote,	   Helms	   would	  extend	   the	   timeframe	   for	   Carbaugh’s	   operation,	   maximising	   the	   chances	  that	   the	  Salvadorans	  would	  reject	   the	  ambassador	  even	  before	  the	  Senate	  vote.	   Pastor	   recommended	  Byrd	   speed	   up	   the	   confirmation	   timetable,	   an	  idea	  that	  Brzezinski	  agreed	  with.456	  	  Helms	   feared	   that	   White	   was	   likely	   to	   be	   highly	   influential	   in	   El	  Salvador	   –	   more	   so	   than	   any	   other	   ambassadorial	   posting.	   White	   had	   a	  reputation	   for	   obstinacy	   and	   activism,	   and	   the	   senator	   worried	   that	   the	  ambassador	   would	   continue	   the	   State	   Department’s	   long	   history	   of	  ‘unparalleled	   and	   arrogant	   intervention’	   in	  El	   Salvador.457	  Helms	  believed	  any	   mistake	   on	   the	   ambassador’s	   part	   ‘could	   result	   in	   the	   loss	   of	   yet	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another	  Central	  American	  nation	  to	  Marxist	  dictatorship.’458	  His	  senatorial	  colleagues,	  who	   told	  White	   to	   act	   less	   as	   an	   ambassador	   and	  more	   as	   an	  American	  proconsul,	  stoked	  Helms’	  fears	  that	  White	  represented	  a	  law	  unto	  himself.	  Perhaps	  worst	  of	  all	  for	  the	  senator,	  the	  White	  House,	  distracted	  by	  the	   Iranian	   hostage	   situation	   and	   domestic	   troubles,	   had	   granted	   White	  substantial	  latitude	  to	  implement	  policy	  as	  he	  saw	  fit.459	  	  Helms	  was	  not	  alone	   in	  his	   condemnation	  of	  White.	  Senator	  Gordon	  Humphrey	   (R-­‐NH)	   placed	   his	   own	   hold	   on	   the	   nomination	   because	   he	  disagreed	  with	  White’s	  alleged	  sympathies	  for	  Cuba	  and	  the	  ambassador’s	  refusal	   to	   hold	   external	   actors	   to	   blame	   for	   the	   Salvadoran	   crisis.460	  In	  April,	  Human	  Events	   declared	   its	   opposition	   to	  White,	   too.	   Its	   assessment	  that	   the	   ambassador	   was	   part	   of	   the	   administration’s	   ‘encouragement	   of	  socialism’	   in	   Central	   America	   helped	   spread	  Helms’	  message	   through	   the	  wider	   conservative	  movement,	   and	   the	  periodical	   praised	   the	   senator	   for	  his	  leadership	  role	  in	  scrutinising	  White’s	  confirmation.461	  The	  comparative	  delay	   in	   its	   announcement,	   however,	   suggested	   that	   the	   senator	  was	   the	  active	  force	  in	  the	  anti-­‐White	  campaign.	  	  Conservative	  fears	  were	  duly	  realised	  when	  White	  quickly	  showed	  a	  willingness	  to	  take	  the	  initiative	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  over	  time,	  became	  the	  most	   influential	   individual	   in	   orchestrating	   U.S.	   policy.462	  Crucially,	   the	  ambassador	   saw	   the	   Salvadoran	   right	   as	   the	   primary	   threat	   facing	   the	  country.	   He	   openly	   criticised	   its	   part	   in	   the	   violence,	   such	   as	   in	   the	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aftermath	   of	   Archbishop	   Óscar	   Romero’s	   assassination	   in	   late	   March.	   As	  violent	   clashes	   erupted	   in	   the	   capital,	   White	   blamed	   the	   right	   for	  intensifying	  the	  conflict.	  He	  pointed	  to	  embassy	  reports	  linking	  anti-­‐Castro	  Cubans	  from	  the	  Omega-­‐7	  terrorist	  group,	  hired	  by	  the	  Salvadoran	  right,	  to	  a	  series	  of	  explosions	  throughout	  the	  country.	  The	  ambassador	  also	  spoke	  of	   a	   right-­‐wing	   plot	   behind	   Romero’s	   murder,	   which,	   alongside	   similar	  allegations	   from	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  U.S.	  officials,	   fuelled	  suspicion	  about	  those	   instigating	   the	   most	   extreme	   violence	   across	   the	   country.463	  White	  also	  headed	  off	  a	  right-­‐wing	  coup	  by	  threatening	  the	  military	  aid	  package	  if	  conservatives	  in	  the	  country	  went	  through	  with	  their	  plan.464	  	  Conservatives,	   Helms	   especially,	   had	   dutifully	   maintained	   that	  violence	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  across	  the	  region	  as	  a	  whole,	  was	  a	  product	  of	  external	   leftist	   provocation.	   Now,	   however,	   the	   most	   senior	   American	  official	  in	  El	  Salvador	  was	  openly	  condemning	  the	  right	  and	  taking	  a	  direct	  and	   immediate	   role	   on	   the	   ground.	   Helms	   was	   so	   concerned	   that	   he	  devoted	   a	   Senate	   speech	   on	   27	   March	   to	   “The	   Poor	   Judgment	   Of	   U.S.	  Ambassador	   Robert	   White”.	   White’s	   comments,	   said	   Helms,	   were	   ‘a	  propaganda	  bonanza	  for	  the	  Communists	  and	  other	  far-­‐left	  elements	  in	  El	  Salvador’,	   and	   a	   justification	   for	   the	   leftist	   insurgency.465 	  Unnecessary	  public	   speculation,	   ‘and	   that	   is	   all	   it	   is,	   public	   speculation,’	  did	  nothing	   to	  help	   U.S.	   policy.	   It	   merely	   added	   to	   the	   ‘explosive	   atmosphere’	   in	   the	  country.	   Recognising	   that	   White’s	   comments	   had	   gained	   widespread	  coverage	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  Helms	  described	  his	  own	  inter-­‐agency	  meetings	  in	  which	  no	  definitive	  evidence	  had	  been	  provided	  as	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  either	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  463	  “5	   killed	   in	   aftermath	   of	   archbishop’s	   slaying,”	   Chicago	   Tribune,	   26	  March,	   1980,	   2,	   “Salvador	   Is	   Rocked	   By	   30	   Bomb	   Blasts,”	   The	   New	   York	  
Times,	   26	   March,	   1980,	   A1,	   and	   Christopher	   Dickey,	   “Salvadorans	   Pay	  Tearful	  Homage	  to	  Slain	  Archbishop,”	  26	  March,	  1980,	  A21.	  
464	  Bonner,	  Weakness	  and	  Deceit,	  186-­‐187.	  
465	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “The	   Poor	   Judgment	   Of	   U.S.	   Ambassador	   Robert	  White,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  126	  (1980),	  6957.	  
	   167	  
anti-­‐Castro	  Cubans	  or	  the	  identity	  of	  Romero’s	  assassin.466	  Protestations	  of	  the	  innocence	  of	  the	  Salvadoran	  right	  were	  to	  become	  a	  familiar	  refrain	  in	  the	  years	  ahead.	  	  Nor	   did	   Helms	   mention	   that	   Omega-­‐7	   was	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	  Argentine	  counter-­‐insurgency	  programme	  that	  the	  senator	  had	  previously	  suggested	   as	   a	   viable	   mechanism	   for	   the	   ‘elimination	   of	   the	   Marxist	  insurgency’	  in	  El	  Salvador.467	  It	  had	  been	  the	  Argentine	  military,	  looking	  to	  expand	  its	  internal	  dirty	  war,	  which	  forged	  what	  Ariel	  Armony	  describes	  as	  a	   ‘formidable	  transnational	  political	  nexus’	  of	  right-­‐wing	  forces	  across	  the	  hemisphere.	   Omega-­‐7	   was	   one	   such	   group,	   incorporated	   as	   Argentina	  looked	   for	   allies	   elsewhere	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Conservative	   groups	   in	   the	  U.S.	  such	  as	   the	  Moral	  Majority,	  with	  which	  Helms	  was	  closely	  associated,	  were	  also	  part	  of	  this	  network.468	  White’s	  comments	  threatened	  to	  shine	  a	  spotlight	  on	  the	  senator’s	  anti-­‐communist	  allies.	  	   Helms’	   fears	   about	   White	   were	   fuelled	   still	   further	   by	   exaggerated	  reports	  he	  received	  from	  conservative	  Salvadoran	  allies,	  who	  told	  him	  that	  White	   was	   encouraging	   leftist	   members	   of	   the	   junta	   to	   join	   ‘other	  representatives	  of	  the	  far	  left’	  in	  mounting	  a	  coup.	  Helms	  wrote	  directly	  to	  White	  to	  request	  a	  formal	  response	  to	  the	  charges.469	  In	  effect,	  he	  accused	  the	  ambassador	  of	  plotting	  a	  coup.	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   The	   letter	   also	   contained,	   as	   the	   ambassador	   recognised,	   a	   subtler	  trap.	   In	   referring	   to	   left-­‐wing	   members	   of	   the	   junta	   and	   ‘other	  representatives	  of	  the	  far	  left’,	  Helms	  conflated	  the	  two,	  looking	  to	  press	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  go	  on	  record	  as	  accepting	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  far	   left	  on	  the	  junta.	  White	  found	  the	  suggestion	  ‘tendentious’,	  and	  the	  entire	  query	  ‘disingenuous.’	  The	  ambassador	  understood	   the	  complexity	  of	   responding	  to	   Helms,	   and	   his	   response	   indicated	   that	   the	   embassy	   was	   becoming	  accustomed	   to	   dealing	   with	   Helms.	   ‘Unless	   the	   Department	   is	   careful	   in	  drafting	  its	  reply’,	  he	  informed	  his	  superiors	  in	  Washington,	  ‘we	  could	  wind	  up	  admitting	  that	  some	  members	  of	  the	  present	  junta	  are	  adherents	  of	  the	  far	  left,	  a	  total	  falsehood.’470	  	  	   	  A	   significant	   part	   of	   Helms’	   animosity	   toward	  White,	   as	   has	   been	  noted,	  was	   the	   ambassador’s	  well-­‐known	   commitment	   to	   socio-­‐economic	  reform	   in	  El	   Salvador.	   The	   senator	   continued	   to	   lead	   those	   congressional	  forces	   seeking	   the	   termination	   of	   such	   initiatives	  when,	   in	   June	   1980,	   he	  tried	   to	   amend	   the	   year’s	   International	   Security	   and	   Development	  Cooperation	  Act	  to	  prohibit	  U.S.	  funds	  being	  used	  for	  the	  nationalisation	  of	  farms	  and	  banks	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  There	  was	  no	  problem	  with	  land	  reform	  if	  it	  was	   achieved	   through	   democratic	   processes,	   Helms	   announced	   (rather	  disingenuously),	   but	   he	   would	   not	   countenance	   the	   American	   taxpayer	  contributing	   to	   what	   he	   dismissed	   as	   ‘not	   land	   reform,	   but	   people	  reform.’471	  	  The	  amendment	  was	  accepted,	  though	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  Helms	  was	  attempting	  to	  construct	  a	  permanent	  record	  of	  colleagues’	  votes	  in	  this	  case,	  despite	  his	  claims	  that	  the	  amendment	  was:	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intended	  to	  put	   the	  Senate	  on	  record	  as	   to	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  believe	   in	   the	   American	   economic	   system…	   or	   whether	   we	  believe	   that	   the	   less	   developed	   countries	   of	   the	  world	  will	   be	  better	   off	   if	   they	   adopt	   Marxist	   or	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   economic	  and	  political	  systems.472	  	  	  He	  asked	  to	  vitiate	  the	  yeas	  and	  nays,	  thus	  bypassing	  a	  recorded	  vote.	  Nor	   was	   his	   amendment	   likely	   to	   influence	   policy.	   The	   Carter	  administration	  placed	  little	  emphasis	  on	  the	  nationalisation	  component	  of	  reform	  in	  El	  Salvador.473	  Helms’	  tactics	  in	  this	  case,	  therefore,	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  effort	  to	  clarify	  and	  promote	  his	  conservative	  vision	  for	  the	  country,	  and	  to	  frame	  the	  policy	  debate	  on	  his	  terms.	  	  As	   has	   been	   the	   case	   in	   Panama	   and	   Nicaragua,	   Helms	   found	  constructing	  a	  foreign	  policy	  vision	  for	  El	  Salvador	  relatively	  simple	  during	  the	   Carter	   administration.	   	   Unconstrained	   by	   the	   necessity	   to	   suggest	  practical	   solutions	   for	   the	  country’s	  mounting	   instability,	   the	   senator	  was	  able	   to	   articulate	   an	   aggressive	   anti-­‐communist	   and	   fiercely	   pro-­‐free-­‐market	  framework.	  This	  appealed	  to	  conservatives	  who	  had	  yet	  to	  face	  the	  challenges	   of	   reconciling	   a	   country	   divided	   by	   precisely	   this	   kind	   of	  Manichean	   Cold	   War	   ideology.	   Over	   the	   next	   eight	   years,	   Helms	   and	  movement	  conservatives	  would	  continue	  to	  insist	  on	  this	  approach,	  even	  as	  Ronald	   Reagan	   found,	   like	   Carter	   before	   him,	   that	   principle	   was	   hard	   to	  maintain	  on	  the	  battlefields	  of	  El	  Salvador’s	  civil	  war.	  	   Helms	  and	  Reagan	  the	  Pragmatist,	  1981-­‐1988	  	  Signals	   in	   the	   transition	  period,	  and	   the	  opening	  days	  of	   the	  Reagan	  administration,	   offered	   movement	   conservatives	   hope	   for	   a	   shift	   in	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priorities	   in	   El	   Salvador.	   Suspect	   State	   Department	   officials	  were	   quickly	  removed	   and	   the	   new	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   Alexander	   Haig,	   outlined	   an	  aggressive	   strategy	   to	   defeat	   the	   FMLN	   swiftly	   and	   decisively.	   This	   was	  formalised	   on	   23	   January,	   1981,	   when	   the	   National	   Security	   Council	  unanimously	   agreed	   to	   increase	  military	   and	   economic	   aid	   and	   prioritise	  the	  defeat	   of	   the	   FMLN.474	  It	  was	   a	   duplication,	   in	   official	   form,	   of	  Helms’	  policy	  statement	  for	  El	  Salvador	  almost	  one	  year	  before.	  	  By	   mid-­‐1981,	   however,	   the	   administration	   was	   moderating	   its	  bellicose	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  face	  of	  congressional	  and	  public	  concern.	  A	  critical	  turning	   point	   was	   a	   16	   July	   speech	   by	   the	   assistant	   secretary	   for	   Latin	  American	   affairs,	   Tom	   Enders,	   in	   which	   he	   emphasised	   the	   need	   for	   a	  political	   solution	   to	   the	   Salvadoran	   crisis.	   Flatly	   contradicting	   the	  movement	   conservative	   theory	   on	   the	   background	   of	   the	   war,	   Enders	  announced,	   ‘“just	   as	   the	   conflict	   was	   Salvadoran	   in	   its	   origins,	   so	   its	  ultimate	   resolution	  must	  be	   Salvadoran.”’	   Elections,	   not	  military	   force,	   he	  said,	  would	  save	  El	  Salvador.475	  The	  plan	  had	   the	  support	  of	  White	  House	  moderates	   like	  Chief	   of	   Staff	   James	  Baker,	  who	   regarded	  Central	  America	  policy	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  the	  president’s	  domestic	  agenda.476	  Crucially,	  however,	   there	  was	   also	   support	   from	   some	  hard-­‐liners,	   notably	  Al	  Haig.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  who	  asked	  Enders	  to	  make	  the	  speech,	  told	  Reagan	  that	  a	  political	  initiative	  would	  shore	  up	  congressional	  support	  for	  aid	  to	  El	  Salvador	  and	  educate	  the	  public	  over	  administration	  policy.477	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   Alexander	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   President	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Enders’	  speech	  received	  substantial	  attention,	  making	  the	  front	  pages	  of	   several	   national	   newspapers	   that	   were	   highly	   critical	   of	   Reagan’s	   El	  Salvador	  policy.	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  dubbed	  the	  administration’s	  apparent	  new	   strategy	   ‘A	   Forward	  Retreat’.478	  Congress	  was	   reassured	  by	  both	   the	  tone	   and	   substance	   of	   the	   remarks,	   though	   it	   did	   not	   entirely	   dispel	   the	  concern	  generated	  by	  months	  of	  aggressive	   rhetoric	   from	  Reagan	  and	  his	  aides.479	  As	  such,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  Congress	  introduced	  a	  certification	  clause	  into	  the	  annual	  foreign	  aid	  bill,	  which	  required	  the	  president	  to	  sign	  off	  on	  progress	  made	  by	  El	  Salvador’s	  government	  on	  human	  rights	  issues,	  free	   elections,	   and	   negotiations	   to	   end	   the	  war,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   continued	  implementation	   of	   economic	   reforms.	   Democrats	   and	   Republicans	   alike	  supported	  the	  measure,	  while	  the	  administration	  believed	  it	  could	  live	  with	  the	   legislation	   as	   an	   easy-­‐to-­‐pay	   price	   for	   continued	   military	   assistance.	  After	  all,	  certification	  only	  required	  periodic	  avowals	  of	  progress,	  and	  such	  progress	  was	  entirely	  at	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  administration.	  	  To	  Helms,	   the	  new	  strategy	  was	  disastrous.	  The	   senator	   singled	  out	  Enders	   as	   the	   responsible	   party,	   and	   declared	   that	   the	   administration’s	  land	  reform	  provisions	  served	  ‘only	  one	  goal:	  pragmatism.’480	  It	  was	  a	  bold	  and	   unvarnished	   repudiation	   of	   the	   administration’s	   policies,	   and	   a	  warning	   sign	   to	   the	  White	  House	   that	   the	   senator	  would	   not	   be	   satisfied	  simply	  by	   increased	  military	   assistance	   for	  El	   Salvador.	   Just	   as	   important	  was	   a	   Salvadoran	   society	   predicated	   around	   the	   core	   principles	   of	  conservatism,	  which	  meant	   rejecting	   economic	   reforms	   that	   struck	   at	   the	  existing	  distribution	  of	  private	  property.	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  Times,	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  LeoGrande,	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  130,	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  73.	  
480	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	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In	  such	  a	  way,	  Helms	  emerged	  as	  one	   the	   foremost	  opponents	  of	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  El	  Salvador	  strategy.	  Helms	  sought	  to	  prohibit	  U.S.	  funding	  for	  land	  reform	  ‘in	  any	  way,	  shape,	  or	  form’	  on	   the	   basis	   that	   intervention	   in	   the	   economic	   sphere	   was	   contrary	   to	  Reagan’s	  own	  political	  ideals.	  Unwilling	  to	  accept	  the	  pragmatic	  reasoning	  that	  lay	  behind	  the	  administration’s	  reluctant	  commitment	  to	  land	  reform,	  and	  disregarding	  Reagan’s	  public	  support	   for	   the	  programme,	   the	  senator	  depicted	  himself	   acting	  as	  a	   shield	   for	   the	  president.	   ‘My	  amendment’,	   he	  told	  colleagues,	  ‘is	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  principles	  enunciated	  by	  President	  Reagan	   and	   responsible	   economists	   worldwide	   and	   in	   the	   major	   policy	  speeches	  of	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State.’481	  He	  could	  not	  claim	  that	   he	   had	   the	   support	   of	   Ronald	   Reagan,	   but	   he	   could	   portray	   his	  entrepreneurship	  as	  an	  act	  of	  loyal	  protection.	  	  Otto	  Reich,	  who	  served	  as	  assistant	  administrator	  for	  the	  Agency	  for	  International	   Development	   between	   1981	   and	   1983,	   recalled	   that	   the	  division	  between	  Helms	  and	  the	  administration	  over	  land	  reform	  infuriated	  the	   senator’s	   camp.	   ‘We	   used	   to	   drive	   them	   crazy’,	   Reich	   remembered,	  because	  Helms’	  office	  was	   ‘philosophically	   totally	  opposed	   to	   some	  of	   the	  things	   that	   the	   Reagan	   Administration	   was	   doing.’	   Reich	   concluded,	   in	  hindsight,	   that	   the	   administration	   failed	   adequately	   to	   respond	   to	  Helms’	  concerns.	  482	  This	   administration	   inability	   to	   sell	   policy	   not	   only	   to	   the	  American	   public	   but	   to	   conservatives	   –	   their	   supposedly	   strongest	  supporters	  –	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  Helms’	  calls	  for	  clarity	  in	  the	  United	  States’	  approach	  to	  El	  Salvador.	  Support	  for	  land	  reform	  not	  only	  tempered	  conservatism,	  in	  the	  senator’s	  eyes,	  but	  it	  confused	  allies	  and	  demonstrated	  a	   lack	   of	   resolve.	   ‘It	   is	   time	   that	   we	   stopped	   sending	   ambiguous	   and	  confusing	  signals	  to	  the	  international	  community’,	  Helms	  told	  the	  Senate:	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  (1981),	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  Throughout	   Latin	   America,	   throughout	   the	   world,	   the	   world	  should	   know	  where	  we	   stand,	  Mr.	   President.	  Do	  we	   stand	   for	  growth	   or	   stagnation?	   State	   control	   or	   individual	   initiative?	  Freedom	  or	  socialism?	  A	  strong,	  vibrant	  economy	  or	  a	  collapse	  which	   can	  only	   aid	   the	   guerrillas?	  Mr.	   President,	   I	   believe	   the	  choice	  is	  clear.’483	  	   Helms	  always	  maintained	  that	  the	  foundation	  of	  democracy	  lay	  in	  the	  free	   market.	   The	   ability	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   democratic	   process	   was	   a	  secondary	   right,	   inferior	   to	   that	   of	   owning	  private	  property.484	  As	  he	   told	  colleagues	  in	  March	  1981,	  reading	  from	  a	  letter	  sent	  to	  him	  by	  a	  Salvadoran	  businessman	  with	  whom	  he	  was	  acquainted:	  	  The	   real	   help	   that	   we	   need	   from	   our	   foreign	   friends	   is	   in	  restoring	  in	  this	  country	  [El	  Salvador]	  the	  laws	  that	  protect	  the	  free	  enterprise	  system.	  That	  will	  be	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  future	  of	  democracy,	  progress,	  and	  justice	  for	  all	  our	  people,	  and	  a	  stable,	  friendly	  country	  to	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.485	  	  Only	   by	   ceasing	   the	   restrictive	   and	   destructive	   economic	   reforms	   being	  imposed	   on	   El	   Salvador	   by	   his	   government	   could	   the	   transition	   toward	  democracy	   begin.	   Yet	   the	   senator’s	   efforts	   to	   restrict	   the	   progress	   of	  economic	   reforms	   in	   El	   Salvador	   were	   considered	   by	   the	   embassy	   in	   El	  Salvador	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  this	  change,	  and	  officials	  warned	  Washington	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   (NC),	   “U.S.	   Policy	  Regarding	  El	   Salvador	   –	  What	   Should	   It	  Be?	  How	  Should	  We	  Approach	  It?”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  127	  (1981),	  3900.	  
	   174	  
that	   Helms	   strategy	   for	   restricting	   spending	   on	   compensation	   for	  expropriated	  lands	  could	  undermine	  the	  whole	  programme	  of	  reform.486	  	  By	  1982,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  had	  committed	  itself	  to	  a	  political	  solution	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  Officials	  in	  Washington	  joined	  with	  their	  Salvadoran	  colleagues	   in	   promoting	   elections	   for	   a	   new	   legislative	   assembly	   in	   1982	  and	   a	   civilian	   president	   in	   1984.	   The	  White	  House	   hoped	   these	   elections	  would	   foster	   a	   working	   democracy	   and	   maintain	   moderate	   economic	  reform.	  This	  would	  in	  turn	  mollify	  congressional	  critics	  who	  held	  the	  key	  to	  funding	   the	   administration’s	   top	   priority:	   military	   assistance	   to	   El	  Salvador’s	  beleaguered	  armed	  forces.487	  	  The	   Reagan	   administration	   saw	   José	   Napoleón	   Duarte	   and	   his	  Christian	   Democrat	   Party	   (PDC)	   as	   the	   most	   promising	   allies	   for	   this	  strategy.	   Duarte	   was	   a	   long-­‐standing	  member	   of	   the	   Salvadoran	   political	  elite,	  having	  helped	  found	  the	  PDC	  in	  1960	  before	  serving	  as	  mayor	  of	  San	  Salvador	   between	   1964	   and	   1970.	   Though	   he	   had	   been	   somewhat	  tarnished	  by	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  juntas	  of	  the	  early	  1980s,	  during	  which	  time	  human	  rights	  abuses	  intensified	  dramatically,	  he	  nevertheless	  enjoyed	  a	  reputation	  as	  a	  pragmatic,	  conscientious	  moderate.	  He	  had	  good	  relations	  with	  Congress	  and	   the	  White	  House,	  and	   the	  support	  of	   the	  United	  States	  embassy	   in	   San	   Salvador.	   Even	   Helms	   called	   him	   ‘an	   exceedingly	  impressive	  man’,	  and	  argued	  he	  ought	  to	  be	  given	  ‘a	  fair	  shot	  at	  getting	  his	  country	  straightened	  out.’488	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While	  it	  remained	  supportive	  of	  Duarte	  and	  the	  Christian	  Democrats,	  the	   White	   House	   was	   not	   averse	   to	   organised	   political	   involvement	   by	  Salvadoran	  conservatives.	  Officials	  in	  Washington	  believed	  that	  democratic	  reform	  could	  modernise	  El	  Salvador’s	  oligarchy	  by	  introducing	  its	  members	  to	   openly	   contested	   politics.	   An	   effective,	   even	   pragmatic,	   Salvadoran	  political	   right	  might	  gain	  some	  measure	  of	  power	  –	   thus	  possibly	   limiting	  the	   pace	   of	   reform	   –	   but	   it	   would	   be	   incontrovertible	   evidence	   of	  democracy	   at	  work.	  This	  multi-­‐ideological	   Salvadoran	  democracy,	   backed	  by	  moderate	   reforms	   and	   a	   supportive	  military,	  would	   then	   help	   sustain	  congressional	  support	  as	  the	  administration	  worked	  on	  defeating	  the	  FMLN	  on	  the	  battlefield.489	  	  To	   the	   Reagan	   administration’s	   consternation,	   however,	   Robert	  D’Aubuisson	  and	  his	  National	  Republican	  Alliance	  (ARENA)	  party	  emerged	  as	  the	  Salvadoran	  right’s	  political	  front.	  The	  former	  army	  major	  was	  a	  near	  legendary	   figure	   on	   the	   extreme	   right.	   A	   protégé	   of	   General	   José	   Alberto	  Medrano,	   whose	   intelligence	   and	   paramilitary	   organisations	   had	   formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  brutal	  Salvadoran	  security	  state,	  D’Aubuisson	  rose	  through	  the	  military	  ranks	  as	  a	  counterrevolutionary	  intelligence	  operative.	  He	  was	  highly	   influential	   in	   the	   organisation	   of	   right-­‐wing	   death	   squads	   and	  paramilitary	   co-­‐ordinating	  organisations,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  his	   forced	  retirement	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  October	  1979	  coup.	  His	   involvement	   in	   the	  assassination	  of	  Archbishop	  Romero,	  among	  his	  other	  activities,	  led	  Robert	  White	  to	  label	  the	  major	  ‘“a	  pathological	  killer.”’490	  	  The	   Reagan	   administration	   reacted	   to	   D’Aubuisson’s	   newfound	  political	   career	   by	   denying	   him	  permission	   to	   visit	   the	  United	   States	   and	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  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	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  Overviews	  of	  D’Aubuisson’s	  career	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  be	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  Protection	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  Bonner’s	  Weakness	  and	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declaring	   him	   ‘“undesirable”’.491	  Yet	   neither	  D’Aubuisson’s	   reputation	   nor	  inflammatory	   rhetoric	   worried	   Helms.	   The	   senator	   and	   his	   staff	   saw	   a	  kindred	   conservative	   spirit	   in	   D’Aubuisson,	   someone	   Helms	   believed	  ‘openly	   espoused	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   Republican	   Party	   in	   the	   United	  States’	   and	   promoted	   ‘the	   same	   values	   and	   principles	   as	   held	   by	  mainstream	   Americans’. 492 	  Helms	   became	   D’Aubuisson’s	   patron	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   For	   more	   than	   a	   decade,	   no	   American	   was	   a	   more	   open	  advocate	  for	  the	  major.	  Despite	  his	  spurious	  claim	  that	  ‘I	  hold	  no	  particular	  brief	   for	   any	   politicians	   in	   El	   Salvador’,	   the	   senator	   worked	   tirelessly	   to	  legitimise	  D’Aubuisson	  and	  his	  party	  as	  a	  serious	  and	  supportable	  electoral	  force.493	  	  	  Even	  before	  D’Aubuisson’s	  emergence	  as	  a	  political	  contender,	  Helms	  and	  his	  staff	  moved	  within	  the	  same	  transnational	  anti-­‐communist	  network	  as	  the	  major.	  The	  Confederación	  Anticomunista	  Latinoamerican	  (CAL),	   for	  example,	  whose	  meetings	   both	  Helms’	   staff	   and	  D’Aubuisson	   attended	   in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  facilitated	  their	  association	  and	  the	  sharing	  of	  information	  and	  ideas.494	  Both	  possessed	  an	  intense	  anti-­‐communism	  that	  shaped	  their	  understanding	  of	   the	  western	  hemisphere’s	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  turmoil,	   and	   CAL	   provided	   a	   natural	   forum	   in	   which	   to	   cement	   their	  connection.	   D’Aubuisson’s	   objective	   was	   to	   oust	   the	   Sandinistas	   and	  remove	   Castro	   from	   power.	   Both	   fitted	   neatly	   with	   Helms’	   goals	   for	   the	  region.495	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   Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	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Cong.	  Rec.	  135	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  10510.	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  In	   this	   period,	   according	   to	   an	  Albuquerque	   Journal	   article	   by	   Craig	  Pyes,	   two	   of	   Helms’	   principal	   assistants	   –	   Chris	   Manion	   and	   Deborah	  DeMoss	  –	  forged	  close	  contacts	  with	  the	  major	  and	  his	  wealthy	  Salvadoran	  backers	  exiled	  in	  Miami.496	  The	  importance	  of	  such	  connections	  for	  Helms’	  independent	  information	  entrepreneurship	  quickly	  became	  clear,	  as	  it	  was	  information	   supplied	   by	   D’Aubuisson	   and	   his	   supporters,	   visiting	  Washington	   in	   July	  1980,	   that	   led	  Helms	   to	  accuse	  Robert	  White	  over	   the	  alleged	   leftist	   coup	   plot	   at	   that	   time.497	  The	   reciprocal	   benefit	   of	   this	  transnational	   anti-­‐communist	   network	   for	   D’Aubuisson	   and	   ARENA	   was	  manifested	  in	  the	  origins	  of	  his	  party.	  Mario	  Sandoval	  Alarcón,	  a	  prominent	  Guatemalan	   politician,	   death	   squad	   leader,	   and	   member	   of	   CAL,	   advised	  D’Aubuisson	  to	  form	  a	  political	  party	  to	  legitimise	  the	  far	  right’s	  goals	  in	  El	  Salvador.498	  Helms’	   office,	   Pyes	   alleged,	   was	   also	   involved.	   Chris	   Manion	  urged	  D’Aubuisson	  to	  create	  a	  political	  front,	  and,	  using	  material	  from	  the	  1980	  Republican	  Party	  platform	  (which,	  as	  previously	  discussed,	  had	  been	  partly	  crafted	  by	  Helms	  and	  his	  staff),	  Manion	  helped	  ARENA	  draft	  its	  own	  guiding	  principles	  and	  policy	  proposals.	  Though	  Helms	  and	  his	  staff	  denied	  Pyes’	  claims,	  DeMoss	  conceded,	  ‘“we	  do	  know	  these	  people.”’	  As	  Link	  points	  out,	  there	  is	  strong	  circumstantial	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Helms’	  office	  was	  closely	  connected	  with	  the	  origins	  of	  ARENA.499	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   further	   discussion	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   the	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   of	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  U.S.	  conservatives,	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  ARENA,	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  Montgomery,	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  Westview	  Press,	  1995),	  157.	  
	   178	  
D’Aubuisson’s	  entrance	  into	  the	  legitimate	  political	  sphere	  prompted	  fears	   about	   renewed	   political	   instability	   and	   violence	   in	   El	   Salvador.	   The	  major’s	   rhetoric	   was	   so	   inflammatory	   –	   at	   one	   point	   he	   suggested	   an	  ARENA	  government	  would	  place	  Christian	  Democrats	  on	  trial	  for	  treason	  –	  that	   the	   head	   of	   the	   country’s	   election	   committee	   suggested	   that	   rebel	  sympathisers	  might	   actually	  want	  a	  D’Aubuisson	  victory.500	  D’Aubuisson’s	  backlash	   politics,	   Dr.	   Jorge	   Bustamante	   argued,	  would	   swell	   the	   ranks	   of	  the	   insurgency	  and	   increase	   its	   strength.501	  Such	   fears	  not	  only	  prompted	  the	   Reagan	   administration	   to	   distance	   itself	   from	   D’Aubuisson	   and	   his	  party,	  but	  to	  actively	  support	  the	  PDC	  in	  the	  upcoming	  legislative	  assembly	  elections.	  	  	   ARENA’s	   rapid	   growth	   in	   popularity,	   partly	   a	   consequence	   of	  D’Aubuisson’s	   considerable	   charm	   and	   campaign	   energy,	   surprised	  American	   officials.	   The	   administration	   feared	   their	   reform	   programme	  would	   be	   gutted	   by	   a	   far-­‐right	   government	   brought	   into	   power	   by	   the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  own	  commitment	   to	  democracy.502	  When	  ARENA	  joined	   several	   other	   conservative	   political	   allies	   to	   create	   a	   majority	  capable	   of	   placing	   D’Aubuisson	   in	   the	   presidency,	   the	   United	   States	  intervened.	   It	   told	   the	   armed	   forces	   that	   military	   aid	   would	   be	   cut	   off	  should	  D’Aubuisson	  be	  chosen,	  and	  provided	  nine	  alternative	  candidates	  to	  choose	   from.	   Sufficiently	   worried	   by	   the	   danger	   to	   their	   war	   effort,	   the	  officer	  corps	  forced	  the	  country’s	  political	  class	  to	  choose	  from	  those	  on	  the	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list.	   Alvaro	   Magaña,	   a	   political	   neutral	   with	   close	   connections	   to	   the	  military,	  was	  duly	  appointed	  president.503	  	  	   On	   22	   April,	   just	   two	   days	   after	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   had	  dispatched	   General	   Vernon	  Walters	   to	   deliver	   the	   president’s	   ultimatum,	  Helms	  told	  the	  Senate	  he	  had	  received	  reports	  that	  the	  Salvadoran	  military	  was	   exercising	   undue	   influence	   on	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   election.	   Like	   in	  Nicaragua,	  where	  Helms	  embraced	  democracy	  as	  a	  means	  of	  pressuring	  the	  Sandinistas	   and	   furthering	   anti-­‐communist	   goals,	   the	   senator	   trumpeted	  the	   nascent	   Salvadoran	   democracy	   so	   that	   he	   might	   protect	   early	  indications	  of	  conservative	  electoral	  gains.	  Helms	  therefore	  asked	  if	  events	  did	   not	   show	   a	   ‘breach	   of	   the	   neutrality	   of	   the	   Salvadoran	  military	   with	  regard	   to	   politics,	   a	   neutrality	   which	   many	   in	   this	   Chamber	   have	  encouraging	  during	  the	  past	  months.’	  His	  reproach	  to	  the	  army,	  a	  bastion	  of	  the	  established	  order	  that	  he	  had	  previously	  defended,	  was	  sharp:	  	  I	   think	   the	   Salvadoran	   army	   should	   understand	   that	  many	   in	  this	  country	  would	  consider	  such	  a	  blatant	  manipulation	  to	  be	  tantamount	   to	   a	  military	   coup,	   and	   a	   tragic	   breakdown	  of	   the	  fragile	  democratic	  process	  which	  so	  many	  here	  have	  supported	  during	  the	  past	  few	  months.	  Let	  the	  word	  go	  out	  to	  El	  Salvador	  that	   we	   encourage	   the	   democratic	   assembly	   and	   the	  development	  of	  truly	  representative	  government,	  and	  that	  this	  Senator	  would	  deplore	   the	   intimidation	  of	   that	  process,	  either	  from	  this	  country	  or	  from	  the	  Salvadoran	  armed	  forces.504	  	  Despite	  the	  senator’s	  public	  unease,	  and	  although	  the	  administration	  was	  distancing	  itself	  from	  D’Aubuisson	  and	  his	  allies,	  the	  close	  cooperation	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between	   Helms	   and	   the	   far	   right	   in	   El	   Salvador	   necessitated	   an	   uneasy	  truce	   between	   the	   White	   House	   and	   his	   office.	   Helms	   was	   disingenuous	  about	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   he	   had	   received	   reports	   of	   the	   military’s	  influence	  on	  the	  elections.	  His	  aide	  John	  Carbaugh	  had	  been	  part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  delegation	  to	  El	  Salvador	  during	  the	  crisis,	  and	  was	  specifically	  tasked	  with	  making	   clear	   to	   the	   military	   that	   the	   cut-­‐off	   in	   assistance	   was	   a	   real	  possibility	   and	   not	   a	   ruse	   by	   the	   State	   Department. 505 	  Carbaugh’s	  involvement	   followed	   Ambassador	   Hinton’s	   suggestion	   that	   ‘perhaps	   the	  best	   way	   to	   have	   some	   impact	   on	   the	   economic	   powers	   who	   have	  supported	  ARENA	   [sic]…	  during	   the	  election	  campaign	  and	  who	  probably	  are	  still	  manoeuvring,	  is	  through	  Senator	  Helms.’	  In	  an	  indication	  of	  Helms’	  political	   allies	  within	   the	  administration,	  Hinton	  argued	  National	   Security	  Advisor	  William	  Clark	  would	   be	   the	   best	   person	   to	   approach	   the	   senator	  about	  the	  matter.506	  This	  was	  to	  be	  a	  recurring	  aspect	  of	  El	  Salvador	  policy.	  At	   a	   handful	   of	   critical	   moments	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   turned	   to	  Helms	  and	  his	  staff	  to	  exert	  meaningful	  leverage	  on	  the	  Salvadoran	  right.	  	  The	   Reagan	   administration’s	   manipulation	   of	   the	   electoral	   process	  angered	  Helms’	  allies	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  Just	  as	  the	  senator	  had	  condemned	  the	  United	   States,	   and	   especially	   the	   State	  Department,	   for	   its	   interference	   in	  the	   country,	   so	   too	   did	   D’Aubuisson	   tap	   into	   this	   narrative	   as	   the	   1984	  presidential	   elections	   neared.	   A	   fervent	   nationalist,	   D’Aubuisson	  consistently	   criticised	   the	   embassy	   as	   a	   manipulative	   influence.507 	  The	  State	  Department	  wanted	   ‘“a	   government	   of	   puppets	   operated	  by	  Carter-­‐like	  manipulators”’,	  he	  told	  campaign	  audiences,	  and	  blamed	  diplomats	  for	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placing	   the	   families	   of	   military	   officers	   at	   risk	   through	   their	   constant	  human	  rights	  talk.508	  	  Unlike	  Helms,	  however,	  D’Aubuisson	  was	  able	  to	  stomach	  displays	  of	  pragmatism	   –	   at	   least	   in	   private	   –	   so	   as	   to	   keep	   himself	   in	   the	   game.	  Understanding	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   reform	   programme	   to	   the	   White	  House,	   D’Aubuisson	   tempered	   his	   rhetoric	   when	   confronted	   by	   U.S.	  officials.	   Land	   reform,	   he	   promised	   cautious	   embassy	   personel,	  would	   be	  adapted	   rather	   than	   jettisoned. 509 	  It	   was	   a	   surprising	   sentiment,	   and	  undoubtedly	   can	   be	   treated	   with	   a	   great	   degree	   of	   scepticism,	   but	  D’Aubuisson	  was	  at	  the	  very	  least	  able	  to	  appear	  tolerant	  of	  political	  reality.	  	  The	  presidential	  election	  itself	  was	  the	  next	  milestone	  for	  the	  Reagan	  administration.	   Officials	   hoped	   a	   peaceful	   election	   of	   a	   congressionally	  acceptable	   candidate	   with	   a	   clear	   popular	   mandate	   would	   placate	   any	  remaining	  critics	  by	  demonstrating	  even	  more	  substantial	  progress	  toward	  civilian	   government.	   Such	   a	   result,	  White	   House	   officials	   believed,	   would	  persuade	  those	  legislators	  still	  reticent	  about	  military	  assistance	  to	  support	  Reagan’s	  attempts	  to	  bolster	  El	  Salvador’s	  armed	  forces.510	  Although	  the	  26	  March	   round	  of	   voting	   failed	   to	   produce	   a	   decisive	   victory	   for	   any	   of	   the	  candidates,	   the	   administration’s	   strategy	   appeared	   to	   be	   validated	   when	  the	  U.S.	  observer	  team	  publicly	  praised	  participation	  levels	  and	  Democrats	  who	   had	   witnessed	   the	   election	   spoke	   openly	   of	   reconsidering	   their	  previous	  opposition	  to	  Reagan’s	  military	  aid	  programme.511	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  The	   lack	   of	   a	   clear	   result	   in	   the	   March	   vote	   necessitated	   a	   run-­‐off	  between	  Duarte	  and	  D’Aubuisson,	   scheduled	   for	  6	  May.	  The	  White	  House	  and	  State	  Department	  continued	  to	  oppose	  D’Aubuisson,	  fearing	  a	  massive	  surge	   in	   violence	   should	   he	   win	   the	   presidency.	   The	   administration’s	  decision	   to	   deny	  D’Aubuisson	   a	   visa	   for	   a	   pre-­‐election	   visit	   to	   the	  United	  States	   was	   a	   clear	   indication	   of	   its	   distaste	   for	   his	   candidacy. 512	  Administration	  figures	  also	  encouraged	  speculation	  that	  military	  assistance	  packages	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  pass	  should	  D’Aubuisson	  win.	  According	  to	   one	   official,	   this	   was	   the	   ‘“nightmare”’	   scenario,	   though	   such	   talk	  infuriated	   conservatives	   outside	   of	   the	   White	   House	   who	   continued	   to	  believe	  D’Aubuisson	  was	  the	  man	  to	  successfully	  prosecute	  the	  war	  against	  the	  FMLN.513	  	  Duarte	   did	   not	   enjoy	   the	   administration’s	   complete	   confidence.	  Officials	   had	   identified	   more	   appealing	   candidates	   during	   the	   general	  election,	  including	  Fidel	  Chávez	  Mena	  of	  the	  PDC	  and	  Francisco	  Guerrero	  of	  the	   PCN,	   because	   of	   Duarte’s	   propensity	   to	   anger	   both	   the	   Salvadoran	  military	   and	   the	   country’s	   private	   sector.	   Yet	   with	   D’Aubuisson	   evoking	  such	  strong	  resistance,	  the	  administration	  was	  willing	  to	  overlook	  Duarte’s	  perceived	  political	  and	   ideological	   flaws.	   ‘“Everyone	   in	   the	   [U.S.]	  Embassy	  knew	   that	   if	   Duarte	   didn’t	  win,	   that	  was	   the	   end	   of	   Reagan’s	   policy	   in	   El	  Salvador”’,	   one	   State	   Department	   official	   noted. 514 	  As	   such,	   and	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accordance	  with	  a	  March	  1982	  presidential	  finding,	  the	  CIA	  implemented	  a	  programme	  of	  covert	  aid	   for	  Duarte	  and	   the	  PDC,	  aimed	  at	   securing	   their	  victory.515	  	  The	   administration	   claimed	   that	   it	   was	   following	   a	   policy	   of	  scrupulous	  neutrality.516	  This	  façade,	  however,	  was	  challenged	  when	  Helms	  wrote	   to	   the	   president	   on	   1	   May	   to	   accuse	   Ambassador	   Pickering	   of	  overseeing	   a	   campaign	   of	   indirect	   support	   for	   Duarte.	   It	   was	   an	   ‘open	  secret’,	  Helms	  said,	   that	   the	  ambassador	  had	  met	  with	  various	  candidates	  in	   order	   to	   influence	   the	   election.	   Furthermore,	   according	   to	   the	   senator,	  Pickering	  had	  forced	  President	  Magaña	  to	  veto	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly’s	  effort	   to	   jettison	   an	   AID-­‐backed	   computerised	   voting	   system	   designed	   to	  prevent	  ballot	  fraud.	  Pickering’s	  actions	  made	  him	  ‘the	  leader	  of	  the	  death	  squad	   against	   democracy’,	   Helms	   said,	   and	   the	   senator	   demanded	   he	   be	  recalled.517	  	  Helms’	  accusations,	  which	  he	  repeated	  publicly	  the	  following	  day	  in	  a	  more	   sweeping	   critique	  of	  U.S.	   policy	   in	  El	   Salvador,	  were	   an	  unwelcome	  distraction	   for	  an	  administration	   in	  need	  of	  a	   trouble-­‐free	  election.518	  The	  Republican	   leadership	   was	   exasperated	   by	   Helms’	   decision	   to	   raise	   his	  concerns	   in	   such	   a	   public	   manner.	   Howard	   Baker	   told	   journalists	   ‘“Jesse	  does	   what	   Jesse	   feels	   he	   must	   do”’,	   while	   Charles	   Percy	   (R-­‐IL),	   a	   party	  colleague	  and	  chair	  of	   the	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee,	  declared,	   ‘“That’s	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not	  my	  style,	  that’s	  not	  the	  way	  I	  would	  do	  it.”’519	  In	  the	  White	  House	  too,	  there	  was	  dismay.	  Aides	  circulated	  a	  draft	  reply	  to	  the	  senator’s	  letter	  that	  criticised	  him	  for	  his	  unwillingness	  to	  toe	  the	  administration	  line,	  saying,	  ‘It	  is	   important	   to	   U.S.	   national	   interests	   that	   we	   pull	   together	   on	   this	  important	  issue.’520	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  if	  the	  letter	  was	  ever	  sent,	  however,	  and	  a	  revised	  draft	  no	  longer	  contained	  this	  language	  –	  nor	  even	  an	  affirmation	  of	  the	  administration’s	  impartiality	  in	  the	  election.	  	  As	   with	   his	   legislative	   forays,	   Helms’	   accusations	   forced	   his	   targets	  into	  placing	  their	  position	  on	  record.	  In	  this	  case,	  however,	  the	  senator	  had	  set	  a	   trap	  for	  Reagan,	  not	   the	   liberals	  and	  moderates	  he	  normally	  battled.	  The	   charges	  were	   too	   provocative	   to	   ignore,	   and	   the	   administration	  was	  forced	  into	  a	  misleading	  confirmation	  that	   it	  was	   ‘“taking	  no	  sides”’	   in	  the	  election.521	  To	  do	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  to	  acknowledge	  openly	  that	  it	  had	  been	  tainting	  the	  very	  democracy	  it	  sought	  to	  construct.	  This	  may	  well	  explain	   why	   a	   second	   draft	   of	   the	   president’s	   reply	   to	   Helms	   made	   no	  mention	   of	   neutrality,	   but	   simply	   declared	   Reagan	   had	   ‘the	   utmost	  confidence’	   in	  Pickering	  and	  said	  he	  had	  done	   ‘a	   superb	   job	   in	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  safeguarding	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  El	  Salvador.’522	  	  	  Helms	   thus	   placed	   the	   administration	   in	   a	   catch-­‐22	   situation,	   and	  succeeded	   in	   drawing	   out	   a	   clear	   falsehood	   from	   the	  White	   House.	   That	  Helms	   chose	   to	  write	   to	   Reagan	  while	   the	   president	  was	   returning	   from	  China	  also	  created	  some	  confusion	  within	  the	  administration	  over	  whether	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  New	  York	  Times,	  4	  May,	  1984,	  A1.	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   [05/09/1984	   –	   05/18/1984]	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   Box	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the	  president	  had	   even	   seen	   the	   letter,	   and	  delayed	   a	  definitive	   response	  from	   the	   White	   House	   that	   only	   served	   to	   prolong	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  senator’s	  initial	  claims.523	  	  Helms	  substantially	  transformed	  the	  lens	  through	  which	  the	  election	  was	   viewed,	   both	   in	   the	   United	   States	   and	   El	   Salvador.	   In	   place	   of	   the	  administration’s	   positive	   framework	   of	   democracy	   in	   action,	   the	   debate	  shifted	   toward	   one	   over	   American	   interventionism	   and	   duplicity.	   The	  national	  press	  in	  the	  U.S.	  seized	  upon	  Helms’	  accusations,	  and	  coverage	  of	  the	   election	   repeatedly	   invoked	   his	   charges	   of	   CIA	   and	   State	  Department	  impropriety.524	  Even	   after	   the	   run-­‐off,	   as	   votes	   were	   being	   tallied,	   the	  senator’s	   actions	   continued	   to	  have	   repercussions	   at	   the	  highest	   levels	  of	  government.	   Reagan	   was	   forced	   into	   a	   quiet	   retreat	   from	   his	   previously	  outspoken	   support	   for	   the	  electoral	  process.	  He	  barely	  acknowledged	   the	  Salvadoran	   election	   in	   his	   much	   anticipated	   national	   speech	   on	   Central	  America	  on	  9	  May.525	  ‘“That	  indicates	  they	  [the	  administration]	  felt	  they	  got	  hit	  hard	  by	  Helms”’,	  one	  anonymous	  senator	  explained,	  ‘“and	  he’s	  damaged	  them	  down	  there.”’526	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   Cable	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In	   El	   Salvador	   also,	   Helms’	   charges	   became	   integral	   to	   the	   election.	  ARENA	   officials	   openly	   cited	   his	   letter	   to	   support	   their	   complaints	   about	  U.S.-­‐backed	   electoral	   fraud. 527 	  D’Aubuisson’s	   campaign	   talk	   of	   State	  Department	   interference	   in	  El	  Salvador’s	  sovereign	  affairs	  appeared	  to	  be	  vindicated	  and,	  confident	  that	  the	  right’s	  fears	  were	  justified,	  D’Aubuisson	  used	  Helms’	   letter	   to	  demand	  a	  special	  Legislative	  Assembly	   investigation	  into	   American	   interference	   in	   the	   run-­‐off.528	  He	   was	   also	   able	   to	   use	   the	  letter	  as	  leverage	  to	  gain	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  U.S.	  embassy’s	  political	  officer	  on	  3	  May,	  though	  there	  was	  little	  he	  and	  his	  political	  allies	  could	  do	  during	  the	   discussion	   except	   privately	   state	   their	   shock	   and	   dismay	   at	   U.S.	  actions.529	  	  That	   D’Aubuisson	   and	   his	   party	   could	   quickly	   introduce	   Helms’	  charges	  to	  a	  Salvadoran	  audience	  was	  due	  to	  the	  close	  association	  between	  the	  senator’s	  office	  and	  ARENA.	  Helms’	  staff	  phoned	  ARENA	  with	  the	  text	  of	  the	   letter,	   and	   the	  Salvadoran	  party	  was	  able	   to	  publicise	   the	  accusations	  over	  radio	  on	  the	  same	  day	  the	  senator	  made	  his	  floor	  speech	  demanding	  Pickering’s	  removal.530	  In	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  comparative	  effectiveness	  of	  Helms’	  transnational	  network	  in	  rapidly	  sharing	  information,	  while	  ARENA	  received	   the	   text	  of	  Helms’	   letter	  on	  2	  May,	   the	  U.S.	   embassy	  had	   to	  wait	  until	   4	   May	   before	   receiving	   a	   transcript. 531 	  This	   caused	   sufficient	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confusion	   that	   one	   embassy	   figure,	   upon	   hearing	   ARENA’s	   accusations,	  initially	  questioned	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  letter.532	  	  Two	  days	  after	   the	   run-­‐off,	  Helms	   revealed	   further	  details	  of	  United	  States’	   operations	   on	   behalf	   of	   Duarte	   and	   the	   PDC.	   He	   expanded	   on	   his	  criticism	  of	   the	   CIA’s	   covert	   programme,	   declaring	   that	   the	   agency,	   along	  with	   the	   State	   Department,	   had	   ‘bought	   the	   election’.533	  The	   senator’s	  exposing	   of	   a	   covert	   programme	   could	   have	   left	   him	   open	   to	   charges	   of	  rank	   hypocrisy.	   Only	   a	   month	   earlier,	   in	   discussing	   the	   CIA’s	   harbour	  mining	   operations	   in	   Nicaragua,	   Helms	   told	   colleagues	   that	   in	   general	   ‘it	  does	  not	  advance	  the	  U.S.	  national	  interest	  at	  any	  time	  to	  talk	  about	  specific	  covert	  actions,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  successful.’	  The	  president,	  he	  said,	   ‘has	  the	  constitutional	   authority	   to	   conduct	   our	   foreign	   policy’	   and	   covert	   actions	  were	   ‘a	   classic	   tool	   of	   foreign	   policy.’	   Reagan	   was	   elected	   ‘to	   use	   his	  judgment	  in	  the	  employment	  of	  that	  tool.’534	  	  At	   the	   root	   of	   this	   apparent	   inconsistency	   lay	   one	   of	   the	   critical	  themes	   of	   Helms’	   foreign	   policy	   entrepreneurship:	   his	   perception	   that	  Reagan’s	  El	  Salvador	  policy,	   like	  much	  of	   the	  president’s	   foreign	  policy	   in	  general,	  was	  being	  subverted	  by	  the	  insidious	  machinations	  of	  non-­‐elected	  bureaucrats.	  ‘This	  was	  not	  the	  policy	  of	  President	  Reagan’,	  he	  argued.	  	  I	   have	  known	   the	  President	   too	   long	   to	  believe	   that	  he	  would	  ever	  support	  a	  phony	  election	  or	  a	  crooked	  election.	  This	  was	  the	   policy	   of	   a	   small	   coterie	   of	   bureaucrats	   with	   their	   own	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agenda	   and	   their	   own	   policies	   –	   the	   permanent	   government	  pursuing	  its	  own	  aims	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  President’s	  wishes.535	  	  This	   articulated	   a	   general	   concern	   within	   movement	   conservatism	  that	   the	   president’s	   ‘real’	   foreign	   policy	   agenda	   was	   being	   undermined	  from	  within.	  Such	  fears	  had	  surfaced	  barely	  a	  year	  into	  Reagan’s	  first	  term,	  but	  they	  remained	  persistent	  right	  through	  the	  period	  until	  the	  Salvadoran	  elections	   (and,	   indeed,	   until	   the	   final	   days	   of	   his	   second	   term).536	  Helms’	  outburst	   against	   the	   ‘permanent	   government’	   represented	   a	   particularly	  public	   example	   of	   this	   resentment,	   and	   illustrated	   the	   senator’s	   self-­‐appointed	   guardianship	   of	   what	   conservatives	   perceived	   to	   be	   true	  Reaganism.	  	  Helms’	   second,	   more	   detailed	   statement	   on	   U.S.	   involvement	  coincided	  with	   on-­‐going	   confusion	   over	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   run-­‐off.	  With	  Duarte	   and	   D’Aubuisson	   both	   claiming	   victory,	   the	   situation	   remained	  highly	   charged.537 	  Despite	   the	   latter’s	   apparent	   willingness	   to	   present	  himself	  as	  loyal	  opposition,	  reports	  reached	  the	  embassy	  of	  an	  ARENA	  plot	  to	   delay	   the	   election	   result	   and	   then	   oust	   the	   expected	   Duarte	  government.538	  Though	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   Helms	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aware	   of	   this	   development,	   the	   Salvadoran	   right’s	   persistent	   use	   of	   the	  senator’s	   accusations	   to	   justify	   their	   political	   agitation	   illustrated	   the	  continuing,	  destabilising	  reverberations	  of	  his	  actions.539	  	  It	  was	   only	   after	   a	   direct	  warning	   to	   the	   Salvadoran	  military’s	   high	  command	   by	   both	   Pickering	   and	   Paul	   Gorman,	   head	   of	   U.S.	   Southern	  Command,	   about	   damaging	   consequences	   for	  military	   assistance	   that	   the	  prospective	   coup	   was	   aborted. 540 	  Even	   this	   warning	   did	   not	   entirely	  convince	  El	  Salvador’s	  extreme	  right	  to	  change	  course.	  The	  following	  week,	  the	  U.S.	   received	  reports	   that	  ARENA	  members	  were	  planning	  Pickering’s	  assassination.	  The	   threat,	  deemed	   ‘credible	  and	  extremely	   serious’	  by	   the	  State	   Department,	   prompted	   the	   administration	   to	   once	   again	   dispatch	  Vernon	  Walters	  to	  El	  Salvador	  to	  meet	  with	  D’Aubuisson	  and	  demand	  any	  such	   plan	   be	   aborted	   immediately.	   D’Aubuisson,	  who	   expressed	   shock	   at	  the	  charges,	  promised	  Walters	  he	  would	  head	  off	  any	  plot.541	  No	  attempt	  on	  Pickering’s	  life	  was	  made.	  	  The	   assassination	   scare	   underscored	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   elements	  within	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   had	   lost	   patience	   with	   Helms.	  Anonymous	  officials	  publicly	  accused	  Helms	  of	  encouraging	  the	  far	  right’s	  action	   through	   his	   statements	   on	   the	   Salvadoran	   election.542	  Stories	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  539	  The	   senator’s	   charges	   were	   repeated	   by	   ARENA	   and	   D’Aubuisson	   a	  number	   of	   times	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   election.	   See	   Chavez,	   “Rightist	  Candidate	   Claims	   Victory,”	   A1,	   “ARENA	   Reactions	   to	   Duarte	   Victory,”	  Confidential,	   Cable	   San	   Salvador,	   13	   May,	   1984,	   DNSA,	   and	   “Election	  Related	  Developments,”	  [Heavily	  Excised],	  Confidential,	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  16	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personal	   rebuke	   from	   Reagan	   were	   leaked	   to	   the	   press,	   and	   there	   were	  suggestions	   that	   the	   senator	   and	   his	   aides	   had	   undermined	   the	   United	  States’	   attempts	   to	   mediate	   by	   tipping	   off	   D’Aubuisson	   about	   Walters’	  impending	  visit.543	  Helms	  and	  his	  staff	  insisted	  that	  the	  administration	  had	  asked	  for	  their	  help	  in	  contacting	  D’Aubuisson	  to	  head	  off	  the	  assassination,	  and	  that	  at	  no	  point	  had	  Reagan	  given	  Helms	  a	  dressing	  down.544	  	  An	  accurate	  reconstruction	  of	  events	  is	  difficult	  to	  come	  by.	  Certainly	  Helms’	  office	  contacted	  D’Aubuisson	  on	  17	  May,	  prior	  to	  Walters’	  arrival	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  The	  Salvadoran	  noted	  as	  much	  when	  he	  spoke	  with	  the	  envoy	  during	  the	  following	  day’s	  meeting.545	  There	  is	  also	  a	  consensus	  that	  Helms	  and	  Reagan	  met	  to	  discuss	  El	  Salvador	  some	  days	  prior	  to	  this.	  Beyond	  this,	  understanding	   the	   exact	   sequence	   of	   events	   is	   hindered	   by	   the	   range	   of	  accounts	  offered	  by	  those	  with	  knowledge	  about	  the	  episode.	  DeMoss,	  who	  made	  the	  phone	  call	   to	  D’Aubuisson,	  would	  appear	  most	  credible,	  but	  her	  assertion	   that	   the	   State	   Department	   had	   already	   called	   the	   Salvadoran	   a	  few	   days	   earlier	   does	   not	   fit	   with	   a	   classified	   inter-­‐agency	   memo	   that	  recommended	  Walters’	   visit	   only	   after	   it	   had	   received,	   and	   reviewed,	   the	  threat	  on	  17	  May.546	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   as	   scholarship	   on	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   has	  often	   stated,	   rival	   factions	   within	   the	   White	   House	   repeatedly	   used	  anonymous	   press	   leaks	   to	   fashion	   narratives	   and	   analysis	   favourable	   to	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their	   position.	   How	   accurate	   their	   claims	   about	   Helms’	   motivations	   and	  actions	   were	   has	   to	   be	   viewed	   through	   this	   unhelpful	   framework.	  LeoGrande	   adds	   further	   complexity	   by	   arguing	   Helms	  was	   briefed	   by	   an	  NSC	  official	  about	  the	  threat	  because	  of	  concerns	  that	  the	  senator	  would	  be	  exposed	   as	   an	   ally	   of	   D’Aubuisson	   when	   news	   of	   the	   assassination	   plot	  broke.	   The	   White	   House,	   LeoGrande	   states,	   was	   concerned	   this	   would	  damage	   Helms’	   re-­‐election	   campaign	   and	   potentially	   cost	   the	  administration	  a	  strong	  supporter.547	  The	  senator	  was	  certainly	  briefed	  on	  the	   threat,	   and	   was	   the	   only	   member	   of	   Congress	   to	   be	   afforded	   this	  consideration.548	  Yet	   further	   evidence	   of	   these	   electoral	   justifications	   to	  inform	  Helms	  is	  not	  revealed	  elsewhere.	  Previously,	  White	  House	  political	  operatives	   had	   sought	   to	   distance	   the	   president	   from	   Helms’	   domestic	  problems.	  If	  this	  account	  were	  accurate,	  it	  would	  likely	  represent	  the	  work	  of	   an	   individual	   Helms	   ally	   within	   the	   bureaucracy,	   rather	   than	   an	  orchestrated	  initiative	  by	  the	  administration.549	  	  Despite	   the	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	   Pickering	   plot,	   some	  conclusions	  about	  its	  significance	  can	  be	  reached.	  Firstly,	  despite	  branding	  the	   allegations	   as	   ‘“ridiculous”’	   and	   ‘“sleazy	   journalism”’,	   Helms’	   rhetoric	  had	  undoubtedly	  contributed	  to	  the	  tensions	  that	  lay	  behind	  the	  threat.550	  State	  Department	  personnel	  working	  elsewhere,	  who	  often	  had	  to	  contend	  with	   visits	   from	   the	   senator’s	   staff,	   believed	   Helms	   and	   his	   aides	   ‘gave	  heart’	  to	  hard-­‐line	  conservatives	  in	  host	  countries.551	  In	  this	  case,	  given	  that	  D’Aubuisson	   and	   ARENA	   repeatedly	   invoked	   Helms’	   letter	   during	   their	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protests	  about	  the	  election,	   the	  senator’s	  strategy	  certainly	  contributed	  to	  right-­‐wing	  animosity	  toward	  Pickering.	  	  Secondly,	   regardless	   of	  which	   narrative	   of	   events	  was	   accurate,	   the	  Pickering	   plot	   –	   as	   with	   ARENA’s	   distribution	   of	   the	   Helms	   letter	   –	  illustrated	   the	   efficiency	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   senator’s	   network.	  D’Aubuisson	  was	   immediately	   informed	   of	   the	   administration	   reaction	   to	  the	  plot,	  whether	   intended	  by	   the	  White	  House	  or	  not,	  and	   just	  as	  swiftly	  made	  aware	  of	  Reagan’s	  alarm.	  A	  potentially	  disastrous	  incident	  had	  been	  averted	   because	   of	   the	   close	   connections	   within	   Helms’	   information	  network.	   Later,	   it	   was	   claimed	   that	   the	   White	   House	   again	   used	   the	  senator’s	   network	   as	   an	   instrument	   through	   which	   to	   affect	   immediate	  action.	   Max	   Kampelman,	   a	   senior	   American	   diplomat	   attending	   Duarte’s	  inauguration	  at	  the	  start	  of	  June,	  was	  certain	  that	  the	  senator’s	  network	  had	  an	   ability	   to	   reach	   the	   Salvadoran	   right	   more	   rapidly	   and	   with	   more	  influence	   than	   anyone	   else.	   It	  was	  Helms	   to	  whom	  he	   and	   George	   Shultz	  turned	  for	  help	  while	  en	  route	  to	  the	  ceremony	  when	  another	  assassination	  scare	  was	  reported.552	  	  Helms	  was	  so	  well	   informed	  throughout	   the	  election	  period	  that	   the	  Senate	   Intelligence	   Committee	   leadership	   became	   convinced	   that	   Helms	  must	  have	   inappropriately	  used	  classified	   information	   from	  congressional	  briefings.	   Senators	   Barry	   Goldwater	   and	  Daniel	   Patrick	  Moynihan	   (D-­‐NY)	  issued	   an	  unprecedented	   rebuke	   to	  Helms.553	  The	  warning	  was	  passed	   to	  Senate	   leaders,	   who	   in	   turn	   wrote	   to	   all	   members	   reminding	   them	   to	  ‘“exercise	   especial	   care	   before	   discussing	   intelligence	   matters.”’ 554 	  As	  Helms	   and	   his	   staff	   noted,	   however,	   their	   information	   had	   been	   gleaned	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from	  Salvadoran	  sources,	  not	  official	  briefing	  material	  supplied	  to	  members	  of	   Congress.	   Senate	   intelligence	   had	   ‘“absolutely	   nothing”’	   to	   offer	   that	  ‘“you	   couldn’t	   get	   out	   of	   the	   newspaper”’,	   DeMoss	   noted	   later.555	  Helms’	  network	  afforded	  the	  senator	  a	  flexibility	  few	  other	  lawmakers	  enjoyed.	  He	  was	  not	  bound	  by	   the	  Senate’s	   rigid	  disclosure	   rules	  because	  he	   received	  the	   majority	   of	   his	   information	   from	   sources	   outside	   the	   legislative	   and	  executive	  branches.	  	  In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Pickering	   plot,	   while	   most	   observers	   were	  inclined	   to	   see	   the	   threat	   as	   evidence	   of	   D’Aubuisson’s	   continuing	  contribution	  to	   instability	  and	  violence	   in	  El	  Salvador,	  Helms	  and	  his	  staff	  used	  the	  same	  events	  to	  legitimise	  the	  ARENA	  candidate	  as	  a	  viable	  leader	  of	   Salvadoran	   politics.	   They	   strongly	   contested	   his	   links	   to	   the	   plot,	   and	  emphasised	   his	   productive	   role	   in	   preventing	   any	   attempt	   on	   Pickering’s	  life.	   ‘“I	   can’t	   tell	   you	   what	   was	   in	   the	   cable,”’	   Helms	   told	   journalists	  enquiring	  about	  his	  knowledge	  of	  the	  plot,	  ‘“but	  I	  can	  tell	  you	  what	  was	  not.	  Roberto	   D’Aubuisson	   was	   never	   mentioned.”’ 556 	  DeMoss	   described	  D’Aubuisson	   as	   ‘“concerned”’	   and	   keen	   to	   help	   the	   administration	   when	  informed	  of	  the	  plot.557	  Much	  later,	  DeMoss	  continued	  to	  paint	  D’Aubuisson	  in	  a	  flattering	  light,	  remembering	  how	  the	  major	  was	  ‘“just	  floored”’	  by	  the	  accusations	   during	   their	   phone	   call,	   described	   them	   as	   ‘“absolutely	  outrageous”’,	  and	  promised	  to	  denounce	  them	  the	  next	  day.558	  	  These	  arguments	  were	  part	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  campaign	  by	  the	  senator	  to	   defend	   D’Aubuisson.	   It	   was	   an	   implicit	   acknowledgement	   that	   the	  negative	  publicity	  surrounding	  the	  major	  was	  damaging	  conservatism	  in	  El	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  555	  Martin	  Tolchin,	  “Helms	  a	  Focus	  of	  Controversy	  On	  Disclosure	  of	  Senate	  Data,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  17	  May,	  1984,	  A1,	  and	  Link,	  Righteous	  Warrior,	  249.	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  Gelb,	  “D’Aubuisson	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  in	  Plot	  Uncertain,”	  10.	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  Omang,	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  Feared	  Slaying	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  Envoy	  Here,”	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Salvador	  and	  tilting	  the	  game	  in	  favour	  of	  Duarte.	  If	  Reagan	  were	  to	  insist	  on	   a	   democratic	   political	   solution,	   Helms	   wanted	   a	   level	   playing	   field.	  Stories,	   often	   leaked	   by	   anonymous	   officials,	   damaged	   this	   prospect.	  D’Aubuisson,	  Helms	  argued,	  ‘was	  never	  given	  the	  opportunity	  by	  the	  State	  Department	  or	  the	  media	  to	  confront	  his	  accusers’,	  and	  consistently	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  an	  ‘underground	  campaign	  of	  malicious	  accusations.’559	  	  Helms	  staked	  out	  a	  role	  as	  the	  counter	  to	  this	  campaign,	  and	  turned	  the	   election-­‐tampering	   scandal	   into	   a	   vehicle	   for	   insulating	   D’Aubuisson	  from	  criticism.	  Helms	  had	  steered	  clear	  of	  even	  mentioning	  the	  Salvadoran	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Reagan	  and	  next-­‐day	  speech	  to	  the	  Senate,	  but	  he	  reversed	  course	   during	   his	   8	   May	   speech	   to	   condemn	   the	   charges	   levelled	   at	  D’Aubuisson.	  Dismissing	   references	   to	   ‘so-­‐called	   right-­‐wing	  death	   squads’	  as	  ‘media	  jargon’	  –	  language	  previously	  used	  by	  M.	  Stanton	  Evans	  in	  Human	  
Events	   –	   Helms	   blamed	   Robert	  White’s	   ‘slanderous’	   comments	   about	   the	  major.560	  He	   specifically	   outlined	   his	   own	   investigation	   into	   the	   matter,	  ascribing	  himself	  a	  level	  of	  interest	  and	  expertise	  in	  the	  case	  that	  sought	  to	  persuade	  his	  colleagues:	  	  I	   personally	   made	   inquiries	   of	   every	   agency	   and	   every	   high	  official	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  that	  I	  judged	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  know	  the	  truth.	  In	  almost	  every	  case,	  I	  was	  told,	  in	  effect,	  that	  there	  was	  no	  credible	  evidence,	  but	  that	  it	  would	  be	  impolitic	  to	  say	  so.	  There	  were,	  however,	  one	  or	  two	  who	  sad	  yes,	  there	  was	  evidence	   linking	   Mr.	   D’Aubuisson	   to	   the	   death	   squads;	   but	  when	  pressed	  for	  specifics,	  they	  backed	  down,	  saying	  there	  was	  nothing	   that	  would	  hold	  up	   in	  court.	   I	  am	  still	  waiting	   for	  any	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  Helms,	   “The	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   Results	   In	   El	   Salvador,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	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   (1984),	  11249.	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specific	   evidence,	  whether	   it	  would	   hold	   up	   in	   court	   or	   not.	   I	  invite	  any	  official	  of	  the	  administration	  to	  put	  it	  forward.561	  	  Helms	  even	  met	  with	  CIA	  director	  William	  Casey,	  and	  Casey	  was	  unable	  to	  provide	  evidence	  of	  D’Aubuisson’s	  connections	  to	  death	  squads.562	  	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that,	   while	   Helms	   was	   D’Aubuisson’s	   most	  prominent	  patron	   in	   the	  United	  States,	   the	  senator	  did	  not	  operate	  alone.	  Several	   other	   members	   of	   movement	   conservatism	   also	   worked	   to	  strengthen	  D’Aubuisson’s	  credibility.	  Human	  Events,	  despite	  acknowledging	  that	   the	   major	   had	   ‘raised	   concerns’,	   devoted	   itself	   to	   guarding	   his	  reputation.563	  It	   repeatedly	   questioned	   the	   damaging	   accusations	   made	  against	   D’Aubuisson,	   and	   amplified	   Helms’	   own	   work	   by	   commenting	  favourably	   on	   the	   senator’s	   pivotal	   role	   in	   condemning	   the	   Reagan	  administration	   for	   its	   approach	   to	   the	   Salvadoran.564	  National	  Review,	   far	  less	   inclined	   to	   openly	   promote	   D’Aubuisson,	   nevertheless	   pushed	   back	  against	   stories	   linking	  D’Aubuisson	   to	  Archbishop	  Romero’s	  assassination	  (in	  doing	  so,	  repeating	  Helms’	  own	  rebuke	  of	  White	  for	  not	  acknowledging	  the	   possibility	   of	   left-­‐wing	   complicity	   in	   the	   murder).565 	  Among	   other	  members	  of	  Congress,	  devoted	  movement	  conservatives	  like	  Rep.	  Eldon	  	  (a	  fluent	  Spanish	  speaker	  who	  had	  spent	  time	  in	  Mexico	  serving	  with	  the	  FBI,	  and	   who	   was	   a	   prominent	   supporter	   of	   the	   Somoza	   dynasty)	   lent	   their	  voices	  to	  the	  campaign	  to	  portray	  D’Aubuisson	  as	  the	  only	  viable	  leader	  for	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El	  Salvador.	  It	  was	  D’Aubuisson,	  Rudd	  told	  the	  president,	  who	  had	  ‘the	  guts,	  the	  will	  and	  the	  courage	  to	  eject	  the	  terrorist-­‐communists	  from	  El	  Salvador	  and	  establish	  a	  stable	  government	  friendly	  to	  and	  supportive	  of	  the	  United	  States.’566	  	  This	   campaign	   to	   defend	   D’Aubuisson	   actually	   intensified	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  election	  and	  assassination	  episodes.	  Helms	  adopted	  a	  two-­‐step	  strategy.	  His	  first	  move	  was	  to	  travel	  to	  El	  Salvador	  in	  June,	  ostensibly	  to	   attend	   Duarte’s	   inauguration.	   While	   there,	   Helms	   met	   secretly	   with	  D’Aubuisson	  to	  persuade	  the	  Salvadoran	  that	  he	  should	  avoid	  provocative	  action	  and	  accept	  the	  role	  of	  ‘“loyal	  opposition”’.567	  The	  senator	  reportedly	  told	  D’Aubuisson,	  ‘“You’d	  better	  pray	  that	  Ambassador	  Pickering	  is	  not	  hit	  by	   a	   bread	   truck,	   because	   The	   New	   York	   Times	   will	   have	   that	   truck	  registered	  to	  your	  name	  by	  tomorrow	  morning.”’568	  Helms	  had	  not	  initially	  been	  included	  on	  the	  Department	  of	  State’s	  list	  of	  recommended	  attendees	  at	   the	   inauguration,	   with	   Senators	   Baker	   and	   Byrd	   (or	   their	   respective	  designees)	  named	  the	  agency’s	  preferred	  guests	  from	  the	  upper	  house,	  and	  was	   only	   added	   at	   the	   suggestion	   of	   conservative	  NSC	   staffers	   Jacqueline	  Tillman	   and	   Constantine	   Menges.569	  The	   implication	   is	   that	   those	   in	   the	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administration	   who	   may	   have	   been	   most	   sympathetic	   to	   D’Aubuisson	  sought	  an	  intermediary	  who	  could	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  major.	  	  Helms’	   presence	  was	   ironic.	   State	   told	   the	  White	   House	   that,	   ‘given	  charges	   that	   the	  United	   States	  has	   stage-­‐managed	   the	   election	  process,’	   a	  low-­‐key	   delegation	   was	   preferable	   so	   as	   ‘not	   to	   dominate	   the	  inauguration.’570 	  Helms’	   attendance,	   given	   his	   role	   in	   publicising	   these	  accusations,	   undercut	   the	   department.	   Yet	   Helms’	   conversation	   with	  D’Aubuisson	   evidently	   proved	   persuasive-­‐	   and,	   in	   the	   longer	   term,	  beneficial	   to	   the	  administration.	  D’Aubuisson	  signalled	  he	  would	  continue	  to	   participate	   in	   the	   fledgling	   Salvadoran	   democratic	   process.	   The	  White	  House,	  pleased	  that	  the	  major’s	  presence	  legitimised	  the	  political	  solution,	  responded	   by	   granting	   D’Aubuisson	   a	   travel	   visa.571 	  The	   visa	   allowed	  D’Aubuisson	  to	  complete	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  late	  June	  that	  Helms	  and	  his	   staff	  organised.	   It	   constituted	   the	  next	   step	   in	  Helms’	   attempts	   to	  legitimise	   D’Aubuisson,	   by	   promoting	   the	   Salvadoran	   more	   extensively	  among	   Washington	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   the	   American	   public.	   ‘“He	  [D’Aubuisson]	   has	   not	   had	   an	   opportunity	   to	   present	   his	   views”’,	   said	  Helms’	  principal	  foreign	  policy	  aide,	  Jim	  Lucier.	  ‘“We	  think	  this	  would	  be	  a	  good	   opportunity.”’572 	  After	   the	   visit,	   Helms	   emphasised	   D’Aubuisson’s	  contribution	  to	  Salvadoran	  democracy:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1984,	   folder	   “El	   Salvador	   (4/1/84	   –	  5/31/84)	   (1),”	   Executive	   Secretariat,	  NSC:	  Country	  Files,	  El	  Salvador	  Box	  30,	  RRL.	  
570 	  Memorandum,	   Charles	   Hill	   to	   Robert	   C.	   McFarlane	   and	   John	   S.	  Herrington,	  “U.S.	  Delegation	  to	  the	  Salvadoran	  Inauguration,”	  22	  May,	  1984,	  folder	   “El	   Salvador	   (4/1/84	   –	   5/31/84)	   (1),”	   Executive	   Secretariat,	   NSC:	  Country	  Files,	  El	  Salvador	  Box	  30,	  RRL.	  
571 	  Smith,	   “Salvadoran’s	   Visa	   Tied	   To	   His	   Help,”	   A6,	   and	   Goshko,	  “D’Aubuisson’s	  Cooperation	  Seen	  As	  Vital,”	  A8.	  
572	  “Salvadoran	  Rightist	  Tied	  to	  Murder	  Plot	  Will	  Meet	  Senators,”	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  25	  June,	  1984,	  A9.	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He	   is	   the	   head	   of	   a	   political	   party	   consisting	   of	   businessmen	  and	  farmers	  and	  responsible	  citizens	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  a	  party	  that	  got	  46	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  bureaucracy	  in	  the	  State	  Department	  [provided]	  about	  two	  or	  three	  million	  [dollars]	   of	   the	   tax-­‐payers	   money	   in	   support	   of	   a	   far-­‐left	  candidate.573	  	  For	  most	  senators,	  in	  both	  parties,	  and	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  too,	  D’Aubuisson	  remained	  a	  toxic	  entity.	  No	  administration	  official	  appeared	  in	  public	   with	   D’Aubuisson,	   and	   only	   a	   handful	   of	   conservative	   lawmakers	  met	   the	   Salvadoran.574	  Helms	   began	   to	   suffer	   from	   his	   public	   association	  with	   D’Aubuisson.	   Their	   relationship	   threatened	   to	   derail	   his	   Senate	   re-­‐election	   campaign.	   Helms’	   Democratic	   opponent,	   Governor	   James	   Hunt,	  directed	   attention	   toward	   the	   senator’s	   relationship	   with	   D’Aubuisson	  throughout	   the	   race.575	  In	   particular,	   Hunt’s	   camp	   released	   what	   became	  known	   as	   the	   “dead	   bodies	   ad”.	   Over	   images	   of	   several	   corpses,	  accompanied	   by	   a	   soundtrack	   of	   gunfire,	   the	   advert’s	   narrator	   called	   the	  senator	  D’Aubuisson’s	  ‘“best	  friend	  in	  Washington”’.	  ‘“Jesse	  Helms	  may	  be	  a	  crusader,”’	   the	   spot	   argued,	   ‘“but	   this	   is	   not	   what	   our	   senator	   should	   be	  crusading	  for.”’576	  	  There	   were	   suggestions	   that	   the	   increased	   scrutiny	   of	   Helms’	  connection	  with	  D’Aubuisson	   led	  the	  senator	  to	  distance	  himself	   from	  the	  Salvadoran’s	  Washington	  visit.	  Senator	  Ted	  Stevens	  (R-­‐AK),	  not	  Helms,	  led	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  Helen	  Dewar,	   “Senate	  Race	   in	  North	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   Is	  a	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  Alley	  Fight,”	  Washington	  Post,	  6	  July,	  1984,	  A4.	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  Joanne	   Omang,	   “Key	   Officials	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   Meeting	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  Washington	  
Post,	  28	  June,	  1984,	  A25.	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  Helen	   Dewar,	   “Hunt	   Goes	   on	   Offensive	   In	   Debate	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   Helms,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  30	  July,	  1984,	  A3.	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  Dewar,	   “Senate	  Race	   in	  North	  Carolina,”	  A4,	   and	   Joel	  Brinkley,	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  1984,	  7.	  
	   199	  
D’Aubuisson	   around	   Capitol	   Hill	   and	   invited	   all	   one	   hundred	   senators	   to	  meet	  with	   the	  major,	   telling	   journalists,	   ‘“it’s	   [better]	   to	  keep	   someone	   in	  the	  system	  than	  to	  shut	  him	  out.”’577	  But	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  Helms	  never	  refuted	   his	   association	   with	   D’Aubuisson.	   Indeed,	   he	   directly	   linked	   his	  connections	  with	  the	  Salvadoran	  right	   to	  his	  national	  security	  credentials.	  ‘“Yes,	   sir,”’	   Helms	   replied	   to	   Hunt	   when	   the	   governor	   mentioned	   death	  squads,	   ‘“I	   plead	   guilty	   about	   being	   opposed	   to	   communism	   and	   doing	  everything	  I	  can	  to	  stop	  it.”’578	  	  	  The	   senator’s	   belligerent	   response	   to	   criticism	   of	   his	   policies	   in	   El	  Salvador	  was	  helped	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  resonance	  to	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  in	  the	  North	   Carolina	   Senate	   election	   race.	   ‘“Who	   the	   hell	   is	   this	   Doe-­‐bee-­‐sown	  character”’,	  asked	  Helms’	  constituents,	  and	  Hunt’s	  own	  pollsters	  admitted	  focus	  groups	  in	  North	  Carolina	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  governor’s	  emphasis	  on	   Central	   America	   issues.579 	  Yet	   Helms’	   comments	   demonstrated	   the	  priority	   he	   unashamedly	   attached	   to	   his	   anti-­‐communism	   and	   why	   he	  maintained,	   despite	   intense	   criticism,	   his	   close	   relationship	   with	  D’Aubuisson.	  	  Helms’	  refusal	  to	  compromise	  over	  a	  military	  solution	  to	  El	  Salvador’s	  civil	   war	   led	   him	   to	   embrace	   the	   Reagan	   administration’s	   narrative	   of	  democracy	   in	   that	   country,	   but	   challenge	   its	   implications.	   He	   had	   hardly	  been	  an	  enthusiastic	  advocate	  of	  democratic	  reform	  in	  Latin	  America	  prior	  to	   1982.	   In	   his	   policy	   blueprint	   for	   the	   region,	   written	   in	   1976,	   Helms	  described	   Argentina,	   Brazil,	   Chile,	   Paraguay,	   and	   Uruguay	   as	   beacons	   of	  progress	  in	  the	  region.580	  All,	  at	  that	  time,	  were	  under	  military	  rule.	  In	  the	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   “Key	   Officials	   Avoid	   Meeting	   Salvadoran,”	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   and	   Link,	  
Righteous	  Warrior,	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  Dewar,	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intervening	   years,	   Helms	   added	   Bolivia	   to	   the	   list.	   He	   and	   his	   staff	  promoted	  the	  government	  of	  Luis	  Garcia	  Meza,	  despite	  its	  origins	  in	  a	  1980	  military	   coup.581	  ‘“I	   am	   impressed	  with	   the	   progress	   Bolivia	   has	  made	   in	  recent	  months	  in	  providing	  security	  for	  its	  citizens,”’	  Helms	  wrote	  Meza	  in	  December	   1980,	   ‘“which	   is	   among	   the	   most	   fundamental	   of	   human	  rights”’.582	  Supporting	  non-­‐elected	  governments	  in	  the	  western	  hemisphere	  was	   justifiable	   to	   him	   because	   internal	   security	   was	   paramount.	   A	   free	  ballot	  box,	  Helms	  had	  argued	   in	  1976,	  was	  only	  a	  secondary	  right	   for	  any	  country’s	  people.583	  	  	  In	   El	   Salvador,	   however,	   democratic	   reform	   promised	   a	   publicly	  palatable	   instrument	   by	   which	   to	   ensure	   this	   security.	   When	   the	   1982	  legislative	   assembly	   elections	   demonstrated	   widespread	   support	   for	  D’Aubuisson	  and	  ARENA’s	  militaristic	  anti-­‐communism,	  Helms	  grasped	  the	  opportunity	   to	   legitimise	   full-­‐scale	   war	   on	   the	   insurgency	   through	   the	  ballot	  box.	  Reagan’s	  rhetoric	  of	  democracy	  empowered	  Helms	  because	  the	  senator	   could	   throw	  off	   the	   stigma	  of	  his,	   and	  conservatism’s,	   association	  with	   authoritarianism	   in	   the	   region.	   He	   was	   able	   to	   maintain	   his	  commitment	   to	   a	   military	   solution	   while	   also	   portraying	   himself	   as	   the	  guardian	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  	  Helms’	  stringent	  criticism	  of	  the	  administration	  for	  its	  intervention	  in	  the	   Salvadoran	   democratic	   process	   belied	   the	   fact	   that	   both	   he	   and	   the	  White	  House	   agreed	   on	  wider	   goals	   in	   El	   Salvador.	   There	  was	   never	   any	  question	   that,	   like	   Helms,	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   sought	   a	   military	  victory	  over	   the	   insurgency.	   Its	   commitment	   to	  democratic	   and	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  581	  James	   Dunkerley,	   Rebellion	   in	   the	   Veins:	   Political	   Struggle	   in	   Bolivia,	  
1952-­‐1982	  (London:	  Verso	  Editions,	  1984),	  284-­‐291.	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  Karen	   DeYoung,	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   Defy	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   Wreath-­‐Laying,”	  
Washington	  Post,	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  November,	  1980,	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  and	   Joel	  Brinkley,	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  Times,	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reform	   in	   El	   Salvador	  was	   a	   tactic	   to	   facilitate	   congressional	   support	   for	  this	   armed	   solution.	   Reagan	   found	   as	   president	   that	   power	   required	  responsibility.584	  He	  increasingly	  spoke	  of	  flexibility,	  restraint,	  and	  realism:	  what	   was	   possible,	   not	   necessarily	   desirable.585	  A	   joint	   political-­‐military	  policy	  was	  a	  realistic	  policy.	  Decisive	  military	  victory	  over	   the	   insurgency	  was	  desirable.	  Achieving	  this	  by	  supporting	  Duarte	  and	  political	  moderates	  could	  make	  it	  possible.	  	  	  ‘The	  fight	  is	  not	  yet	  over’:	  Resisting	  Peace,	  1989-­‐1992	  	  In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   1984	   Salvadoran	   presidential	   elections,	   U.S.	  media	   outlets	   and	   political	   elites	   in	   both	   Congress	   and	   the	  White	   House	  allowed	   the	   civil	   war	   to	   slip	   from	   the	   foreign	   policy	   agenda.	   Duarte’s	  popularity	   in	  Washington	   ensured	   that	   U.S.	   assistance	   continued	   to	   flow,	  despite	   corruption	   and	   infighting	   among	   Christian	   Democrats	   that	   made	  the	   party,	   and	   its	   leader,	   unpopular	   in	   El	   Salvador	   itself.	   The	   military	  situation	   stagnated,	   with	   neither	   side	   capable	   of	   delivering	   a	   fatal	   blow.	  American	   officials	   no	   longer	   predicted	   imminent	   victory	   as	   they	   had	   in	  their	  more	  confident	  moments	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  decade,	  but	  they	  were	  less	  fearful	   of	   the	   FMLN	   victory	   that	   had	   seemed	   imminent	   during	   the	   crisis	  years	   of	   1982	   to	   1984.	   El	   Salvador,	   as	   LeoGrande	   summarises,	   retreated	  from	  American	  politics,	  ‘slipping	  out	  of	  sight	  and	  out	  of	  mind.’586	  	  Helms’	   interest	   in	   El	   Salvador	   followed	   a	   similar	   trajectory.	  Increasingly	  focused	  on	  the	  Contra	  war	  and,	  from	  1986	  onwards,	  the	  fate	  of	  Panamanian	  strongman	  Manuel	  Noriega,	  the	  senator	  devoted	  substantially	  less	   of	   his	   time	   to	   El	   Salvador.	   El	   Salvador	   continued	   to	   be	   central	   to	   his	  understanding	  of	  Central	  American	  instability,	  but	  the	  few	  public	  speeches	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   The	   Chimeric	   Imagination	   of	  
Ronald	  Reagan	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2013),	  100.	  
586	  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  282.	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and	  relative	  paucity	  of	  legislative	  entrepreneurship	  indicated	  a	  re-­‐ordering	  of	  his	  congressional	  resources.	  By	  early	  1988,	  such	  was	   the	  shift	   in	   focus,	  his	  regular	  meetings	  with	  Reagan’s	  new	  National	  Security	  Adviser,	  General	  Colin	  Powell,	  began	  to	  omit	  El	  Salvador	  as	  a	  specific	  item	  of	  discussion.587	  	  	  Helms’	   shifting	   focus	   was	   symptomatic	   of	   a	   wider	   trend	   among	  conservatives.	   Those	   who	   had	   been	   most	   supportive	   of	   the	   Reagan	  administration’s	   policies	   in	   El	   Salvador	   seemed	   particularly	   content	  with	  the	   post-­‐1984	   environment.	  National	   Review,	   while	   criticising	   Duarte	   for	  his	  decision	  in	  November	  1984	  to	  engage	  in	  direct	  talks	  with	  the	  guerrillas,	  nevertheless	  concluded	  the	  following	  year	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  on	  the	  country	   was	   because	   of	   the	   ‘things	   are	   improving.’588	  H.	   Joachim	   Maitre,	  writing	  for	  Strategic	  Review	  in	  Winter	  1985,	  also	  declared	  that	  the	  conflict	  was	   ‘winding	   down’,	   with	   the	   guerrillas	   ‘farther	   from	   victory	   than	   ever	  before’.	  Maitre’s	   commentary	  was	   later	   published	   in	  Walter	  Hahn’s	   1987	  overview	   of	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	   Central	   America,	   complete	   with	  laudatory	   introduction	   from	   Jeane	   Kirkpatrick.	   This	   further	   served	   to	  emphasise	   the	   sense	   of	   satisfaction	   among	   many	   conservatives	   over	   the	  administration’s	  handling	  of	  the	  civil	  war.589	  	  	  Even	   Human	   Events,	   the	   most	   consistent	   barometer	   of	   a	   Helmsian	  position	  on	  El	  Salvador,	  reduced	  its	  interest,	  though	  it	  continued	  to	  lament	  the	  disastrous	  effects	  of	  the	  Duarte	  presidency.	  Of	  the	  869	  articles	  relating	  to	   El	   Salvador	   published	   by	   Human	   Events	   between	   January	   1981	   and	  December	  1989,	  507	  appeared	  between	  January	  1981	  and	  December	  1984,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  587	  Memo,	  Alison	  B.	  Fortier	   to	  Colin	  L.	  Powell,	  30	  March,	  1988,	   ID598950,	  FG006-­‐12,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	  
588	  “Duarte	  Negotiates,”	  National	  Review,	  16	  November,	  1984,	  19,	  and	  Laura	  Ingraham,	   “Good	   News	   from	   El	   Salvador,”	   National	   Review,	   23	   August,	  1985,	  17.	  
589	  H.	   Joachim	  Maitre,	   “The	  Dying	  War	   in	  El	   Salvador,”	   in	  Central	  America	  
and	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine,	   Walter	   F.	   Hahn,	   ed.	   (Boston:	   The	   Centre	   for	  International	  Relations,	  1987),	  121.	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and	   357	   were	   published	   between	   January	   1985	   and	   December	   1989.	  
National	   Review	   saw	   an	   even	   steeper	   decline.	   Of	   seventy-­‐nine	   pieces	  relating	  to	  El	  Salvador	  between	  January	  1981	  and	  December	  1989,	  all	  but	  twelve	  were	  published	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  decade.	  590	  	  	   In	  1989,	   however,	  Helms	   returned	   to	   Salvadoran	   affairs	  with	   a	  new	  sense	   of	   purpose.	   The	   catalyst	   was	   that	   year’s	   Salvadoran	   presidential	  election,	   in	   which	   ARENA’s	   Alfredo	   Cristiani	   defeated	   the	   Christian	  Democrats’	   Fidel	   Chávez	   Mena.	   The	   Christian	   Democrats	   had	   suffered	   a	  rapid	  drop	  in	  popularity	  among	  a	  Salvadoran	  electorate	  disillusioned	  with	  continuing	   economic	   stagnation,	   interminable	   civil	   war,	   and	   pervasive	  corruption	   among	   government	   officials.	   After	   losing	   their	  majority	   in	   the	  Constituent	   Assembly	   in	   1988	   elections,	   Cristiani’s	   success	   marked	   a	  substantial	   shift	   in	   the	   political	   landscape.	   Cristiani’s	   more	   moderate	  leadership,	  compared	  to	  D’Aubuisson’s,	  and	  impressive	  grass-­‐roots	  election	  campaign	  produced	  a	  sweeping	  ARENA	  victory.591	  For	  Helms	  and	  the	  anti-­‐PDC	  conservative	  faction	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  was	  both	  a	  validation	  of	  their	   philosophy	   and	   an	   opportunity	   to	   reshape	   the	   story	   of	  democratisation	  in	  Central	  America.	  	   The	   joy	   among	   American	   movement	   conservatives	   at	   ARENA’s	  electoral	  achievements	  manifested	  in	  a	  swift	  effort	  by	  Helms	  and	  his	  allies	  in	   Washington	   to	   herald	   Cristiani	   as	   a	   populist,	   Reagan-­‐esque	   figure	  capable	  of	  leading	  El	  Salvador	  out	  of	  its	  military	  and	  economic	  stagnation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  590 	  Data	   taken	   from	   ProQuest,	   using	   search	   term	   “El	   Salvador”.	   For	  examples	   of	   Human	   Events’	   criticism	   post-­‐1984,	   see	   Deroy	   Murdock,	  “Strong	   Second	   Party	   Emerging	   in	   El	   Salvador,”	   22	   August,	   1987,	   10,	  Virginia	   Prewett,	   “Why	   Land	   Reform	   Has	   Failed	   in	   El	   Salvador,”	   Human	  
Events,	   22	   February,	   1986,	   14,	   and	   Virginia	   Prewett,	   “‘Moderate’	   Duarte	  Harasses	  Pro-­‐Democracy	  Paper,”	  Human	  Events,	  15	  June,	  1985,	  16.	  
591	  Chris	  Norton,	  “The	  Hard	  Right:	  ARENA	  Comes	  to	  Power,”	  in	  A	  Decade	  of	  
War:	   El	   Salvador	   Confronts	   the	   Future,	   eds.	   Anjali	   Sundaram	   and	   George	  Gelber	   (London:	  Catholic	   Institute	   for	   International	  Relations,	  1991),	  196,	  and	  Montgomery,	  Revolution	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  208.	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Alan	   Ryskind,	   writing	   in	   Human	   Events,	   praised	   the	   new	   Salvadoran	  president	   as	   ‘holding	   Reaganite	   views	   on	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policy’,	  while	   Helms	   called	   the	   new	   ARENA	   government	   ‘natural	   allies’	   of	   the	  United	   States	   and	   said	   its	   principles	   were	   shared	   by	   ‘mainstream	  Americans’.592	  	   For	   Helms,	   Cristiani’s	   election	   not	   only	   exonerated	   the	   pure	  conservatism	  he	  had	  been	  striving	  to	  impart	  on	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  but	   it	   also	  provided	   leverage	  at	  home.	  Richard	  Lugar,	   for	  example,	  whom	  Helms	  had	  battled	  over	  Central	  America	  policy	  and	  for	  the	  chairmanship	  of	  the	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee	   after	   the	   1986	   Senate	   elections,	   was	  subjected	   to	   intense	   criticism	   when	   it	   emerged	   he	   would	   be	   leading	   the	  American	  delegation	  to	  Cristiani’s	   inauguration.	  Writing	  to	  Bush’s	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  John	  Sununu,	  Helms	  wryly	  noted	  that	  his	  fellow	  Republican’s	  ‘interest	  in	   this	   trip	   is	   something	   of	   an	   anomaly’.	   Lugar	   ‘has	   never	   supported	   the	  ARENA	   party,	   nor	   Mr.	   Cristiani,	   a	   well-­‐known	   fact	   in	   El	   Salvador’,	   and,	  Helms	  continued,	   ‘despite	  the	  fact	  he	  was	  bound	  to	  have	  known	  what	  was	  going	   on’,	   never	   publicly	   commented	   on	   the	   secret	   operation	   to	   support	  Duarte	  in	  1984.	  In	  contrast,	  Helms	  referred	  to	  Cristiani	  as	  ‘my	  good	  friend’,	  and	   reminded	   the	   administration	   that	   ARENA	   was	   ‘aware’	   of	   Lugar’s	  record.593	  	  	   Helms’	  optimism	  was	  challenged	  in	  November	  1989	  when	  the	  FMLN	  mounted	   a	   surprise	   offensive	   in	   San	   Salvador.	   The	   speed,	   scale,	   and	  location	  of	  the	  violence	  shocked	  Americans	  who	  had	  grown	  accustomed	  to	  stalemate	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  and	  commentators	  rekindled	  the	  Vietnam	  analogy	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  Alan	   Ryskind,	   “Cristiani	  Wins	   ‘Free	   and	   Fair’	   Election	   in	   El	   Salvador,”	  
Human	  Events,	  1	  April,	  1989,	  5-­‐6,	  and	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Inauguration	  Day	  In	  El	  Salvador,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  10510.	  
593	  Letter,	   Senator	   Jesse	  Helms	   to	   John	   Sununu,	   25	  May,	   1989,	   ID040270,	  CO046,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  George	  Bush	  Library	  (hereafter	  GBL).	  
	   205	  
with	  references	  to	  the	  1968	  Tet	  Offensive.594	  For	  those,	  like	  Helms,	  who	  had	  lauded	   the	   Cristiani	   government	   for	   making	   progress	   against	   both	   the	  FMLN	  and	  the	  more	  repressive	  elements	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  worse	  news	  was	  to	   follow.	   In	   the	  midst	  of	   the	  offensive,	  as	  government	   troops	  battled	  guerrillas	   in	   the	   capital’s	   upper-­‐class	   districts,	   elite	   counterinsurgency	  soldiers	   went	   to	   the	   Universidad	   Centroamericana	   (UCA)	   and	   executed	  several	   Jesuit	   priests	   studying	   and	   working	   there,	   as	   well	   their	  housekeeper	   and	   her	   fifteen-­‐year-­‐old	   daughter.	   The	   murders	   brought	  international	  condemnation	  of	  the	  Salvadoran	  government	  and	  once	  more	  imperilled	  U.S.	  aid	  for	  the	  counterinsurgency	  campaign.595	  	  	   As	   one	   of	   the	   principal	   advocates	   of	   both	   the	   Cristiani	   government	  and	  a	  militarised	  solution	  to	  the	  civil	  war,	  Helms’	   immediate	  concern	  was	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  aid	  programme.	  With	  many	  legislators	  and	  their	  constituents	  –	  especially	  religious	  orders	  –	  immediately	  accusing	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  the	  murders,	   the	   White	   House	   and	   Congress	   found	   themselves	   under	  significant	   pressure	   to	   terminate	   assistance.596	  Helms	   felt	   ‘obliged’,	   as	   he	  put	  it,	  to	  respond	  to	  those	  blaming	  the	  army	  ‘without	  any	  evidence’.	  Their	  calls	  to	  stop	  arming	  the	  Salvadoran	  military	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  killings	  were	  ‘irresponsible’,	  he	  said,	  and	  such	  individuals	  threatened	  to	  once	  again	  ‘walk	  away	  from	  the	  brave	  men	  and	  women	  who	  are	  fighting	  communism	  in	  this	  hemisphere.’	   ‘[B]oth	   sides	   in	   the	   conflict	   had	   ample	   motivation	   to	  perpetrate	  this	  crime’,	  Helms	  declared,	  and	  it	  was	  ‘just	  as	  reasonable,	  if	  not	  more	  so,	  to	  look	  toward	  the	  FMLN	  as	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  this	  crime,	  as	  it	  is	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  “Salvador’s	   Tet,”	   Washington	   Post,	   15	   November,	   1989,	   A20,	   Lee	  Hockstader,	   “Salvadoran	  Rebels	  Hold	  Their	  Ground,”	  Washington	  Post,	   15	  November,	  1989,	  A1,	  and	  James	  Dunkerley,	  “Backing	  an	  unwinnable	  war,”	  
Guardian,	  1	  December,	  1989,	  12.	  
595	  Stanley,	  Protection	  Racket	  State,	  247-­‐248.	  
596	  The	   George	   Bush	   Library’s	   El	   Salvador	   country	   file	   contains	   a	   large	  quantity	  of	  highly	  critical	   letters	  about	  the	   Jesuit	  murders,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  forwarded	  from	  members	  of	  Congress.	  For	  these	  letters,	  see	  the	  files	  under	  CO046,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  GBL.	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to	  rush	   to	   judgment,	  as	  some	  are	  doing,	  against	  some	  nebulous	  assailants	  from	  the	  Salvadoran	  military.597	  	   Helms	   offered	   two	   different	   justifications	   for	   the	   murders,	   both	   of	  which	   perpetuated	   the	   conservative	   mantra	   that	   the	   Jesuits	   were	  understandable,	  perhaps	  even	  legitimate,	  victims	  of	  El	  Salvador’s	  violence.	  His	   first	  explanation	  rested	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  FMLN,	  angered	  by	  the	   Jesuits’	   recent	   criticism	   of	   their	   offensive,	   killed	   the	   priests	   in	  retribution,	  albeit	  disguised	  as	  government	  soldiers.	  It	  was	  a	  theory	  partly	  supported	   by	   internal	   analysis	   by	   both	   Defense	   and	   State	   Department	  officials,	   though	   the	   latter	   were	   more	   inclined	   to	   blame	   the	   military.598	  Helms	   talked	   of	   AK-­‐47s,	   the	   guerrillas’	   weapon	   of	   choice,	   and	   stolen	  uniforms,	   forming	   part	   of	   a	   supposed	   St.	   Valentine’s	   Day	   massacre-­‐style	  set-­‐up,	   and	   concluded	   it	   was	   ‘not	   inconceivable	   that	   the	   terrorists,	   the	  FMLN,	  decided	  that	  new	  martyrs	  were	  necessary	   in	  order	  to	  breathe	  new	  life	   into	   their	   dying	   offensive’.	   ‘It	   would	   be	   better	   to	   have	   them	   dead	   as	  martyrs’,	  Helms	  suggested,	  ‘than	  living	  and	  criticizing	  the	  bloody	  revolution	  that	  they	  had	  played	  such	  a	  key	  role	  in	  starting.’599	  	  Yet	  even	  as	  he	  speculated	  on	  FMLN	  culpability,	  Helms	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  Jesuits	  were	  understandable	  targets	  for	  those	  seeking	  to	  defeat	  the	  guerrillas:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  597	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Let	   Us	   Keep	   Our	   Facts	   Straight,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   135	  (1989),	  30484.	  
598 	  “El	   Salvador,”	   [Complete	   Memorandum	   Not	   Attached],	   Confidential,	  Memorandum,	  16	  November,	  1989,	  DNSA,	   and	   “Jesuit	  Rector	  of	  UCA	  Shot	  Dead;	  Seven	  Others	  Killed,”	  Confidential,	  Cable,	  16	  November,	  1989,	  DNSA.	  
599	  Helms,	  “Let	  Us	  Keep	  Our	  Facts	  Straight,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  30485.	  Teresa	  Whitfield,	  who	  investigated	  the	  Jesuit	  murder	  case,	  points	  out	  that	  AK-­‐47s	   were	   actually	   a	   frequently	   used	   weapon	   in	   the	   army’s	   special	  operations.	   Teresa	   Whitfield,	   Paying	   the	   Price:	   Ignacio	   Ellacuría	   and	   the	  
Murdered	   Jesuits	   of	   El	   Salvador	   (Philadelphia:	   Temple	   University	   Press,	  1995),	  10.	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It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  Salvadorans	  looked	  upon	  the	  victims	  as	  the	  leading	   propagandists	   for	   the	   Communist	   guerrillas,	   and	   as	  particularly	   nefarious	   because	   they	   had	   trained	   the	   FMLN	  leadership	   at	   the	   university.	   But	   the	   discovery	   of	   an	   FMLN	  cache	   of	   arms	   at	   the	   Jesuit	   retreat	   house	   [during	   the	   earlier	  search	  conducted	  by	   the	  army]	  must	  have	  confirmed	   that	   this	  group	  was	  working	  against	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  Salvadoran	  people,	  rich	  and	  poor	  alike.600	  	  Having	   announced	   the	   week	   before	   that	   weapons	   and	   ammunition	   had	  been	  captured	   throughout	  San	  Salvador	  during	   the	  FMLN	  offensive,	   ‘most	  notably’	   at	   Central	   America	   University	   and	   the	   Jesuit	   retreat	   house,	   the	  senator	   implied	   the	   Jesuits	  were	   playing	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   destabilising	   El	  Salvador.601	  	   	   It	  was	   an	   account	   that	   had	   ominous	   parallels	  with	   the	   Salvadoran	  right’s	   relentless	  persecution	  of	   the	   Jesuits	   in	  previous	  decades.	  From	  the	  1970s,	  when	  death	  squad	  pamphlets	  and	  graffiti	  urged	  Salvadorans	  to	  ‘“Be	  a	  patriot.	  Kill	  a	  priest”’,	   through	  to	  the	  late	  1980s	  when	  conservative	  civic	  associations	  described	  the	  Jesuits	  teaching	  at	  UCA	  as	  ‘“terrorists”’	  requiring	  ‘“justice”’,	   conservative	   Salvadorans	   targeted	   progressive	   clergy	   for	  supposed	  revolutionary	  activism.602	  As	  a	  leading	  scholar	  and	  proponent	  of	  liberation	  theology,	  which	  advocated	  radical	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  change	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  more	  just	  society,	  the	  rector	  of	  the	  university,	  Ignacio	  Ellacuría	  was	  an	  especially	  prominent	  target.	  His	  outspoken	  criticism	  of	  the	  armed	   forces	   and	   role	   as	   an	   intermediary	   for	   the	   FMLN	   aroused	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  600	  Helms,	  “Let	  Us	  Keep	  Our	  Facts	  Straight,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  30484.	  
601	  Jesse	  Helms	   (NC),	   “Foreign	  Operations,	   Export	   Financing,	   And	   Related	  Programs	   Appropriations,	   Fiscal	   Year	   1990	   -­‐-­‐	   Conference	   Report,”	   Cong.	  
Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  29160.	  
602	  Anna	   L.	   Peterson,	   Martyrdom	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Religion:	   Progressive	  
Catholicism	  in	  El	  Salvador’s	  Civil	  War	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1997),	  62-­‐65,	  and	  Whitfield,	  Paying	  the	  Price,	  331-­‐332.	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conservative	   anger,	   and	   he	   had	   previously	   faced	   exile	   after	   appearing	   on	  death-­‐squad	   lists.603	  In	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	  his	  murder,	   the	   army	  had	   forced	   all	  Salvadoran	  radio	  stations	  to	  broadcast	  a	  call-­‐in	  show	  in	  which	  those	  taking	  part	  called	  for	  the	  deaths	  of	  FMLN	  collaborators,	  including	  Ellacuría.604	  Just	  hours	   before	   the	   killings,	   Roberto	   D’Aubuisson	   had	   briefed	   supporters	  about	   the	   danger	   posed	   by	   the	   Jesuits.	   The	   U.S.	   embassy	   called	   the	   links	  between	   the	   major’s	   inflammatory	   rhetoric	   and	   the	   murders	   ‘difficult	   to	  dismiss	  as	  mere	  coincidence.’605	  	  	   	  It	   also	   brought	   the	   divisions	   in	   Cold	  War	   Christianity	   into	   sharper	  focus.	   For	   Andrew	   Preston,	   studying	   the	   role	   of	   religion	   in	   U.S.	   foreign	  policy,	  the	  conflict	  did	  not	  unify	  American	  Christians	  in	  a	  common	  crusade	  against	   the	   Soviet	   Union,	   but	   highlighted	   often	   radically	   different	   visions	  for	  the	  nation’s	  foreign	  policy.606	  The	  Jesuit	  case,	  like	  the	  murder	  of	  several	  American	  Maryknoll	  nuns	  by	  the	  Salvadoran	  military	  in	  1980,	  reflected	  the	  wider	   struggle	   between	   these	   contrasting	   ideas.	   Helms	   articulated	   a	  militant,	   apocalyptic	   anti-­‐communist	   Christianity	   that	   understood	  progressive	  Christian	  doctrines	  such	  as	  liberation	  theology	  to	  be	  little	  more	  than	  Marxism	  masquerading	  as	   religion.	  Alberto	  Piedra,	  appointed	  as	  U.S.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  603	  Michael	  E.	  Lee,	  “Liberation	  Theology's	  Transcendent	  Moment:	  The	  Work	  of	   Xavier	   Zubiri	   and	   Ignacio	   Ellacuría	   as	   Noncontrastive	   Discourse,”	   The	  
Journal	  of	  Religion	   83,	  No.	   2	   (April,	   2003),	   226.	   Translations	   of	   liberation	  works	  by	  Ellacuría	  and	  the	  other	  murdered	  Jesuits	  can	  be	  found	  in	  John	  J.	  Hassett	  and	  Hugh	  Lacey,	  eds.,	  Towards	  a	  Society	  that	  Serves	  its	  People:	  The	  
Intellectual	  Contribution	  of	  El	  Salvador’s	  Murdered	  Jesuits	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	   Press,	   1991).	   For	   a	   specific	   analysis	   of	   Ellacuría’s	  life	   and	   theological	  positions,	   see	  Kevin	  F.	  Burke,	  The	  Ground	  Beneath	  the	  
Cross:	   The	   Theology	   of	   Ignacio	   Ellacuría	   (Washington	   D.C.:	   Georgetown	  University	   Press,	   2000),	   and	   Whitfield,	   Paying	   the	   Price.	   See	   also	  “Information	   on	   Ignacio	   Ellacuria,”	   Classification	   Excised,	   Cable,	   11	  November,	  1981,	  DNSA.	  
604	  Stanley,	  Protection	  Racket	  State,	  249.	  
605 	  “Killing	   of	   Dr.	   Ignacio	   Ellacuria,”	   Classification	   Excised,	   Intelligence	  Memorandum,	  17	  November,	  1989,	  DNSA.	  
606	  Preston,	  Sword	  of	  the	  Spirit,	  415.	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ambassador	  to	  Guatemala	  in	  1984	  on	  the	  advice	  of	  Helms	  and	  friendly	  with	  administration	   hawks	   like	   Jeane	   Kirkpatrick,	   declared	   the	   doctrine	   ‘not	  only	  tries	  to	  adapt	  Christianity	  to	  Marxian	  theory	  or	  to	  the	  strategic	  needs	  of	  the	  praxis	  of	  liberation,	  but	  it	  attempts	  to	  build	  a	  new	  Christianity,	  a	  new	  Church,	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  Marxism.’607	  	  	  To	   make	   matters	   worse,	   conservatives	   believed	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  cynically	  appropriated	  liberation	  theology	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  legitimise	  its	  foreign	  policies	  in	  the	  Third	  World.608	  	  Helms’	  distrust	  of	  the	  Jesuits	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	   of	   a	   Southern	   Baptist	   sentiment	   that	   had,	   in	   the	   past,	   looked	   with	  particular	  animosity	  on	  Catholicism	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Seeing	  Catholics	  as	   beholden	   to	   a	   totalitarian	   faith,	   in	   contrast	   to	   their	   more	   democratic	  philosophy,	   some	   Southern	   Baptists	   consistently	   opposed	   alliances	   with	  Catholics	  in	  the	  quest	  for	  victory	  over	  the	  Soviet	  Union.609	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  religious	  component	  that	  liberation	  theology	  added	  to	  the	  Salvadoran	  crisis	  further	   intensified	   the	   Cold	   War	   ideological	   framework	   placed	   on	   El	  Salvador.610	  The	  senator’s	  comments	  were	  intended	  to	  undermine	  both	  the	  rationale	   and	   accomplishments	   of	   a	   religious	   activism	   that,	   as	   Peterson	  argues,	  achieved	  widespread	  influence	  in	  El	  Salvador	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.611	  	  	   With	  one	  or	  two	  exceptions	  –	  notably	  Bob	  Dornan,	  who	  believed	  the	  killers	   were	   most	   likely	   ‘psychopathic	   killers	   on	   the	   far	   right’	   –	   U.S.	  conservatives	  were	  quick	  to	  admonish	  those	  who	  immediately	  blamed	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  607	  Alberto	  M.	  Piedra,	   “Some	  Observations	  on	  Liberation	  Theology,”	  World	  
Affairs	  148,	  No.	  3	  (Winter,	  1985-­‐1986),	  156.	  
608	  Marlan	   Leighton,	   “The	   Soviets,	   the	   Pope,	   and	   Liberation	   Theology,”	  
Human	  Events,	  23	  March,	  1985,	  12.	  
609	  Matthew	   J.	   Hall,	   “Cold	  Warriors	   in	   the	   Sunbelt:	   Southern	   Baptists	   and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1947-­‐1989,”	  Ph.D.	  Diss.,	  University	  of	  Kentucky,	  2014,	  212.	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  Brands,	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  America’s	  Cold	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  86-­‐87.	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  Peterson,	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Salvadoran	  right.	  612	  Human	  Events	   told	   its	  readers	  there	  was	   ‘no	  evidence	  whatsoever’	   of	   government	   involvement	   and	   allegations	   of	   right-­‐wing	  complicity	   were	   mere	   allegations,	   while	   Don	   Nickles,	   the	   Oklahoma	  Republican	  senator,	  cautioned	  his	  colleagues	  that	  it	  was	  ‘a	  little	  premature’	  to	  apportion	  blame.613	  National	  Review	  accepted	  it	  was	  possible	  the	  killers	  had	   been	   army	   personnel,	   but	   noted	   ‘on	   the	   principle	   of	   cui	   bono?	   (who	  benefits?)	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  they	  were	  killed	  by	  Communists	  wearing	  army	  uniforms.’614	  The	  driving	   force	   behind	   all	   these	   assertions	  was	   a	   concern,	  shared	   by	  Helms,	   that	   Congress	  would	   not	   only	   terminate	   assistance	   but	  also	  push	  harder	  for	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  to	  end	  the	  violence.	  	   Indeed,	  such	  fears	  proved	  to	  be	  well	  founded.	  The	  Jesuit	  murder	  case	  rapidly	   accelerated	   the	   momentum	   toward	   a	   negotiated	   peace.	   With	   the	  wisdom	   of	   violent	   repression	   in	   doubt,	   Cristiani	   and	   other	   pragmatic	  ARENA	  politicians	  found	  themselves	  in	  a	  stronger	  position	  to	  override	  the	  military’s	  institutional	  resistance	  to	  a	  negotiated	  peace.	  As	  U.S.	  military	  aid	  declined	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   the	   military	   diminished	   as	   a	   political	   force.	  Moreover,	  with	   the	  FMLN	  benefiting	   from	  a	  modernised	  arsenal	  obtained	  from	  the	  Sandinistas,	  defeating	  the	  guerrillas	  on	  the	  battlefield	  became	  an	  ever	   more	   remote	   proposition. 615 	  In	   January	   1992,	   after	   months	   of	  painstaking	   arbitration	   by	   the	   United	   Nations,	   ARENA	   and	   the	   guerrillas	  ended	  twelve	  years	  of	  civil	  war	  with	  Treaty	  of	  Chapultepec.	  	   For	   Helms,	   the	   agreement	   was	   ‘no	   more	   than	   a	   piece	   of	   paper.’	  Convinced	   that	   ‘genuine	   peace’	   would	   only	   occur	   once	   the	   FMLN	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  612	  Robert	   Dornan	   (CA),	   “Stop	   The	   Communists,	   Stop	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   Killings,”	   Cong.	  
Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  17	  November,	  29886.	  
613 	  “Democrats	   Side	   with	   FMLN	   Against	   Cristiani,”	   Human	   Events,	   2	  December,	   1989,	   4,	   and	   Don	   Nickles	   (OK),	   “El	   Salvador,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   135	  (1989),	  29681.	  
614	  “El	  Salvador:	  Keep	  Your	  Eye	  on	  the	  Ball,”	  National	  Review,	  22	  December,	  1989,	  13.	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  Stanley,	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dismantled	   itself,	   he	   declared	   negotiations	   with	   the	   guerrillas	   were	   the	  ‘height	   of	   folly’.	   Rather	   than	   supporting	   Chapultepec,	   the	   United	   States	  ‘should	  provide	  as	  much	  military	  assistance	  as	  necessary	  to	  El	  Salvador	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  people	  of	  that	  country	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  toward	  real	  peace	   from	   a	   position	   of	   strength.’616 	  The	   senator	   had	   opposed	   each	  attempt	  by	  Congress	   to	   cut	   the	  military	  assistance	  budget	   for	  El	   Salvador	  during	   the	   early	   1990s,	   allying	   with	   a	   committed	   group	   of	   conservative	  senators	   who	   saw	   continued	   FMLN	   activity	   as	   an	   affront	   to	   the	   peace	  process.617	  Helms’	   strategy	  had	   little	   impact	   on	   a	  Congress	  determined	   to	  reduce	   military	   aid	   as	   the	   fledgling	   peace	   agreement	   took	   shape,	   but	   it	  nevertheless	   sustained	   his	   reputation	   among	   those	   conservatives	   who	  continued	  to	  believe	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  raging	  in	  El	  Salvador.618	  	   It	   was	   a	   sentiment	   almost	   entirely	   out	   of	   sync	   with	   congressional,	  administration,	   and	   mainstream	   Salvadoran	   opinion.	   While	   some	  Salvadorans	   to	   the	   right	   of	   Cristiani	   shared	   Helms’	   opinion,	   the	  disintegration	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   persuaded	   many	   in	   the	   country’s	  conservative	   community	   that	   the	   external	  driving	   force	  behind	   the	  FMLN	  had	  evaporated,	  thus	  making	  negotiations	  a	  more	  palatable	  proposition.619	  	   Helms’	   frustrated	   response	   reflected	   this	   changed	   policy	  environment.	   His	   brand	   of	   chauvinistic	   anti-­‐communism,	   reliant	   on	   the	  image	   of	   a	   Soviet	   Union	   as	   an	   intractable	   expansionist	   foe,	   had	   little	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  616 	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Further	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   Year	  1992,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  138	  (1992),	  7747.	  
617	  This	   group	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   old	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   Steve	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  voting	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  El	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  Leg.,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  30519,	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  Vote	  No.	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  Leg.,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	   136	   (1990),	   31255,	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  138	  (1992),	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618 	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   Events,	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   April,	   1992,	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  Events,	  10	  August,	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  18.	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relevance	   for	   El	   Salvador	   in	   a	   new	   unipolar	   world.	   	   The	   collapse	   of	   the	  Soviet	   Union	   in	   late	   1991,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   Sandinista	  government	   in	   neighbouring	   Nicaragua	   in	   1990,	   rendered	   the	   senator’s	  fears	   about	   external	   intervention	   in	   El	   Salvador	   moot.	   Furthermore,	  whereas	  Central	  America	  had	  dominated	  the	  nation’s	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  for	  a	  decade	  and	  a	  half,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  acted	  to	  reduce	  the	  United	  States’	  involvement	  in	  its	  neighbours’	  affairs.	  Accepting	  the	  United	  Nations	  as	   a	   mediation	   partner	   for	   the	   Salvadoran	   peace	   process	   was	   just	   one	  example	  of	  the	  administration’s	  desire	  to	  find	  a	  quick	  and	  effective	  solution	  to	  the	  region’s	  instability	  while	  lessening	  the	  United	  States’	  direct	  presence.	  	  Helms	   and	   his	   movement	   allies	   might	   well	   have	   sought	   continued	  military	   aid,	   but	   their	   rhetoric	   lacked	   resonance	   with	   those	   Salvadorans	  negotiating	  the	  peace	  process.	  Military	  stalemate,	  the	  demise	  of	  wider	  Cold	  War	   considerations,	   and	   recognition	   by	   Salvadorans	   –	   especially	   the	  country’s	   private	   sector	   –	   that	   stability	   and	   economic	   growth	   was	   only	  possible	   through	   peace,	   motivated	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   civil	   war	   to	   seek	  reconciliation.620	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   Bush’s	   moderation,	   combined	   with	  congressional	  pressure	  for	  aid	  cuts,	  fostered	  a	  political	  environment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  in	  which	  conservative,	  militarised	  Cold	  War	  policies	  floundered.621	  	  Indeed,	   calls	   for	   military	   aid	   directly	   threatened	   the	   nascent	   peace	  process	  by	   supporting	  what	  Stanley	  describes	  as	   the	  by-­‐now	   ‘discredited’	  ‘coercive	   strategy’	   represented	   by	   El	   Salvador’s	   army.	   The	   momentum	  toward	   peace	   had	   built	   precisely	   because	   armed	   resolution	   proved	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   Journal	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   No.	   3	  (August,	   2007),	   468-­‐473,	   Antonio	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   and	   Hêctor	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   D.C.:	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  Wilson	  Center	  Press,	  1999),	  72-­‐73,	  and	  Tricia	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  End	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  (Basingstoke:	  MacMillan	  Press,	  1998),	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impossible,	   and	   ARENA’s	   influence	   over	   the	   army	   had	   increased	   partly	  because	  U.S.	  military	  aid	  declined.622	  	  	  Helms’	   decision	   to	   convince	   D’Aubuisson	   and	   ARENA	   to	   engage	   in	  Salvadoran	   politics	   as	   loyal	   opposition	   made	   a	   small,	   but	   significant,	  contribution	   to	   the	   longer-­‐term	   prospects	   for	   peace.	   ARENA’s	   transition	  away	   from	   reactionary	   extremism	   toward	   constructive	   political	  engagement	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   was	   crucial	   in	   providing	   a	   vehicle	   for	   the	  oligarchy	  to	  participate	  in	  competitive	  politics.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  facilitated	  a	  re-­‐ordering	  of	  the	  civil-­‐military	  structures	  of	  Salvadoran	  society,	  as	  the	  army	  proved	   incapable	   of	   resisting	   the	   growing	   influence	   of	   the	   country’s	  powerful	  entrepreneurial	   sector.623	  As	   these	  elites	   realised	   the	  benefits	  of	  peace	  and	  stability	  outweighed	  the	  destruction	  and	  turmoil	  of	  the	  civil	  war,	  momentum	  built	  within	  ARENA	  for	  a	  negotiated	  settlement.624	  Thus,	  while	  Helms	  opposed	  the	  peace	  talks	  of	  the	  early	  1990s,	  his	  actions	  half	  a	  decade	  earlier	  had	  helped	  lay	  early	  foundations	  for	  this	  very	  process.	  	  The	   senator’s	   resistance	   to	   talks	   with	   the	   FMLN	   and	   his	   continued	  commitment	   to	   the	   D’Aubuisson	   wing	   of	   Salvadoran	   politics	   meant,	  however,	  that	  Helms	  remained	  a	  significant	  voice	  for	  a	  conservative	  foreign	  policy	   that	  did	  not	   acknowledge	   a	   finished	  –	  or	   even	  waning	  –	  Cold	  War.	  ‘Too	  many	  people	  equate	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  empire	  with	  the	  end	  of	  communism’,	   he	   told	   the	   Senate	   in	   his	   criticism	   of	   El	   Salvador’s	   peace.	  While	  Castro	  continued	  to	  repress	  his	  people	  and	  export	  revolution,	  Helms	  said,	   and	  while	   the	   Sandinistas	  maintained	   de	   facto	   control	   in	  Nicaragua,	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   William	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external	   support	   for	   communist	   guerrillas	   throughout	   Central	   America	  would	  continue.	  There	  also	  remained	  the	  Salvadoran	  nationalist	  streak	  that	  had	   long	   infused	   his	   rhetoric	   on	   the	   country’s	   plight,	   dating	   back	   to	   his	  support	   for	  D’Aubuisson	   in	   the	   early	  1980s.	   ‘I	  will	   do	   everything	   I	   can	   to	  assist	  the	  people	  of	  El	  Salvador	  in	  their	  struggle	  for	  victory’,	  he	  claimed,	  as	  he	  voted	  against	  1992	  appropriations	  that	  sent	  military	  aid	  to	  the	  country	  only	  in	  the	  form	  of	  non-­‐lethal	  material.	  ‘The	  fight	  is	  not	  yet	  over.’	  625	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Nicaragua,	  1985-­‐1992	  	  	   The	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  Contra	  campaign	  had	  seen	  Helms	  largely	  in	  lockstep	  with	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   over	   its	   Nicaragua	   policy,	   as	   he	  and	  movement	  conservatives	  worked	  in	  tandem	  with	  a	  White	  House	  keen	  to	   emphasise	   a	   military	   solution	   to	   its	   Sandinista	   problem.	   The	   second	  phase	   of	   Helms’	   activities	   toward	   Nicaragua,	   however,	   suffered	   intense	  turbulence,	  as	  he	  struggled	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  policy	  climate.	  In	   the	   aftermath	  of	   the	   Iran-­‐Contra	   affair,	   the	  Reagan	  administration	  was	  unable	   to	   maintain	   its	   hard-­‐line	   approach	   to	   Nicaragua,	   and	   its	   political	  leadership	  of	  the	  Contra	  cause	  evaporated	  as	  it	  attempted	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  damaging	   consequences	   of	   the	   scandal.	   The	   new	   policy	   reality	   forced	  Reagan	   into	   reluctant	   support	   for	   regional	   peace	   talks,	   and	   his	   successor	  followed	  by	   fully	   accepting	   a	  diplomatic	   and	   electoral	   solution.	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  pulled	  back	  from	  the	  Contras	  to	  an	  even	  greater	  extent,	  supporting	  a	  mixed	  coalition	  of	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  political	  forces	  in	  the	  1990	  Nicaraguan	  elections,	  and	  allowing	  the	  Contras	  to	  wither	  away	  as	  a	  policy	  instrument.	  	  Helms’	  response	  to	  these	  events	  illustrated	  the	  tensions	  that	  suddenly	  emerged	  among	  conservatives	  over	  Nicaragua	  policy.	  Largely	  united	  when	  faced	  with	  President	  Carter	   as	   an	  opponent,	   and	   supportive	  of	  Reagan	  as	  Contra	   policy	   took	   shape	   in	   the	   early	   1980s,	   conservatism	   struggled	   to	  reconcile	   itself	  with	   the	   new	   policy	   atmosphere	   of	   the	   late	   1980s.	   Helms	  emerged	  as	  a	  beacon	  for	  a	  pro-­‐Contra	  community	  that	  increasingly	  argued	  against	  Reagan’s	  Nicaragua	  agenda,	  after	  staunchly	  defending	  the	  president	  and	  his	   advisers	   throughout	   the	   Iran-­‐Contra	   scandal.	   Subsequently,	  when	  George	  Bush	  looked	  to	  mend	  the	  bitter	  divisions	  of	  Central	  America	  policy	  and	   shift	   U.S.	   interest	   away	   from	   the	   Contras	   and	   the	   Sandinistas,	   Helms	  continued	   to	   preach	   a	   pro-­‐Contra	   conservative	   foreign	   policy	   that	  maintained	  the	  spotlight	  on	  Nicaragua.	  Like	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  Helms’	  policies	  in	   Nicaragua	   in	   the	   later	   1980s	   and	   early	   1990s	   illustrate	   both	   the	  longevity	  of	  Cold	  War	  conservatism	  and	   its	   frustrated	  struggle	  with	   those	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who	   wished	   –	   or	   were	   forced	   –	   to	   adopt	   pragmatism	   as	   the	   price	   for	  maintaining	  at	  least	  some	  control	  of	  policy.	  	  ‘Jesse	  Helms’	  Boys’:	  Lew	  Tambs	  and	  the	  Contras	  	   All	   of	   this,	   however,	   seemed	   inconceivable	   in	   spring	   1985.	   At	   this	  moment,	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   forces	   enjoyed	   a	   sudden	   upturn	   in	   fortunes.	  Congress	   showed	   increasing,	   albeit	   still	   cautious,	   support	   for	   the	  Contras,	  because	  of	  increasing	  discontent	  with	  the	  Sandinista	  government,	  changes	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Contras,	  a	  perception	  that	  the	  administration	  had	  begun	   to	   compromise	   in	   its	   approach,	   and	   a	   concerted	   effort	   by	   the	  president	  and	  conservatives	  to	  persuade	  moderates	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  their	  cause. 626 	  Helms	   contributed	   to	   the	   lobbying	   effort	   for	   a	   rehabilitated	  Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	   Nicaragua.	   In	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee	   hearings	  devoted	  to	  Central	  America,	  he	  decried	  those	  who	  had	  ‘mutilated’	  Reagan’s	  policies	   out	   of	   domestic	   political	   concerns,	   even	   as	   he	   reminded	   those	  present	   of	   an	   imminent	   immigration	   crisis	   that	   would	   bring	   twenty-­‐five	  million	   people	   flooding	   into	   the	   country.	   The	  magnitude	   of	   the	   situation	  was	  clear	  in	  the	  options	  facing	  the	  country:	  it	  was	  not	  ‘a	  choice	  between	  a	  little	   bit	   of	   nonintervention	   [sic]	   here	   and	   something	   else.	   It	   may	   be	   a	  choice	   of	   survival,	   of	   freedom	   in	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America.’627	  When	  Contra	  aid	  came	  before	  the	  Senate	  in	  1985,	  Helms	  told	  his	  fellow	  legislators	  that	  they	  must	  ‘decide	  whether	  the	  United	  States	  wants	  to	  support	  freedom	  and	   human	   rights,	   or	   whether	   one	   more	   nation	   will	   fall	   by	   default	   to	  Marxism-­‐Leninism.’628	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  626	  Arnson,	  Crossroads,	  183.	  
627	  U.S.	   Senate,	   Committee	   on	   Foreign	   Relations,	   The	   Situation	   in	   Central	  
America,	  19	  April,	  1985,	  16-­‐17.	  
628	  Jesse	  Helms	   (NC),	   “Nicaragua	   –	   The	   Chance	   to	  Decide,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  131	  (1985),	  8837.	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Through	  such	  efforts,	  the	  campaign	  was	  able	  to	  secure	  a	  narrow	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  new	  funds	  for	  the	  rebels.	  Yet	  the	  senator’s	  role	  in	  the	  resurgent	  Contra	   network	   was	   not	   limited	   to	   oratory.	   In	   one	   of	   his	   most	   direct	  contributions	   to	   the	   cause,	   Helms	   secured	   Lewis	   Tambs	   the	   post	   of	  Ambassador	   to	   Costa	   Rica	   in	   August	   1985.	   According	   to	   Tambs’	  predecessor	   in	  Costa	  Rica,	   Secretary	  of	   State	  George	  Shultz	  permitted	   the	  appointment	   in	   order	   to	   pacify	   Helms	   at	   a	   time	   of	   conservative	  consternation	   over	   a	   perceived	   Shultzian	   ‘purge’	   of	   conservatives	   within	  the	  State	  Department.629	  The	  senator	  had	  previously	  pressured	  the	  Reagan	  administration	   to	   appoint	   Tambs	   as	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   in	   the	  Bureau	  of	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs,	  and,	  despite	  Tambs’	  historical	  opposition	  to	   the	   Canal	   Treaties,	   as	   ambassador	   to	   Panama. 630 	  Curtin	   Winsor,	  ambassador	   to	  Costa	  Rica	   before	  Tambs	   and	   an	   admirer	   of	  Helms’	   policy	  positions,	  described	  Tambs	  as	  ‘one	  of	  Jesse	  Helms’	  boys.’631	  	  Tambs	  had	  lost	  none	  of	  his	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  rollback	  of	  communism	  since	  helping	  to	  author	  the	  Santa	  Fe	  Document,	  and	  had	  enjoyed	  influence	  in	   policymaking	   in	   the	   first	   years	   of	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	   National	   Security	   Council	   staff,	   alongside	   fellow	   Santa	   Fe	  veteran	  Roger	  Fontaine.632	  While	  serving	  at	  the	  NSC,	  he	  continued	  to	  act	  as	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  Curtin	  Winsor,	  interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  29	  February,	  1988,	  
ADST.	   See	   also	   M.	   Stanton	   Evans,	   “Shultz	   Shoots	   the	   Wounded	   At	   State	  Dep’t,”	   Human	   Events,	   26	   January,	   1985,	   9,	   “State	   Department	   Shakeup	  Alarms	   Conservatives,”	   Human	   Events,	   29	   December,	   1984,	   3,	   John	   M.	  Goshko	   and	   Lou	   Cannon,	   “Conservatives	   Suspicious	   of	   Shultz	   Purge,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  23	  December,	  1984,	  A1.	  
630 	  Gutman,	   Banana	   Diplomacy,	   308,	   Michael	   Getler,	   “Clark	   Curbs	  Administration	   Turf	   Struggles,”	  Washington	   Post,	   17	   May,	   1982,	   A9,	   and	  Edward	   Walsh,	   “Some	   Key	   Reagan	   Foreign	   Policy	   Aides	   Remain	   in	  Bureaucratic	  Twilight	  Zone,”	  Washington	  Post,	  14	  April,	  1981,	  A3	  
631	  Curtin	  Winsor,	  interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  29	  February,	  1988,	  
ADST.	  
632 	  Hepple,	   “Lewis	   Tambs,”	   12-­‐15.	   Tambs’	   outlook	   is	   also	   noted	   in	  interviews	   with	   former	   Department	   of	   State	   personnel.	   See	   Charles	  Anthony	  Gillespie	  Jr.,	   interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  19	  September,	  1995,	  ADST.	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a	  beacon	   for	   conservatives	  who	  saw	  Central	  American	   instability	   through	  an	   East-­‐West	   framework,	   earning	   the	   praise	   of	   Barry	  Goldwater	   for	   such	  analysis.633	  As	  ambassador	  in	  Colombia,	  from	  May	  1983	  to	  February	  1985,	  Tambs	  delighted	  Helms	  with	  his	  aggressive	  and	  interventionist	  leadership	  of	   anti-­‐drugs	   programmes.	   The	   senator	   praised	   Tambs	   for	   helping	  orchestrate	  what	  he	  described	  as	   ‘the	  world’s	  biggest	  drug	  bust’,	   in	  which	  Colombian	  forces,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  U.S.	  Embassy	  observer,	  seized	  almost	  14	   tonnes	   of	   cocaine	   worth	   $1.2	   billion.634	  Critics,	   however,	   were	   less	  impressed	  by	  Tambs’	  unorthodox	  methods,	  which	  they	  felt	   intensified	  the	  threat	   to	   American	   officials	   working	   in	   Colombia.635 	  Among	   the	   more	  controversial	   elements	  of	  Tambs’	  approach	  was	  his	   invention	  of	   the	   term	  ‘narcoguerrilla’,	  which,	  while	  popular	  with	  conservatives	  looking	  to	  further	  chastise	  the	  immorality	  of	  communist	  rebels,	  insulted	  Colombian	  traditions	  that	   saw	   counterrevolutionaries	   as	   idealistic	   –	   even	   romantic	   –	   figures	  of	  heroism.636	  	  Nicaragua	  was	   never	   off	   the	   radar	   though.	   The	   ambassador	   kept	   in	  touch	  with	  another	  acquaintance	  from	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  network,	  Oliver	  North,	   who,	   like	   members	   of	   Helms’	   staff,	   shared	   a	   commitment	   to	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  Barry	  Goldwater	   (AZ),	   “Concerns	   For	  Central	  America,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	   128	  (1982),	  2511.	  
634	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “The	  Achievement	  of	  Ambassador	  Tambs,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  130	   (1984),	   6157,	   and	   “World’s	   largest	   drug	   bust	   made	   in	   Colombia	  jungles,”	  Chicago	  Tribune,	  21	  March,	  1984,	  d5.	  
635	  J.	  Phillip	  Mclean,	  who	  served	  as	  deputy	  director	  and	  director	  of	  Andean	  Affairs	   at	   the	   State	   Department,	   remembered	   Tambs’	   strategy	   required	  extra	   security	   precautions	   for	   the	   ambassador.	   Tambs	   himself	   travelled	  with	  personal	  firearms:	  “I	  must	  say	  it	  made	  me	  a	  little	  bit	  nervous”,	  Mclean	  recalled.	  J.	  Phillip	  Mclean,	  interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  11	  January,	  1999,	  ADST.	  
636	  For	  more	  on	  Tambs’	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘narcoguerrilla’,	  see	  Merrill	  Collett,	  “The	   Myth	   of	   the	   ‘Narco-­‐Guerrillas,”	   The	  Nation,	   13	   August,	   1988,	   1.	   See	  also	   J.	   Phillip	   Mclean,	   interview	   by	   Charles	   Stuart	   Kennedy,	   11	   January,	  1999,	  ADST.	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intensifying	   the	   southern	   front	   in	   the	   war	   in	   Nicaragua.637	  In	   November	  1985,	  Tambs	  was	  sent	  to	  Costa	  Rica	  as	  ambassador,	  ostensibly	  because	  of	  that	  nation’s	   strategic	  value	   in	   the	   fight	  against	   communism.638	  In	   fact,	  he	  was	  dispatched	  with	  the	  specific	  intention	  of	  opening	  a	  southern	  front,	  on	  the	  orders	  of	  both	  North	  and	  Elliot	  Abrams.639	  The	  initiative	  was	  known	  to	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  pro-­‐Contra	  Washington	  insiders,	  and	  was	  not	  authorised	  by	   Congress.	   It	   continued	   a	   pattern	   for	   Tambs,	   after	   he	   had	   previously	  acknowledged	   to	   his	   managers	   at	   the	   State	   Department	   that,	   while	  acknowledging	  their	  instructions,	  his	  activities	  in	  Colombia	  had	  been	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  White	  House	  officials.640	  	  Political	   appointees	  were	   not	   viewed	  with	   overt	   suspicion	   by	   those	  running	   the	   State	   Department	   at	   the	   time.	   Ronald	   Spiers,	   who	   helped	  oversee	  personnel	  as	  Undersecretary	  of	  Management	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  State	   between	   1983	   and	   1989,	   later	   argued	   ‘a	   modicum	   of	   political	  appointees	  is	  good	  for	  the	  Foreign	  Service.’641	  Nor,	  of	  course,	  was	  it	  unusual	  for	   the	   administration,	   or	   indeed	   any	   administration,	   to	   use	   ideological	  allies	   within	   the	   ambassadorial	   system.	   Yet	   in	   the	   fragmented	   policy	  bureaucracy	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  where	  competing	  constellations	  of	   activists	   vied	   for	   influence,	   placing	   one	   of	   the	   most	   hard-­‐line	   Contra	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  Oliver	   North,	   Under	   Fire:	   An	   American	   Story	   (New	   York:	   Harper	  Paperbacks,	   1992),	   302.	   Edward	   A.	   Lynch,	   a	   member	   of	   the	  administration’s	  Office	  of	  Public	  Liaison,	  recalls	  a	  meeting	  at	  the	  American	  Security	  council	  in	  which	  a	  member	  of	  Helms’	  staff	  called	  on	  the	  attending	  Contra	   representative	   to	   increase	   their	   actions	   in	   southern	   Nicaragua.	  Lynch,	  Cold	  War’s	  Last	  Battlefield,	  223.	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  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “The	  Achievement	  of	  Ambassador	  Lew	  Tambs,”	  Cong.	  
Rec.133	  (1987),	  11994.	  
639	  James	  L.	  Tull,	  interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  15	  June,	  2001,	  ADST.	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  J.	  Phillip	  Mclean,	  interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  11	  January,	  1999,	  
ADST.	  
641	  Ronald	   I.	   Spiers,	   interview	   by	   Charles	   Stuart	   Kennedy,	   11	   November,	  1991,	  ADST.	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advocates	   in	   such	   a	   significant	   post	   tilted	   the	   field	   toward	   the	   illegal	  operations	  then	  being	  run	  by	  North	  and	  his	  associates.	  	  This	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  mutually	  reinforcing	  nature	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	   community.	   Having	   Tambs	   in	   close	   proximity	   to	   Contra	  operations	   on	   the	   ground,	   operating	   among	   a	   community	   devoted	   to	   the	  Contras	   as	   the	   sole	   instrument	   of	   U.S.	   policy	   in	   Nicaragua,	   led	   to	   the	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  of	  policy	  initiatives	  that	  had	  no	  relation	  to	  other	   parts	   of	   the	   administration’s	   strategy.	   James	   Tull,	   who	   served	   as	  Tambs’	   assistant	   in	   Costa	   Rica,	   believed	   that	   Tambs,	   North,	   Abrams,	   and	  CIA	   Central	   American	   task	   force	   director	   Allen	   Fiers	   were	   essentially	  implementing	  their	  own	  Contra	  agenda	  unilaterally.642	  	  	  One	  of	   the	  most	  notable	   incidents	   that	  demonstrated	   the	  dangers	  of	  the	  network’s	  multi-­‐track	  policy	  involved	  Contra	  commander	  Eden	  Pastora.	  A	   leading	   Sandinista	   during	   the	   Revolution,	   Pastora	   rapidly	   grew	  disillusioned	  with	   the	  new	  government	   in	  Managua.	  After	   disavowing	  his	  former	   comrades,	   Pastora	   was	   contacted	   by	   the	   CIA’s	   Latin	   America	  operations	  chief	  Duane	  “Dewey”	  Claridge.	  Claridge	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  former	   Sandinista	   represented	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   Contra	   leader:	  charismatic,	   bold,	   and,	   crucially,	   one	   who	   enjoyed	   popular	   support	   in	  Nicaragua.643	  Despite	  a	  positive	  start,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Pastora	   broke	   down.	   U.S.	   officials	   described	   him	   variously	   as	   ‘singularly	  ineffective’	   and	   ‘disorganized	   and	   unstable’. 644 	  In	   1984,	   after	   Pastora	  refused	   to	   ally	  with	   the	   CIA-­‐backed	  Nicaraguan	  Democratic	   Force	   (FDN),	  assistance	  to	  his	  faction	  was	  terminated.645	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  642	  James	  L.	  Tull,	  interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  15	  June,	  2001,	  ADST.	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  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  295.	  
644	  Curtin	  Winsor,	  interview	  by	  Charles	  Stuart	  Kennedy,	  29	  February,	  1988,	  
ADST,	  and	  Pardo-­‐Maurer,	  The	  Contras,	  20.	  
645	  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  465.	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Though	  other	  members	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  were	  relieved	  to	   be	   rid	   of	   Pastora,	   Helms	   was	   outraged.	   The	   senator	   was	   a	   leading	  supporter	   of	   Pastora	   and	   had	   developed	   a	   close	   relationship	   with	   him,	  going	  as	   far	  as	   to	   label	   the	  Nicaraguan	   ‘the	  one	  authentic	   folk	  hero	  of	   the	  revolution’.646	  Pastora	   contacted	   Helms	   in	   1985	   to	   ask	   for	   assistance	   in	  regaining	  U.S.	  support,	  and	  both	  the	  senator	  and	  his	  aide	  Deborah	  DeMoss	  subsequently	  met	  with	   the	   guerrilla	   leader.	   The	   following	   year,	   in	  March	  1986,	   General	   John	   Singlaub	   (ret.),	   a	   close	   acquaintance	   of	   Helms	   and	  founder	  of	   the	  U.S.	  chapter	  of	   the	  World	  Anticommunist	  League,	   travelled	  to	  Central	  America	  to	  meet	  with	  Pastora.647	  Singlaub	  was	  an	  active	  member	  of	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   and	   a	   leading	   private	   fundraiser	   for	   the	  rebels,	   having	  been	  dismissed	   from	  his	   command	  by	  President	  Carter	   for	  publicly	  criticising	  the	  president’s	  Korea	  policy	  in	  1977.648	  	  While	  DeMoss	  denied	  that	  Helms	  or	  his	  office	  had	  urged	  Singlaub	  to	  visit	   Pastora,	   Tambs	   claimed	   the	   general	  was	  Helms’	   envoy.649	  There	  was	  no	  direct	  link	  between	  the	  senator	  and	  the	  substance	  of	  Singlaub’s	  visit,	  but	  good	  news	  followed	  for	  Helms	  when,	  after	  meeting	  with	  the	  retired	  general,	  Pastora	   agreed	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	   FDN	   in	   return	   for	   a	   resumption	   in	  assistance.650	  The	  accord	  essentially	  altered	  official	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  the	  Contras	   by	   re-­‐engaging	   with	   the	   previously	   discredited	   Pastora.	   Tambs	  denied	  allegations	   from	  the	  State	  Department	   that	  he	  had	  authorised	   this	  unsanctioned	   deal,	   reporting	   to	   his	   superiors	   that	   neither	   he,	   nor	   any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  646	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “The	   Nicaraguan	   Resistance:	   Is	   It	   Being	   Sold	   Down	  The	  River?”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  131	  (1985),	  6641.	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  Link,	  Righteous	  Warrior,	  333	  –	  334.	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  “Gen.	  Singlaub	  forced	  to	  retire	  after	  criticizing	  Carter,”	  Chicago	  Tribune,	  29	   April,	   1978,	   2,	   and	   Storer	   Rowley,	   “Private	   funds	   fuel	   contras’	   fight,”	  
Chicago	  Tribune,	  9	  September,	  1985,	  12.	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  Pastora/Singlaub	   Agreement,	   Top	   Secret,	   Cable	   San	   Jose,	   26	   March,	  1986,	  DNSA.	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  Ibid.	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member	   of	   his	   embassy,	   was	   linked	   in	   any	   way	   to	   the	   agreement.651	  Nevertheless,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Shultz	  ordered	  Tambs	   to	  disavow	  the	   agreement	   out	   of	   fears	   it	   could	   embarrass	   the	   U.S.	   government.	   The	  ambassador	  was	  told	  to	  notify	  Pastora	  that	  the	  arrangement	  was	  void.652	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   episode	  was	   a	   short-­‐lived	   embarrassment	   for	   the	  U.S.,	   and	   threatened	   to	   undermine	   attempts	   to	   forge	   a	   unified	   Contra	  movement.	  Tambs,	  despite	  his	  close	  association	  with	  Helms,	  was	  suspicious	  of	  Pastora,	  and	  believed	  the	  senator’s	  support	  for	  the	  guerrilla	  damaged	  the	  overall	   Contra	   strategy. 653 	  Yet	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   disagree	   with	   the	   State	  Department’s	  finding	  that	  Tambs’	  involvement	  in	  the	  deal	  –	  particularly	  his	  decision	   to	   transmit	   the	   agreement	   to	   Washington	   –	   represented	   ‘an	  unwarranted	  stamp	  of	  official	  approval.’654	  Not	  only	  did	  it	  further	  fragment	  Contra	   policy,	   it	   also	   reinforced	   the	   belief	   among	   observers	   that	   Tambs’	  independent	  streak	  made	  him	  unsuitable	  for	  such	  a	  senior	  position.655	  Even	  Winsor	  believed	  Tambs	  lacked	  political	  courage,	  and	  noted	  that	  because	  of	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   Agreement,	   [Lewis	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   Response	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  about	  Eden	  Pastora-­‐John	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  Secret,	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  San	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  Pastora-­‐Singlaub	   Agreement,	   [George	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   Instructions	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   John	   Singlaub	   is	   Not	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   Authorized	   Negotiator	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  Secret,	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   registered	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   hope	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   when	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  Agreement,	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   Secret,	   Cable	   San	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   March,	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   Secretary	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   State,	   registered	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   Agreement,	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Tambs’	  actions,	  Contra	  policy	  suffered	  ‘much	  deeper	  trouble	  than	  it	  should	  have’.656	  	  This	   confused	   affair,	   which	   involved	   a	   multitude	   of	   foreign	  governments	   and	   private	   individuals	   working	   alongside,	   and	   often	   in	  tension	  with,	  U.S.	  government	  actors,	  was	  symptomatic	  of	   the	  wider	   Iran-­‐Contra	   scandal	   that	   was	   soon	   to	   hit	   the	   headlines. 657 	  It	   also	   raised	  controversy	  around	  the	  Contra	  programme	  at	  precisely	  the	  time	  Congress	  was	  gearing	  up	  for	  battle	  over	  Reagan’s	  $100	  million	  lethal	  aid	  request	  for	  1986.	  Only	   the	  week	  before,	   the	  president’s	   annual	   funding	  proposal	   had	  been	  defeated	  after	  the	  administration	  withdrew	  from	  its	  cautious	  alliance	  with	  Rep.	  Dave	  McCurdy	  (D-­‐OK)	  and	  his	  bloc	  of	  Contra	  swing	  votes.658	  On	  top	   of	   this	   damaging	   blow	   to	   Contra	   policy,	   additional	   negative	   coverage	  created	   by	   the	   Pastora	   episode	   could	   have	   dealt	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   a	  serious	  blow.	  	  As	  it	  was,	  the	  embarrassment	  was	  cut	  short	  by	  a	  Sandinista	  incursion	  into	  Honduras	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  House	  vote.	  Though	  Sandinista	  attacks	  on	  Contra	  camps	  inside	  its	  neighbour’s	  territory	  were	  nothing	  new,	  the	  White	  House	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  generate	  additional	  support	  for	  its	  Nicaragua	  policy.	   Under	   intense	   pressure	   from	   administration	   officials,	   Honduras	  played	   up	   the	   incident,	   and	   enough	   Democrats	   were	   discouraged	   by	   the	  apparent	   Sandinista	   aggression	   to	   pass	   the	   president’s	   $100	   million	   aid	  request.659	  Helms	   declared	   before	   the	   Senate	   that	   the	   Sandinistas,	   ‘under	  Cuban	   and	   Soviet	   supervision,	   have	   arrogantly	   invaded	   Honduras’	   and	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Contra	  ‘blood	  is	  still	  flowing	  as	  we	  talk.’	  When	  the	  upper	  chamber	  voted	  on	  the	   aid	   bill	   on	   27	   March,	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   won	   a	   surprising	  victory,	  53-­‐47.660	  	  During	  his	  floor	  speech,	  Helms	  ratcheted	  up	  the	  pressure	  by	  attacking	  opponents	   of	   Contra	   aid	   as	   weak	   and	   saying	   they	   would	   be	   responsible	  should	   Central	   America	   fall	   to	   communism.	   It	   was	   a	   strategy	   that	  conservatives	  in	  the	  White	  House	  had	  been	  advocating	  from	  the	  start	  of	  the	  year,	  with	  Pat	  Buchanan	   telling	  Reagan’s	   chief	  of	   staff	   in	   January	   that	   the	  administration	  must	   ‘admonish	   Congress	   either	   to	   give	   the	  White	   House	  the	  military	   assistance	   needed	   for	   the	   Freedom	   Fighters	   and	   the	   Central	  American	  allies	  to	  prevail,	  or	  take	  full	  responsibility	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  Central	  America	   to	   the	   Soviet	   Union.’661	  The	   senator’s	   statement	   that	   the	   vote	  would	   ‘let	   us	   see	   who	   stands	   where	   with	   respect	   to	   protecting	   the	  American	  people	  from	  the	  inevitable	  if	  Central	  America	  is	  allowed	  to	  fall	  as	  the	  latest	  victim	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Communists’	  was	  in	  perfect	  harmony	  with	   Buchanan’s	   public	   relations	   strategy,	   and	   provided	   congressional	  support	  for	  the	  administration’s	  aggressive	  pro-­‐Contra	  campaign.662	  	  Meanwhile,	  Helms	  pressed	  the	  principled	  conservative	  Contra	  agenda	  by	   introducing	   his	   own	   funding	   proposal	   to	   authorise	   Reagan’s	   original	  1985	   aid	   programme	   –	   military	   aid	   dispensed	   by	   the	   CIA	   –	   unless	   the	  Sandinistas	  met	  a	   series	  of	   conditions,	   including	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  and	   Cuban	   forces,	   cessation	   of	   subversive	   activities	   in	   neighbouring	  countries,	  adherence	  to	  promises	  made	  to	  the	  OAS	  and	  Contadora	  groups,	  and	  free	  elections	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.663	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  660	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Aid	   To	   Contras,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	   132	   (1986),	   6290,	   and	  “Rollcall	  Vote	  No.	  51	  Leg.,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  132	  (1986),	  6520.	  
661	  Memo,	   Pat	   Buchanan	   to	   Donald	   Regan,	   9	   January,	   1986,	   ID364321,	  CO114	  Box	  140	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	  
662	  Helms,	  “Aid	  To	  Contras,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  132	  (1986),	  6290.	  
663	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Aid	  To	  Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  132	  (1986),	  6404.	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  Amid	  a	  bipartisan	  effort	   to	   find	  a	   compromise	   that	  would	  provide	  a	  strong	  show	  of	  support	  for	  Reagan’s	  policy,	  the	  proposal	  –	  which	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  link	  the	  aid	  to	  on-­‐going	  negotiations	  –	  was	  too	  provocative	  to	  be	  viable.664 	  It	   was	   rejected	   39-­‐60,	   but	   served	   as	   a	   reminder	   of	   Helms’	  commitment	   to	   a	   more	   robust	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	   Nicaragua.665	  It	   also	  helped	  to	  sustain	   the	  conservative	  argument	   that,	  while	   the	  Contras	  were	  suffering	   without	   U.S.	   assistance,	   they	   could	   win	   the	   war	   if	   Congress	  provided	   the	   necessary	  military	   aid.666	  When	   Helms	   asked	   his	   colleagues	  ‘What	   happens	   if	   the	   conditions	   are	   right	   for	   a	   sweeping	   forward	  movement?’,	  the	  implicit	  suggestion	  was	  that	  with	  the	  right	  aid,	  the	  Contras	  could	  make	  significant	  military	  gains	  against	  the	  Sandinistas.667	  	  Helms	   also	   promoted	   executive	   supremacy	   in	   the	   foreign	   policy	  process.	  He	  told	  Senate	  colleagues	  that	  ‘we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  make	  foreign	  policy’,	  and	  though	  ‘It	  would	  be	  perfectly	  proper	  for	  Congress	  to	  say	  what	  we	  think	  should	  be	  done…	  we	  have	  no	  constitutional	  authority	  to	  say	  what	   shall	   be	   done	   under	   the	   President’s	   authority	   to	   conduct	   foreign	  relations.’	   His	   amendment,	   Helms	   argued,	   supported	   Reagan’s	   position:	  ‘The	   question	   then	   is	  whether	  we	   go	   all	   out	   to	   support	   the	   President,	   or	  whether	  we	  hobble	  his	  actions	  to	  support	  freedom	  in	  Central	  America.’668	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  664	  Dorothy	  Collin,	   “Senate	   leaders	  seek	  deal	  on	  contras,”	  Chicago	  Tribune,	  26	  March,	  1986,	  12,	  Steven	  V.	  Roberts,	  “Party	  Chiefs	  Seek	  ‘Common	  Ground’	  On	   Contras,”	   The	   New	   York	   Times,	   25	   March,	   1986,	   A18,	   and	   Milton	  Coleman	   and	   Lou	   Cannon,	   “Contra	   Bill	   Compromise	   Sought,”	  Washington	  
Post,	  25	  March,	  1986,	  A9.	  
665	  “Rollcall	  Vote	  No.	  47	  Leg.,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  132	  (1986),	  6407.	  
666	  “The	  Contras	  Can	  Win,”	  Human	  Events,	  22	  March,	  1986,	  1,	  and	  Patrick	  J.	  Buchanan,	  “The	  Contras	  Need	  Our	  Help,”	  Washington	  Post,	  5	  March,	  1986,	  A19.	  
667 	  Helms,	   “Aid	   To	   Nicaraguan	   Democratic	   Resistance,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   132	  (1986),	  6405.	  
668	  Ibid.,	  6405.	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  Of	   course	   Helms’	   commitment	   to	   defending	   Reagan’s	   authority	  reflected	  his	  faith	  in	  the	  administration’s	  strategy	  at	  this	  point.	  As	  was	  the	  case	   throughout	   his	   involvement	   in	   Central	   America	   across	   the	   period,	  there	  was	  often	  a	  direct	  relationship	  between	  the	  senator’s	  advocacy	  of	  the	  executive	  branch’s	  constitutional	  prerogatives	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  White	   House	   followed	   a	   path	   acceptable	   to	   Helms.	   In	   this	   case,	   with	   the	  Reagan	   administration	   launching	   an	   intensive	   campaign	   at	   the	   start	   of	  1986	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Contras	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  ardent	  anti-­‐Sandinistas	  in	  the	  White	  House,	  and	  buoyed	  by	  the	  conservative	  policies	  being	  promoted	  by	  the	  new	  national	  security	  adviser,	  John	  Poindexter,	  the	  senator	  appeared	  at	  ease	  with	  the	  Executive.669	  	  	   There	   was	   great	   success	   for	   the	   administration	   again,	   in	   August,	  when	  the	  Senate	  agreed	  to	  Reagan’s	  new	  request	  for	  $100	  million	  in	  Contra	  aid.	   The	   celebrations,	   however,	   were	   short-­‐lived.	   On	   3	   November,	   the	  Lebanese	   magazine	   Ash-­‐Shiraa	   published	   an	   article	   describing	   how	   the	  administration	   had	   negotiated	   with	   Iran	   to	   provide	   that	   country	   with	  weapons	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  release	  of	  several	  American	  hostages	  held	  by	  the	  Iranian-­‐backed	  Hezbollah	  group.	  On	  22	  November,	  while	  investigating	  the	  magazine’s	   claims,	  Attorney	  General	   Ed	  Meese	  discovered	  documents	  implicating	  Oliver	  North	  and	  several	  colleagues	   in	   the	  transfer	  of	  residual	  funds	   from	   the	   Iran	   weapons	   deal	   to	   the	   Contras.	   Three	   days	   later,	  President	   Reagan	   told	   Americans	   that	   he	   was	   ‘deeply	   troubled’	   by	   the	  ‘seriously	   flawed’	   implementation	   of	   his	   policy	   to	   free	   the	   hostages,	   and	  promised	  an	  investigation.670	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal	  had	  begun.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  669	  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  445-­‐446,	  and	  Letter,	  Senator	  Jesse	  Helms	  to	  John	  Poindexter,	  30	  April,	  1986,	  ID414989,	  FG006-­‐12,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	  
670	  “Remarks	   Announcing	   the	   Review	   of	   the	   National	   Security	   Council's	  Role	   in	   the	   Iran	  Arms	   and	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   Aid	   Controversy,	   25	  November,	   1986,”	  
The	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  Papers	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  accessed	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  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Scandal,	  1986-­‐1988	  	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  affair	  would	  become	  the	  largest	  single	  foreign	  policy	  scandal	   Reagan	   would	   face	   as	   president.	   Over	   the	   next	   year,	   as	   various	  investigations	  into	  the	  matter	  took	  their	  course,	  Helms	  resolutely	  defended	  Reagan,	   seeking	   to	   insulate	   the	   president	   from	   criticism	   as	   his	   approval	  rating	  began	  to	  collapse.671	  He	  also	  maintained	  a	  consistent	  defence	  of	  the	  Contra	   programme,	   and	   defended	   those	   implicated	   in	   the	   scandal	   as	  patriots	  seeking	  to	   implement	   the	  president’s	  national	  security	  policies	   in	  the	   face	  of	  media	  misrepresentation	  and	  congressional	  resistance.	  Finally,	  he	   sought	   to	  minimise	   the	   scope	  and	   resonance	  of	   investigations	   into	   the	  scandal	   and	   the	   potential	   legal	   consequences	   for	   those	   implicated.	   As	  Helms’	   aide	   Clint	   Fuller	   told	   the	   White	   House	   in	   a	   12	   December	   letter,	  before	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  had	  been	  established,	  ‘we’re	  on	  your	  side.	  Keep	  up	  the	  good	  works.’672	  	  Helms’	  defence	  of	   the	  president	  began	   in	  December,	  when	  his	  office	  distributed	   a	   pro-­‐forma	   letter	   to	   those	   who	   had	   contacted	   the	   senator	  about	   the	   scandal.	   Noting	   the	   large	   amount	   of	   correspondence	   about	   the	  affair,	  the	  senator	  opened	  with	  a	  plea	  for	  restraint:	  	  My	   own	   feeling,	   based	   on	   a	   fair	   amount	   of	   experience	   in	   this	  city	   -­‐	   -­‐	   and	   a	   close-­‐range	   observation	   of	   how	   the	  major	   news	  media	  operate	   -­‐	   -­‐	   leads	  me	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   country	  would	  be	  best	  served	   if	   (1)	  voices	  could	  be	   lowered	  a	  bit,	  and	  (2)	  all	  of	  us	  would	  wait	  to	  see	  precisely	  how	  the	  facts	  develop.	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  LeoGrande,	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  484.	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  Letter,	   Clint	   Fuller	   to	   Pat,	   12	   December,	   1986,	   folder	   “Helms,	   Jesse	   A.	  (18),”	  WHORM:	  Alpha	  File,	  RRL.	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Bearing	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  senator	  added,	  Americans	  should	  remember	  the	   successes	   of	   Reagan’s	   presidency.	   ‘His	   administration	   has	   raised	   the	  prestige,	   security	   and	   independence	   of	   the	   United	   States’,	   the	   senator	  wrote,	   ‘a	   fact	   that	   his	  media	   critics	   refuse	   to	   acknowledge.’	  Moreover,	   in	  defending	   the	   Monroe	   Doctrine	   –	   ‘which	   has	   not	   been	   repudiated,	   and	  therefore	   stands	   as	   a	   firm	   policy	   for	   this	   nation	   and	   its	   President’	   –	   and	  with	   ‘constant	   roadblocks	   thrown	   in	   his	   path	   by	   Congress	   and	   the	  major	  news	  media’	   the	  president	   ‘has	  done	  his	  best	   to	  keep	  communism	  off	  our	  door-­‐step,	  and	  restore	  freedom	  in	  Nicaragua.’673	  	  A	  week	   later,	   Helms	   repeated	   the	   argument	   to	   the	  Raleigh	  Times.	   ‘I	  find	  myself	  wishing	   that	   the	  major	  news	  media	  had	  half	   the	   integrity	  and	  forthrightness	  of	  the	  President,’	  he	  wrote	  to	  the	  editor,	  ‘not	  to	  mention	  his	  dedication	  to	  restoring	  and	  preserving	  freedom	  in	  the	  world.’	  Awaiting	  the	  facts	   of	   the	   case	   was	   more	   prudent	   than	   ‘engaging	   in	   a	   cacophony	   of	  speculations,	  innuendo	  and	  criticism’	  of	  Reagan,	  and	  it	  was	  fortunate	  that:	  	  the	  American	  people	  have	  not	  elected	  any	  editor	  to	  enforce	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  in	  Latin	  America	  -­‐	  -­‐	  or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  to	  try	  to	  achieve	  a	  measure	  of	  stability	  in	  the	  complicated	  Persian	  Gulf	  and	  Middle	  East	  situations.	  Ronald	  Reagan	  presently	  is	  alone	  in	  bearing	  that	  responsibility.’674	  	  	  Within	  a	  month,	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  new	  Congress,	  Helms	  further	  attacked	   the	   ‘innuendo,	   misrepresentation,	   [and]	   flatout	   [sic]	   falsehoods’	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  In	   a	  handwritten	  annotation	  on	   the	   copy	   sent	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  Pat	  Buchanan,	  Helms	  told	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   that	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levelled	  at	  the	  president,	  lamenting	  that	  ‘nobody	  is	  willing	  to	  stand	  up	  and	  say	  this	  President	  is	  not	  guilty	  of	  that.’675	  	  	  That	   Helms	  moved	   quickly	   to	   defend	   the	   president	   and	   his	   policies	  was	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   to	   the	   majority	   of	   Republicans.	   Most	   proved	  unwilling	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  scandal	  to	  defend	  the	  Contra	  programme	  or	   sale	   of	   weapons	   to	   Iran,	   both	   of	   which	   were	   publicly	   unpopular	   and	  appeared	   to	   yield	   little	   political	   benefit	   given	   that	   Reagan	   would	   not	   be	  running	  for	  re-­‐election	  in	  1988.676	  Yet	  Helms’	  reaction	  was	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  effort	  by	  movement	  conservatives	  to	  sustain	  both	  Contra	  aid	  and	  Reagan’s	  foreign	  policies	  more	  generally.	  As	  one	  White	  House	  insider	  put	  it,	  ‘“They’re	  [Democrats]	  going	  to	  stick	  it	  hard	  to	  Republicans	  on	  Iran,	  I	  can	  feel	  it”’,	  with	  
National	  Review	   concluding	   that	   ‘at	   an	   appropriate	   time,	   they’ll	   attack.’677	  Pat	   Buchanan	   savaged	   the	   media	   and	   congressional	   Democrats	   for	   the	  ‘feeding	   frenzy’	   and,	   with	   one	   eye	   on	   Ted	   Kennedy,	   declared	   that	   the	  Democrats	  would	  ‘not	  succeed	  in	  leaving	  another	  band	  of	  patriots	  like	  the	  Contras	   on	   the	   beaches	   of	   another	   Bay	   of	   Pigs.’678	  Mistakes	   should	   be	  punished,	  Rep.	   Jack	  Kemp	   (R-­‐NY)	   accepted,	   but	   ‘it	   is	   not	   the	  policies	   that	  must	  be	  sacrificed.’679	  	  Helms’	   fears,	   and	   those	   of	   conservatives	   in	   general,	   should	   be	   seen	  within	   the	   context	   of	   November’s	   mid-­‐term	   elections,	   when	   Democrats	  took	  control	  of	  the	  Senate	  and	  maintained	  their	  majority	  in	  the	  House.	  This	  shocked	  the	  White	  House,	  who	  seemed	  unprepared	   for	   the	  eventuality.680	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  (NC),	  “Select	  Committee	  On	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  And	  Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  280.	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  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  484.	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  “Letter	  From	  Washington,”	  National	  Review,	  5	  December,	  1986,	  15.	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  “Conservatives	  Strongly	  Defend	  Embattled	  President,”	  Human	  Events,	  20	  December,	  1986,	  17.	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  “Conservatives	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Grassroots	   conservatives	  urged	  Republicans	   to	   fight	  back	  and	   ‘quit	   acting	  like	   scared	   rabbits’,	   conscious	   of	   the	   fact	   that,	   as	   a	   front-­‐page	   article	   in	  
Human	   Events	   noted,	   ‘the	   Democratic-­‐controlled	   Congress	   has	   the	  assistance	  program	  within	  its	  lethal	  sights.’681	  	  To	  reduce	  the	  impact	  of	  Iran-­‐Contra,	  when	  the	  new	  legislative	  session	  began	  on	  6	  January,	  1987,	  Helms	  quickly	  sought	  to	  reduce	  both	  the	  scope	  and	  resonance	  of	   the	   investigations.	  As	   the	  Senate	  considered	  creating	   its	  own	   investigative	  body	   into	   the	   incident,	  Helms	   told	  his	   colleagues	   that	  a	  Senate	   Select	   Committee	   on	   Iran	   and	  Nicaragua	  would	   be	   redundant,	   too	  costly,	   and	   bad	   legislation.	   ‘I	   just	   do	   not	   feel	   that	   another	   investigation,	  duplicating	  effort,	   going	  back	  over	   the	   same	   treadmill,	   is	  worth	   it’,	  Helms	  told	  his	  colleagues,	  before	  arguing	   that	   ‘we	  ought	   to	  get	  on	  with	   trying	   to	  balance	  the	  budget	  and	  some	  of	  the	  others	  problems	  facing	  this	  Nation.682	  	  Certainly	  Congress	  was,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  1987,	  facing	  the	  prospect	  of	  an	  acrimonious	  budget	  battle	  with	   the	  administration,	  and	  Helms’	  comments	  came	  on	   the	  day	  Reagan	  announced	  his	  1988	  budget.683	  The	  conservative	  movement	   had	   been	   vocally	   committed	   to	   a	   balanced	   budget,	   or	   at	   least	  greater	   fiscal	   responsibility,	   and	   Helms’	   appeal	   took	   advantage	   of	   these	  right-­‐wing	   talking	   points	   to	   divert	   attention	   from	   Iran-­‐Contra.684	  Yet	   the	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  10	   January,	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  and	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  Events,	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  January,	  1987,	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senator	  was	  almost	  certainly	  using	  the	  budget	  as	  a	  prop.	  As	  Helms	  stated,	  ‘To	  string	  this	  thing	  out	  even	  to	  August	  is	  totally	  irresponsible	  as	  far	  as	  I	  am	  concerned’.685	  Helms	   wanted	   a	   quick	   and	   definitive	   acknowledgement	   of	  the	  president’s	  innocence,	  not	  a	  prolonged	  congressional	  examination	  that	  would	   maintain	   damaging	   headlines	   throughout	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   year.686	  Helms	   badly	   misjudged	   Senate	   sentiment,	   however.	   When	   the	   vote	   was	  called,	   only	   senators	   Chic	   Hecht	   (R-­‐NV),	   Gordon	   Humphrey	   (R-­‐NH),	   and	  Ernest	  Hollings	  (D-­‐SC)	  joined	  him	  in	  opposing	  the	  resolution.687	  	  	  Conservatives	   latched	   on	   to	   the	   Tower	   Commission’s	   review	   of	   the	  scandal,	   published	   in	   February,	   which	   concluded	   that	   Reagan	   had	   not	  sought	   to	   mislead	   the	   public	   or	   cover	   up	   any	   illegal	   actions.688	  Indeed,	  conservatives	   began	   arguing	   that	   the	   report	   had	   exonerated	   the	  administration	  entirely,	  ignoring	  the	  report’s	  equally	  damaging	  account	  of	  a	  president	  unable	   to	  manage	  his	  own	  staff.689	  At	   this	  critical	  moment,	  with	  debate	  over	  the	  report’s	  analysis	  swirling	  and	  with	  less	  than	  two	  weeks	  to	  go	  before	  Congress	  voted	  on	  the	  remaining	  $40	  million	  of	  the	  1986	  funding	  package,	  Helms	  joined	  several	  Senate	  conservatives	   in	  requesting	  that	  the	  White	   House	   authorise	   the	   delivery	   of	   ‘high-­‐quality	   U.S.	   weapons’	   to	   the	  rebels:	  Stinger	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missiles,	  as	  well	  as	  TOW	  and	  Dragon	  anti-­‐tank	  weapons.	  He	  claimed	  that	  should	  such	  weapons	  be	  successful	  in	  destroying	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Soviet	   helicopters	   operating	   in	   Nicaragua,	   momentum	   would	   build	   for	  further	  support.690	  	  The	   request	   suggested	   that	   the	   senator	   envisioned	   the	   successful	  ‘Afghanisation’	   of	   battlefield	   tactics	   in	   Nicaragua,	   even	   amidst	   the	  uncertainty	   caused	   by	   Iran-­‐Contra.	   The	   Stinger	   missile,	   introduced	   to	  mujahedeen	  forces	   in	   late	  1986,	  was	  credited	  with	  altering	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  a	  series	  of	  media	  reports	  through	  December	  1986	  and	   spring	   1987. 691 	  Conservatives	   celebrated	   this	   news,	   and	   though	  scholars	   have	   debated	   the	   overall	   effectiveness	   and	   consequences	   of	  Stinger	  systems	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Helms’	  desire	  to	  see	  such	  weapons	  used	  in	  Nicaragua	  suggested	  his	  faith	  for	  a	  repeat	  performance.692	  	  As	   Chester	   Pach	   notes,	   the	   deployment	   of	   Stingers	   was	   a	   critical	  moment	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  in	  Afghanistan.	  It	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  steps	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  NSDD-­‐166,	  Reagan’s	  decision	  in	  March	   1985	   to	   formally	   define	   a	   Soviet	   loss	   in	   Afghanistan	   as	   a	   specific	  objective	   of	   United	   States	   policy	   in	   that	   country.693	  By	   seeking	   a	   similar	  strategy	   in	  Nicaragua,	  Helms	   looked	   to	  model	  Contra	  policy,	   and	   thus	   the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	   in	  Central	  America,	   in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  even	  more	  highly	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militarised	   conflict	   in	   Asia.	   Helms’	   strategy	   suggested	   that	   movement	  conservatives	   looked	   critically	   on	   the	   inconsistencies	   with	   which	   the	  Reagan	   Doctrine	   was	   applied	   around	   the	   world.	   Instead	   of	   adapting	   the	  general	  principles	  of	   the	  doctrine	   to	   each	   case,	  Helms	  wanted	  a	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	   strategy	   that,	   irrespective	   of	   local	   tactical	   considerations,	   would	  provide	  the	  maximum	  level	  of	  assistance	  to	  indigenous	  anti-­‐communists.	  	  	   The	  White	  House	  had	  a	  different	  vision.	  The	  administration,	  having	  already	   upgraded	   the	   Contras’	   air-­‐defence	   capabilities,	   rejected	   the	  senator’s	   proposals,	   noting	   that	   current	   strategic	   assessments	   did	   not	  support	   the	   need	   for	   such	   weapons. 694 	  Despite	   his	   defence	   of	   the	  administration	   over	   the	   previous	   four	  months,	  Helms’	   efforts	   to	   intensify	  the	  conflict	  in	  Nicaragua	  did	  not	  appeal	  to	  a	  White	  House	  dealing	  with	  the	  ramifications	  of	  Iran-­‐Contra.	  	  	  Helms’	  request	  for	  greater	  firepower	  was	  even	  more	  strongly	  at	  odds	  with	   congressional	   sentiment,	   where	   the	   consequences	   of	   Iran-­‐Contra	  manifested	  themselves	  in	  the	  heated	  debate	  and	  close	  vote	  over	  S.	  J.	  Res	  81,	  “Disapproval	   Of	   Certain	   Assistance	   To	   The	   Nicaraguan	   Democratic	  Resistance”.	  The	  first	  test	  of	  Nicaraguan	  policy	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	   revelations,	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   vote	   was	   irrelevant	   to	   the	  authorisation	   of	   assistance	   because	   Reagan	   would	   veto	   the	   resolution	  should	   it	   pass	   in	   Congress.	   It	   nevertheless	   represented	   a	   ‘bellwether’,	   as	  LeoGrande	  puts	   it,	   for	   subsequent	  votes	  on	   the	  administration’s	  1987	  aid	  request.695	  As	   Senator	  Tom	  Harkin	   (D-­‐IA)	  noted,	   it	   became	   ‘a	   referendum	  on	  the	  goals	  and	  tactics	  of	  administration	  policy	  in	  Central	  America.’696	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  694	  Letter,	  J.	  Edward	  Fox	  to	  Senator	  Jesse	  Helms,	  28	  April,	  1987,	  ID465682,	  FG013,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	  
695	  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  485.	  
696	  Tom	  Harkin	  (IA),	  “Disapproval	  Of	  Certain	  Assistance	  To	  The	  Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  6050.	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Democrats	  in	  the	  House	  sought	  to	  make	  the	  vote	  a	  judgement	  on	  the	  administration’s	   tactics	   and	   corruption	  within	   the	  Contra	  movement,	   and	  the	   chamber	   voted	   on	   an	   altered	   resolution	   that	   sought	   a	   six	   month	  moratorium	   on	   Contra	   aid	   while	   a	   full	   accounting	   process	   was	  completed.697	  However,	   Helms,	   operating	   in	   the	   Senate	   where	   the	   rules	  limited	  matters	  to	  a	  simple	  yes-­‐or-­‐no	  vote	  on	  the	  package,	  used	  the	  debate	  to	   chastise	   opponents	   of	   the	   president.	   Helms’	   opening	   argument	   on	   17	  March	  summarised	  his	   case:	   ‘If	   the	   flickering	   light	  of	   freedom	  goes	  out	   in	  this	  hemisphere	  in	  our	  own	  front	  yard	  in	  Central	  America,	  it	  will	  have	  been	  blown	  out	  not	  in	  Nicaragua	  but	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  and	  specifically	  in	  the	  Congress	  of	  the	  United	  States.’698	  	   Helms	   continued	   to	   use	   the	   Monroe	   Doctrine	   as	   an	   explicit	  justification	  for	  the	  Contra	  programme,	  although	  his	  interpretation	  by	  now	  bore	   little	   resemblance	   to	   its	   original	   form,	   or	   even	   its	   Rooseveltian	  adaptation.	   It	  might	   be	   1987,	   he	   concluded	   in	   a	   rebuke	   of	   one	   colleague	  who	   had	   denied	   the	   doctrine’s	   contemporary	   relevance,	   but	   ‘insofar	   as	   I	  know,	   the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  has	  not	  been	  withdrawn	  as	  national	  policy	  of	  this	  country,	  and	  I	  pray	  that	  it	  never	  will	  be.’	  The	  doctrine	  ‘was	  sound	  when	  it	  was	  enunciated	  and	  it	  is	  sound	  today’,	  he	  added,	  concluding	  that	  ‘we	  will	  ignore	   it	   at	   our	   peril.’699 	  On	   the	   day	   of	   the	   vote,	   Helms	   repeated	   his	  warning:	   ‘If	   we	   abandon	   the	   Monroe	   Doctrine,	   then	   we	   are	   inviting	   a	  takeover	  of	  this	  hemisphere	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union.’700	  	  	  That	  conservatives	  saw	  Iran-­‐Contra	  as	  a	  means	  of	  reinvigorating	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  was	  made	  clear	  in	  William	  Buckley’s	  later	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  697	  LeoGrande,	  Our	  Own	  Backyard,	  485-­‐487.	  
698	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Disapproval	  Of	  Certain	  Assistance	  To	  The	  Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  5892-­‐5893.	  
699 	  Helms,	   “Disapproval	   Of	   Certain	   Assistance	   To	   The	   Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  6084.	  
700	  Ibid.,	  6460.	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suggestion	  that	  Oliver	  North	  run	  for	  the	  Senate	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  reaffirming	  the	   doctrine.701	  Yet,	   as	   Gaddis	   Smith	   points	   out,	   the	   secrecy	   of	   North’s	  operations	  had	   actually	   removed	   the	   last	   elements	  of	  President	  Monroe’s	  original	   appeal	   for	   ‘candor’	   between	   interested	   parties	   in	   the	  hemisphere.702	  Thus,	   Helms’	   continued	   insistence	   on	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	  doctrine,	   rooted	   in	   its	   nineteenth	   century	   context	   yet	   unconscious	   of	   the	  destruction	   of	   one	   of	   its	   most	   important	   principles,	   underlined	   the	  senator’s	   (and	   the	   conservative	   movement’s)	   re-­‐issuing	   of	   the	   doctrine	  with	  specific	  Cold	  War	  purposes	  in	  mind.	  	  Helms’	  fears	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  future	  of	  the	  Contra	  programme	  were	  evident	  in	  the	  escalation	  of	  his	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  March	  debates.	   ‘There	  is	  no	  more	  time	  to	  debate	  this	  issue’,	  he	  told	  his	  colleagues.	  ‘As	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  coolly	  sits	  back	  debating	  inane	  arguments,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  protecting	  its	  investment.’703	  ‘Nicaragua	   is	   already	   a	   Soviet	   base.	   I	   hope	   Senators	   will	  wake	  up	  and	  smell	  the	  coffee.’704	  Helms’	  allusions	  to	  the	  mass	  migration	  of	  refugees	  was	   intensified,	   supporting	   a	  White	  House	   that	   had	   recently	   re-­‐affirmed	   the	   topic	   as	   a	   critical	   talking	   point	   for	   building	   support	   for	  Nicaragua	  policy.705	  As	  previously	  noted	   (see	  page	  142),	  Helms	  no	   longer	  limited	   it	   to	   the	   25	  million	   of	   previous	   years,	   and	   instead	   identified	   100	  million	  people	  between	  Panama	  and	  Texas	  who,	  in	  	  ‘an	  absolute	  probability	  …	  will	  walk	  north’:	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  William	   F.	   Buckley,	   Jr.,	   “Next	   Step	   For	   North?”	   National	   Review,	   14	  August,	  1987,	  55.	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  Smith,	  Last	  Years	  of	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  201.	  
703 	  Helms,	   “Disapproval	   Of	   Certain	   Assistance	   To	   The	   Nicaraguan	  Democratic	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	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  Ibid.,	  5893.	  
705	  Action	  Plan,	  Charlie	  Wick	  to	  Frank	  C.	  Carlucci,	  9	  March,	  1987,	  ID464580,	  CO114,	  WHORM:	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They	   will	   come	   into	   our	   country,	   seeking	   and	   yearning	   for	  freedom	  –	  people	  who	  cannot	  speak	  English,	  who	  have	  no	  jobs	  or	   home,	   or	   anything	   else	   except	   that	   yearning	   for	   freedom.	  They	  will	  go	  on	  welfare,	  they	  will	  impact	  upon	  our	  schools	  and	  other	  institutions.706	  	  Further	   pessimism	   could	   be	   detected	   in	   explicit	   references	   to	  American	   casualties.	   Helms	   promised	   that	   American	   lives	   would	   be	   lost	  should	   Congress	   abandon	   the	   Contras.	   ‘We	   must	   send	   American	   dollars	  now,	  or	  spill	  American	  blood	  later’,	  he	  concluded	  before	  the	  vote,	  receiving	  praise	  from	  Senator	  Phil	  Gramm	  for	  doing	  so.707	  Steve	  Symms	  took	  up	  the	  same	  point,	   noting	   that	   ‘Either	  we	  aid	   the	  Contras	  now,	  or	  we	  do	   the	   job	  later	   with	   our	   own	   soldiers.’708	  Only	   three	   days	   after	   the	   vote,	   Human	  
Events	   demanded	   a	   ‘bold	   and	   imaginative	   course	   of	   action’	   from	   Reagan,	  arguing	  that	  the	  president:	  	  can	  no	   longer	  say,	  as	  he	  has	   in	   the	  past,	   that	  U.S.	   soldiers	  will	  never	   be	   committed	   to	   combat.	   He	   has	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   quite	  likely	   that	   they	   will	   be,	   unless	   the	   Contras	   can	   get	   the	  wherewithal	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  to	  do	  it	  on	  their	  own.709	  	  Taken	  together,	  the	  comments	  suggested	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  was	  fearful	  of	  the	  prospects	  for	  Contra	  aid	  during	  the	  coming	  year	  and	  wiling	  to	  use	  the	  previously	  taboo	  topic	  of	  American	  casualties	  as	  rhetorical	  leverage	  for	  gaining	  congressional	  and	  public	  support	  for	  the	  rebels.	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   Certain	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  Resistance,”	  Cong.	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   (ID),	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  Rec.	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   Events,	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  1987,	  19.	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  S.	  J.	  Res.	  81	  was	  rejected	  in	  the	  Senate,	  52-­‐48.	  Helms	  voted	  against	  the	  resolution,	  but	   it	   is	  hard	   to	  measure	   the	   impact	  of	  his	   rhetoric.710	  Despite	  Democratic	   gains,	   the	   1986	   elections	   produced	   only	   a	   two-­‐vote	   swing	  against	  Contra	  aid	   in	   the	  upper	  chamber.711	  	   It	  was	  not	  enough	   to	  sustain	  the	   resolution	  of	  disapproval.	  Helms	  saved	  his	  most	  notorious	  attempt	   to	  influence	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal	  until	   late	  in	  the	  year.	  On	  5	  November,	  he	  triggered	  Senate	  outrage	  when	  he	  sought	  to	   intervene	  over	  possible	   indictments	   of	   North	   and	   others	   being	   investigated.	   He	   had	  already	  expressed	  concern	  at	  the	  potential	  public	  distribution	  of	  Congress’	  Iran-­‐Contra	  report.	   ‘Well,	   I	  am	  not	  certain	  about	   that’,	  Helms	  told	  Warren	  Rudman	  (R-­‐NH),	  who	  had	  proposed	  a	  widespread	  distribution	  of	  the	  report	  in	   order	   to	   aid	   public	   understanding.	   ‘Maybe	   the	   people	   of	   this	   country	  would	  rather	  have	  the	  money	  saved.’	  Earlier,	  Helms	  had	  also	  opposed	  mass	  mailings	  of	   the	   report	  by	  members	  of	  Congress,	   again	   citing	   cost.	   In	  both	  cases,	   as	   with	   his	   plea	   in	   January	   that	   senators	   consider	   the	   cost	   of	  additional	  investigative	  bodies,	  Helms	  used	  fiscal	  responsibility	  as	  a	  fig	  leaf	  for	  limiting	  the	  fallout	  of	  the	  scandal.712	  	  Helms	   argued	   that	   limiting	   prosecutions	   best	   served	   the	   nation’s	  security,	   and	   that	   the	   U.S.	   Code’s	   section	   594	   specifically	   allowed	   for	  prosecutorial	  discretion	  in	  such	  a	  case.	  He	  urged	  the	  Senate	  to	  go	  on	  record	  ‘against	  a	  further	  drawing	  out,	  extension	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  affair	  that	  will	  service	  absolutely	  no	  purpose	  except	  to	  aid	  those	  governments	  around	  the	  world	  which	   are	   unfriendly	   to	   the	  United	   States,	   chiefly	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  and	   Iran.’713	  Helms	   also	   positioned	   himself	   as	   a	   champion	   of	   populist	  sentiment.	  ‘I	  have	  had	  many	  requests	  to	  offer	  this	  amendment’,	  he	  claimed.	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‘Not	  a	  one	  of	  them	  coming	  from	  anybody	  in	  Government.	  The	  requests	  have	  come	  from	  the	  American	  people,	  obviously,	  especially	  from	  North	  Carolina,	  who	  have	  had	  their	  own	  reaction	  to	  the	  events	  of	  the	  past	  several	  months.’	  Helms	   saw	   a	   public	   ‘tired	   of	   hauling	   military	   officers	   and	   others	   before	  various	   tribunals	   asking	   them	   about	   everything	   ranging	   from	   their	   NFL	  preferences	  to	  where	  they	  keep	  their	  paperclips.’	  As	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  public	  hearings	   into	   Iran-­‐Contra,	   it	   continued	   a	   conservative	   narrative	   that	   the	  previous	   summer’s	   events	   ‘had	   little	   to	   do	   with	   factfinding’,	   as	   the	  Republican	   minority	   report	   argued,	   but	   had	   been	   a	   vehicle	   for	   a	  ‘sycophantic’	   and	   ‘arrogant’	   Congress,	   out	   of	   touch	   with	   the	   American	  people,	  to	  criticise	  North	  and	  others	  involved.714	  	  Finally,	  Helms	  argued	  that	  North	  and	  his	  co-­‐accused	  had	  been	  unfairly	  victimised	   for	   their	   patriotic	   actions,	   and	   should	   be	   left	   alone.	   ‘I	   do	   not	  think	  Ollie	  North	  should	  be	  indicted’,	  the	  senator	  stated	  bluntly.	  Observers	  were	   perhaps	   reminded	   of	   Richard	   Nixon’s	   infamous	   1962	   “last	   press	  conference”	  when	  Helms	  said	  ‘I	  do	  not	  think	  he	  [North]	  ought	  to	  be	  pushed	  around	   any	   more.’	   There	   was	   ‘little	   question…	   that	   they	   were	   trying	   to	  serve	   their	   country’,	   and	   their	   actions	   had	   been	   undertaken	   with	  ‘honorable’	  intentions.	  ‘I	  just	  feel	  strongly	  that	  Ollie	  North	  and	  others	  have	  been	  put	  through	  the	  wringer	  enough;	  particularly	  when	  it	  is	  fairly	  well	  and	  broadly	  acknowledged	   that	   they	  were	  doing	  what	   they	   thought	  was	  good	  for	  the	  country.	  Even	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  it	  may	  not	  have	  been	  good.’715	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  714	  U.S.	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  Investigating	  the	  Iran-­‐
Contra	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  and	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  of	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  a	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  Be	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  Human	  Events,	  15	  August,	   1987,	   17,	   “Letter	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  Washington,”	  National	  Review,	   14	  August,	  1987,	  14,	  William	  A.	  Rusher,	  “The	  Real	  Difference	  Between	  Ollie	  North	  and	  His	  Detractors,”	  Human	  Events,	  8	  August,	  1987,	  18,	  “North	  Hearings	  Show	  Inouye	   at	   His	   Worst,”	   Human	   Events,	   25	   July,	   1987,	   3,	   and	   John	  Chamberlain,	  “Private	  Donors	  Now	  Subject	  to	  Congressional	  Insult,”	  Human	  
Events,	  11	  July,	  1987,	  12.	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This	  talk	  bolstered	  an	  Oliver	  North	  lobby,	  which	  had	  emerged	  among	  conservatives	   eager	   to	   defend	   both	   his	   actions	   and	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	  more	  generally.	  In	  the	  pages	  of	  right-­‐wing	  periodicals,	  North	  was	  showered	  with	   praise	   for	   his	   courage,	   honour,	   and	   willingness	   to	   stand	   up	   to	  congressional	   posturing.	   Only	   weeks	   after	   Iran-­‐Contra	   erupted,	   Human	  
Events	   described	   him	   as	   a	   ‘full-­‐fledged	   hero’	   whose	   transgressions,	  whatever	   they	   might	   be,	   ‘are	   far	   outweighed	   by	   his	   Luke	   Skywalker	  achievements.’716	  After	  his	  testimony	  in	  the	  summer,	  North	  was	  proclaimed	  a	   ‘swashbuckling	   figure’,	   who	   ‘didn’t	   back	   off	   an	   inch’	   under	   the	  intimidating	  questioning.717	  	  Perhaps	   more	   importantly,	   movement	   conservatives	   saw	   North’s	  testimony	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  Contras	  as	   the	  most	  effective	   justification	   thus	  heard	  for	  the	  president’s	  Nicaragua	  policy.	  Stan	  Evans	  noted	  that	  North	  had	  ‘strongly	  defended	  the	  supposedly	  disgraceful	  Iran	  and	  Contra	  policy’,	  and	  with	  polls	  showing	  an	  increase	  in	  public	  support	  for	  Contra	  aid,	  ‘was	  able	  to	  do	  in	  six	  days	  of	  testimony	  what	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  had	  not	   been	   able	   to	   accomplish	   in	   six	   years.’718	  Such	   commentary	   revealed	  signs	   of	   discontent	   among	   conservatives	   over	   the	   administration’s	   public	  outreach	   effort,	   as	   strict	   movement	   conservatives	   began	   to	   believe	   that	  Americans	   favoured	   the	   principled	   stance	   taken	   by	   North	   when	   it	   was	  clearly	  presented	  to	  them.	  	  	  Helms’	  efforts	  in	  1989	  to	  restore	  North’s	  military	  pension	  cemented	  his	  position	  as	  North	  stalwart,	  and	  earned	  him	  rave	  reviews	  from	  the	  wider	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  M.	   Stanton	   Evans,	   “Iran-­‐Contra	   Hearings	   Show	   Media	   Alienation,”	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   Events,	   8	   August,	   1987,	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conservative	  movement.719	  Even	  as	   late	  as	  1997,	   the	  senator	  continued	  to	  work	   with	   conservative	   groups	   to	   defend	   North’s	   reputation.	   Appearing	  alongside	  what	  Stan	  Evans	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  All-­‐Star	  conservative	   line-­‐up,	  Helms	  helped	  Freedom	  Alliance	  celebrate	  North’s	  heroism	  at	  a	  July	  tribute	  to	  the	  former	  army	  officer.	  To	  great	  applause	  from	  the	  crowd,	  the	  senator	  related	  a	  story	  of	  how,	  during	  a	  meeting	  between	  himself	  and	  Reagan,	  the	  president	   had	   tapped	   Helms,	   pointed	   to	   North,	   and	   said,	   ‘“There	   is	   an	  authentic	   American	   hero.”’720	  Indeed,	   such	   was	   the	   apparent	   affection,	  when	  North	  ran	   for	   the	  Senate	   in	  1994,	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  alike	  identified	   him	   as	   a	   potential	   successor	   to	   Helms	   as	   the	   voice	   of	  conservatism.	   ‘“That’s	   certainly	   what’s	   motivating	   me”’,	   said	   one	  Democratic	   operative	   who	   mobilised	   against	   him.	   ‘“If	   this	   guy	   gets	   the	  baton	  from	  Jesse	  Helms	  he’s	  around	  for	  30	  years.”’721	  	  To	   opponents	   of	   Helms’	   amendment,	   North’s	   reputation	   was	  irrelevant.	  Senator	  Rudman,	  a	  centrist	  Republican,	  noted	  that	  his	  criticism	  was	  ‘not	  because	  I	  do	  not	  share	  some	  of	  the	  views	  of	  my	  friends	  from	  North	  Carolina	  about	  some	  of	  the	  witnesses’.	  Instead,	  Rudman	  condemned	  Helms	  for	  seeking	  to	  subvert	  due	  process:	  ‘The	  strength	  of	  this	  democracy	  is	  that	  none	  of	  us	  are	  above	  the	  law,	  even	  those	  who	  may	  break	  laws	  because	  they	  may	  think	  it	  is	  in	  the	  national	  interest.’722	  Arlen	  Specter,	  another	  moderate	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  Human	  Events,	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   Human	   Events,	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   Freedom	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Republican	   and	   former	   District	   Attorney	   of	   Philadelphia,	   told	   Helms	   that	  his	  amendment	  was	  ‘a	  statement	  far	  outside	  existing	  law.’723	  	  Democrats	   expressed	   similar	   sentiments.	   George	   Mitchell	   (D-­‐ME)	  considered	   it	   ‘highly	   inappropriate’	   for	   the	   legislature	   to	   interfere	   with	  another	   branch	   of	   government,	   while	   John	   Kerry	   (D-­‐MA)	   believed	   the	  amendment	  ‘would…	  give	  credence	  to	  the	  point	  of	  view	  expressed	  by	  some	  at	   the	   NSC	   that	   sometimes	   its	   [sic]	   alright	   to	   go	   above	   the	   law.’724	  The	  combined	  weight	  of	  these	  counter-­‐arguments	  was	  too	  strong,	  and,	  as	  with	  the	   senator’s	   efforts	   to	   reject	   a	   Senate	   investigation	   into	   Iran-­‐Contra,	   his	  colleagues	  overwhelmingly	  lined	  up	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  vote.	  Mirroring	  the	   meagre	   alliance	   he	   had	   formed	   in	   January,	   Helms	   found	   only	   three	  other	   supportive	   votes:	   senators	   Orrin	   Hatch,	   Chic	   Hecht,	   and	   Steve	  Symms.725	  Conservatives	  might	   have	   considered	  North	   a	   hero,	   but	   few	   in	  Congress	  –	  or,	   indeed,	  outside	  Capitol	  Hill	  –	  were	  willing	   to	   join	  Helms	   in	  pressing	  for	  legislative	  interference	  within	  the	  judicial	  system	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  man.	  	  	  While	  the	  amendment	  had	  been	  swiftly	  and	  overwhelmingly	  rejected,	  Helms’	  willingness	  to	  go	  on	  record	  favouring	  this	  action	  made	  it	  one	  of	  the	  most	   radical	   proposals	   he	   offered	   relating	   to	   Central	   America	   policy.	  Despite	   his	   protestations	   to	   the	   contrary,	   the	   resolution	   would	   have	  interfered	  with	  due	  process	  by	  placing	  the	  weight	  of	  Senate	  opinion	  on	  the	  independent	   counsel.	  As	  Rudman	  astutely	  noted	   in	  his	   rebuttal	   of	  Helms’	  argument,	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725	  “Rollcall	  Vote	  No.	  369	  Leg.”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  31097.	  
	   242	  
Although	   this	   is	   nonbinding,	   I	   know	   the	   Senator	   from	   North	  Carolina	  would	  not	  disagree	  with	  me	  that	  a	  sense-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Senate	  resolution	  such	  as	  this	  has	  a	  certain	  force	  and	  power	  of	  its	  own.	  If	   it	  did	  not,	   the	  Senator	  from	  North	  Carolina	  would	  not	  waste	  the	  time	  of	  the	  body	  to	  introduce	  it.726	  	  For	   an	   individual	   who	   had	   relied	   so	   heavily	   on	   the	   separation	   of	  powers	   during	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   debate	   and	   congressional	  discussion	   over	   Reagan’s	   Central	   America	   policies,	   Helms’	   actions	  demonstrated	   an	   uncomfortable	   inconsistency,	   wherein	   the	   senator	  willingly	  placed	  ideology	  above	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  It	  also	  served	  as	  a	  reminder	  that	  when	  conservatism	  was	  in	  power,	  the	  post-­‐war	  right	  displayed	  a	  more	  executive-­‐centric	   conception	   of	   foreign	   policy	   in	   Central	   America	   as	  compared	   with	   the	   previous	   decade	   when	   the	   prerogatives	   of	   the	  legislative	   branch	   had	   been	   lauded	   so	   as	   to	   restrict	   the	   Nixon,	   Ford,	   and	  Carter	   administrations	   (most	   noticeably,	   of	   course,	   over	   the	   Canal	  Treaties).	  	  Such	  rigid	  commitment	   to	   ideology	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   final	  collapse	  in	  support	  for	  the	  rebels.	  What	  had	  formerly	  been	  advantages	  now	  proved	   to	   be	   important	   factors	   in	   the	   decline	   of	   support	   for	   the	   Contras.	  Where	  once	   informal,	  often	  clandestine,	   relationships	  had	  allowed	   for	   the	  implementation	  of	  a	  rapid,	   flexible	  and	  covert	  policy,	   in	  the	  harsh	  glare	  of	  public	   exposure	   during	   the	   Iran-­‐Contra	   scandal	   they	   proved	   to	   be	   costly.	  The	   public	   and	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   Congress	   found	   such	   methods	  unpalatable,	   and	   the	   entirety	   of	   U.S.	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   policy	   became	  associated	  with	  these	  secretive	  means.	  Furthermore,	  the	  ideological	  rigidity	  expressed	  by	  the	  group	  –	  whether	  in	  their	  legislative	  strategy	  or	  rhetorical	  framework	  for	  its	  policy	  –	  reduced	  their	  influence	  on	  a	  public	  and	  Congress	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  726 	  Rudman,	   “Printing	   Of	   Reports	   Of	   The	   Senate	   And	   House	   Select	  Committees	  On	  Iran,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  31093.	  
	   243	  
wearied	  by	  the	  sustained	  and	  acrimonious	  policy	  debates	  of	  the	  past	  eight	  years.	  	  	  Helms	   and	   conservatives	   claimed	   that	   Nicaragua	   policy	   had	   been	  reaffirmed	   by	   the	   groundswell	   of	   public	   support	   for	   the	   Contras	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  North’s	  testimony,	  but	  the	  reality	  was	  that	  politics	  had	  shifted	  against	  them.	  At	  home,	  pragmatic	  elements	  in	  the	  administration,	  led	  by	  the	  new	  White	   House	   Chief	   of	   Staff	   Howard	   Baker,	   wanted	   to	   avoid	   further	  battles	  with	  Congress	  over	  Contra	  aid	  and	  reconstruct	  Reagan’s	  agenda	  by	  focusing	   on	   more	   popular	   policies,	   such	   as	   arms	   limitation	   negotiations	  with	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   To	   achieve	   this,	   the	   White	   House	   proposed	   that	  Speaker	   Jim	  Wright	   and	   the	   president	   jointly	   announce	   a	   peace	   plan	   for	  Central	  America.	  The	  Wright-­‐Reagan	  plan,	   announced	  on	  5	  August,	   called	  for	   a	   cease-­‐fire,	   suspension	   of	   U.S.	   and	   Soviet	   aid	   to	   those	   fighting	   in	  Nicaragua,	  and	  national	  reconciliation.727	  	  	   In	   Central	   America,	   the	   consequences	   of	   Iran-­‐Contra	   were	   also	  significant.	  Fearful	  of	  possible	  recriminations	  over	  their	  Contra	  support,	  El	  Salvador	  and	  Honduras	  –	  the	  two	  nations	  most	  critical	  to	  the	  policy	  –	  subtly	  retreated	  from	  the	  war.728	  This	  shift,	  alongside	  the	  peace	  plan	  proposed	  by	  Costa	  Rican	  president	  Oscar	  Arias	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  year,	  culminated	  with	  the	  five	  Central	  American	  republics	  agreeing	  on	  7	  August	  to	  the	  Esquipulas	  II	  peace	  accord.	  This	  was,	  in	  part,	  motivated	  by	  self-­‐interest.	  Daniel	  Ortega,	  the	  prominent	  Sandinista	  who	  had	  won	  the	  country’s	  presidential	  election	  in	  1984,	  and	  José	  Napoleón	  Duarte	  were	  acutely	  aware	  that	  peace	  offered	  the	  prospect	  of	  self-­‐preservation,	  while	  Honduran	  president	  Azcona	  feared	  being	  blamed	   for	   any	   collapse	   in	   the	   talks.	  As	   such,	   the	  Central	  American	  nations	  agreed	  to	  a	  plan	  similar	  to	  the	  Wright-­‐Reagan	  agreement.729	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the	  American	  document,	  however,	  Esquipulas	   II	  marginalised	   the	  Contras	  as	  a	  negotiating	  party	  by	  calling	   for	  their	  disbandment,	  and	  demanded	  no	  cessation	  of	  Soviet	  aid	  to	  Nicaragua.730	  	  	   All	   this	   dismayed	   movement	   conservatives.	   Believing	   North’s	  passionate	   defence	   of	   the	  Contra	  programme	  had	   energised	   the	   public	   in	  support	   of	   Nicaragua	   policy,	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	   suddenly	   found	  itself	   facing	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   negotiated	   settlement.	   ‘Why	   on	   earth	   did	  President	  Reagan	  offer	  that	  so-­‐called	  “peace	  plan”	  for	  Central	  America	  last	  week?’	  Human	   Events	   lamented	   on	   a	   front-­‐page	   article:	   ‘What	   the	  White	  House	   doesn’t	   understand	   is	   that	   it	   has	   traded	   away	   its	   high	   cards.’	   The	  article	  pointed	  to	  Helms,	  Bill	  Armstrong	  and	  Jack	  Kemp	  as	  believing	  Reagan	  had	  squandered	  the	  opportunity	  created	  by	  North’s	  testimony.731	  	  	   Helms	   contributed	   to	   the	   chorus	   of	   conservative	   disapproval.	   The	  senator	   had	   long	   regarded	   the	   Central	   American	   peace	   process,	   in	   its	  various	  forms,	  as	  a	  deceptive	  and	  unwelcome	  intrusion	  upon	  United	  States’	  policies	  in	  Nicaragua.	  Now,	  he	  and	  five	  conservative	  Republican	  colleagues	  met	  with	  Reagan	  on	  the	  day	  the	  Wright-­‐Reagan	  plan	  was	  signed	  to	  express	  their	  opinion	  that	  the	  president	  had	  been	  duped.732	  	  Later	  that	  day,	  Helms	  condemned	  the	  agreement	  publicly.	  Though	  he	  believed	  cooperation	  with	  Democrats	  was	  ‘noteworthy’,	  the	  plan	  itself	  ‘has	  the	  gauzy	  contures	  [sic]	  of	  a	   grand	   dream,	   rather	   than	   of	   a	   practical	   course	   of	   action.’	   The	   problem	  with	   the	   accord,	   Helms	   argued,	   was	   that	   it	   was	   unverifiable	   and	   did	   not	  maintain	  support	  for	  the	  Contras	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  leverage:	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The	  only	  way	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  diplomatic	  initiative	  will	  not	  fail	  is	   to	  make	   absolutely	   clear	   to	   the	  Communist	   regime	   that	   the	  Congress	   will	   support	   full	   military	   action	   by	   the	   freedom	  fighters	   if	  necessary.	  Otherwise,	   the	  Communists	  will	  perceive	  that	   all	   they	   have	   to	   do	   is	   delay,	   delay,	   and	   delay	   until	   the	  freedom	  fighters	  run	  out	  of	  weapons	  and	  money.733	  	  	   Meanwhile,	  Helms	  wrote	  up	  an	  amendment	  to	  provide	  $300	  million	  for	  the	  rebels	  should	  the	  peace	  plan	  fail.	  Two	  days	  later,	  Esquipulas	  II	  was	  signed.	   Helms	   immediately	   took	   to	   the	   Senate	   floor	   to	   threaten	   any	  legislation,	  bar	  the	  debt-­‐ceiling	  bill,	  with	  his	  amendment.	  ‘I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  see	  the	  freedom	  fighters	  die	  on	  the	  vine’,	  Helms	  stated,	  ‘while	  some	  illusory	  proposal	  goes	  on	  to	  delay	  the	  mechanism	  which	  has	  been	  going	  on	  for	  8	  or	  9	  years.’734	  	  It	   is	   doubtful	   that	   Helms	   viewed	   his	   amendment	   as	   viable.	   He	   had	  admitted	  that	  his	  proposal	  would	  simply	  be	  a	  ‘test	  vote’.	  Helms	  maintained	  ‘I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  put	  it	  as	  bluntly	  as	  one	  of	  my	  colleagues	  put	  it’,	  that	  ‘this	  amendment	   will	   make	   it	   clear	   who	   is	   voting	   for	   the	   Contras	   and	  who	   is	  voting	   for	   the	   Communists.’	   Yet	   this	   is	   precisely	   what	   the	   senator	   did,	  stating:	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   the	   amendment,	   if	   I	   can	   find	   the	   appropriate	  vehicle	  this	  afternoon	  or	  this	  evening,	  is	  to	  get	  an	  expression	  of	  where	   Senators	   stands	   on	   this	   issue.	  Which	   side	   are	   they	   on?	  Are	  they	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  freedom	  fighters	  or	  are	  they	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Communists?735	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  It	   was	   a	   reminder	   that	   as	   much	   as	   Helms’	   ‘test	   votes’	   were	   helpful	   for	  conservatives	   keeping	   tabs	   on	   senators,	   there	   was	   also	   a	   sense	   that	   the	  senator	  deployed	  them	  as	  another	  “bomb	  throwing”	  tactic.	  	  Moderates	   in	   the	   Reagan	   administration,	   particularly	   Shultz	   and	  Central	   America	   envoy	   Philip	   Habib,	   saw	   Esquipulas	   II	   as	   a	   success,	   and	  Reagan	  was	  persuaded	  to	  offer	  a	  half-­‐hearted	  welcome	  for	  the	  plan	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	   its	   signing.736	  Despite	   strong	   criticism	   from	  vocal	  pro-­‐Contra	  advocates	  in	  the	  administration,	  notably	  Abrams,	  Carlucci,	  and	  Weinberger,	  and	   even	   with	   outspoken	   support	   in	   the	   Senate	   from	   Chic	   Hecht,	   Helms	  appeared	   to	   be	   increasingly	   isolated	   from	   the	   president’s	   agenda.737	  The	  senator	  admitted	  as	  much	  when	  he	  noted	  ‘I	  have	  not	  talked	  to	  him	  [Reagan]	  about	  what	  I	  am	  doing.	  I	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  he	  favors	  it	  or	  not.’738	  	  Helms’	  rigid	  commitment	  to	  the	  Contras	  had	  always	  left	  him	  isolated	  when	  seeking	  to	  exert	  influence	  on	  the	  details	  of	  legislation,	  and	  in	  August	  it	  was	  no	  different.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Contras’	  directorate	  ironically	  steered	  clear	  of	  the	  more	  determined	  aid	  advocates	  during	  a	  visiting	  to	  Washington	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  aid	  vote	  suggested	   that	   the	  senator’s	   intransigence	  was	  costing	  him	  influence.739	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737	  Kagan,	  Twilight	   Struggle,	   544-­‐545,	   and	   Chic	   Hecht	   (NV),	   “Support	   For	  The	  Nicaraguan	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  23156.	  
738	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	   “Support	  For	  The	  Nicaraguan	  Resistance,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	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   Five	  weeks	  later,	  Helms	  sought	  to	  attach	  his	  $310	  million	  Contra	  aid	  package	  to	  the	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  for	  1988	  and	  1989.	  With	  co-­‐sponsorship	   from	   senators	   Armstrong,	   Bond,	   Hatch,	   Hecht,	   Heflin,	  Shelby,	   Symms,	   Thurmond,	   and	   Wilson	   –	   a	   sizeable	   bipartisan,	   but	   still	  conservative,	  coalition	  –	  Helms’	  amendment	  would	  have	  allowed	  Reagan	  to	  allocate	   the	   funds	   to	   the	  Contras	  unless	   the	  president	  had	  certified	  by,	  or	  on,	   30	   September	   that	   there	   were	   no	   Soviet	   or	   Cuban	   bases	   within	  Nicaragua	  that	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  region;	  that	  the	  Sandinistas	  posed	  no	  threat	  to	  their	  neighbours	  or	  provided	  a	  staging	  area	  for	  insurgent	  groups;	  and	  that	  basic	  human	  rights	  were	  being	  respected.740	  	  In	   the	  aftermath	  of	  Reagan’s	   tepid	   support	   for	  Esquipulas,	   the	  more	  ardent	  anti-­‐Sandinistas	   in	   the	  White	  House	  had	  successfully	   lobbied	   for	  a	  retreat	   from	  that	  position.	  Habib	  resigned	  after	  steadfast	  pro-­‐Contras,	   led	  by	   Weinberger	   and	   Abrams,	   blocked	   a	   Shultz	   proposal	   for	   the	   envoy	   to	  travel	  to	  Nicaragua	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  new	  peace	  process.	  Yet	  though	  this	  suggested	   the	   hardliners	   had	   gained	   an	   upper	   hand,	   mixed	   signals	  continued	  to	  emanate	   from	  the	  White	  House.	  The	  administration,	  Gutman	  notes,	  was	  acting	  ‘as	  if	  it	  had	  lost	  its	  compass’,	  and	  movement	  conservatives	  feared	  the	  abandonment	  of	  both	  the	  Contras	  and	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine.741	  	  Helms’	   amendment	   provided	   congressional	   conservatives	   with	   a	  symbolic	   moment	   to	   express	   their	   own	   disappointment	   at	   this	   lack	   of	  direction,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   rallying	   point	   in	   support	   of	   the	   principled	  conservative	  position	  that	  its	  right-­‐wing	  critics	  believed	  the	  administration	  had	   abandoned.	   ‘I	   never	   saw	   such	   a	   team	  of	  wild	   horses	  with	   everybody	  running	   in	   a	  different	  direction	  as	   is	   the	   case	  with	   this’,	  Helms	   lamented,	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  (1987),	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while	  Ernest	  Hollings	  believed	  policy	  would	  be	  hurt	  if	  senators	  did	  not	  ‘get	  them	   [the	   administration]	   to	   make	   up	   their	   minds.’	   ‘I	   want	   to	   help	   the	  Contras,’	  Hollings	  stated,	  ‘but	  I	  am	  having	  trouble	  with	  the	  administration.’	  ‘So	  am	  I,’	  Helms	  replied.742	  It	  was	  a	  damning	  verdict	  on	  the	  breakdown	  of	  a	  relationship	   that	   had	   long	   been	   sustained	   by	   a	   shared	   commitment	   to	   a	  militarised	  overthrow	  of	  Sandinistas.	  Now,	  as	  policy	  disarray	  set	   in	  at	   the	  White	  House	  and	  NSC,	  and	  as	  Howard	  Baker	  grew	  increasingly	   influential	  as	   Reagan’s	   new	   Chief-­‐of-­‐Staff,	   Helms’	   alliance	   with	   the	   administration	  withered.	  	  In	   fact,	   Helms’	   amendment	   threatened	   to	   undermine	   the	  administration’s	   new	   outlook,	   by	   backing	   Abrams’	   strategy	   of	   seeking	   a	  showdown	   with	   Congress	   over	   Contra	   aid.	   Gutman	   notes	   that	   the	  preference	  among	  congressional	  conservatives,	  allied	  with	  Abrams,	  was	  for	  a	   final	   battle	  with	   the	  Democrats.	   Even	   if	   aid	  were	   lost,	   the	  Contra	   lobby	  would	   be	   able	   to	   charge	   their	   foes	   with	   being	   soft	   on	   Communism.743	  Helms’	  request	  for	  $310	  million,	  and	  his	  rhetoric	  on	  the	  matter,	  fitted	  this	  approach,	   though	   whether	   the	   senator	   negotiated	   its	   introduction	   with	  Abrams	   is	   unclear.	   Abrams	   recalled	   that	   requests	   of	   this	   sort	  were	   often	  discussed	   with	   the	   senator’s	   office,	   but	   that	   Helms	   would	   also	   draft	  proposals	  without	  notification.744	  Doubts	  over	  whether	  the	  administration	  officially	  supported	  the	  senator’s	  actions	  led	  to	  chaos	  in	  the	  Senate,	  where	  Helms	   maintained	   that	   the	   president	   had	   expressed	   his	   support	   for	   the	  amendment	   but	   both	   John	   McCain	   and	   Bob	   Dole	   stated	   that	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  742	  Helms,	   “National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  For	  Fiscal	  Years	  1988	  And	  1989,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	   133	   (1987),	   24411,	   and	   Ernest	   Hollings	   (SC),	   “National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act	  For	  Fiscal	  Years	  1988	  And	  1989,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	  24411.	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administration	   did	   not	   want	   the	   Helms	   amendment	   brought	   up	   until	   its	  own	  aid	  request	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  Congress.745	  	  The	   fundamental	   logic	  of	  Helms’	   legislative	  strategy	  –	   that	  principle,	  not	   moderation,	   dictated	   policy	   –	   doomed	   the	   amendment.	   Widespread	  reluctance	  among	  senators	  to	  endorse	  a	  request	  perceived	  as	  hasty	  and	  ill	  judged	  stopped	  Helms’	  effort.	  Moreover,	  previous	  allies	  began	  to	  disappear,	  as	   the	   pro-­‐Contra	   network	   evolved	   and	   contracted.	   Former	   pro-­‐Contra	  supporters	   such	   as	   Sam	  Nunn	   (D-­‐GA),	   Chuck	   Grassley	   (R-­‐IA),	   and	   Alan	   J.	  Dixon	   (D-­‐IL)	   criticised	  Helms’	   tactics.	   Dixon,	   a	   previous	   floor	  manager	   of	  Contra	  aid	  bills,	  argued	  that	  he	  could	  not	  think	  of	   ‘a	  worse	   time	  when	  the	  peace	   initiative	   is	   under	   serious	   consideration…	   this	   amendment	   cannot	  prosper	  tonight,	  and	  that	  [its	  authors]	  are	  going	  to	  lose	  a	  good	  many	  votes	  on	   this	   side	   that	   in	   the	   past	   have	   supported	   that	   effort.’746	  The	   Helms	  amendment	  was	  tabled,	  61-­‐31,	  and	  the	  symbolic	  fight	  that	  the	  senator	  and	  his	  conservative	  allies	  sought	  did	  not	  materialise.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	   Helms	   and	   the	   core	   of	   the	   Contra	   network	   looked	   on	   in	  horror	  as	  the	  president	  who	  had	  vowed	  to	  keep	  the	  rebels	  together,	  “heart	  and	  soul”,	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  pragmatism	  they	  so	  passionately	  opposed.	  	  Reinvigorating	  the	  Network,	  1989-­‐1992	  	  When	  President	  Bush	  was	  elected	  in	  November	  1988,	  Helms	  and	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	   network	  were	   confronted	  with	   an	   even	   greater	   shift	   over	  Nicaragua.	   Worried	   that	   continued	   animosity	   between	   the	   White	   House	  and	   Capitol	   Hill	   over	   the	   Contras	   would	   damage	   its	   wider	   legislative	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agenda,	  the	  new	  administration	  acted	  swiftly	  to	  reduce	  tensions.	  Prominent	  and	   controversial	  Contra	  advocates	  were	   replaced,	   and	  Secretary	  of	   State	  James	  Baker	  negotiated	  a	  landmark	  bipartisan	  accord	  with	  Democrats	  that	  promised	   support	   for	   the	   regional	   peace	   process	   in	   exchange	   for	   limited,	  non-­‐military	   Contra	   funding.	   While	   the	   administration	   still	   sought	   to	  remove	   the	   Sandinistas,	   it	   would	   do	   so	   through	   cooperation,	   not	  confrontation,	  both	  with	  Democrats	  and	  the	  Central	  American	  republics.	  	  
Human	   Events	   was	   quick	   to	   condemn	   Helms	   over	   his	   apparent	  acquiescence	   to	   this	   new	   era	   of	   rapprochement,	   pointing	   to	   an	   apparent	  lack	   of	   interest	   in	   the	   Contras	   following	   Bush’s	   election.747	  The	   criticism,	  however,	   was	   unfair.	   Helms	   may	   not	   have	   been	   legislatively	   active	   on	  behalf	  of	   the	  Contras	   in	  the	  early	  days	  of	   the	  Bush	  administration,	  and	  he	  had	   even	   spoken	   of	   Baker’s	   appointment	   as	   one	   that	   ‘bodes	   well	   for	   a	  foreign	  policy	  based	  on	  bipartisan	  consultation.’748	  However,	  he	  pointedly	  referred	   to	   the	   rebels	   having	  been	   ‘left	   high	   and	  dry	  by	  Congress’	   during	  Baker’s	   Senate	   confirmation	   vote,	   and	   his	   pronouncement	   that	   the	   new	  secretary	   of	   state	   would	   now	   introduce	   ‘an	   American	   desk’	   at	   the	   State	  Department	   might	   well	   be	   construed	   as	   a	   demand	   rather	   than	   a	  prediction.749	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   administration’s	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Events,	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  State,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  436.	  
	   251	  
Any	  suggestion	  that	  the	  senator	  was	  at	  peace	  with	  Baker’s	  approach	  on	   foreign	   policy	   was	   off	   the	   mark.750	  In	   mid-­‐March,	   Helms	   introduced	  legislation	   that	   called	   for	   $75	   million	   in	   non-­‐military	   funding	   for	   the	  Contras	   while	   also	   recommending	   up	   to	   $50	   million	   in	   direct	   military	  assistance	  should	  the	  Sandinistas	  renege	  on	  their	  promise	  to	  hold	  free	  and	  fair	   elections	   the	   next	   year.	   Helms	   acerbically	   described	   his	   plan	   as	   ‘the	  Congressional	  Credibility	  Restoration	  Act	  of	  1989’,	  ‘the	  last	  chance	  for	  this	  body	  to	  put	  some	  semblance	  of	  substance	  behind	  the	  hundreds	  of	  hours	  of	  debate	   that	   we	   have	   heard	   in	   this	   Chamber	   about	   the	   importance	   of	  democracy	  in	  Nicaragua.’751	  	  	  The	   inflammatory	   rhetoric	   was	   out	   of	   touch	   with	   the	   new	   era	   of	  bipartisan	  toleration	  over	  Nicaragua.	  It	  was,	  however,	  perfectly	  reflective	  of	  the	   sentiments	   of	   a	   beleaguered	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   community	   that	  desperately	  sought	   to	  maintain	   interest	   in	   the	  region.752	  It	  also	  reinforced	  this	  same	  community’s	  argument	  that	  the	  Contras	  remained	  the	  only	  viable	  instrument	   for	   the	  U.S.	   strategy	  of	  democracy	  promotion	   in	  Nicaragua.	  753	  As	  Phil	  Crane	   told	   the	  House	   just	  before	  Helms’	  bill	  was	   introduced,	   only	  the	   Contras	   had	   ever	   pushed	   the	   Sandinistas	   to	   reform.	   If	   it	   failed	   to	  support	  the	  rebels	  once	  more,	  he	  said,	  ‘Congress	  is	  disregarding	  history	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Nicaragua.’754	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  750 	  “Bush’s	   Questionable	   Foreign	   Policy	   Team,”	   3,	   “Democrats	   Relish	  ‘Bipartisan	  Strategy,”	  Human	  Events,	  7	  January,	  1989,	  7,	  	  
751 	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	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   And	   Joint	  Resolutions,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  4575.	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  “Conservatives	  Are	  Failing	  The	  Contras,”	  Human	  Events,	  4	  March,	  1989,	  1,	  “Bush	  and	  Baker	  Must	  Make	  Contras	  Their	  Top	  Priority,”	  Human	  Events,	  25	  February,	  1989,	  and	  Henry	  J.	  Hyde	  (IL),	  “Central	  America:	  Guaranteeing	  A	  Soviet	  Beachhead,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  3174-­‐3175.	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  Elliot	  Abrams,	   “Are	  The	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  Finished?”	  National	  Review,	  10	  March,	  1989,	  30-­‐31.	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  Philip	  M.	  Crane	  (IL),	  “The	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  Dream,”	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  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	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  Helms’	  bill	   therefore	  acted	  as	  a	  rallying	  point	   for	   the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  network	  in	  a	  post-­‐Reagan	  environment.	  Human	  Events	  urged	  its	  readers	  to	  support	  Helms	  and	  his	  band	  of	   ‘dissident	  lawmakers’	  in	  their	  fight	  to	  save	  the	  Contras,	  and	  several	   long-­‐standing	  Contra	  advocates	   in	   the	  Senate	  co-­‐sponsored	   the	   legislation. 755 	  In	   the	   House,	   Robert	   Dornan,	   the	   fiery	  California	  conservative	  and	  long-­‐standing	  Contra	  advocate,	  introduced	  the	  Helms	  bill	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  similar	  Contra	  coalition	  in	  the	  lower	  chamber.	  To	  reinforce	   the	   bill’s	   importance	   as	   a	   marker	   point	   around	   which	  conservative	   pro-­‐Contra	   forces	   could	   orientate	   themselves,	   the	   American	  Conservative	   Union	   included	   it	   in	   its	   1989	   congressional	   vote-­‐rating	  index.756	  	  Yet	  with	   the	   bipartisan	   agreement	   only	   days	   away,	  Helms’	   proposal	  was	   really	   only	   a	   symbolic	   act	   of	   resistance.	   So	   too	   was	   the	   senator’s	  attempt	   to	   ward	   off	   the	   on-­‐going	   regional	   peace	   negotiations	   that	   were	  rapidly	  reaching	  a	  consensus	  on	   the	  need	   for	  Contra	  demobilisation	  prior	  to	  Nicaragua’s	  February	  1990	  elections.	  Writing	   to	  President	  Bush	   in	   late	  July,	  along	  with	   thirteen	  other	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  conservatives,	  Helms	  urged	  the	  president	   to	   ‘take	  all	  possible	  steps’	   to	  ward	  off	   the	  Central	  American	  plan.	  757	  That	   the	   senator	   had	   been	   forced	   to	   appeal	   so	   directly	   to	   the	  president	   suggested	   the	   limits	   of	   his	   influence	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Contras.	  Facing	   policy	   momentum	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   regional	   peace	   process,	   and	  without	  institutional	  allies	  in	  the	  bureaucracy,	  Helms	  was	  left	  to	  call	  upon	  a	  president	  whose	  Nicaragua	  policy	  he	  had	  opposed	  for	  the	  past	  five	  months.	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  3.	  
756	  “1989	  ACU	  Senate	  Vote	  Descriptions,”	  ACU	  Ratings	  of	  Congress,	  accessed	  10	   May,	   2014,	  http://www.conservative.org/ratingsarchive/uscongress/1989/desc_sen.html.	  	  
757	  Letter,	   Senator	   Jesse	   Helms	   to	   President	   George	   Bush,	   27	   July,	   1989,	  OA/ID	  08610,	  Miscellaneous,	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  Requests	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  Legislative	  Affairs:	  Helms,	  Jesse	  [1],	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  of	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  Affairs,	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  The	   senator’s	   fear	   that	   the	  Contras	  were	   about	   to	   be	   abandoned	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Central	  American	  allies	  was	  realised	  in	  autumn	  when,	  at	  Tela	  in	  Honduras,	   the	   five	   republics	   agreed	   to	   demobilise	   the	   Contras.	   The	  decision,	   and	   particularly	   Bush’s	   reluctance	   to	   stand	   up	   for	   the	   Contras,	  was	   a	   ‘sell	   out’	   according	   to	   the	  American	   right,	   symptomatic	   of	   the	   new	  president’s	   ‘bankrupt	   diplomacy’.	   Conservatives	   believed,	   as	   Helms	   had	  told	   President	   Bush	   in	   July,	   that	   without	   the	   Contras	   as	   leverage,	   the	  Sandinistas	   would	   not	   risk	   a	   true	   test	   of	   their	   popularity.758 	  William	  McGurn,	   writing	   in	   National	   Review,	   was	   blunt.	   ‘Today’,	   he	   wrote,	   ‘the	  Sandinistas	  have	  won’.759	  	  	  	   Helms’	   distress	   at	   the	  Bush	   administration’s	   embrace	   of	   the	   peace	  process	  was	  magnified	  by	  the	  United	  States’	  role	  in	  the	  upcoming	  election.	  In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  February	  1990	  elections,	  U.S.	  officials	  helped	  organise	  the	   National	   Opposition	   Union	   (UNO),	   a	   broad-­‐based	   anti-­‐Sandinista	  political	  movement	  which	  included	  conservative,	  centrist,	   leftist,	  and	  even	  communist	  groups.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  United	  States	  pick	  Violeta	  Chamorro	  to	  head	  UNO	  on	  account	  of	  her	  pragmatic	   appeal,	   but	   it	   also	   set	   aside	  $11.6	  million	   in	   funds	   from	   the	  National	   Endowment	   for	   Democracy	   (NED)	   for	  UNO-­‐affiliated	  groups.	  The	  CIA,	  having	  stated	  it	  would	  do	  nothing	  to	  assist	  the	   opposition	   inside	   Nicaragua,	   used	   $6	   million	   of	   its	   own	   funding	   to	  further	   bolster	   UNO	   by	   training	   activists	   outside	   Nicaraguan	   territory.	  Secretary	   of	   State	   James	   Baker	   assured	   Republican	   leaders	   that	   the	   aid	  ‘“would	  not	  be	  used	  for	  political	  campaigning”’,	  but,	  as	  LeoGrande	  notes,	  no	  one	   in	  Washington	  was	   persuaded	   that	   the	   funding	  was	   for	   anything	   but	  supporting	  the	  UNO	  campaign.760	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  William	   McGurn,	   “The	   Dodd	   Doctrine,”	   National	   Review,	   15	   August,	  1989,	  28.	  
760	  Bob	  Dole	  (KS),	  “A	  Fighting	  Chance	  In	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  Cong.	  Rec.	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  (1989),	  21373,	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  A	  useful	  overview	  of	  the	   NED	   campaign	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Colin	   S.	   Cavell,	   Exporting	   ‘Made-­‐in-­‐
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   Surprisingly,	   the	  pro-­‐Contra	  network	  was	   largely	  supportive	  of	   the	  Bush	   administration’s	   strategy.	   Many	   members	   demonstrated	   a	   sudden	  degree	  of	  political	  pragmatism,	  as	  the	  chance	  to	  oust	  the	  Sandinistas	  via	  the	  ballot	  box	  became	  a	  tenable	  proposition.	  A	   large	  number	  of	  congressional	  conservatives,	  long-­‐standing	  allies	  of	  Helms	  in	  their	  campaigning	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  rebels,	  now	  supported	  aid	  to	  UNO	  as	  the	  best	  means	  of	  ousting	  the	  Sandinistas	  from	  government.	  Human	  Events,	  critical	  of	  so	  much	  of	  Bush’s	  Nicaragua	  policy	  in	  1989,	  also	  appeared	  to	  accept	  the	  rationale	  for	  helping	  UNO,	   publishing	   pleas	   for	   assistance	   from	   knowledgeable	   observers.761	  When	   the	   vote	   on	   the	   assistance	   package	   came	   before	   the	   Senate,	   its	  passage	   was	   assisted	   by	   a	   large	   number	   of	   votes	   from	   the	   pro-­‐Contra	  community.762 	  Conservative	   support	   for	   UNO,	   and	   the	   administration’s	  policies,	  was	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  tensions	  between	  principle	  and	  pragmatism	  within	  the	  movement,	  and	  that	  shifts	  toward	  one	  or	  the	  other	  could	  occur	  on	  territory	  where	  a	  different	  position	  had	  long	  been	  staked	  out.	  	  	   Helms,	   however,	   joined	  with	   a	   coalition	   of	   liberals	   and	  moderates	  who	   were	   dismayed	   that	   the	   Bush	   administration	   would	   undermine	   the	  NED’s	  neutrality.	  ‘You	  cannot	  jump	  start	  democracy’,	  Helms	  said,	  nor	  ‘teach	  the	   lessons	   of	   democracy	   by	   using	   undemocratic	   means.’763 	  The	   State	  Department	  and	  CIA,	  who	  ‘know	  little	  or	  nothing	  about	  the	  political	  process	  in	   the	  United	  States,	  much	   less	   in	  other	  countries’,	  wanted	   ‘to	   control	   the	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electoral	  process	  and	  prevent	  an	  effective	  nationalist	  opposition.’764	  Some	  Republicans,	  unconvinced	  by	  their	  own	  leadership’s	  appeal	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  administration,	  shared	  these	  concerns,	  and	  Helms	  became	  so	  isolated	  from	  other	   vehement	   anti-­‐Sandinistas	   that	   he	   embraced	   bitter	   enemies	   in	   the	  Senate.765	  	  Despite	  Congress	  passing	  the	  assistance	  bill,	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Contra	   network	   and	   wider	   congressional	   debate	   over	   electoral	   aid	  demonstrated	  that	  Nicaragua	  remained,	  as	  William	  Robinson	  described	  it,	  a	  ‘laboratory’	   for	   political	   intervention.766	  Yet,	  while	   Congress	   disagreed	   on	  how	   best	   to	   support	   democratisation	   in	   Nicaragua,	   there	   was	  overwhelming	  praise	  for	  Chamorro	  and	  UNO	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  election.	  The	   pro-­‐Contra	   network	   was	   almost	   entirely	   unified	   in	   its	   support	   for	  Chamorro,	  and	  even	  those	  who	  had	  expressed	  doubt	  about	  U.S.	  support	  for	  UNO	  were	  happy	  to	  extoll	  the	  virtues	  of	  Daniel	  Ortega’s	  opponents.	  	  That	  is,	  except	  Helms.	  Where	  his	  colleagues,	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle	  and	   across	   all	   points	   on	   the	   ideological	   spectrum,	   saw	   a	   champion	   of	  freedom	   and	   democracy,	   the	   senator	   saw	   ‘pseudo-­‐Sandinistas’,	   offering	  ‘only	  a	  weak,	  “me-­‐too”	  revolutionary	  philosophy	  which	  they	  have	  no	  means	  of	   implementing	   if	   they	  should	  win.’	  Chamorro	  might	  be	  a	   ‘nice	   lady’,	  but	  she	  was	  not	  ‘politically	  active	  or	  particularly	  knowledgeable.’	  Her	  apparent	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  Helms,	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  For	  Free	  And	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  Elections	  In	  Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  24257,	  and	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Sunday’s	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Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  2371.	  
765	  Republican	  opposition	  came	   from	  Sen.	  Mark	  Hatfield,	  who	  claimed	   the	  processes	   was	   one	   of	   ‘manipulation	   and	   deceit.’	   Mark	   Hatfield	   (OR),	  “Assistance	   For	   Free	   And	   Fair	   Elections	   In	   Nicaragua,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   135	  (1989),	  24870.	  For	  Democrats,	  see	  Patrick	  Leahy	  (VT),	  “Assistance	  For	  Free	  And	   Fair	   Elections	   In	   Nicaragua,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   135	   (1989),	   24868,	   Tom	  Harkin	   (IA),	   “Assistance	   For	   Free	  And	   Fair	   Elections	   In	  Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  
Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  24869,	  and	  Carl	  Levin	  (MI),“Assistance	  For	  Free	  And	  Fair	  Elections	  In	  Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  24876.	  
766	  William	  I.	  Robinson,	  Promoting	  Polyarchy:	  Globalization,	  US	  intervention,	  
and	  hegemony	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  203.	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failure	   to	   repudiate	   the	  Marxist	   orthodoxy	   of	   the	   Sandinistas,	   whom	   she	  had	  represented	  on	  the	  1979	  revolutionary	  junta	  and	  whose	  former	  labour	  minister	   was	   now	   her	   running	   mate,	   made	   her	   ideologically	   suspect.	   ‘A	  weaker	   candidate’,	   Helms	   argued,	   ‘is	   harder	   to	   imagine.’767 	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  the	  senator,	  not	  only	  were	  the	  majority	  of	  parties	  in	  the	  UNO	  coalition	   Communists,	   but	   Sandinista	   candidates	   had	   infiltrated	   UNO	   as	  well.	  Nicaraguans,	  therefore,	  faced	  ‘the	  choice	  of	  the	  Sandinista	  Party	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  United	  States-­‐backed	  Communist	  Party	  on	  the	  other.’768	  	  	   Helms’	   stinging	   criticism	   of	   Chamorro	   and	   UNO	   was	   a	   last	   ditch	  effort	   to	   legitimise	   the	   Contras	   and	   return	   to	   a	   militarised	   solution	   in	  Nicaragua,	   regardless	   of	   the	   election	   result.	   In	   describing	   Chamorro	   as	   a	  U.S.	   prop,	   helping	   to	   ‘stage	   a	   fake	   election	   to	   legitimize	   the	   present	  Communist	   regime	   in	  Managua’,	   the	   senator	   set	   the	   Contras	   up	   as,	   in	   his	  own	  words,	   ‘the	  true	  freedom	  fighters	  of	  Nicaragua’.	  Only	  days	  before	  the	  election,	  the	  senator	  claimed	  that	  ‘the	  only	  sign	  of	  hope	  in	  Nicaragua	  today	  is	   that	   the	  Nicaraguan	  Resistance…	  have	  pledged	   to	  continue	   the	   fight	   for	  freedom.’	   ‘Perhaps	   they	   [the	   Contras]	   will	   topple	   the	   Sandinista	  government’,	   Helms	   said,	   ‘whether	   the	   Sandinista	   government	   is	   led	   by	  Daniel	   Ortega	   or	   led	   by	   anyone	   else.’	   Having	   spent	   months	   condemning	  UNO	   as	   quasi-­‐Sandinistas,	   the	   sentiment	   appeared	   as	   tacit	   support	   for	  military	  action	  against	  a	  Chamorro	  government.769	  	  When	  Chamorro	  won	  the	  election,	  Helms’	  adversarial	  stance	   toward	  her	  and	  UNO	  further	  isolated	  him	  amid	  the	  joyous	  reaction	  in	  Washington.	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  “Assistance	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  Free	  And	  Fair	  Elections	  In	  Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  24258,	  and	  Helms,	   “Sunday’s	  Nicaragua	  Elections,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  2372.	  
768	  Helms,	  “Assistance	  For	  Free	  And	  Fair	  Elections	  In	  Nicaragua,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	   (1989),	   24257-­‐24258,	   and	   Helms,	   “Sunday’s	   Nicaragua	   Elections,”	  
Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  2371-­‐2373.	  
769	  Helms,	   “Sunday’s	   Nicaragua	   Elections,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   136	   (1990),	   2371-­‐2373.	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President	   Bush	   announced	   support	   for	   Chamorro’s	   goals	   of	   national	  reconciliation	  and	  economic	  reconstruction,	  and	  lauded	  her	  as	  ‘a	  woman	  of	  great	   moral	   courage,	   an	   inspiration	   to	   the	   people	   of	   her	   nation.’770	  Pro-­‐Contra	  conservatives	  also	  expressed	  their	  happiness	  at	  Chamorro’s	  victory.	  Trent	   Lott,	   who	   had	   co-­‐signed	   Helms’	   letter	   to	   Bush	   the	   previous	   July,	  praised	   Chamorro’s	   ‘great	   victory’,	   while	   Bob	   Dole	   described	   the	  Nicaraguan	   leader	   as	   ‘an	   extraordinarily	   brave	   and	   tenacious	  woman’.	  771	  	  Strom	   Thurmond	   called	   the	   election	   result	   ‘a	   victory	   for	   freedom,	  democracy,	  and	  peace	   in	  Central	  America.’772	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  vociferous	  praise	   for	   Chamorro	   came	   from	   Bob	   Dornan,	   the	   outspoken	   Contra	  advocate	  who	  had	  introduced	  Helms’	  Contra	  aid	  bill	  to	  the	  House	  in	  March	  1989.	   Chamorro	   was,	   Dornan	   said,	   ‘“an	   elegant	   lady…	   a	   miracle	   in	   the	  history	  of	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere”’	  who	  had	  ‘united’	  Nicaragua.773	  	  	  Now	  standing	  virtually	  alone,	  Helms	  cautioned	  against	  this	  optimism.	  ‘In	  Nicaragua,’	  Helms	  said,	   ‘there	  can	  never	  be	  peace,	  and	  there	  can	  never	  be	   fundamental	   reform	   of	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   system	   unless	   all	  Sandinista,	  Marxist,	  and	  Communist	  ideologies	  are	  removed	  from	  decision-­‐
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   as	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   of	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   26	   February,	   1990,	   Public	   Papers,	   George	   Bush	   Library,	  accessed	   10	   May,	   2014,	  http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1588,	   and	  “Remarks	  at	  a	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  Briefing	  on	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  16	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  1990,”	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  Papers,	   George	   Bush	   Library,	   accessed	   10	   May,	   2014,	  http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1755.	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  Cong.	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  2504,	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  (KS),	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  (1990),	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   (SC),	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   Cong.	   Rec.	   136	  (1990),	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  Jack	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   and	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   van	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   Barred,”	  
Washington	  Post,	   30	  March,	  1990,	  E5,”	  Guy	  Gugliotta,	   “Criticism	  Muted	  as	  Nicaraguans	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   1991,	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  (1990),	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making	   posts.’774	  In	   pursuit	   of	   this	   goal,	   Helms	   closely	   scrutinised	   the	  Chamorro	   government	  during	   the	   early	  1990s,	   successfully	   hindering	   the	  Bush	   and	   Clinton	   administrations	   from	   sending	   U.S.	   aid	   to	   assist	  Nicaragua’s	   reconstruction.	   The	   senator’s	   campaign	   helped	   foster	   a	  renewed	   surge	   of	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   sentiment	   among	   conservatives	   in	   the	  United	   States,	   and	   fed	   a	   lingering	   Cold	   War	   conservatism	   that	   did	   not	  acknowledge	   the	  disappearance	  of	   old	   ideological	   battles	   in	   a	   post-­‐Soviet	  world.	  	  	  The	   centrepiece	   of	   Helms’	   campaign	   was	   an	   August	   1992	   report	  produced	  by	  Republican	  staff	   for	  the	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee.	  At	  the	  behest	  of	  Helms,	  and	  led	  by	  Deborah	  DeMoss,	  the	  group	  spent	  seven	  months	   investigating	   Chamorro’s	   government	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	  Sandinistas	   in	  post-­‐civil	  war	  Nicaragua.	  They	  offered	  scathing	  criticism	  of	  Chamorro’s	   economic	  policies	   and	  human	   rights	   record,	   and	  attacked	   the	  Sandinistas	  for	  their	  pernicious	  influence	  on	  the	  country’s	  social,	  political,	  and	   economic	   life.	   James	  Nance,	   a	   retired	  Navy	   admiral	   and	  old	   friend	  of	  Helms	  who	   served	   as	   Republican	   staff	   director	   for	   the	   Foreign	   Relations	  Committee,	   concluded	   that	   the	   report	   showed	   Nicaragua	   to	   be	  ‘overwhelmingly	  controlled	  by	   terrorists,	   thugs,	   thieves	  and	  murderers	  at	  the	  highest	  levels.’775	  	  Among	  the	  most	  incendiary	  comments	  were	  suggestions	  that	  the	  new	  Nicaraguan	   government	   was	   complicit	   in	   a	   campaign	   of	   assassinations	  directed	   at	   former	   Contras.	   The	   report	   listed	   the	   names	   of	   217	   former	  rebels	  killed	  under	  the	  Chamorro	  government,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  circumstances	  of	   their	  death.	  Smaller	  sections	  dwelled	  on	  other	  human	  rights	  violations,	  such	  as	  restrictions	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  press,	  but	  the	  focus	  lay	  mainly	  on	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   “The	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Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  2937.	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  Senate	   Committee	   on	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  Relations,	  Nicaragua	  Today,	   102nd	   Cong,	  2nd	  sess.,	  S.	  Rpt	  102-­‐102,	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the	  deaths	  of	  former	  resistance	  fighters.776	  The	  Contras	  deaths	  led	  Helms	  to	  describe	   post-­‐war	   Nicaragua	   as	   a	   repressive	   and	   violent	   state,	   where	  former	   rebel	   leaders-­‐turned	   civilians	   were	   being	   ‘massacred’	   by	   a	   new	  government	  guilty	  of	  ‘a	  systematic	  campaign	  of	  murder.’777	  	   No	  other	  issue	  was	  given	  greater	  priority	  in	  the	  report,	  however,	  than	  that	   of	   property	   rights.	   It	   concluded	   465	   Americans	   had	   a	   total	   of	   over	  2,000	  claims	  regarding	  property	  appropriated	  by	  the	  Sandinistas	  yet	  to	  be	  returned	  by	  Chamorro’s	  government,	  and	  stated	  that	  progress	  would	  only	  be	  made	  when	  every	   single	   item	  of	   confiscated	  property	  was	   returned	   to	  the	   appropriate	   citizens.	   ‘Without	   the	   respect	   for	   basic	   private	   property	  rights,’	  the	  report	  argued,	  ‘no	  other	  economic	  reforms	  in	  Nicaragua	  will	  be	  meaningful	  or	   lasting.’778	  ‘[T]he	   stolen	  homes	  and	  businesses	  of	  hundreds	  of	  American	  and	  Nicaragua	  citizens	  remain	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  thieves’,	  he	  told	  Senate	   colleagues	   in	   1993,	   ‘with	   the	   blessing	   of	   the	   Chamorro	  government.’779	  	  The	  research	  conducted	  at	  Helms’	  direction	  increasingly	  coloured	  the	  conservative	  view	  of	   the	  Chamorro’s	  government.	   It	  was	  true	  that	  several	  conservatives	   in	   Congress	   were	   already	   expressing	   grave	   concerns	   over	  property	  rights	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  before	  the	  report’s	  publication,	  but	  its	  conclusions	  energised	  the	  anti-­‐Sandinista	  community.780	  M.	  Stanton	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Evans,	   citing	   ‘the	  mass	   of	   evidence’	   accumulated	   by	   Helms	   and	   his	   staff,	  called	   for	   direct	   assistance	   to	   be	   terminated	   until	   ‘the	   power	   of	   the	  Sandinistas	  is	  broken	  and	  the	  assassins	  and	  other	  criminals	  are	  brought	  to	  justice.’781	  The	  following	  year,	  Elliot	  Abrams	  argued	  in	  National	  Review	  that	  human	   rights	   violations	   in	   Nicaragua	   did	   little	   to	   support	   the	   claim	  democracy	  had	  ‘triumphed’	  there,	  while	  in	  Human	  Events	  Jeane	  Kirkpatrick	  concluded	  Chamorro	  had	  been	  fooled	  by	  the	  Sandinistas.782	  	  More	   significantly,	   the	   report	   forced	   the	   Bush	   administration	   to	  respond	   to	   Helms’	   concerns.	   Deputy	   assistant	   secretary	   of	   state	   John	   F.	  Maisto	   was	   sent	   to	   Nicaragua	   to	   emphasise	   the	   United	   States’	   desire	   for	  greater	   progress	   on	   human	   rights,	   democracy	   promotion,	   and	   economic	  growth,	   and	   State	   Department	   officials	   declared	   that	   aid	   to	   Nicaragua	  would	  be	  denied	  until	  Chamorro	  took	  steps	  to	  mollify	  Helms.783	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  hoping	  to	  persuade	  Helms	  to	  relent	  in	  his	  campaign,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  James	   Baker	   negotiated	   a	   compromise	   with	   Chamorro	   in	   which	   the	   U.S.	  would	   release	  $50	  million	   in	   aid	   in	   return	   for	   the	   firing	  of	   the	  Sandinista	  head	   of	   police	   and	   replacement	   of	   a	   third	   of	   Sandinistas	   in	   the	   force.784	  Though	   intended	   to	   persuade	   Helms	   to	   relent	   in	   his	   obstructionism,	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  Warrior,	   424.	   In	   the	   short	   term,	   Helms	   got	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   of	   his	  wishes	  when	  Chamorro	   replaced	  her	  police	   chief,	   though	  she	   claimed	   the	  move	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   at	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   law	   enforcement.	   Shirley	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  “Chamorro	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  September,	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failed	   to	   impress	   the	  senator.	  He	   taped	  a	  message,	  played	  out	   to	  cheering	  crowds	  in	  Nicaragua	  by	  DeMoss,	  in	  which	  he	  declared	  he	  would	  ‘“not	  back	  down”’	  in	  the	  face	  of	  that	  ‘“defiant	  lady	  in	  Managua.”’785	  	   Helms’	   ability	   to	   push	   the	   Bush	   (and,	   later,	   the	   Clinton)	  administration	   in	   his	   preferred	   policy	   direction	   said	   much	   about	   the	  importance	   of	   property	   rights	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   economic	  worldview	   that	  dominated	   the	   United	   States’	   foreign	   agenda	   during	   the	   early	   and	   mid-­‐1990s.786	  While	   there	   was	   criticism	   from	   individual	   senators	   –	   Arkansas	  Democrat	   Bill	   Alexander	   condemned	   Helms’	   hold	   on	   aid	   as	   ‘astonishing	  both	  procedurally	  and	  substantively	  –	  by	  1994,	  senior	  senators	  were	  telling	  Chamorro	   that	   congressional	   support	   for	   extensive	   aid	   had	   ‘all	   but	  evaporated’.787	  The	  Washington	   Post	   criticised	   Helms’	   strategy	   as	   ‘heavy-­‐handed’,	   ‘unnecessary’	   and	   ‘un-­‐helpful’,	   and	   Nicaragua’s	   foreign	   minister	  suggested	  that	  the	  Bush	  administration	  had	  sacrificed	  the	  country’s	  future	  to	   gain	   Helms’	   support	   for	   the	   president’s	   re-­‐election	   campaign,	   but	  Congress	   was	   largely	   willing	   to	   follow	   Helms	   and	   the	   administration.788	  Though	  it	  could	  hardly	  be	  argued	  that	  senators	  and	  executive	  officials	  had	  flocked	  to	  his	  cause	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  the	  case	  that	  the	  senator’s	   efforts	   had	   contributed	   to	   a	   noticeable	   cooling	   in	   relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  post-­‐civil	  war	  Nicaragua.	  The	  net	  result	  was	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an	   American	   disengagement	   from	   Nicaragua	   that,	   for	   Helms	   at	   least,	  represented	  a	  hardly	  rousing,	  but	  at	  least	  somewhat	  successful	  culmination	  to	  almost	  a	  decade	  and	  a	  half	  of	  engagement.	  	  In	  1992,	   two	  years	   after	   the	  Sandinistas	  were	  defeated	  at	   the	  ballot	  box,	  Pat	  Buchanan	  addressed	  the	  Republican	  Party	  national	  convention	  in	  Houston.	  Buchanan	  attributed	  U.S.	  success	  in	  Nicaragua	  to	  Ronald	  Reagan.	  In	   that	   country,	   according	   to	   the	   president’s	   former	   communications	  director	   and	   long-­‐serving	   member	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   network,	   ‘the	  Marxist	   regime	   was	   forced	   to	   hold	   free	   elections	   –	   by	   Ronald	   Reagan’s	  contra	  army	  –	  and	  the	  communists	  were	  thrown	  out	  of	  power.’789	  There	  is	  considerable	  debate	  over	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Contras	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  policy,	  but	  in	  any	  case,	  Buchanan’s	  hagiographic	  depiction	  of	  the	  former	  president’s	   role	   in	   policy	   was	   a	   disservice	   to	   his	   fellow	   anti-­‐Sandinistas,	  and	   in	   particular,	   to	   Senator	   Helms.	  790	  There	   was	   no	   ‘Ronald	   Reagan’s	  contra	  army’;	  there	  was,	  however,	  an	  army	  –	  and	  a	  doctrine	  –	  based	  on	  the	  actions	  and	  ideology	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  individuals	  whose	  relationship	  with	  Helms,	   and	   his	   with	   them,	   was	   a	   crucial	   element	   in	   the	   war	   against	   the	  Sandinistas.	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That	  Helms	   achieved	   such	   influence	   on	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   policy	  was	   a	  product	   of	   his	   integration	  within	   a	   network	   of	   hard-­‐line	   anti-­‐Sandinistas	  whose	  goal	  of	  overthrowing	  the	  Nicaraguan	  government	  was	  evident	  even	  prior	   to	   Reagan’s	   election	   as	   president.	   Helms	   valued	   such	   networks	   for	  their	   information-­‐gathering	   abilities.791	  As	   has	   been	   noted,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Nicaragua	   the	   senator	   utilised	   such	   information	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	  campaign	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  alleged	  Sandinista	  atrocities	  and	  totalitarian	  programmes.	   In	  doing	  so,	  Helms	  helped	   to	  articulate	   the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  as	  a	  defence	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  freedoms.	  	  Yet	   such	   networks	   do	   not	   simply	   act	   as	   conduits	   for	   information.	  Alliances	  offer	  a	  source	  of	  wider	  support	  for	  actions	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	   shared	  goals.792	  Helms	  was	   astute	   in	   recognising	   that	  his	   goals	   in	  Nicaragua	  were	  shared	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  individuals,	  both	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  across	  the	  hemisphere.	   In	  developing	  relationships	  with	  these	   figures,	   the	  senator	  was	  contributing	  to	  a	  group	  whose	  influence	  lay	  not	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  single	  member,	  but	  in	  the	  combined	  strength	  of	  the	  community.	  Thus,	  Carbaugh,	   Hamrick,	   and	   Schamis	   could	   tie	   their	   efforts	   in	   with	   the	  Argentines	   and	   Hondurans.	   Tambs	   and	   North	   could	   operate	   together	   in	  opening	  up	  their	  desired	  southern	  front.	  Singlaub	  and	  Pastora	  could	  work	  to	   draw	   a	   banished	   group	   back	   into	   the	   Contra	   fold.	   The	   support	   was	  mutually	  reinforcing,	  and	  all	  the	  more	  influential	  because	  of	  it.	  	  	  In	   a	   post-­‐Vietnam	   political	   environment	   in	   which	   Congress	   had	  reasserted	  its	  prerogatives	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  sphere,	  Helms	  understood	  that	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  contained	  many	  points	  of	  access,	  and	  an	  individual	   could	   achieve	   much	   greater	   leverage	   by	   seeking	   out	   these	  opportunities	  and	  taking	  advantage	  of	   their	  existence.	  By	  actively	  seeking	  connections	   –	   directly,	   or	   through	   proxies	   –	  with	   individuals	   and	   groups	  like	   Oliver	   North,	   Elliot	   Abrams,	   Jeane	   Kirkpatrick,	   Eden	   Pastora,	   Lewis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  791	  Helms,	  Here’s	  Where	  I	  Stand,	  208.	  
792	  Scott,	  Deciding	  to	  Intervene,	  246.	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Tambs,	  Gerardo	  Schamis	  and	  the	  Argentinean	  military,	  and	  Colonel	  Gustavo	  Álvarez	  Martínez	  and	  the	  Honduran	  armed	  forces	  –	  the	  senator	  successfully	  located,	  and	  achieved,	  access	  to	  a	  range	  of	  these	  contact	  points.	  	  	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say	   that	  Helms	  was	  consistently	  successful	   in	  his	  anti-­‐Sandinista	   initiatives,	   or	   that	  we	  must	   consider	   the	   strategy	   as	   a	   “Helms	  Doctrine”.	  There	  were	  failures,	  or	  at	  least	  weaknesses,	  in	  the	  senator’s	  use	  of	  the	  network	  and	  his	  personal	  rhetorical	  and	  legislative	  tactics.	  Congress	  was	  rarely	  persuaded	  by	  Helms’	  efforts	  against	  the	  Sandinistas.	  Though	  the	  network	  allowed	  him	  to	  be	  updated	  on	   the	  state	  of	   the	  Contra	  crusade,	   it	  failed	   to	   provide	  many	   votes	   on	   the	   Hill.	   Helms’	   ideological	   rigidity	   kept	  him	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  legislative	  battles	  over	  Contra	  aid,	  and	  it	  was	  the	  more	  moderate	  members	  of	  Congress	  –	  those	  willing	  to	  bend	  over	  certain	  aspects	   of	   legislation	   –	   who	   achieved	   the	   most	   influence	   on	   policy.	   His	  partisan	  efforts	  to	  support	  the	  Contras	  were	  more	  often	  than	  not	  doomed	  by	   over-­‐reaching,	   or	   by	   his	   unwillingness	   to	   compromise	   on	   matters	   of	  principle	  –	  a	  political	  strategy	  about	  which	  he	  was	  unapologetic.793	  	  Yet	   when	   considering	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   in	  Nicaragua,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  Contra	  policy	  was	  not	  merely	  the	  application	  of	   the	   president’s,	   or	   his	   senior	   team’s,	   ideology	   and	   directives.	   A	   wider	  network	  of	   hard-­‐line	   anti-­‐Sandinistas,	  within	  which	   Jesse	  Helms	  played	   a	  critical	   role,	   contributed	   to	   the	   formulation,	   development	   and	   active	  implementation	   of	   anti-­‐Sandinista	   strategy.	   James	   Scott	   has	   argued	   that	  these	   kinds	   of	   alliances,	   which	   competed	   with	   rival	   networks	   of	   policy	  advocates,	  have	  just	  as	  great	  a	  claim	  on	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	  as	  individuals	  within	   the	   White	   House.	   ‘Credit,	   if	   it	   is	   due,’	   Scott	   declares,	   ‘must	   be	  shared.’794	  In	   seeking	   to	   apply	   the	  Reagan	  Doctrine	   to	  Nicaragua,	   Senator	  Jesse	  Helms	  could	  justly	  claim	  some	  of	  that	  credit.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  793	  Helms,	  Here’s	  Where	  I	  Stand,	  64.	  
794	  Scott,	  Deciding	  to	  Intervene,	  253.	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Panama,	  1981-­‐1992	  	  	   	  	   Between	  1981	  and	  1986,	  Panama	  retreated	  to	  the	  periphery	  of	  U.S.-­‐	  Central	   American	   relations.	   The	   Reagan	   administration	   believed	   U.S.	  interests	   in	   the	   Isthmus	  –	   security	   of	   the	  Canal	   and	   the	   right	   to	  maintain	  military	  bases	  –	  were	  safe	  despite	  changes	  in	  the	  country’s	  leadership	  after	  Omar	  Torrijos’	  death	  in	  1981.	  Panama’s	  National	  Guard	  (restructured,	  after	  1984,	  into	  the	  Panamanian	  Defense	  Force,	  or	  PDF),	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Manuel	   Antonio	   Noriega,	   promised	   to	   continue	   the	   transition	   toward	  civilian	  rule	  started	  by	  Torrijos.	  Even	  after	  fraudulent	  elections	  in	  1984	  and	  the	   ousting	   of	   the	   Panamanian	   president	   in	   late	   1985,	   the	   United	   States	  expressed	   little	   concern.	   Noriega,	   both	   a	   CIA	   asset	   and	   Cuban	   informer,	  with	  ties	  to	  the	  Medellín	  drug	  cartel	  and	  regional	  arms	  smuggling,	  proved	  helpful	  in	  the	  war	  on	  the	  Sandinistas.	  In	  return,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  looked	  the	  other	  way	  as	  he	  cemented	  his	  position	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  Panama’s	  political	   life.	  795	  In	   these	   years,	   Panama	   returned	   to	   its	   position	   as	   what	  John	  Dinges	  called	  ‘the	  sideshow	  in	  Central	  America’.796	  	  	   Yet,	   in	   December	   1989,	   less	   than	   a	   year	   after	   the	   Reagan	  administration	   left	   office,	   the	   United	   States	   invaded	   Panama,	   captured	  Noriega,	   and	   extradited	   him	   to	   Florida	   to	   face	   drug	   trafficking	   charges.	  President	  Bush	  called	  the	  operation	  –	  itself	  bluntly	  code-­‐named	  Just	  Cause	  –	  ‘a	  noble	  cause’,	  associating	  the	  six-­‐week	  long	  battle	  with	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	  infamous	  description	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.797	  It	  was	  one	  of	  the	  major	  ironies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  795	  Carothers,	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  Democracy,	  167-­‐169.	  
796	  John	  Dinges,	  Our	  Man	  in	  Panama:	  How	  General	  Noriega	  Used	  The	  United	  
States	  –	  and	  Made	  Millions	   in	  Drugs	  and	  Arms	   (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  199),	  318.	  
797	  “Remarks	   Announcing	   the	   Surrender	   of	   General	   Manuel	   Noriega	   in	  Panama,	  3	  March,	  1990,”	  Public	  Papers,	  George	  Bush	  Library,	  accessed	  23	  May,	   2014,	  http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1397.	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of	   Central	   America	   policy	   in	   the	   late	   Cold	   War	   that	   Bush,	   a	   president	  maligned	  by	  movement	   conservatives	   for	  his	   tepid,	   bipartisan	   strategy	   in	  Nicaragua	  and	  El	  Salvador,	  and	  not	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  was	  the	  one	  to	  deploy	  U.S.	   troops	   in	  Central	  America.	  That	  such	  an	  action	   took	  place	   in	  Panama,	  and	  not	  El	  Salvador	  or	  Nicaragua,	  was	  testament	  to	  a	  dramatic	  realignment	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1980s.	  	  Jesse	   Helms	   was	   instrumental	   in	   this	   course	   correction.	   From	   the	  start	   of	   1986	   onwards,	   the	   senator	   engaged	   in	   a	   persistent	   campaign	   of	  policy	  entrepreneurship	  that	  helped	  shift	  congressional	  opinion	  on	  Panama	  and	  forced	  the	  Reagan	  and	  Bush	  administrations	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  United	  States’	  close	  relationship	  with	  Manuel	  Noriega.	  Helms	  was	  the	  first	  member	  of	  Congress	  to	  focus	  the	  nation’s	  attention	  on	  critical	  themes	  that	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  Panama	  debate:	  Noriega’s	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses,	   as	   well	   as	   his	   money	   laundering,	   weapons	   smuggling,	   and	  association	   with	   Cuba.	   Using	   institutional	   mechanisms	   afforded	   by	   his	  position	  in	  the	  Senate,	  notably	  committee	  hearings	  and	  floor	  speeches,	  the	  senator	   reshaped	   perceptions	   of	   Panama’s	   role	   in	   Central	   America’s	  instability.	  	  Crucially,	  Helms’	  actions	  took	  place	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broad	  Senate	  coalition	  against	  Noriega.	  Built	  upon	  an	  unlikely	  alliance	  with	  liberal	  Massachusetts	  Democrat	   John	   Kerry,	   who	   shared	   Helms’	   interest	   in	   controlling	  hemispheric	   drug	   trafficking,	   the	   anti-­‐Noriega	   community	   in	   the	   upper	  chamber	  eventually	  comprised	  nearly	  all	  one	  hundred	  senators.	  Working	  in	  close	   cooperation	   with	   his	   colleagues	   from	   1986	   until	   late	   1989,	   Helms	  introduced	   several	   pieces	   of	   legislation	   that	   emphasised	   congressional	  discontent	  with	  U.S.	  policy	   in	   the	   Isthmus	  or,	   at	   key	  moments,	   imposed	  a	  measure	   of	   institutional	   oversight	   on	   an	   executive	   branch	   uneasy	   about	  threats	  to	  its	  existing	  Panama	  policy.	  	  The	  power	  of	  Helms’	  entrepreneurship	  derived	  from	  the	  resonance	  of	  the	  themes	  he	  prioritised.	  At	  a	  time	  when	  the	  war	  on	  drugs	  was	  permeating	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the	   national	   consciousness,	   the	   senator’s	   relentless	   campaign	   to	   expose	  Noriega’s	   links	   to	   the	  hemispheric	  narcotics	   trade	   tapped	   into	  a	  powerful	  public	  fear.	  Likewise,	  his	  discussion	  of	  Panama’s	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  subversion	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  co-­‐opted	  the	  language	  of	  democracy	  promotion	   and	   humanitarianism	   that	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Central	   America	  divide	  in	  Washington	  had	  come	  to	  employ	  during	  the	  1980s.	  These	  issues	  created	   a	   solid	   foundation	  upon	  which	  he	   and	  his	   colleagues	   could	  work,	  despite	  being	  at	  odds	  over	  many	  other	  aspects	  of	  regional	  policy.	  	  Yet	   while	   Helms’	   actions	   were	   a	   striking,	   and	   rare,	   example	   of	   his	  ability	   to	   work	   with	   ideological	   adversaries,	   his	   entrepreneurship	  remained	  rooted	  in	  conservative	  principles.	  His	  horror	  at	  Noriega’s	  links	  to	  drug	   trafficking	  was	  a	  product	  of	   social	   conservative	  consternation	  at	   the	  impact	   of	   illegal	   substances	   on	   the	   moral	   fabric	   of	   American	   society.	  Likewise,	   his	   targeting	   of	   the	   Panamanian	   was	   consistent	   with	   the	  American	   right’s	   focus	   on	   the	   need	   to	   address	   the	   drug	   problem	   on	   the	  supply	  side.	  Helms’	  attempts	  to	  reform	  Panama’s	  secretive	  banking	  culture,	  partly	  related	  to	  its	  specific	  role	  in	  the	  laundering	  of	  drug	  profits,	  emerged	  from	   his	   fusionist,	   pristine-­‐capitalist	   economic	   framework	   that	   treated	  transnational	  finance	  with	  suspicion.	  	  Moreover,	   Helms’	   perception	   that	   removing	   Noriega	   represented	   a	  defeat	   for	   communism	   qualifies	   the	   view	   of	   scholars	   that	   Operation	   Just	  Cause	  was	  a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  action.798	  The	  invasion	  of	  Panama	  is	  attributed	  to	   several	   factors,	   with	   the	   war	   on	   drugs	   and	   Bush’s	   desire	   to	   project	  American	   (and	   his	   own)	   strength	   being	   among	   the	   foremost.	   There	   are	  undoubtedly	  good	  reasons	  to	  accept	  these	  arguments,	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  conflict	  –	  as	  Eastern	  Europe	  emerged	  from	  Soviet	  control	  and	  the	  transition	  toward	   democracy	   accelerated	   throughout	   Latin	   America	   –	   means	   Just	  Cause	  was	  situated	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Bush	  administration	  began	  to	  face	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  798	  Eytan	   Gilboa,	   “The	   Panama	   Invasion	   Revisited:	   Lessons	   for	   the	   Use	   of	  Force	   in	   the	   Post	   Cold	   War	   Era,”	   Political	   Science	   Quarterly	   110,	   No.	   4	  (Winter,	  1995-­‐1996),	  539,	  and	  Zelizer,	  Arsenal	  of	  Democracy,	  357.	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new	   international	   order.	   Yet	   for	   Jesse	  Helms,	   and	   for	   conservatives	  more	  widely,	  the	  downfall	  of	  Manuel	  Noriega	  was	  very	  much	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  campaign	  rooted	  in	  Central	  America’s	  Cold	  War.	  	   A	  Disappearing	  Cause?	  The	  Panama	  Canal,	  1981-­‐1986	  	  Between	  1981	  and	  1986,	  Helms’	  interest	  in	  Panama	  remained	  centred	  on	  the	  Canal.	  The	  intensity	  of	  his	  focus	  recalled	  his	  vociferous	  opposition	  to	  the	   treaties	   during	   the	   Nixon,	   Ford,	   and	   Carter	   years,	   not	   least	   when	   he	  described	  matters	  relating	  to	  increasing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  waterway	  as	  ‘among	  the	   gravely	   important	   questions’	   that	   faced	   the	  United	   States	   or	   spoke	  of	  the	   modernisation	   of	   the	   Canal	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   ‘global	   geopolitical	  importance	   and	   crucial	   for	   both	   interoceanic	   commerce	   and	   hemisphere	  security.’799	  Such	   rhetoric	   was	   reinforced	   by	   his	   attendance	   at	   hearings	  dedicated	  to	  the	  Canal,	  outside	  his	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee	  remit,	  such	  as	   John	   East’s	   1983	   hearings	   on	   the	   unconstitutionality	   of	   the	   treaties.	   It	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  future	  of	  the	  waterway	  had	  lost	  none	  of	  its	  importance	  to	  the	  senator.	  	  Helms’	  activism	  on	  this	  issue	  was	  well	  received	  by	  the	  grassroots	  anti-­‐Treaties	   lobby. 800 	  In	   the	   same	   year,	   after	   the	   Reagan	   administration	  transferred	  air-­‐traffic	  control	  responsibility	   for	  Canal	  airspace	   to	  Panama,	  the	   staunchly	   anti-­‐Treaties	   Canal	   Watchers	   Education	   Association	  expressed	  considerable	  alarm	  at	  the	  decision	  partly	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Helms	  had	   not	   been	   consulted.801	  	   Though	   sporadic,	   such	   examples	   showed	   the	  senator’s	  enduring	  support	  from	  lower-­‐level	  organisations	  opposed	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  799	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “The	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  129	  (1893),	  5983.	  
800	  Letter,	   Phillip	   Harman	   to	   Robert	  McFarlane,	   19	   July,	   1983,	   ID188683,	  CO121,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL,	  and	  G.	  Russell	  Evans,	  “Hearings	  on	  Canal	  Treaties	  Fraud	  Ignored	  by	  Senate	  and	  the	  Media,”	  Human	  Events,	  6	  August,	  1983,	  12.	  
801 	  Letter,	   Frank	   B	   Turberville,	   Jr.	   to	   William	   Clark,	   31	   May,	   1983,	  ID151736,	  CO121,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	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Carter-­‐Torrijos	   agreements,	   years	   after	   the	   anti-­‐Treaties	   campaign	   was	  supposed	  to	  have	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  	  Yet	  while	  his	  stock	  within	  the	  anti-­‐Treaties	  movement	  remained	  high,	  there	  was	  no	  doubting	  that	  Helms’	  interest	  in	  Panama	  had	  declined	  in	  the	  first	   half	   of	   the	   1980s.	   The	   crises	   in	   El	   Salvador	   and	   Nicaragua	   shifted	  attention	  away	  the	  Isthmus	  and,	  with	  only	  limited	  time	  and	  resources,	  the	  senator	  devoted	  his	  energies	  to	  these	  more	  pressing	  issues.	  He	  was	  hardly	  alone	  in	  this	  respect,	  as	  the	  nation	  and	  its	  policymakers	  focused	  on	  conflict	  enveloping	  other	  nations	  in	  the	  United	  States’	  backyard.	  	  The	  senator	  may	  also	  have	  accepted	   that	   the	  Reagan	  administration	  had	   resigned	   itself	   to	   upholding	   the	   Canal	   Treaties,	   despite	   its	   campaign	  rhetoric	  and	  the	  wishes	  of	  grass-­‐roots	  conservatives	  who	  had	  provided	  so	  much	  of	  the	  momentum	  for	  its	  election	  victory.	  Certainly	  there	  were	  those	  in	  the	  White	  House	  who	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  accept	  Carter’s	  framework	  without	  question.	   Roger	   Fontaine,	   a	   prominent	   member	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Treaties	  community,	  told	  the	  president’s	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  only	  weeks	  into	  the	   new	   term	   that	   the	   administration	  had	   to	  work	  quickly	   lest	   it	   ‘end	  up	  merely	   following	   the	   lines	   laid	   down	   by	   the	   Carter	   Administration’.802	  Nevertheless,	  internal	  policy	  debate	  was	  centred	  over	  how,	  not	  whether,	  to	  implement	  the	  treaties,	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  was	  ordered	  to	  make	   it	  clear	   to	   the	   international	   community	   that	   continuity	   would	   exist	   in	   the	  nation’s	  Panama	  policy.803	  After	  president-­‐elect	  Reagan	  had	  written	   to	  his	  Panamanian	  counterpart	  in	  December	  1980,	  U.S.	  ambassador	  Ambler	  Moss	  informed	   Panama	   the	   following	   August	   that	   the	   United	   States	   would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  802 	  Memorandum,	   Roger	   Fontaine	   to	   Richard	   Allen,	   “Panama	   Canal	  Appropriations	  Authorization	  Act,	  FY1982,”	  22	  April,	  1981,	  folder	  “Panama	  (04/19/1981	  –	  06/16/1981),”	  Box	  33,	  Executive	  Secretariat,	  NSC:	  Country	  File,	  Latin	  America,	  RRL.	  
803 	  Don	   Oberdorfer,	   “Foreign	   Policy:	   Changes	   Vast,	   Pace	   Cautious,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  10	  May,	  1981,	  A1.	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continue	   to	  honour	  Reagan’s	  pledge	   to	   ‘to	  respect	  and	  carry	  out	   fully’	   the	  treaties.804	  	  Moss’	   very	   presence	   was	   indicative	   of	   the	   administration’s	  pragmatism	   over	   Panama	   Canal	   policy.	   A	   holdover	   from	   the	   Carter	  administration,	   Moss	   was	   retained	   on	   the	   advice	   of	   Howard	   Baker,	   the	  moderate	   Republican	   Senate	   leader	   who	   had	   voted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  treaties.805	  Not	  all	  White	  House	  staff	  agreed	  with	  the	  decision	  –	  one	  official	  described	  it	  as	  a	  ‘wrong	  direction’	  for	  the	  new	  administration	  –	  but	  Baker’s	  proposal	   received	   the	   endorsement	   of	   influential	   conservatives	   like	  Fontaine	  and	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  Richard	  Allen.806	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   it	  was	  clear	  that	  hard-­‐line	  grassroots	  anti-­‐Treaties	  groups	   associated	   with	   Helms	   lacked	   sway	   with	   the	   administration	   now	  that	   it	   had	   transitioned	   from	   conservative	   opposition	   to	   conservative	  government.	   When	   anti-­‐Treaties	   activists	   appealed	   to	   the	   White	   House,	  they	   received	   short	   shrift.	   Al	   Sapia-­‐Bosch,	   Latin	   America	   specialist	   at	   the	  National	   Security	   Council,	   described	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Canal	   Watchers	  Education	  Association	  as	  ‘a	  nut.’807	  Bob	  Kimmitt,	  executive	  secretary	  of	  the	  NSC,	  warned	  that	  such	   individuals	  should	  be	   ignored.808	  Keen	  to	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  Cable,	  American	  Embassy	  Panama	  City	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  11	  August,	  1981,	   folder	   “(7/24/81	   –	   8/14/81),”	   Executive	   Secretariat,	   NSC:	   Country	  File,	  Latin	  America,	  Box	  33,	  RRL.	  
805 	  Letter,	   Howard	   Baker	   to	   Alexander	   Haig,	   6	   February	   1981,	   folder	  “Panama	   (2/17/81	   –	   3/30/81),”	   Executive	   Secretariat,	  NSC:	   Country	   File,	  Latin	  America,	  Box	  33,	  RRL.	  
806	  See	  Memorandum,	  Roger	  Fontaine	  to	  Richard	  Allen,	  17	  February,	  1981,	  folder	  “Panama	  (2/17/81	  –	  3/30/81),”	  Executive	  Secretariat,	  NSC:	  Country	  File,	   Latin	   America,	   Box	   33,	   RRL,	   and	   Memorandum,	   Richard	   Allen	   to	  Alexander	  Haig,	  20	  February,	  1981,	  folder	  “Panama	  (2/17/81	  –	  3/30/81),”	  Executive	  Secretariat,	  NSC:	  Country	  File,	  Latin	  America,	  Box	  33,	  RRL.	  
807	  Memorandum,	   Al	   Sapia-­‐Bosch	   to	   Dick	  Morris,	   “Use	   of	   Howard	   AFB	   in	  Panama,”	  10	  June,	  1983,	  ID151736,	  CO121,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	  
808	  Note,	  Robert	  Kimmitt	  to	  Dick	  Morris,	  10	  June,	  1983,	  ID151736,	  CO121,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	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Panama	  narrative	  away	  from	  the	  Canal,	  the	  administration	  looked	  critically	  upon	   those	   that	  might	   threaten	   the	  stability	  of	  U.S.-­‐Panamanian	  relations.	  Ideological	   Canal	   warriors	   lost	   the	   battle	   again,	   and	   this	   time	   with	   a	  supposedly	   sympathetic	   administration,	   a	   fact	   that	   aroused	   the	   ire	   of	  grassroots	   conservatives	   who	   had	   expected	   ‘a	   quick	   abrogation’	   of	   the	  treaties.809	  	  This	  closing	  of	  the	  policy	  window	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Panamanian	  government.	  Despite	  political	  turbulence	  during	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   1980s	   as	   the	   planned	   democratic	   transition	  faltered	   and	  Noriega’s	   hold	   on	  power	   grew,	   Panama	  did	   little	   that	  Helms	  could	   have	   used	   to	   accuse	   it	   of	   sabotaging	   the	   security	   of	   the	   Canal	   or	  reneging	   on	   the	   1978	   agreements.	   As	   William	   Furlong	   noted	   in	   January	  1988,	  any	  problems	  concerning	  the	  Canal	  during	  the	  previous	  decade	  had	  been	   resolved	   ‘through	   a	   tranquil,	   established	   process’	   set	   out	   by	   the	  treaties. 810 	  This	   bilateral	   collaboration,	   part	   of	   the	   wider	   cooperation	  between	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   and	   its	   Panamanian	   counterpart	   in	  these	  years,	  minimised	  tensions	  that	  the	  senator	  could	  have	  otherwise	  used	  to	  his	  advantage.	  	  Their	  Man	  in	  Panama:	  Manuel	  Noriega,	  1986-­‐1988	  	   By	  the	  end	  of	  1986,	  Helms	  had	  come	  to	  question	  the	  indifference	  that	  had	   dominated	   U.S.	   policy	   in	   Panama	   for	   the	   previous	   five	   years.	   He	  publicly	  attacked	  Noriega	  as	  ‘“head	  of	  the	  biggest	  drug	  trafficking	  operation	  in	   the	  Western	   Hemisphere”’	   and	   ‘“a	   business	   partner	  with	   Castro”’,	   and	  asked	  whether	  Panama	  now	  represented	  a	  national	   security	   threat	   to	   the	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  “Conservative	  Forum,”	  Human	  Events,	  2	  October,	  1982,	  18.	  
810	  William	   L.	   Furlong,	   “The	   1977	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties:	   The	   Non-­‐Issue	  Issue,”	  The	  World	  Today	  44,	  No.	  1	  (January,	  1988),	  13.	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United	  States.811	  He	  held	  hearings	  into	  the	  situation	  in	  Panama	  that,	  while	  failing	  to	  generate	  much	  traction	  at	  the	  time,	  played	  a	  considerable	  part	  in	  starting	   the	   momentum	   toward	   a	   wholesale	   change	   in	   Panama	   policy.	  Moreover,	   the	   hearings	   demonstrated	   a	   thus-­‐far	   rare	   intrusion	   by	   the	  legislative	  branch	  into	  the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  Panama	  policies,	  posing	  an	   uncomfortable	   challenge	   to	   an	   executive	   branch	   loath	   to	   reveal	   its	  cooperation	  with	  Noriega.	  By	   the	   time	   the	  year	  closed,	  Helms	  had	  greatly	  increased	  his	  oversight	  of	  the	  administration,	  and	  even	  engaged	  in	  an	  open	  feud	   with	   CIA	   director	   William	   Casey	   over	   the	   agency’s	   intelligence	   on	  Noriega.	   Helms	   dramatically	   and	   very	   suddenly	   departed	   from	  what	   had	  been	  formerly	  a	  predictable,	  but	  relatively	  low-­‐key,	  Canal-­‐based	  interest	  in	  Panama.	  	  	   Helms’	  abrupt	  transformation	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  September	  1985	  murder	   of	   Dr.	   Hugo	   Spadafora,	   a	   popular	   and	   charismatic	   revolutionary	  figure	   in	  Panama.	  Spadafora,	  a	   former	  minister	  of	  health	   for	  Torrijos	  who	  had	  fought	  Somoza	  and	  then	  the	  Sandinistas	  in	  Nicaragua,	  was	  a	  vocal	  critic	  of	  Noriega	  and	  the	  PDF.	  Throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1980s,	  he	  regularly	  accused	  the	  general	  and	  senior	  officers	  of	  corruption,	  drug	  trafficking,	  and	  political	   oppression.	   In	   September	   1986,	   members	   of	   the	   PDF	   took	  Spadafora	  off	  a	  bus,	  before	  torturing	  and	  then	  executing	  him.	  His	  headless	  body	  was	  left	  just	  inside	  the	  Costa	  Rican	  side	  of	  the	  border	  with	  Panama.812	  It	   was	   never	   subsequently	   proved	   that	   Noriega	   directly	   ordered	   the	  murder,	  but	  he	  certainly	  contributed	  to	  its	  cover-­‐up.813	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  811	  John	   Herbers,	   “Panama	   General	   Accused	   By	   Helms,”	   The	   New	   York	  
Times,	  23	  June,	  1986,	  A3,	  and	  Jesse	  Helms	  (NC),	  “Intelligence	  Authorization	  Act,”	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  Rec.	  132	  (1986),	  25807.	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  Dinges,	   Our	   Man	   in	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   Frederick	   Kempe,	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Dictator:	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  Bungled	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  with	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  (London:	  I.	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  Co	  Ltd,	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  176,	  and	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   Spadafora’s	  murder	  was	  an	  act	  of	   violence	  unusual	   in	  Panamanian	  politics,	   whose	   instability	   had	   been	   largely	   confined	   to	   mostly	   bloodless	  struggles	   within	   the	   PDF.	   This	   was	   part	   of	   the	   reason	   why	   U.S.	  policymakers	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  country	  during	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  1980s.814	  The	   identity	  of	   the	  victim,	  and	  the	  brutality	  of	   the	  crime,	  caused	  outrage	   in	   Panama,	   exacerbated	   by	   Noriega’s	   decision	   to	   force	   President	  Nicolás	  Barletta’s	  resignation	  when	  he	  publicly	  called	  for	  an	  investigation.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  however,	  events	  received	  little	  immediate	  attention.	  A	  handful	   of	   newspaper	   articles,	   buried	   in	   the	   back	   pages,	   offered	   only	  cursory	  commentary	  on	  the	  potential	  damage	  to	  Reagan’s	  Central	  America	  democratisation	   strategy. 815 	  Capitol	   Hill	   was	   also	   unmoved.	   In	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  murder,	  only	  three	  members	  of	  Congress	  –	  Michael	  Barnes	  and	   Dante	   Fascell	   in	   the	   House,	   and	   David	   Durenberger	   in	   the	   Senate	   –	  spoke	   about	   the	   case. 816 	  When	   Spadafora’s	   brother,	   Winston,	   visited	  Washington	  in	  late	  1985	  to	  gather	  support	  for	  his	  campaign	  for	  justice,	  he	  found	  a	  sympathetic	  but	  largely	  uninterested	  American	  political	  elite.	  There	  was	   little	   indication	   that	   Spadafora’s	   murder	   was	   about	   to	   become,	   as	  Margaret	  Scranton	  called	  it,	  Noriega’s	  ‘Watergate’.817	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   James	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  Times,	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   In	   January	   1986,	   Helms	   met	   with	   Winston	   Spadafora.	   It	   was	  indicative	  of	  his	  staff’s	  activist	  nature	  that	  the	  meeting	  came	  about	  through	  the	   advice	   of	   Deborah	   DeMoss,	   who	   had	   decided	   to	   meet	   with	   Winston	  during	   his	   ill-­‐fated	   trip	   to	   Washington	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   previous	   year.	  There	  was	   little	   ideological	   common	  ground	  between	  Helms	  and	  Winston	  Spadafora,	   as	   the	   latter	   readily	   acknowledged,	   and	   given	   that	   it	   took	  DeMoss’	   intervention	   to	  arrange	   their	  get-­‐together,	   it	   seemed	   the	   senator	  had	   little	   enthusiasm	   initially	   for	   dealing	  with	   the	   family	   of	   a	   prominent	  Torrijista.	   Nevertheless,	   when	   Helms	   emerged	   from	   the	   meeting,	   he	  appeared	  outraged	  by	  what	  he	  had	  heard.	   ‘“I’m	  going	   to	  promise	   to	  work	  my	  hardest	  to	  get	  justice	  for	  your	  brother	  and	  to	  raise	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  level	  of	  President	  Reagan’s	  agenda”’,	  he	  reportedly	  told	  Winston.818	  	  	   Helms	   did	   exactly	   as	   promised,	   moving	   swiftly	   to	   introduce	  legislation	  in	  the	  Senate	  that	  would	  have	  blocked	  U.S.	  assistance	  to	  Panama	  until	  an	  investigation	  into	  Spadafora’s	  death	  and	  Noriega’s	  drug	  trafficking	  was	  carried	  out.819	  Just	  as	  a	   lack	  of	   congressional	   interest	   in	  his	  brother’s	  death	  the	  previous	  autumn	  doomed	  Winston	  Spadafora’s	  initiatives,	  so	  too	  did	   an	   apathetic	   Senate	   disregard	   Helms’	   efforts	   now.	   There	   was	   no	  indication	   that	   the	   senator’s	   concerns	   over	   human	   rights	   and	   drug	  trafficking	   in	   Panama	   had	   traction	  with	   his	   colleagues,	  who	   continued	   in	  early	  1986	  to	  permit	  the	  executive	  branch	  a	  free	  hand	  in	  the	  Isthmus.	  	  	  Indeed,	   part	   of	   the	   problem	   was	   that	   Helms	   was	   the	   messenger.	  Democrats	   were	   suspicious	   that	   he	   was	   using	   the	   Spadafora	   case	   and	  related	  drug	  trafficking	  accusations	  as	  a	  new	  form	  of	  leverage	  to	  repeal	  the	  Canal	   Treaties.	   Chris	   Dodd,	   reacting	   to	   Helms’	   proposal	   in	   the	   Foreign	  Relations	   Committee,	   accused	   Helms	   of	   conspiring	   to	   re-­‐claim	   the	   Canal,	  while	   John	   Kerry	   privately	   expressed	   his	   suspicion	   that	   Helms	   had	  recognised	   an	   opportunity	   to	   build	   pressure	   on	   the	   administration	   to	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repeal	   the	   treaties.	   Such	   concerns	   were	   widespread	   among	   those	   who	  understood	   Helms’	   long-­‐standing	   antipathy	   toward	   the	   Carter-­‐Torrijos	  agreements.820	  	  	  In	  the	  future,	  the	  senator	  and	  his	  staff	  would	  attempt	  to	  counter	  these	  suspicions	  by	  portraying	  their	  reaction	  to	  the	  Spadafora	  case	  as	  one	  of	  non-­‐partisan,	   humanitarian	   concern.	   Looking	   back	   on	   the	   meeting,	   DeMoss	  recalled	   Helms’	   reaction	   to	   photographs	   of	   Spadafora’s	   tortured	   body	   as	  one	  of	  revulsion.	   ‘“I	  don’t	  think	  I’ve	  ever	  seen	  Helms	  so	  moved,”’	  she	  said.	  ‘“He	  looked	  at	  the	  photographs	  a	  long	  time,	  and	  then	  he	  put	  them	  down	  and	  shook	  his	  head.	  That’s	  when	  he	  decided	  to	  do	  something.”’821	  The	  senator,	  for	   his	   part,	   frequently	   emphasised	   the	   brutality	   of	   the	  murder	  when	   he	  later	  spoke	  about	  the	  case,	  pointedly	  reminding	  observers	  that	  he	  had	  little	  in	   common	   with	   Spadafora’s	   ideology	   (which	   he	   described	   as	   Social	  Democratic).822	  	  The	  senator’s	  previous	  politicisation	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  suggests	  this	  was	  only	  part	   of	   the	   story.	  After	   all,	   the	  Maryknoll	   nun	  murders	   and	  Jesuit	  killings	   in	  El	   Salvador	  –	  high	  profile	  and	  equally	  brutal	   cases	  –	  had	  not	  elicited	  a	  similar	  reaction.	  Nor	  had	  Somoza-­‐era	  repression	  in	  Nicaragua	  registered	  highly	  on	  the	  senator’s	  radar.	  Only	  in	  Nicaragua,	  where	  Miskito	  communities	  faced	  Sandinista	  reprisals,	  did	  Helms	  raise	  an	  outcry.	  It	  was	  a	  consistent	   pattern	   of	   filtering	   human	   rights	   violations	   through	   a	   broader	  anti-­‐communist	  framework.	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  Kempe,	  Divorcing	  the	  Dictator,	  176.	  
822	  Jesse	  Helms	   (NC),	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  (1986),	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Perhaps	  no	   incident	   illustrated	   this	  as	  clearly	  as	   the	  case	  of	  Rodrigo	  Rojas,	  a	  young	  Chilean	  protestor	  tortured	  and	  burnt	  to	  death	  on	  2	  July	  1986	  by	   members	   of	   General	   Pinochet’s	   security	   forces.	   The	   timing	   of	   this	  incident,	   described	   by	   Mary	   Helen	   Spooner	   as	   ‘one	   of	   the	   most	   flagrant	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  the	  Pinochet	  regime’s	  history’,	  was	  telling.823	  Even	  as	  Helms	  portrayed	  his	  interest	  in	  the	  Spadafora	  murder	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  concern	   for	   human	   rights	   and	   democracy	   in	   Panama,	   he	   continued	   to	  support	  the	  Pinochet	  government.	  Helms	  described	  Rojas	  as	  a	  ‘“terrorist”’,	  and	  privately	  told	  Ambassador	  Harry	  Barnes	  that	  he	  had	   ‘“screwed	  it	  up”’	  by	   going	   to	   the	   funeral	   without	   authorisation.	   Only	   members	   of	   the	  extreme	  left	  had	  attended	  the	  service,	  Helms	  said,	  and	  Barnes	  had	  planted	  ‘“the	  American	  flag	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  communist	  activity.”’824	  	  	  The	   difference	   in	   reaction	  was	   rooted	   in	   Helms’	   faith	   in	   Pinochet’s	  anti-­‐communism	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  ordered	  democratic	  progress.	   ‘“Chile	  is	  one	   of	   two	   countries	   in	   the	   entire	   Latin	   American	   area	   that	   resists	  communism”’,	   he	   said	   at	   the	   time.	   “‘Its	   transition	   to	   democracy	   is	   on	   an	  orderly	   course.”’ 825 	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Helms	   increasingly	   regarded	  Noriega	   as	   an	   ally	   of	   Castro,	   a	   threat	   to	   U.S.	   national	   security	   interests	  (especially	   the	   Canal),	   and	   an	   impediment	   to	   Panama’s	   shift	   toward	   full	  civilian	   government.	   Drugs	   also	   played	   a	   part.	   Though	   he	   had	   been	  informed	   by	   Ambassador	   Barnes	   that	   Chile’s	   cooperation	   on	   anti-­‐drugs	  policy	   was	   less	   convincing	   than	   the	   senator	   believed,	   Helms	   remained	  convinced	   that	   Pinochet’s	   government	   was	   free	   from	   the	   pernicious	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  12	  July,	  1986,	  A14.	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influence	   of	   the	   hemisphere’s	   drug	   cartels.826	  The	   senator	   did	   not	   believe	  the	  same	  of	  Noriega	  and	  the	  PDF.	  	  	  Consequently,	  Helms	  sided	  with	  the	  mounting	   internal	  opposition	  to	  Noriega	   in	   Panama	   while	   simultaneously	   maintaining	   his	   long-­‐standing	  support	   for	   Pinochet.	   Both	   cases	   represented	   a	   break	   with	   the	   Reagan	  administration.	  In	  Chile,	  Elliot	  Abrams	  denounced	  the	  senator’s	  criticism	  of	  Barnes	   as	   ‘“indefensible”’	   and	   his	   support	   for	   long-­‐term	   military	   rule	   in	  Chile	  as	   ‘“playing	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  communists.”’827	  Though	  President	  Reagan	   privately	   regarded	   Pinochet	   as	   an	   admirable	   bastion	   of	   anti-­‐communism,	   and	   despite	   stubborn	   resistance	   from	   administration	   hard-­‐liners,	   the	   State	   Department	   had	   begun	   pushing	   Pinochet	   toward	  democratic	  reform.828	  	  Similarly,	  Helms’	  interest	  in	  Panama	  led	  to	  his	  growing	  isolation	  from	  the	   executive	   branch,	   including	   from	  many	   conservatives	  with	  whom	   the	  senator	  had	  cooperated	  over	  Nicaragua	  policy.	  In	  1986,	  almost	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  foreign-­‐policy	  bureaucracy	  was	  in	  agreement	  that	  excessive	  pressure	  on	  Noriega	  was	   counter-­‐productive.	   Only	   Constantine	  Menges	   at	   the	  NSC	  and	   Carlton	   Turner,	   the	   president’s	   special	   advisor	   on	   drug	   control,	  supported	   efforts	   to	   reinstate	   Barletta	   following	   his	   ousting	   by	   Noriega.	  Even	  Ambassador	  Ted	  Briggs,	  a	  close	  Helms	  ally,	  tempered	  his	  initial	  hard-­‐line	  on	  Noriega	  in	  light	  of	  the	  wider	  goals	  of	  the	  Reagan’s	  Central	  America	  policy. 829 	  Elliot	   Abrams’	   decision	   to	   overrule	   Briggs’	   initial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  826	  “Rojas	   Case,”	   15	   July	   1986,	   Virtual	   Reading	   Room,	   U.S.	   Department	   of	  State,	   http://foia.state.gov/,	   accessed	   3	   September,	   2013,	   and	   Link,	  
Righteous	  Warrior,	  330.	  
827	  John	  M.	  Goshko,	  “Elliot	  Abrams:	  ‘Tough	  Guy’	  of	  Convictions	  on	  Reagan’s	  Team	  at	  State,”	  Washington	  Post,	  21	  July,	  1986,	  A13.	  
828	  Carothers,	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  Democracy,	  155-­‐157.	  
829	  Dinges,	  Our	  Man	  in	  Panama,	  231-­‐232.	  Helms	  would	   later	  credit	  Briggs,	  along	  with	  his	  successor,	  Arthur	  Davis,	  as	  consistent	  opponents	  of	  Noriega.	  In	  February,	  1990,	  he	  told	  colleagues,	   ‘When	  others	  were	  making	  excuses,	  and	   giving	   supposed	   pragmatic	   reasons	   to	   support	   a	   gangster,	   these	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recommendation	   of	   support	   for	   Barletta	   also	   indicated	   concern	   for	   the	  wider	  policy	  ramifications	  for	  a	  then-­‐stable	  Panama.830	  	  These	  concerns	  translated	  into	  efforts	  to	  persuade	  Helms	  to	  abandon	  his	  March	  and	  April	   hearings	   into	  Panama.	  Nestor	   Sanchez,	   an	   ally	  of	   the	  senator	  on	  Nicaragua	  policy,	  advised	  Helms	  against	  the	  sessions,	  but	  it	  was	  Abrams	   who	   appeared	   as	   the	   administration’s	   main	   voice.	   He	   phoned	  Helms	  before	  the	  hearings	  to	  specifically	  remind	  him	  of	  Noriega’s	  help	  for	  the	  Contras.	   ‘“If	   you	  have	   the	  hearings,”’	  Abrams	   is	   reported	   to	  have	   told	  Helms,	   ‘“it’ll	   alienate	   them.	   It	   will	   provoke	   them	   and	   they	   won’t	   help	   us	  with	  the	  Contras.”’831	  	  	  	  	   When	   the	  hearings	  did	   take	  place,	   the	  gap	  between	  Helms	  and	   the	  administration	  was	  notable.	  Abrams,	  while	  accepting	  the	  senator’s	  concern	  about	  Noriega’s	  relationship	  with	  Castro,	  nevertheless	  concluded	   ‘we	   [the	  United	  States]	  have	  never	  lacked	  a	  sympathetic	  hearing	  for	  our	  views	  from	  Panama’s	   Government.’	   More	   importantly,	   he	   continued,	   the	   bilateral	  consensus	   on	  U.S.	  military	   forces	   in	   Panama	  was	   ‘notable	   and	   beneficial’.	  When	   pressed	   on	   the	   names,	   provided	   by	   Helms’	   staff	   contacts	   in	   the	  Panamanian	   opposition,	   of	   prominent	   drug	   dealers	   associated	   with	  Noriega,	  U.S.	  officials	  pleaded	  ignorance.	  Abrams	  would	  only	  note	  that	  the	  Reagan	   administration	   was	   ‘aware	   and	   deeply	   troubled	   by	   persistent	  rumors	   of	   corrupt,	   official	   involvement	   of	   Panamanians	   in	   drug	  trafficking.’832	  The	   senator	   also	   managed	   to	   force	   the	   administration	   to	  reveal	   National	   Security	   Agency	   phone	   intercepts	   from	   the	   day	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  dedicated	  Ambassadors	  were	  quietly	  working	  within	  the	  system	  to	  expose	  the	   real	   Noriega	   regime.	   Their	   work	   exemplifies	   the	   most	   professional	  traditions	   of	   our	   diplomacy.’	   Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Providing	   Urgent	  Assistance	  For	  Democracy	  In	  Panama,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  1614.	  
830	  Dinges,	  Our	  Man	  in	  Panama,	  231.	  
831	  Ibid.,	  237-­‐238,	  and	  Kempe,	  Divorcing	  the	  Dictator,	  177.	  
832	  U.S.	   Senate,	   Committee	   Foreign	   Relations,	   Subcommittee	   on	   Western	  Hemisphere	  Affairs,	  Situation	  in	  Panama,	  21	  April,	  1986,	  39.	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Spadafora’s	  murder.	  ‘“We	  have	  the	  rabid	  dog,”’	  a	  senior	  PDF	  officer	  had	  told	  Noriega,	   presumably	   referring	   to	   Spadafora.	   ‘“What	   do	   you	   with	   a	   rabid	  dog?”’	  the	  general	  replied.833	  	  Helms’	  hearings	  received	  mixed	  reviews.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  was	  the	  only	   senator	   present	   on	   10	  March,	   while	   only	   two	   colleagues	   –	   senators	  Zorinsky	  and	  Trible	  –	  attended	  the	  23	  April	  session.	  Lawmakers	  were	  not	  yet	   inclined	   to	   join	   Helms	   in	   his	   Panama	   inquisition,	   while	   outside	  Congress,	  his	  criticism	  of	  Noriega	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  relationship	  with	  the	  Panama	  was	  treated	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  scepticism	  by	  those	  who	  saw	  it	  as	   little	   more	   than	   an	   attempt	   to	   subvert	   the	   Canal	   Treaties.	   Various	  national	  media	   outlets,	   all	   committed	   to	   the	   treaties,	   criticised	  Helms	   for	  disingenuously	   using	   allegations	   of	   drug	   trafficking	   and	   human	   rights	  violations	  for	  his	  own	  anti-­‐treaties	  agenda.	  The	  Washington	  Post	  described	  it	   as	   a	   ‘cynical	   cultivation	   of	   instability	   in	   Panama’,	   while	   the	   Chicago	  
Tribune	  said	  Helms’	  suggestion	  that	  the	  treaties	  might	  be	  re-­‐examined	  was	  ‘as	  dumb	  and	  as	  extreme	  an	  idea	  as	  was	  the	  suggestion	  by	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  in	  the	  1970s	  that	  the	  general	  be	  assassinated.’834	  	  Yet,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   senator’s	   hearings	   did	   prompt	   renewed	  attention	   on	   Panama	   policy.	   Seymour	   Hersh,	   whose	   22	   June	   New	   York	  
Times	   article	   further	   exposed	   many	   of	   the	   issues	   surrounding	   Noriega’s	  government,	  cited	  the	  senator’s	  interest	  as	  an	  important	  causal	  factor	  in	  his	  investigation. 835 	  	   The	   New	   York	   Times	   itself	   lauded	   Helms	   for	   having	  ‘usefully	   underlined’	   the	   questions	   surrounding	   Noriega’s	   activities. 836	  Panama’s	   ambassador	   to	   the	   United	   States	   was	   sufficiently	   worried	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  833	  Dinges,	  Our	  Man	  in	  Panama,	  239.	  
834	  “Tales	  of	  Panama,”	  Washington	  Post,	  24	  June,	  1986,	  A18,	  and	  “The	  man	  astride	  the	  Panama	  Canal,”	  Chicago	  Tribune,	  27	  June,	  1986,	  16.	  
835	  Seymour	  Hersh,	   “Panama	  Strongman	  Said	   to	  Trade	   in	  Drugs,”	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  12	  June,	  1986,	  A1.	  
836	  “Alarm	  About	  Panama,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  24	  June,	  1986,	  A26.	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Helms’	  actions	  that	  he	  condemned	  the	  senator	  by	  name	  in	  a	  robust	  defence	  of	  Panama’s	  reputation,	  published	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  shortly	  after	  the	  Spadafora	  hearings.837	  	   Thus,	   while	   the	   accusations	   did	   not	   fully	   persuade	   Congress,	   the	  administration,	   or	   the	   media	   of	   the	   need	   to	   re-­‐evaluate	   the	   country’s	  relations	  with	  Noriega,	  the	  senator	  nevertheless	  opened	  Panama	  policy	  up	  to	   a	   level	   of	   scrutiny	  not	   seen	   since	   the	   debate	   over	   the	  Canal	   Treaties	   a	  decade	  earlier.	  From	  now	  on,	  Noriega’s	  name	  became	  associated	  with	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  John	  Weeks	  and	  Phil	  Gunson,	  looking	  back	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  Spadafora	  case	  in	  Noriega’s	  demise,	  believed	  Helms’	   meeting	   with	   Hugo’s	   brother	   was	   the	   first	   example	   of	   Banquo’s	  ghost	   returning	   to	   haunt	   the	   general.838	  In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   that	  meeting,	  Helms	  made	  sure	  that	  Banquo’s	  ghost	  would	  remain	  centre-­‐stage.	  	  In	  September	  1986,	  Helms’	  efforts	  to	  isolate	  Noriega	  and	  pressure	  the	  administration	   over	   its	   Panama	   policy	   dovetailed	   with	   his	   interest	   in	  intelligence	   reform.	  By	   this	   point,	  Helms’	   suspicions	   about	   the	  CIA’s	   anti-­‐communist	   credentials	   had	   reached	   their	   peak.	   In	   Central	   America,	   the	  agency’s	   involvement	   with	   Duarte’s	   1984	   presidential	   campaign	   and	   its	  animosity	  toward	  Pastora	  and	  other	  Helms-­‐approved	  factions	  of	  the	  Contra	  movement	  infuriated	  the	  senator.	  In	  August	  1986,	  this	  animosity	  increased	  dramatically.	   Helms	   was	   incensed	   by	   charges	   that	   his	   office	   had	   leaked	  classified	   intelligence	   about	   U.S.	   surveillance	   of	   Chile’s	   military.	   Helms	  accused	   the	  CIA	   and	   the	   State	  Department	  of	   ‘“trying	   to	  discredit	  me”’	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  837 	  Dominador	   Kaiser	   Bazan,	   “Attack	   on	   Panama	   is	   Anonymous	   and	  Unproved,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  15	  July,	  1986,	  A28.	  
838	  John	  Weeks	  and	  Phil	  Gunson,	  Panama:	  Made	  in	  the	  USA	   (London:	  Latin	  America	   Bureau,	   1991),	   60.	   The	   three	   most	   detailed	   narratives	   of	   U.S.-­‐Panamanian	   relations	   in	   this	   period	   all	   give	   substantial	   attention	   to	   the	  Helms	  meeting	  as	  a	   turning	  point.	  See	  Kevin	  Buckley,	  Panama:	  The	  Whole	  
Story	   (New	   York:	   Touchstone,	   1991),	   47-­‐48,	   Dinges,	  Our	  Man	   in	  Panama,	  236-­‐249,	  and	  Kempe,	  Divorcing	  the	  Dictator,	  176-­‐177.	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part	   of	   a	   wider	   attempt	   to	   undermine	   the	   Pinochet	   government	   and	   its	  supporters.839	  	  Helms’	  frustration	  with	  the	  CIA	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  its	  performance	  in	  Latin	  America.	  He	   had	   grown	  disillusioned	  with	   its	   entire	   outlook	   on	   the	  Cold	   War.	   The	   previous	   October,	   he	   had	   written	   to	   President	   Reagan	  expressing	  concern	  about	  the	  agency’s	  ‘long-­‐standing	  problem…	  regarding	  an	   apparent	   analytical	   bias	   which	   continuously	   under-­‐estimates	   Soviet	  intentions	   and	   capabilities.’	   According	   to	   experts,	  Helms	   told	  Reagan,	   the	  CIA	  might	  well	  be	   ‘pro-­‐Soviet.’840	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  he	  told	  Rowland	  Evans	  and	  Robert	  Novak	  in	  September	  1986,	  the	  agency	  was	  a	  ‘loose-­‐cannon’.	  In	  an	  oft-­‐used	  criticism,	  Helms	  called	   the	  CIA	  an	   ‘operating	  arm’	  of	   the	  State	  Department.841	  This	  collusion	  undermined	  the	  United	  States’	   international	  agenda,	  Helms	  argued,	  and	  the	  two	  departments	  were	  ‘“kicking	  our	  friends	  in	  the	  teeth	  around	  the	  world	  and	  cozying	  up	  to	  the	  emissaries	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.”’842	  	  Helms’	   solution	   was	   to	   amend	   the	   Intelligence	   Authorization	   Act,	  which	   acted	   as	   a	   key	   mechanism	   for	   congressional	   oversight	   of	   the	  intelligence	   community.	   Initially	   proposing	   thirty	   amendments,	   all	  designed	  to	  subject	  the	  CIA	  to	  more	  intense	  scrutiny	  and	  expand	  the	  role	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  839 	  Joanne	   Omang,	   “CIA	   Said	   to	   Hold	   Information	   On	   Helms,	   Pinochet	  Bugging,”	  Washington	  Post,	   27	   September,	   1986,	   A1,	   “Helms	   denies	   Chile	  leaks,	   requests	   probe,”	   Chicago	   Tribune,	   12	   August,	   1986,	   12,	   Steven	   V.	  Roberts,	   “Helms	  Assails	  Many	  Over	  Chile,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	   8	  August,	  1986,	  A9,	  and	  “FBI	  investigating	  Helms	  in	  leak	  of	  classified	  plans	  to	  Chile,”	  
Chicago	  Tribune,	  3	  August,	  1986,	  3.	  
840 	  Letter,	   Senator	   Jesse	   Helms	   to	   President	   Reagan,	   2	   October,	   1985,	  ID340926,	  CO165,	  WHORM:	  Subject	  File,	  RRL.	  
841	  Transcript,	   Senator	   Jesse	   Helms,	   Rowland	   Evans,	   and	   Robert	   Novak,	  folder	   “Helms,	   Jesse	   A.	   (16),”	  WHORM:	   Alpha	   File,	   RRL,	   and	   Jesse	   Helms	  (NC),	   “The	  Nicaragua	  Resistance:	   Is	   It	  Being	  Sold	  Down	  The	  River?”	  Cong.	  
Rec.	  131	  (1985),	  6639-­‐6640.	  
842	  Omang,	  “CIA	  Said	  to	  Hold	  Information,”	  A1.	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the	   hard-­‐line	   Defense	   Intelligence	   Agency,	   Helms	   eventually	   reduced	   his	  demands	  to	  just	  two	  amendments	  after	  negotiations	  between	  his	  staff	  and	  aides	   to	  moderate	  Republican	  committee	  chairman	  David	  Durenberger.843	  Helms’	   first	   addition	   to	   the	   bill	   –	   a	   classified	   provision	   –	   demanded	   the	  ‘competitive	  analysis’	  of	  thirty-­‐two	  Cold	  War	  issues.	  The	  second,	  which	  was	  introduced	   in	   public,	   required	   the	   CIA	   to	   report	   on	   Panamanian	   drug	  trafficking	   and	   corruption,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Spadafora	   murder.	   Helms’	  insistence	  that	  the	  Panama	  amendment	  was	  one	  of	  the	  two	  that	  made	  the	  cut	  out	  of	  the	  original	  thirty	  indicated	  the	  importance	  he	  was	  now	  attaching	  to	  events	  in	  the	  Isthmus.	  	  	  It	  was	  long-­‐standing	  Senate	  tradition	  that	  members	  looking	  to	  amend	  intelligence	   legislation	   reached	   behind-­‐closed-­‐door	   agreements	   with	   the	  intelligence	  committee	  over	  their	  proposals.844	  In	  openly	  amending	  the	  bill	  during	  floor	  discussion	  Helms	  therefore	  made	  a	  significant	  break	  from	  this	  established	  norm.	  His	  decision	   to	  do	  so	  encouraged	  a	   roll-­‐call	  vote	  on	  his	  legislation	  and	  therefore	  a	  recorded,	  empirical	  measure	  of	  Senate	  opinion	  on	  the	  Noriega	  question.	  ‘I	  hope	  that	  this	  rollcall	  vote’,	  he	  said,	  ‘will	  produce	  an	   overwhelming	   call	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Senate	   for	   the	   truth	   about	   Panama,	  whatever	   it	   is.’845	  Of	   course,	   the	   publicity	   of	   open	   Senate	   deliberation	  allowed	  Helms	  to	  shape	  perceptions	  of	  this	  ‘truth’,	  and	  he	  spoke	  openly	  of	  the	   questions	   surrounding	   Spadafora’s	   death,	   the	   PDF’s	   involvement	   in	  arms	   and	   drugs	   smuggling,	   electoral	   fraud,	   and	   the	   forced	   resignation	   of	  Barletta.	   To	   add	   further	   negativity	   to	  Noriega’s	   public	   image,	   the	   senator	  implied	   the	   Panamanian	   strongman	   was	   responsible	   for	   the	   plane	   crash	  that	  killed	  his	  predecessor,	  Omar	  Torrijos.	  Finally,	  in	  what	  would	  become	  a	  common	  theme	  of	  Helms’	  entrepreneurship,	  he	  brought	  Noriega	  explicitly	  into	   a	   Cold	   War	   context	   by	   emphasising	   the	   links	   between	   Cuba	   and	  Noriega.	  The	  general’s	  ‘longstanding	  ties	  with	  Cuba	  are	  well-­‐known’,	  Helms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  843	  Ibid.	  
844	  Kempe,	  Divorcing	  the	  Dictator,	  179.	  
845	  Helms,	  “Intelligence	  Authorization	  Act,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  132	  (1986),	  25813.	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said,	   citing	   Hersh’s	   June	   article	   as	   proof.	   Such	   ties	   demanded	   a	   response	  from	   the	   United	   States:	   ‘I	   believe	   that	   we	   absolutely	   must	   ask	   ourselves	  whether	   this	   situation	  constitutes	  a	  national	   security	   threat	   to	   the	  United	  States	  if	  proven	  true.’846	  	  His	   amendment	   was	   not	   without	   opposition,	   not	   least	   among	  members	  of	   the	   intelligence	   committee	  who	   feared	   it	  was	   redundant	   and	  potentially	  dangerous.847	  Yet	  just	  as	  Kingdon	  has	  noted	  that	  entrepreneurs	  distribute	   their	   ideas	  across	  many	   forums	  so	  as	   to	   ‘“soften	  up”’	   the	  policy	  environment,	   so	   too	   did	   Helms	   spread	   a	   wide	   net	   of	   accusations	   against	  Noriega	   so	   as	   to	   maximise	   the	   chances	   of	   something	   sticking.848 	  The	  overlapping	  themes	  that	  Helms	  used	  offered	  one	  or	  more	  justifications	  for	  interested	  senators	  to	  support	  the	  amendments.	  There	  were	  those,	  like	  Ted	  Kennedy	  (D-­‐MA),	  who	  were	  persuaded	  that	  Noriega’s	  record	  of	  corruption	  and	   internal	   repression	   permitted	   them	   to	   support	   Helms	   out	   of	  humanitarianism	  and	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  democracy.849	  	  	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   the	   legislation	   tied	  Panama	  policy	  more	  closely	   to	  the	  much	  wider	  national	   furore	  over	  drugs	  and	  their	   impact	  on	  American	  society.	   By	   1986	   such	   concern	   had	   reached	   record	   levels,	   prompting	  Congress	   to	   re-­‐write	   almost	   all	   drug-­‐related	   legislation	   and,	   critically,	  leading	  Reagan	   to	   explicitly	   link	   global	   narcotics	   trafficking	  with	  national	  security.850	  The	   multi-­‐faceted	   nature	   of	   Helms’	   criticism	   of	   Noriega	   thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  846	  Ibid.,	  25807-­‐25808.	  
847	  For	  examples,	  see	  arguments	  by	  David	  Durenberger,	  Patrick	  Leahy,	  and	  George	   Cohen,	   “Intelligence	   Authorization	   Act,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   132	   (1986),	  25812-­‐25814.	  
848	  Kingdon,	  Agendas,	  127-­‐131.	  
849	  Ted	   Kennedy	   (MA),	   “Intelligence	   Authorization	   Act,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   132	  (1986),	  25814.	  
850	  Ted	   Galen	   Carpenter,	  Bad	  Neighbor	  Policy:	  Washington’s	  Futile	  War	  on	  
Drugs	   in	  Latin	  America	   (Gordonsville:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan,	   2003),	   29,	   and	  “Narcotics	  Security	  Decision	  Directive	  Number	  221,”	  Narcotics	  and	  National	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increased	  his	  chances	  of	  constructing	  a	  broad	  Senate	  coalition	  in	  support	  of	  his	  ideas.	  	  	  Helms	   also	   asserted	   congressional	   prerogatives	   that	   infused	   his	  actions	  whenever	  the	  executive’s	  agenda	  did	  not	  meet	  his	  expectations	  or	  standards.	   Reporting	   requirements,	   which	   demand	   that	   the	   executive	  inform	   Congress	   of	   its	   actions	   on	   a	   specific	   topic	   or	   issue,	   allow	   for	  lawmakers	   to	   mobilise	   against	   policy	   should	   they	   disagree	   with	   the	  findings.851	  Until	  this	  point,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  was	  not	  constrained	  in	   its	   relationship	   with	   Noriega,	   and	   this	   had	   helped	   maintain	   the	   low	  profile	  of	  U.S.-­‐Panama	  relations	  for	  the	  first	  half	  of	   the	  1980s.	  Despite	  the	  publicity	  of	  Helms’	  hearings	  and	  growing	  press	  coverage,	  the	  White	  House	  had	  deftly	  contained	  growing	  congressional	  scepticism	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  relationship	   with	   Noriega.	   Helms’	   amendment	   aimed,	   as	   he	   put	   it,	   to	  publicise	   the	   ‘truth’	   about	   Panama	   and,	   consequently,	  make	   it	   harder	   for	  the	  executive	  to	  maintain	  its	  current	  approach.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   a	   shrewd	   executive	   branch	   can	   counter	   congressional	  institutionalism	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  reporting	  requirements.	  They	  do	  this	  by,	  as	  Lindsay	   notes,	   maintaining	   strict	   compliance	   with	   the	   letter	   of	   the	   law	  while	   ignoring	   its	  spirit.	  This	  had	  been	  useful	   for	  Helms	  and	  conservative	  allies	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Contras,	  where	  the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  third-­‐party	   funding	   initiatives	   and	   the	   CIA’s	   harbour	  mining	   programme	  were	  presented	   as	   entirely	   permissible	   under	   legislation	   enacted	   by	   Congress.	  The	  administration	  and	  its	  supporters	  argued	  in	  that	  case	  that	  because	  the	  relevant	   committees	   had	   been	   briefed	   about	   the	   mining,	   in	   a	   single	  sentence	   delivered	   by	   William	   Casey,	   the	   executive	   had	   fulfilled	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Security	   (NSC-­‐NSDD-­‐221),	   Federation	   of	   American	   Scientists	   Intelligence	  Resource	   Program,	   accessed	   21	   March,	   2014,	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obligation	  to	  Congress.852	  In	  Panama,	  however,	  the	  senator	  found	  the	  tables	  turned.	  The	  CIA	  resisted	  the	  senator’s	  intrusion	  upon	  its	  relationship	  with	  Noriega,	  and,	  when	  the	  agency	  published	  its	  Panama	  report	  a	  year	  later,	  it	  saw	  fit	  to	  set	  out	  only	  one	  and	  a	  half	  pages	  of	  findings.	  Helms	  was	  livid.	  The	  report	  ‘was,	  in	  fact,	  a	  nonreport’,	  he	  told	  colleagues.	   ‘It	  was	  insulting	  in	  its	  deliberate	  disregard	  of	   the	  clear	   intent	  of	   the	  amendment	  adopted	  by	   the	  Senate	  and	  later	  enacted	  into	  law.’853	  	  The	  agency’s	  response	  to	  Helms	  was	  hardly	  surprising.	  William	  Casey	  publicly	   criticised	   the	   senator	   for	   micromanaging	   intelligence	   policy	   and	  reneging	  on	  legislative	  language	  agreed	  between	  the	  various	  parties.	  Casey	  and	   White	   House	   officials	   portrayed	   the	   broader	   support	   for	   Helms’	  amendments	  as	  reluctant	  pragmatism	  from	  senators	  desperate	   to	  pass	  an	  intelligence	  bill	  before	  Congress	  went	   into	   recess.854	  Anonymous	  senators	  and	   their	   aides	   further	   fuelled	   this	   damaging	   anti-­‐Helms	   narrative	   by	  suggesting	   to	   the	   press	   that	   Casey	  was	   correct	   in	   believing	  Helms	  would	  use	   this	   precedent	   as	   a	   stepping	   stone	   to	   rewrite	   greater	   portions	   of	  intelligence	   legislation	   in	   the	   future. 855 	  It	   would	   become	   apparent,	  however,	   that	   while	   the	   CIA	   might	   have	   believed	   its	   half-­‐hearted	  cooperation	  would	  foil	  Helms,	   it	  actually	  only	  served	  to	  fire	  congressional	  criticism	   of	   the	   administration	   one	   year	   later	   when	   the	   report	   was	  published.	  	  This	   public	   acrimony	   between	   Casey	   and	   Helms	   spoke	   to	   the	  breakdown	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   executive	   and	   Helms	   over	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Noriega.	   ‘“You	   don’t	   understand”’,	   Casey	   is	   reported	   to	   have	   told	   the	  senator	   in	   a	   heated	   phone	   call.	   ‘“You	   are	   destroying	   our	   policy.	   There’s	  some	  things	  you	  don’t	  know	  about,	   things	  Noriega	   is	  doing	   for	   the	  United	  States.”’	  Helms	  appeared	  open	  to	  persuasion	  –	  ‘“Fine,	  come	  up	  and	  tell	  me	  about	  them”’,	  he	  is	  said	  to	  have	  replied	  –	  but	  the	  CIA	  director	  was	  unwilling	  to	   follow	   through.856	  It	   was	   evident	   that	   Helms’	   continuing	   interest	   in	  Noriega	   was	   generating	   resistance	   toward	   the	   senator	   from	   a	   growing	  portion	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	   	  	  	   Helms’	   actions	   in	   1986	   were	   important	   in	   setting	   the	   ball	   rolling	  against	   Noriega,	   but	   it	   is	   important	   not	   to	   exaggerate	   their	   impact.	   A	  significant	   faction	   of	   the	   national	   security	   apparatus	   –	   especially	   at	   the	  Department	   of	   Defense,	   CIA,	   and,	   to	   a	   slightly	   lesser	   extent,	   the	   State	  Department	   –	   remained	   convinced	   that	   Noriega	   was	   critical	   in	   the	   war	  against	  the	  Sandinistas.	  This	  group	  included	  several	  conservatives	  working	  with	   the	   senator	   to	  manage	   the	   fallout	  over	   Iran-­‐Contra,	  but	   they	  did	  not	  share	   his	   concern	   that	   the	   United	   States’	   relationship	   with	   Noriega	   was	  problematic.	   In	   autumn	   1986,	   for	   example,	   Oliver	   North	   approved	   a	  campaign	  by	  public	  relations	  firm	  International	  Business	  Communications,	  which	  also	  worked	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Contras,	  to	  improve	  Noriega’s	  tarnished	  reputation.	   Two	  months	   later,	   North	   approached	   Jack	   Lawn,	   head	   of	   the	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Agency	  (DEA),	  and	  offered	  to	  smooth	  matters	  over	  after	  hearing	   some	   DEA	   agents	   were	   investigating	   Noriega’s	   links	   to	   drug	  trafficking.	  The	  DEA,	  for	  its	  part,	  generally	  continued	  to	  laud	  Noriega	  for	  his	  cooperation	   in	   recent	   anti-­‐drug	   operations,	   and	   sent	   a	   strong	   letter	   of	  commendation	  to	  Noriega	  as	  thanks	  for	  his	  help.857	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   Claims	   by	   administration	   officials	   that	   Noriega	  was	   helping	   in	   the	  war	   on	   drugs	   outraged	   the	   senator.	   When	   the	   White	   House	   certified	   in	  April	  1987	  that	  Panama	  was	  fully	  cooperating	  with	  anti-­‐drug	  efforts,	  Helms	  co-­‐sponsored	   John	   Kerry’s	   resolution	   of	   disapproval.	   It	   was	   a	   highly	  symbolic	  censure	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  despite	  the	  senator’s	  claim	  that	   the	   White	   House	   merely	   offered	   a	   ‘routine’	   approval	   of	   a	   decision	  actually	  made	  by	  the	  State	  Department.	  ‘This	  Senator	  is	  not	  going	  to	  vote	  in	  favor	   of	   a	   certification	   that	   is	   a	   falsehood’,	   he	   told	   colleagues,	   reminding	  them	   of	   numerous	   press	   reports	   linking	   the	   PDF	   and	   Noriega	   with	   drug	  trafficking.	   Panama	   had	   pulled	   out	   of	   negotiations	   over	   the	  Mutual	   Legal	  Assistance	   Treaty	   aimed	   at	   money	   launderers,	   Helms	   added,	   and	   its	  banking	  system	  assisted	  drug	  traffickers	  because	  it	  was	  ‘high	  on	  secrecy…	  and	  low	  on	  accountability’.	  The	  situation	  was	  ‘made	  to	  order	  for	  criminals	  with	  large	  amounts	  of	  American	  cash	  from	  drug	  trafficking	  to	  launder.’858	  	  	   To	  build	  pressure	  on	  the	  administration,	  Helms	   linked	  certification	  with	   the	  domestic	  war	  on	  drugs,	  questions	  over	  congressional	   credibility,	  and	   senators’	   electoral	   survival.	   In	   an	   echo	  of	   conservative	   tactics	   during	  the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   debate,	   Helms	   predicted	   voter	   backlash	   for	  those	  who	  supported	  the	  administration.	  	  ‘Anybody	  who	  votes	  to	  table	  this	  joint	  resolution	  will	  be	  making	  a	  serious	  mistake’,	  he	  said.	  ‘I	  would	  hate	  to	  be	  running	  for	  re-­‐election	  having	  voted	  to	  table	  the	  amendment.	  Senators	  who	  did	  so	  would	  be	   telling	   the	  voters	   that	   “I	  will	  bluster	  about	   the	  drug	  problem,	  but	  I	  won’t	  do	  anything	  about	  it.”’	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  continued	  to	  press	  for	  greater	  integrity	  from	  his	  fellow	  senators.	  Failing	  to	  support	  its	  own	  drug	  legislation	  made	  ‘wimps’	  of	  the	  Senate.	   ‘If	  we	  do	  not	  start	  doing	  something	  beyond	  talking,	  it	  is	  going	  to	  bring	  down	  this	  society.’859	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   Some	  senators	  dismissed	  Helms’	  bullish	  rhetoric,	  and	  criticised	  the	  resolution	   for	   its	   heavy-­‐handed	   approach	   to	   Panama	   policy.	   Voting	   for	  disapproval	   was	   ‘an	   easy	   vote’,	   Chris	   Dodd	   said,	   ‘because	   you	   will	   be	  attacking	  a	  general’	  rather	  than	  considering	  the	  issues	  at	  stake.860	  Claiborne	  Pell	   cautioned	   senators	   that	   	   ‘serious	   foreign	   policy	   implications’	   were	  involved,	  not	  least	  anti-­‐drug	  cooperation.	  ‘[W]hile	  we	  can	  all	  agree	  that	  Mr.	  Noriega	   is	  no	  great	  hero	  or	   individual	  of	  whom	  we	  are	  particularly	   fond,’	  Pell	   said,	   ‘we	  ought	   to	   recognize	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Government	  of	  Panama	  has	  adopted	  new	  narcotics	  laws.’861	  By	  now,	  however,	  the	  war	  on	  drugs	  had	  become	   an	   overriding	   concern	   for	   many	   lawmakers,	   and	   the	   coalition	  centred	  on	  Helms	  and	  Kerry	  benefited.	  A	  motion	  to	  table	  Kerry’s	  resolution	  was	   defeated	   31-­‐58,	   and	   the	   Senate	   subsequently	   disapproved	   the	  administration’s	  certification	  of	  Panama.862	  It	  was	  an	  important	  sign	  of	  the	  growing	   congressional	   discontent	   over	   Panama	   policy,	   and	   became	   a	  milestone	  for	  Helms	  in	  pushing	  the	  Senate	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  drug	  control	  policy.863	  	  	   Obstacles	  still	  remained,	   largely	  because	  opponents	  of	  the	  measure	  were	   able	   to	   derail	   the	   Kerry	   resolution	   by	   delaying	   it	   until	   the	   time	  window	   allocated	   for	   implementation	   had	   elapsed.	   This	   helped	   Noriega	  hang	   on	   a	   little	   longer,	   although	   the	   critical	   factor	   lay	   in	   Panama.	   The	  country’s	   civilian	   opposition,	   organised	   around	   the	   country’s	   business	  community	   and	   young	   professionals,	   accepted	   Noriega’s	   presence	   as	   a	  necessary,	  if	  unedifying,	  component	  of	  a	  longer-­‐term	  strategy	  for	  restoring	  democracy	   in	   the	   country.864	  Helms’	   efforts,	   though	   persuading	   growing	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numbers	   of	   senators,	   were	   not	   persuading	   ordinary	   Panamanians	   living	  under	  Noriega	  and	  the	  PDF	  to	  express	  their	  own	  dissatisfaction.	  	  Noriega	   achieved	   that	   himself	   in	  mid-­‐1987.	   At	   the	   start	   of	   June,	   he	  reneged	   on	   a	   promise	   to	   allow	   the	   PDF’s	   second-­‐in-­‐command,	   Colonel	  Roberto	  Díaz	  Herrera,	   a	   graceful	   retirement.	  Díaz	  Herrera	  was	  associated	  with	   leftist	   elements	   in	   the	   PDF,	   and	   Noriega	   saw	   allowing	   his	   quiet	  retirement	   as	   an	   effective	  way	   of	   removing	   a	   potential	   threat	   to	   his	   rule.	  Noriega,	  however,	   suddenly	  changed	  his	  mind,	  and	  prepared	   to	  announce	  Díaz	   Herrera’s	   dishonourable	   discharge.	   Furious	   at	   this	   betrayal,	   Díaz	  Herrera	   promptly	   attacked	   Noriega’s	   record	   of	   criminality	   and	   political	  repression	   in	   a	   series	   of	   interviews	   in	   the	   Panamanian	   press.865 	  The	  accusations	   resonated	   with	   what	   Dinges	   describes	   as	   ‘some	   forgotten	  reservoir	  of	  outrage	  in	  the	  Panamanian	  people,’	  and	  thousands	  of	  ordinary	  citizens	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  protest.	  Their	  actions	  captured	  international	  attention	   and	   dramatically	   intensified	   the	   pressure	   on	   Noriega	   and	   the	  PDF.866	  	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  protests	  was	  a	  twist	  of	  fate	  for	  Helms.	  It	  was	  during	  these	   middle	   days	   of	   1987	   that	   the	   details	   of	   Iran-­‐Contra	   were	   being	  exposed	   to	   the	   American	   public	   during	   televised	   congressional	   hearings.	  Noriega’s	  closest	  allies	  at	  the	  National	  Security	  Council,	  as	  well	  within	  the	  Defense	  and	  State	  Departments,	  were	  no	   longer	   in	  a	  position	  to	  help	  him.	  Oliver	  North	  was	  pushed	  out	  of	  the	  NSC,	  and	  William	  Casey,	  Noriega’s	  most	  dependable	  ally	  in	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  died	  the	  same	  weekend	  that	  Díaz	  Herrera	   launched	  his	   public	   attacks	   on	   the	   general.	   The	   very	   events	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  Post,	  9	  June,	  1987,	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  Stephen	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  Day	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  12	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  Preston,	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  Post,	  11	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that	   were	   causing	   Helms	   such	   consternation	   over	   Nicaragua	   served	   to	  strengthen	  his	  policy	  toward	  Panama.	  	  Spurred	  by	   the	  protests,	   the	   Senate	  passed	   a	   resolution	   in	   late	   June	  that	  declared	  support	  for	  Panamanian	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  As	  his	  colleagues	  attested,	  Helms	  was	   instrumental	   in	  assembling	   the	   legislation	  and	   its	   fifty-­‐two	   co-­‐sponsors	   (drawn	   from	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   aisle,	   and	  across	   the	   ideological	   spectrum). 867 	  Using	   an	   expanding	   network	   of	  Panamanian	   opposition	   contacts,	   including	   the	   former	   Panamanian	  ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Gabriel	  Lewis,	  Helms	  worked	  to	  assuage	  the	   doubts	   of	   those	   senators	   who	   remained	   unconvinced	   by	   his	   Panama	  policy.	  Unlike	  so	  many	  cases	   in	   the	  past,	  when	  Helms	  had	  been	  willing	   to	  stand	  alone	  and	  suffer	  defeat	  in	  order	  to	  rigidly	  defend	  his	  principles,	  here	  he	  was	   determined	   to	  work	   productively	  with	   his	   colleagues	   and	  win	   an	  overwhelming	  Senate	  consensus	  on	  Noriega.	  This	  was	  best	  illustrated	  in	  his	  acceptance	   of	   Chris	   Dodd’s	   request	   that	   the	   measure	   be	   made	   a	  freestanding	  resolution.868	  In	  doing	  so,	  Helms	  made	  a	  beneficial	  break	  from	  his	   customary	   strategy	   of	   using	   unsuitable	   legislative	   vehicles	   to	   further	  policy	  goals	  and	  shape	  public	  discourse.	  	   	   The	   resolution	  was	   the	   clearest	   expression	  yet	   of	   Senate	   intent	   on	  Panama	   policy,	   and,	   in	   a	   roundabout	   manner,	   resulted	   in	   the	   State	  Department	  shifting	   its	   stance	  on	  Noriega	   toward	   the	  end	  of	  1987.	   In	   the	  aftermath	   of	   the	   Senate’s	   action,	   furious	   Panamanian	   crowds	   –	   widely	  reported	  to	  be	  public	  servants	  acting	  on	  government	  orders	  –	  attacked	  the	  U.S.	   embassy	   and	   U.S.	   Information	   Service	   buildings	   in	   Panama	   City.	   The	  incident	  persuaded	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Shultz	  that	  Noriega	  could	  no	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  (MN),	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  And	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  Act	  Of	  1987,”	  Cong.	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  133	  (1987),	  17769	  and	  Steve	  Symms	  (ID),	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  Trade	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  Of	  1987,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  133	  (1987),	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  Helms	   (NC),	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  Trade	  And	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  1987,”	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  Rec.	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  (1987),	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longer	   be	   tolerated.869	  The	   unrest	   also	   raised	   public	   awareness	   in	   the	  United	   States,	   including	   among	   conservatives,	   as	   the	   movement	   press	  began	  to	  pay	  closer	  attention	  to	  the	   instability	   in	  Panama.	  For	  example,	   it	  was	  only	  in	  late	  1987	  that	  Human	  Events	  began	  to	  criticise	  Noriega	  for	  his	  drug-­‐trafficking,	  anti-­‐democratic	  principles,	  and,	  predictably,	  the	  threat	  he	  posed	  to	  the	  Canal.870	  	  Worse	   news	   for	   Noriega	   followed	   when,	   on	   5	   February	   1988,	   two	  federal	   grand	   juries	   in	   Florida	   indicted	   him	   on	   drug	   trafficking	   charges.	  Once	  again	  Panama	  and	  Nicaragua	  policy	   intertwined	  in	  peculiar	  ways,	  as	  Helms	   found	   himself	   lauding	   the	   work	   of	   the	   U.S.	   attorney	   who	   had	  supervised	  the	  criminal	  prosecution	  of	  Oliver	  North.	  Helms,	  unsurprisingly,	  did	   not	   single	   out	   the	   attorney,	   Leon	  Kellner,	   for	   specific	   praise	  when	  he	  commented	  on	  the	  prospect	  of	  federal	  charges	  against	  Noriega.871	  	   For	  Helms,	  the	  indictments	  were	  a	  vindication	  of	  his	  lengthy	  personal	  crusade	   against	   the	   Panamanian	   dictator.	   ‘[F]or	   a	   decade	   I	   have	   tried	   to	  warn	  the	  American	  people	  about	  Noriega’s	  activities’,	  reminding	  colleagues	  of	   his	   1978	   comments	   about	   the	   general.	   His	   hearings	   into	   drugs	   and	  Panama,	   convened	   in	   1984	   when	   he	   chaired	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere	  Subcommittee,	   had	   shown	   Panama	   to	   be	   ‘a	   haven	   for	   drug	   traffickers,	  terrorists,	   and	   Mafia	   hit	   men.’	   ‘I	   have	   conducted	   hearings,	   taken	  depositions,	  and	  held	  personal	  interviews	  with	  scores	  of	  Panamanians,	  and	  directed	   staff	   to	  make	   thorough	   investigations’,	   Helms	   told	   colleagues.872	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  10.	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  1073-­‐1074.	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‘Events’,	  he	  concluded,	   ‘have	  proven	   this	  Senator	  was	   fully	   justified	   in	  his	  investigations	  of	  the	  Panamanian	  dictator	  and	  his	  role	  in	  international	  drug	  trafficking.’873	  	  	  	   The	   indictments	   became	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   a	   conservative	   effort	   to	  settle	  old	  scores	  over	  Panama.	  Writing	  shortly	  after	   the	   indictments	  were	  issued,	  M.	   Stanton	   Evans	   pointed	   to	   his	   columns	   on	   the	   issue	   during	   the	  Carter	  administration,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  activities	  of	  Helms,	  Bob	  Dole,	  and	  John	  Murphy.874	  Helms	  himself	  stated,	  ‘Those	  of	  us	  who	  have	  been	  pointing	  this	  [Panama’s	   drug	   trafficking]	   out	   for	   many	   years	   were	   finally	   proven	  right.’875	  	  	   The	   senator,	   however,	   refused	   to	   see	   the	   indictments	   as	   a	   final	  victory	   over	   Noriega.	   Unwilling	   to	   let	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   off	   the	  hook,	   he	   criticised	   unnamed	   members	   of	   the	   government	   who	   had	  ‘supported	   Noriega	   for	   too	   long.’	   The	   long-­‐term	   damage	   caused	   by	   this	  alliance	  could	  be	  disastrous,	  Helms	  said,	  and	  Americans	  ‘must	  pray	  that	  it	  is	  not	   too	   late	   to	   restore	   freedom	   to	   the	   Panamanian	   people.’	   Even	   as	   he	  expressed	   tempered	   approval	   for	   the	   apparent	   unity	   now	   developing	  among	   policymakers,	   he	   cautioned,	   ‘it	   is	   crucial	   that	   we	   proceed	   to	   do	  whatever	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  return	  Panama	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Panama.’876	  	  	  	   Indeed,	   the	   newfound	   consensus	  was	   by	   no	  means	   cemented.	   The	  White	   House	   had	   moved	   closer	   to	   Helms’	   position	   by	   accepting	   the	  indictments,	  but	  its	  position	  was	  motivated	  largely	  by	  the	  political	  need	  of	  appearing	   committed	   to	   the	   war	   on	   drugs	   during	   a	   presidential	   election	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year.877	  Outside	   the	  West	  Wing,	   officials	   continued	   to	   send	  mixed	   signals.	  Law	   enforcement	   officials	   denied	   the	   indictments	   were	   part	   of	   an	  administration	  strategy	  to	  force	  Noriega’s	  resignation,	  and	  sources	  among	  foreign	   policy	   agencies	   quickly	   criticised	   the	   charges	   as	   harmful	   to	   U.S.	  policy	  in	  Panama.878	  Bureaucratic	  infighting	  split	  the	  DEA	  into	  two	  factions,	  as	   one	   group	   of	   agents	   continued	   to	   support	   Noriega	   because	   of	   his	  assistance	  in	  several	  of	  their	  operations	  while	  a	  separate	  group,	  involved	  in	  the	  investigation,	  supported	  the	  indictments.879	  	  Perhaps	   the	   most	   public	   example	   of	   bureaucratic	   factionalism,	  however,	   and	   one	   which	   fuelled	   Helms’	   suspicion	   of	   the	   department,	  occurred	  at	  State.	  In	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  indictments,	  the	  State	  Department	  rejected	  its	  own	  drug	  unit’s	  recommendation	  that	  Panama	  be	  certified	  despite	  unsatisfactory	  progress	  on	  combating	  drug	   trafficking.880	  	  Though	  the	  department	  was	  making	  exactly	  the	  decision	  Helms	  wanted,	  the	  senator	  was	  not	  satisfied.	  He	  used	  the	  indecision	  among	  officials	  to	  attack	  State’s	   record	   and	  blame	   it	   for	   the	   incoherence	   in	   the	  nation’s	   anti-­‐drugs	  strategy.	   ‘It	   is	  well	  known	  that	  the	  drug	  certification	   is	  determined	  by	  the	  State	   Department’,	   he	   argued,	   though	   he	   failed	   to	   note	   that	   the	   final	  recommendation	  ignored	  Defense	  and	  Justice	  Department	  advice.881	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  The	   discontent	   over	   Panama	   that	   Helms	   had	   helped	   foster	   was	  important	   in	   the	  State	  Department’s	  decision	  to	  overturn	   its	  own	  internal	  recommendation.	  ‘I	  wouldn’t	  deny	  that	  there	  were	  political	  realities	  on	  the	  Hill	  that	  were	  factored	  in’,	  one	  anonymous	  official	  told	  the	  press.882	  Yet	  the	  White	  House	  still	   resisted	  calls	   from	  Helms	  and	  Congress	   to	   impose	  more	  stringent	   sanctions	   on	   Panama,	   beyond	   the	   suspension	   of	   military	   and	  economic	   aid	   agreed	   upon	   the	   previous	   year.	   It	   was	   revealing	   of	   the	  importance	  of	  Noriega	  to	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  power	  of	  policy	  momentum.	  Helms	  found	  his	  calls	   for	  full	  sanctions	  ignored	  by	  a	  president	   convinced	   that	   such	   action	   was	   excessive	   and	  counterproductive.883	  	  	  It	  was	  not	  only	  Helms	  who	  was	  ‘deeply	  concerned’	  by	  the	  president’s	  refusal	  to	  consider	  moving	  beyond	  the	  mandatory	  sanctions.884	  At	  a	  White	  House	   conference	   on	   drugs	   the	   day	   before	   the	   certification,	   lawmakers	  from	   across	   party	   lines	   urged	   Reagan	   to	   adopt	   a	   tougher	   approach	   to	  Noriega.885	  On	   3	  March,	  when	   additional	   sanctions	  were	   proposed	   by	   the	  Panama	   coalition,	  members	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Noriega	   group	   criticised	   Reagan’s	  caution.	   Al	   D’Amato	   warned	   that	   one	   should	   not	   confuse	   ‘caution	   with	  inaction’,	   and	   that	   any	   delay	   in	   taking	   steps	   against	  Noriega	   threated	   the	  ‘battle	   for	  our	  youth	  and	   the	  very	   fiber	  of	   society.’886	  Ted	  Kennedy,	  David	  Durenberger,	   and	   John	   Kerry	   added	   their	   support	   to	   calls	   for	   swift	   and	  decisive	  action	  against	  the	  general.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  882	  Helms,	  “Drug	  Certification,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  2862.	  
883	  John	  M.	  Goshko	  and	  Lou	  Cannon,	  “Reagan	  Finds	  Panama	  Lax	  On	  Drugs,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  1	  March,	  1988,	  A1.	  
884	  Helms,	  “Drug	  Certification,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  2862.	  
885	  George	   Curry,	   “U.S.	   censures	   Panama,	   but	   congressmen	   want	   more,”	  
Chicago	  Tribune,	  2	  March,	  1988,	  12.	  
886 	  Alfonse	   D’Amato	   (NY),	   “Statements	   On	   Introduced	   Bills	   And	   Joint	  Resolutions,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  3171-­‐3172.	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  The	  Panama	  coalition’s	  solution	  to	  administration	  foot-­‐dragging	  was	  to	  propose	  an	  import-­‐export	  ban,	  suspension	  of	  air	  travel	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	   Panama,	   and	   a	   halt	   to	   the	   transfer	   of	   funds	   between	   depository	  institutions	   in	   both	   countries.	   Helms,	   who	   co-­‐sponsored	   the	   sanctions	  alongside	  D’Amato,	  Kerry,	  Kennedy,	  Durenberger,	  Bob	  Graham	  (D-­‐FL)	  and	  Howell	   Heflin	   (D-­‐AL),	   framed	   the	   measures	   as	   a	   populist	   response	   to	  Noriega’s	  anti-­‐democratic	  and	  criminal	  policies	   in	  the	  Isthmus.	   ‘We	  would	  not	  propose	   these	  sanctions’,	  Helms	  argued,	   ‘unless	  we	  sincerely	  believed	  that	  the	  people	  of	  Panama	  are	  ready	  to	  make	  the	  required	  sacrifice	  in	  order	  to	  regain	  their	  freedom.’	  Panamanians,	  he	  added,	  ‘are	  tired	  of	  waiting	  to	  see	  where	  the	  United	  States	  stands.	  They	  want	  Noriega	  out,	  and	  they	  want	  their	  country	   back. 887 	  Kerry	   concurred,	   remarking	   that	   the	   bill	   aimed	   ‘to	  restore…	  democracy	  for	  a	  people	  who	  want	  it.’888	  	  Lingering	  in	  the	  background,	  however,	  were	  continuing	  tensions	  over	  the	   Canal.	   	   Moderate	   and	   liberal	  members	   of	   the	   Panama	   coalition	  were	  quick	   to	  push	  back	  on	   suggestions	   that	   their	   activities	  were	   linked	   to	   the	  Carter-­‐era	   treaties.	  When	  Howell	  Heflin,	   a	   conservative	  Democrat,	   argued	  the	   bill	   should	   prompt	   Senate	   reconsideration	   of	   the	   treaties,	   John	  Kerry	  and	   Al	   D’Amato	   quickly	   opposed	   the	   idea.	   ‘This	   is	   not	   about	   the	   Canal	  Treaty,’	   Kerry	   argued.	  889	  Yet	   growing	   anti-­‐Noriega	   sentiment	   acted	   as	   a	  rallying	  point	  for	  those,	  like	  Helms,	  who	  refused	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  planned	  handover	  of	  the	  Canal	  in	  2000	  was	  inevitable.	  Now,	  even	  as	  he	  continued	  to	  lead	  the	  anti-­‐Noriega	  coalition	  in	  the	  Senate,	  he	  worked	  with	  conservatives	  to	   renew	   the	   campaign	   to	   repeal	   the	   treaties.	   It	   became	   clear	   that	   the	  substantial	   progress	   Helms	   had	   enjoyed	   in	   his	   compromise	   strategy	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  887	  Helms,	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   On	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   And	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   Resolutions,”	   Cong.	  
Rec.	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  (1988),	  3174.	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  John	  Kerry	  (MA),	  Statements	  On	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  And	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Cong.	  Rec.	  134	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  Kerry,	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increasingly	   challenged	  by	  his	   commitment	   to	   the	  pre-­‐existing	  movement	  conservative	  principle	  of	  retaining	  the	  Canal.	  What	  emerged	  was	  a	  conflict	  between	  pragmatism	  and	  principle,	  as	  the	  senator	  proved	  unable	  to	  resist	  the	  urge	  to	  re-­‐open	  his	  fight	  against	  the	  treaties.	  	  	   Until	   late	  1987,	  when	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  began	  to	   toughen	  its	  rhetoric	  on	  Noriega,	  Helms	  had	  shown	  a	  surprising	   level	  of	  caution	  on	  the	   issue.	   His	   comments	   during	   the	   Spadafora	   hearings	   that	   Noriega’s	  complicity	   in	   drug	   trafficking	   and	   political	   repression	   might	   suggest	   the	  need	  for	  a	  re-­‐examination	  of	  the	  1978	  agreements	  were	  not	  repeated	  for	  a	  number	   of	   months.	   He	   talked	   briefly	   in	   October	   1986	   of	   the	   State	  Department’s	   decision	   to	   proceed	   with	   plans	   for	   a	   new	   sea-­‐level	   canal	  (against	  all	  ‘sound	  work	  done	  by	  experts	  in	  the	  field’),	  but	  that	  constituted	  his	   only	   Senate	   commentary	   on	   the	   issue.890	  When	  Helms	   came	   to	   justify	  his	   disapproval	   of	   certification	   the	   following	  April,	   he	   subtly	   inserted	   the	  Canal	   into	   the	   debate	   by	   pointing	   to	   a	  Reader’s	  Digest	   article	   on	   Noriega	  entitled	  “Will	  This	  Man	  Control	  the	  Panama	  Canal?”	  Yet	  while	  he	  described	  it	  as	  ‘an	  enlightening	  article’,	  he	  avoided	  any	  direct	  pronouncement	  on	  the	  treaties	  at	  that	  time,	  too.891	  	   	  In	   October	   1987,	   however,	   the	   temptation	   to	   associate	   the	   ongoing	  anti-­‐Noriega	   campaign	   with	   the	   Canal	   became	   too	   much.	   Helms	   joined	  Steve	  Symms	  in	  introducing	  a	  resolution	  calling	  for	  the	  Canal	  Treaties	  to	  be	  voided.	  Helms	  and	  Symms	  were	  careful	   to	   frame	   the	   legislation	  primarily	  on	   legal	  grounds,	  claiming	  the	  1977	  agreement	  was	  void	  because	  Panama	  did	  not	   accept	   the	  DeConcini	  Reservation	   that	  had	  made	   clear	   the	  United	  States	   could	   act	   to	   protect	   the	   Canal	   if	   necessary.	   Yet	   the	   Idaho	  conservative	   argued	   that	   the	   resolution	   was,	   in	   a	   broader	   sense,	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  Jesse	  Helms	   (NC),	   “Panama	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   Future	  Policy	  Determination,”	  Cong.	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  132	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  27672-­‐27683.	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necessitated	   by	   Noriega’s	   authoritarianism	   and	   criminality. 892 	  Though	  Helms	  spoke	  only	  on	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  1977	  treaties	  –	  ‘I	  believe	  it	  to	  have	  been	  an	  illegal	  and	  unconstitutional	  act’,	  he	  claimed,	  and	  a	  deal	  which	  the	  Senate	   was	   ‘snuckered’	   into	   –	   his	   endorsement	   of	   the	   Symms	   resolution	  undercut	   suggestions	   by	   Republican	   staffers	   that	   anti-­‐Noriega	   initiatives	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Canal	  Treaties.893	  The	  Symms	  amendment,	  and	  Helms’	  vote	  against	  a	  measure	  to	  table	  it,	  were	  picked	  up	  by	  Human	  Events,	  as	  the	  magazine	  began	  to	  draw	  ever	  closer	  links	  between	  Noriega’s	  fate	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Canal	  treaties.894	  	  	   It	   was	   a	   fine	   line	   for	   Helms.	   Talking	   about	   the	   Canal	   Treaties	  provided	   opponents	   ammunition	   to	   question	   his	  motives	   on	  Panama	   and	  open	   ideological	   fissures	   within	   the	   broader	   anti-­‐Noriega	   coalition.	   In	  March,	   during	   Senate	   discussion	   on	   sanctions	   against	   Panama,	  Helms	  did	  not	  remark	  on	  the	  treaties	  or	  comment	  on	  Heflin’s	  calls	  to	  re-­‐examine	  the	  agreements.	  Indeed,	  the	  bill	  contained	  language	  specifically	  reaffirming	  the	  treaties.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  senator	  appeared	  comfortable	  switching	  rapidly	  between	   the	   two	   camps,	   as,	   the	   very	   next	   day,	   Helms	   proposed	   two	  amendments	  to	  the	  intelligence	  authorisation	  act	  calling	  for	  the	  abrogation	  of	  certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  1977	  agreements	  because	  of	  Panama’s	  delay	  in	  extraditing	  Noriega.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  proposed	  that	  Reagan	  consider	  extracting	  American	  dependents	  and	  halt	  the	  base	  closures	  and	  troop	  withdrawals	  agreed	  under	  the	  Canal	  Treaties	  unless	  Noriega	  was	  extradited.	  The	  second,	  which	  Helms	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  “U.S.	  distancing	   itself	   from	  Panama’s	   strife,”	  Chicago	  Tribune,	   16	  August,	   1987,	  27.	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outlined	  but	  never	  introduced,	  added	  a	  demand	  for	  democratic	  government	  in	  Panama	  alongside	  Noriega’s	  transfer	  to	  U.S.	  custody.	  Neither	  amendment	  received	   co-­‐sponsors,	   but	   this	   was	   irrelevant.	   Helms	   was	   not	   seeking	   to	  build	   a	   genuine	   legislative	   coalition	   behind	   these	  measures,	   as	   he	  was	   in	  other	   parts	   of	   the	   Panama	   debate.	   Instead,	   as	   he	   admitted	   after	  parliamentary	   tactics	   repeatedly	   delayed	   his	   efforts,	   he	   only	   wanted	   a	  rollcall:	  ‘I	  have	  been	  here	  for	  4	  hours,	  for	  one	  purpose:	  Trying	  to	  get	  a	  vote	  on	  an	  amendment.’895	  	  In	  particular,	  Helms	  wanted	  his	   colleagues	  placed	  once	  more	  on	   the	  record	   over	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties.	   The	   amendments,	   he	   told	  colleagues,	  ‘would	  allow	  Senators	  who	  were	  not	  here	  on	  April	  18	  1978…	  an	  opportunity	   to	   express	   their	   view	   on	   the	  wisdom	   or	   lack	   of	   it	   in	   turning	  over	   the	  Panama	  Canal	  Zone	   to	  Panama’.	   It	  would	  also	  permit	   those	  who	  were	  present	  in	  1978	  ‘to	  assess	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  decision	  they	  made,	  one	  way	  or	   another,	   on	   that	   crucial	  day	   in	  Senate	  history.’896	  The	   senator	  and	   other	   movement	   conservatives	   were	   convinced	   that	   support	   for	   the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties	  remained	  an	  electoral	   liability,	  and	  as	   in	   this	  case,	  never	  ceased	  to	  remind	  colleagues	  of	  the	  defeats	  many	  pro-­‐treaty	  senators	  suffered	  after	  the	  1978	  vote.	  Placing	  current	  rivals	  on	  record	  as	  supporting	  the	  original	   treaties	   thus	  provided	  a	   ready-­‐made	  attack	  strategy	   in	   future	  electoral	  battles.	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   Helms	   believed	   that	   changing	   circumstances	   in	  Panama	  necessitated	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  the	  treaties.	  Helms	  was	  careful	  to	  deny	   his	   amendments	   affected	   the	   treaties,	   arguing	   they	   merely	   took	  ‘precautionary	   steps	   to	   defend	   our	   vital	   national	   interests	   in	   the	   Panama	  Canal	  and	  to	  encourage	  Panama	  to	  extradite	  General	  Noriega	  to	  the	  United	  States	   for	   trial.’	   This	   was	   true,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   his	   amendments	   were	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  Jesse	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  (NC),	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  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	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  Jesse	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   (NC),	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   (1988),	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merely	   suggestive,	   not	   prescriptive.	   Yet	   Helms	   failed	   to	   maintain	   his	  message	  discipline.	  He	  reminded	  colleagues	  that	  a	  well-­‐established	  custom	  of	  international	  relations	  allowed	  for	  treaties	  to	  be	  terminated	  in	  the	  event	  of	  changed	  circumstances.	  Noriega’s	  recent	  indictment,	  the	  senator	  pointed	  out,	  ‘certainly	  qualifies	  as	  a	  changed	  circumstance.’	  Helms	  declared	  bluntly	  that	   ‘Government	   of	   Panama	   is	   clearly	   unstable	   and	   totally	   incapable	   of	  defending	   the	   canal’,	   and	   therefore	   endangered	   vital	   U.S.	   security	  interests.897	  A	  rollcall	  vote	  would	   force	  senators	   to	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  this	  argument.	  	  Without	   support,	   even	   from	   movement	   conservatives,	   Helms	   was	  hopelessly	   isolated	   on	   this	   approach.	   Outmanoeuvred	   by	   David	   Boren’s	  perfecting	  amendment	  –	   ‘I	  recognize	  the	  parliamentary	  procedure’,	  Helms	  confessed.	  ‘I	  have	  used	  it	  myself	  when	  I	  did	  not	  want	  an	  amendment	  to	  be	  even	  considered	  by	  the	  Senate’	  –	  Helms’	  efforts	  were	  further	  hampered	  by	  a	   bipartisan	   cloture	   motion	   that	   cut	   off	   debate.	   The	   senator	   defiantly	  proposed	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   chamber	   until	   his	   amendment	  was	   voted	   on,	   but	  though	   the	   second	   amendment	   was	   introduced	   on	   15	  March,	   the	   Senate	  took	   no	   further	   action. 898 	  At	   a	   time	   when	   pressure	   on	   Noriega	   was	  intensifying	   rapidly,	   with	   the	   administration	   increasingly	   supportive	   of	  efforts	  to	  remove	  the	  general,	  Helms’	  efforts	  to	  bring	  up	  the	  Canal	  Treaties	  was	  an	  unwelcome	  intrusion	  upon	  this	  consensus.	  	  Helms’	   strategy	   on	   the	   Canal,	   however,	   fitted	   with	   a	   broader	  conservative	   effort	   that	   peaked	   in	   1988	   with	   the	   movement’s	   resurgent	  campaign	   to	  suspend	  parts,	  or	  all,	  of	   the	   treaties.	  Conservatives	   looked	   to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  growing	  public	  awareness	  of	  the	  Noriega	  problem	  and	  the	  administration’s	  belated	  recognition	  of	  the	  Panamanian’s	  threat	  to	  regional	  security	  issues.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  March,	  Robert	  Walker	  gained	  over	  seventy	  co-­‐sponsors	   for	   his	   legislation	   in	   the	  House	   that	   proposed	   renegotiating	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  897	  Helms,	  “Intelligence	  Oversight	  Act,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  3348.	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treaties	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   permanent	   presence	   of	   U.S.	   troops	   in	  Panama	  and	  independent	  military	  action	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  Canal.899	  In	  mid-­‐April,	  Connie	  Mack	  introduced	  a	  resolution	  calling	  for	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  treaties.900	  In	   the	   Senate,	   Chic	   Hecht	   was	   joined	   by	   Symms	   and	   Texas	  Republican	   Phil	   Gramm	   in	   proposing	   that	   the	   1977	   agreements	   be	  suspended	   until	   Noriega	   and	   others	   involved	   in	   drug	   trafficking	  relinquished	  control	  of	  Panama’s	  government.901	  	   Despite	   this	   distinctively	   conservative	   agenda,	   Helms	   continued	   to	  work	  effectively	   in	   the	  wider	   Senate	   anti-­‐Noriega	   coalition.	  By	   the	   end	  of	  March,	   in	   a	   legislative	   entrepreneurship	   blitz,	   he	   had	   co-­‐sponsored	   three	  multi-­‐ideological	   resolutions	   over	   Panama.	   The	   first,	   which	   passed	   92-­‐0,	  called	   for	   immediate	   steps	   to	   hasten	   the	   transition	   toward	   democracy.902	  The	  second,	  accepted	  92-­‐1,	  called	  on	  Reagan	  to	  consider	  denying	  Noriega’s	  government	  U.S.	  credit	  and	  to	  hold	  in	  escrow	  funds	  due	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  Panama.903	  The	   third,	   accepted	   on	   a	   voice	   vote,	   proposed	   that	   American	  employees	  be	  able	  to	  shop	  at	  U.S.	  military	  bases	  because	  of	  safety	  concerns	  in	   Panama. 904 	  The	   breadth	   of	   support	   for	   these	   proposals	   starkly	  contrasted	   Helms’	   anti-­‐treaties	   work	   with	   his	   more	   productive	   anti-­‐Noriega	  efforts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  899 	  Robert	   Walker	   (PA),	   “Proposed	   Renegotiation	   Of	   Panama	   Canal	  Treaties,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  5875.	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  Connie	  Mack	  (FL),	  “Abrogate	  The	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaty,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  7010.	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  Chic	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  (NE),	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  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	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   Democracy	   In	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   Cong.	   Rec.	   134	   (1988),	   5259-­‐5269,	  and	  “Rollcall	  Vote	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  74	  Leg.,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  5268.	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  “Panamanian	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   Sanctions,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	   134	   (1988),	   6046-­‐6048,	  and	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  84	  Leg.,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	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   At	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   Of	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  (1988),	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  Helms	   was	   also	   increasingly	   vocal	   about	   ‘Cubanisation’	   in	   Panama;	  that	   is,	  Noriega’s	   gradual	   alignment	  with	  Castro.	   It	  was	  a	   term	  coined	   for	  the	  Panamanian	  context	  by	  Al	  D’Amato,	  after	  reports	  in	  the	  press	  suggested	  Cuban	   troops	   had	   fired	   upon	   American	   soldiers	   near	   the	   Canal.905	  No	  evidence	   existed	   to	   back	   up	   the	   claims,	   apart	   from	   the	   belief	   among	   U.S.	  troops	   in	   the	   country	   that	   Cuban	   special	   forces	   had	   been	   operating	   for	  some	  time	  in	  the	  Isthmus.906	  Nevertheless,	  Helms	  seized	  upon	  the	  incident,	  concluding,	  'the	  armed	  forces	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  countries	  named	  in	  the	  presently	   pending	   amendment,	   probably	   Soviet-­‐controlled	   Cubans,	   may	  have	  penetrated	  Canal	  defense	  areas	  manned	  by	  United	  States	  troops	  and	  may	  have	  actually	  engaged	  United	  States	  troops	  in	  combat.907	  	  Prior	   to	   this,	   the	   link	   between	   Noriega	   and	   communism	   had	   been	  difficult	   to	   sustain.	   Close	   U.S.	   intelligence	   relations	  with	   the	   Panamanian,	  especially	   William	   Casey’s	   praise,	   undermined	   the	   argument. 908 	  After	  Casey’s	  death	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	   the	  Contra	  programme,	  however,	  Helms	  could	   comment	  without	   fear	   of	   contradiction	   from	   the	   administration.	   In	  May,	  Helms	   tested	   the	   Senate’s	   acceptance	   of	   the	   Cubanisation	   theory	   by	  introducing	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  National	  Defense	  Authorization	  Act.	  The	  senator’s	  proposal	  prohibited	  U.S.	  funding	  for	  the	  Combined	  Canal	  Defense	  Board,	  set	  up	  by	  the	  1977	  treaties	  in	  order	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  protection	  of	  the	  waterway,	   unless	   the	   president	   certified	   that	   no	   Cuban,	   Nicaraguan,	   or	  Soviet	  troops	  were	  present	  in	  Panama	  (or	  until	  Noriega	  was	  removed	  from	  office).	  Repeating	  D’Amato’s	  claim	  that	  increasing	  Cubanisation	  of	  Panama	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  905 	  Alfonse	   D’Amato	   (NY),	   “Acquired	   Immunodeficiency	   Syndrome	  Research	  And	  Information	  Act,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  134	  (1988),	  9304.	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   “U.S.	   tangles	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   shadowy	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   in	   Panama,”	   Chicago	  
Tribune,	  3	  April,	  1988,	  1.	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was	  ‘a	  growing	  reality’,	  Helms	  argued	  that	  the	  Senate	  must	  face	  the	  issue	  if	  the	   administration,	   and	  particularly	   the	  Defense	  Department,	   did	  not.	   ‘To	  this	  date,’	  he	  told	  his	  audience,	  ‘I	  must	  sadly	  say	  the	  administration	  has	  not	  been	  willing	   to	   take	  a	   firm	  stand	  against	  Noriega	  and	   the	  Cubanization	  of	  Panama,	  nor	  in	  my	  judgment	  to	  face	  up	  to	  the	  hard	  facts.’909	  	  	   The	   decision	   to	   target	   the	  Defense	   Board,	   a	   provision	   of	   the	   1977	  agreements,	   explains	  why	  Helms’	   initiative	   lacked	   the	   bipartisan	   support	  found	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   anti-­‐Noriega	   coalition.	   It	   only	   received	   co-­‐sponsorship	   from	  two	  of	  his	  colleagues,	  Bob	  Dole	  and	  Strom	  Thurmond	  –	  both	  veterans	  of	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  Canal	  Treaties.	  As	  Sam	  Nunn,	  chair	  of	  the	   Armed	   Services	   Committee,	   noted,	   Panama’s	   government	   could	   well	  use	   the	   threat	   to	   the	   treaties	   as	   a	   means	   of	   exploiting	   anti-­‐American	  sentiment.	  Moreover,	  Nunn	  added,	  cutting	  off	  funding	  to	  a	  key	  component	  of	   the	   Canal’s	   defence	   framework	   would	   threaten	   the	   security	   of	   the	  waterway.910	  	   Yet	   when	   Helms	   came	   down	   on	   the	   pragmatic	   side	   of	   the	  equation,	  and	  reworded	  the	  amendment	  so	  that	  it	  permitted	  the	  president	  to	   continue	   funding	  defence	  measures	   for	   the	  waterway,	   not	   one	   senator	  opposed	   passage	   of	   the	   legislation.	   It	   was	   but	   a	   small	   example	   of	   the	  success	   the	   senator	   achieved	   on	   Panama	   policy	   when	   he	   accepted	   the	  limitations	   to	   a	   pure	   conservative	   agenda,	   and	   embraced	   a	   degree	   of	  moderation	  he	  had	  long	  criticised	  from	  other	  foreign	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  A	  Just	  Cold	  War	  Cause:	  Removing	  Noriega,	  1989-­‐1992	  	   On	   3	   October,	   1989,	   Major	   Moisés	   Giroldi,	   a	   senior	   officer	   in	   the	  Panamanian	  Defense	  Forces,	  launched	  a	  coup	  against	  Noriega.	  Believing	  he	  had	   the	  support	  of	  U.S.	   forces	  stationed	   in	  Panama,	  Giroldi	  and	  his	   fellow	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plotters	   seized	   Noriega	   at	   the	   Comandancia,	   the	   PDF’s	   headquarters,	   at	  around	   9.00am.	   Though	   Giroldi’s	   family	   were	   given	   protection	   at	   an	  American	  base,	  direct	  U.S.	  support	  failed	  to	  materialise,	  and	  Noriega’s	  loyal	  Special	   Forces	   units	   bypassed	   small	   detachments	   of	   American	   troops	  deployed	   to	   block	   off	   routes	   to	   the	   Comandancia.	   Surrounded	   by	   pro-­‐Noriega	   soldiers,	   Giroldi	   and	   his	   followers	   gave	   in.	   Five	   hours	   after	   his	  initial	   capture,	   Noriega	  was	   rescued	   and	  Giroldi,	   along	  with	   several	   coup	  leaders,	  executed.911	  The	  coup	  marked	  the	  collapse	  of	  American	  hopes	  for	  a	  Panamanian	  solution	  to	   its	  Noriega	  problem,	  and	   led	  to	  scathing	  criticism	  of	  a	  Bush	  administration	  that	  appeared	  unable	  –	  or	  unwilling	  –	  to	  back	  its	  own	  tough	  rhetoric	  on	  supporting	  Panamanian	  efforts	  to	  oust	  Noriega.	  	  It	   is	  doubtful	  that	  the	  events	  of	  3	  October	  would	  have	  been	  revealed	  to	  the	  American	  public	  as	  quickly,	  and	  in	  as	  much	  detail,	  without	  Helms	  and	  his	   regional	   information	   network.	   The	   senator	   was	   perhaps	   the	   most	  knowledgeable	  observer	  of	  the	  coup	  outside	  those	  actively	  participating	  in	  it.	  The	  rapid,	  frequently	  real-­‐time,	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  Helms’	  sources	  in	  both	  Panama	  and	  the	  United	  States	  allowed	  the	  senator	  to	  act	  as	  an	  issue	  leader	  throughout	  the	  coup	  and	  in	  the	  days	  that	  followed.	  	  Within	   two	   hours	   of	   Giroldi	   and	   his	   forces	   taking	   control	   of	   the	  
Comandancia,	  the	  senator’s	  office	  was	  communicating	  with	  the	  rebel	  forces.	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  coup,	  his	  staff,	  led	  by	  DeMoss,	  was	  in	  direct	  phone	  contact	  with	  Giroldi.	  Using	   the	   information	  relayed	   to	   them	   from	  Panama	  City,	   Helms’	   staff	   charted	   live	   troop	   movements	   in	   the	   capital,	   and	   even	  spoke	  to	  Noriega	  at	  one	  point	  when	  the	  rebels	  put	  him	  on	  the	  line.912	  This	  information	  was	  augmented	  by	  details	  received	  from	  senators	  D’Amato	  and	  Kerry,	   as	   well	   as	   former	   Panama	   ambassador	   to	   the	   U.S.	   Juan	   Sosa	   and	  consul	  officer,	  José	  Blandón.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  911	  There	  are	  several	  excellent	  summaries	  of	  the	  coup.	  See	  John	  Dinges,	  Our	  
Man	  in	  Panama,	  304-­‐305,	  and	  Buckley,	  Panama,	  197-­‐211.	  
912	  Link,	  Righteous	  Warrior,	  326-­‐327.	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  Between	  them,	  the	  anti-­‐Noriega	  coalition	  were	  able	  to	  gather	  together	  sufficient	  details	  about	  the	  coup	  to	  provide	  the	  first	  in-­‐depth	  press	  briefing	  on	   the	  matter,	   not	   the	  White	  House.	  Helms,	  who	   spoke	   first,	   outlined	   the	  situation	  by	   telling	   journalists	   assembled	   in	   the	  Senate	  Press	  Gallery	   that	  the	  rebels	  were	  in	  control	  and	  were	  looking	  to	  retire	  all	  PDF	  officers	  with	  over	   twenty-­‐five	   years	   of	   experience.	   ‘And	   this	   includes	   a	   guy	   named	  Noriega,	   thank	   the	   Lord’,	   Helms	   added,	  with	   obvious	   delight.	   Helms	   then	  stepped	  aside	  to	  let	  D’Amato,	  Kerry,	  and	  Sosa	  speak	  further.913	  	  Critics	   later	   accused	   Helms	   and	   his	   colleagues	   of	   jumping	   to	  conclusions	   about	   the	   coup’s	   success.	   The	   senator’s	   statement	   was	  described	   the	   following	  day	  as	   appearing	   ‘to	  have	  no	  basis	   in	   fact’,	   and	   it	  was	  contrasted	  unfavourably	  with	  the	  administration’s	  caution	  throughout	  the	   crisis.914 	  This	   was	   unfair	   to	   Helms.	   At	   no	   point	   during	   the	   press	  conference	   did	   he,	   or	   any	   of	   his	   colleagues	   in	   the	   coalition,	   suggest	   their	  information	  was	  irrefutable.	  Their	  account	  represented	  ‘only	  what	  we	  think	  we	   know’,	   as	   Helms	   put	   it.915	  As	   rumours	   swirled	   around	  Washington,	   it	  was	   only	   natural	   that	   the	   senator’s	   statement	  would	   add	   to	   the	   sense	   of	  hope	   that	   Noriega	   had	   been	   removed,	   but	   at	   the	   time	   Helms	   claimed	   no	  certainty	  about	  his	  information.	  	  	  As	   long	   as	   the	   coup	   was	   proceeding,	   the	   senator	   and	   the	   Bush	  administration	  both	  called	  for	  Panamanians	  to	  oust	  Noriega.	  They	  publicly	  encouraged	   Giroldi	   and	   his	   followers,	   taking	   advantage	   of	   their	   media	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  913	  “Reactions	   to	   Attempted	   Overthrow	   of	   Noriega,”	   3	   October,	   1989,	   C-­‐
Span,	   accessed	   10	  December,	   2013,	   http://www.c-­‐span.org/video/?9352-­‐1/reactions-­‐attempted-­‐overthrow-­‐noriega.	  
914 	  Ray	   Moseley,	   “Bush	   denies	   U.S.	   role	   in	   Panama	   uprising,”	   Chicago	  
Tribune,	  4	  October,	  1989,	  4.	  
915	  “Reactions	   to	   Attempted	   Overthrow	   of	   Noriega,”	   3	   October,	   1989,	   C-­‐
Span,	   accessed	   10	  December,	   2013,	   http://www.c-­‐span.org/video/?9352-­‐1/reactions-­‐attempted-­‐overthrow-­‐noriega.	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exposure	  to	  engage	  directly	  with	  those	  in	  Panama.	  In	  his	  closing	  remarks	  at	  the	   press	   conference,	   Helms	   addressed	   the	   rebels:	   ‘I	   want	   the	   people	   in	  Panama	   –	   rebels	   if	   you	  want	   to	   call	   them	   that	   –	   I	   want	   them	   to	   hang	   in	  there,	  because	  they	  are	  doing	  the	  right	  thing.’916	  Over	  at	   the	  White	  House,	  responding	   to	   questions	   from	   reporters	   during	   his	   meeting	   with	   Soviet	  defence	   minister	   Dmitry	   Yazov,	   President	   Bush	   remarked,	   ‘in	   the	   hopes	  that	   it	   be	   conveyed	   instantly	   to	   Panama:	   We	   have	   no	   argument	   with	  Panamanian	  Defense	  Forces…	   if	  you	  can	  use	  all	   these	  cameras	   to	  get	   that	  message	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Panama,	  I	  really	  think	  it	  would	  be	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  peace.’ 917 	  In	   an	   era	   of	   instant	   news,	   Helms,	   like	   the	   president,	   took	  advantage	  of	  the	  medium	  to	  seek	  immediate	  policy	  influence.	  	  Yet	   the	   huge	   difference	   in	   their	   respective	   support	   for	   the	   PDF	   –	  Bush’s	  comments	  held	  out	  an	  olive	  branch	  to	  Panama’s	  military,	  something	  Helms	  did	  not	  do	  –	  augured	  poorly	  for	  a	  unified	  front	  over	  the	  coup.	  Indeed,	  when	  news	  of	  Noriega’s	  escape	  reached	  Washington	  in	  late	  afternoon,	  any	  harmony	   evaporated	   instantly.	   The	   senator’s	   information	   network	   now	  acted	  as	   the	  basis	   for	  his	   intense	  public	   criticism	  of	   the	  White	  House	  and	  the	   foreign	   policy	   bureaucracy.	   He	   was	   the	   first	   member	   of	   Congress	   to	  speak	  on	  the	  record	  about	  the	  events	  at	  the	  Comandancia,	  interrupting	  the	  Senate’s	   discussion	   on	   national	   drug	   control	   policy	   to	   lament	   Noriega’s	  escape.	  Using	  intelligence	  presumably	  received	  via	  DeMoss	  and	  Giroldi,	  the	  senator	  revealed	   that	   ‘at	   the	  crucial	  moment	  during	   the	  coup	  attempt	   the	  United	   States	   apparently	   rejected	   overtures	   from	   the	   rebels	   to	   assist	   in	  their	   efforts	   to	  depose	   this	  present	  dictator.’	  Unable	   to	  decide	  on	   its	  own	  authority	  to	  take	  custody	  of	  Noriega,	  Helms	  said,	  the	  administration	  ‘acted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  916	  Ibid.	  
917	  “Exchange	   With	   Reporters	   on	   the	   Attempted	   Overthrow	   of	   General	  Manuel	  Noriega	  of	  Panama,	   3	  October,	   1989,”	  Public	  Papers,	   George	  Bush	  Library,	   accessed	   10	   April,	   2014,	  http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1002. 
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like	  a	  bunch	  of	  Keystone	  Cops	  running	  around	  bumping	  into	  each	  other.’	  ‘I	  have	  never	  seen	  such	  confusion	  and	  contradiction,’	  Helms	  concluded.918	  	  Two	  days	  later,	  after	  a	  personal	  investigation	  into	  what	  he	  called	  ‘the	  story	  of	  the	  tragic	  inaction	  of	  the	  United	  States…	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  strong	  plea	  from	   patriotic	   Panamanians	   for	   help’,	   Helms	   expanded	   on	   his	   initial	  account.	  Helms	  told	  colleagues	  that	  Noriega	  had	  been	  in	  custody	  for	  at	  least	  five	  hours	  and,	  critically,	  that	  Giroldi	  was	  eager	  to	  turn	  him	  over	  to	  the	  U.S.	  The	   rebels	   had	   phoned	   SouthCom	   at	   9.00am	   to	   request	   assistance,	   but	  ‘received	   not	   the	   slightest	   encouragement’	   from	   the	   U.S.	   military.	  SouthCom,	  Helms	  said,	  did	  not	  know	  its	  own	  authority,	  and	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  responded	  ‘that	  their	  decision	  was	  not	  to	  make	  a	  decision.’	  The	  senator	  did	  not	  limit	  his	  criticism	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Defence.	  The	  White	  House	  was	  too	  busy	  ‘wining	  and	  dining’	  the	  president	  of	  Mexico	  to	  respond	  to	  Giroldi’s	  requests	  for	  help,	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  created	  a	  task	  force	  to	  monitor	  events	  but	  not	  act	  on	   them.	  U.S.	   government	  officials,	  Helms	  said,	  did	  not	  have	  information	  on	  the	  crisis	  and	  ‘some	  of	  them	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  care.’919	  	  Other	  members	  of	  Congress	  were	  also	  critical	  of	  the	  administration	  in	  the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   coup.	   Yet	   the	   detail	   provided	   by	   Helms	   and	   the	  intensity	  of	  his	  criticism	  propelled	  the	  senator	  to	  centre-­‐stage.	  ‘“The	  Helms	  Version”’,	   as	   the	   New	   York	   Times,	   called	   it,	   reverberated	   throughout	  reporting	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   coup.920	  News	   coverage	   quickly	   moved	  away	  from	  describing	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  response	  to	  questioning	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  918	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Implementation	   Of	   The	   President’s	   1989	   National	  Drug	  Control	  Strategy,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  22965-­‐22966.	  
919	  Helms,	  “Implementation	  Of	  The	  President’s	  1989	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Strategy,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  23424-­‐23425.	  
920	  “Panama	   Fiasco:	   The	   Helms	   Version,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	   7	   October,	  1989,	  23.	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An	   increasing	   number	   of	   inside	   sources	   began	   to	   acknowledge	   executive	  confusion	  and	  disorganisation	  during	  the	  coup.921	  	  As	   the	   administration	   found	   itself	   facing	   significant	   criticism	   and	  questioning,	   it	   reacted	   by	   launching	   a	   campaign	   to	   undermine	   Helms’	  credibility.922	  The	  president’s	  press	   secretary,	  Marlin	  Fitzwater,	   called	   the	  senator	   ‘“full	  of	   it”’	   for	  suggesting	  the	  rebels	  had	  asked	  for	  U.S.	  assistance.	  No	  request	  had	  been	  made,	  Fitzwater	  said,	  and	  Helms’	  staff	  ‘“couldn’t	  prove	  anything.”’923	  Secretary	   of	  Defense	  Dick	   Cheney	  described	  Helms’	   account	  as	   ‘“a	   bunch	   of	   hogwash”’	   and	   his	   criticism	   of	   the	   administration	  ‘“crazy”’.924	  Even	   President	   Bush	   rejected	   Helms’	   argument,	   though	   in	   a	  rather	  more	   courteous	  manner.	   ‘“I	   think	   the	   record	  will	   show	   that	   there	  was	   never	   a	   chance	   to	   have	   him	   [Noriega]	   handed	   over	   to	   us”’,	   the	  president	  declared.925	  	  On	   the	   specifics	   of	   Helms’	   narrative,	   administration	   sources	  systematically	   refuted	   each	   claim.	   Girold’s	   actions	   were	   not	   ‘well	  coordinated	   and	   effective’,	   as	   Helms	   argued,	   but	   badly	   planned,	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   4	  October,	  1989,	  A1.	  	  
922	  Buckley,	  Panama,	  215.	  
923	  Molly	   Moore	   and	   Joe	   Pichirallo,	   “Cheney:	   U.S.	   Was	   Willing	   to	   Take	  Custody	  of	  Noriega,”	  Washington	  Post,	  6	  October,	  1989,	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disorganised,	  and	  never	  likely	  to	  succeed.926	  The	  senator	  had	  described	  the	  Panamanians	   leading	   the	   coup	   as	   ‘courageous’	   and	   ‘untainted	   by	   drug	  corruption’,	  with	  Giroldi	  ‘exactly	  the	  sort	  of	  person	  the	  United	  States	  should	  have	   been	   cultivating.’ 927 	  The	   administration,	   led	   by	   Cheney,	   instead	  declared	   that	   Giroldi	   was	   ‘“a	   noted	   confidant,	   crony	   of	   Noriega’s”’,	   and	  ‘“events	  might	  well	  have	  been	  a	  set	  up.”’928	  The	  coup	  plotters	  only	  wanted	  Noriega’s	   resignation	   and	   internal	   exile,	   said	   administration	   sources,	   and	  were	  not,	  as	  Helms	  claimed,	  eager	  to	  turn	  the	  general	  over	  to	  the	  U.S.929	  The	  low-­‐key	   American	   response	   to	   the	   coup	   reflected	   President	   Bush’s	  judicious	   caution	   about	   involving	   U.S.	   forces	   in	   such	   an	   uncertain	  environment.	  ‘“It’s	  easy	  to	  be	  an	  armchair	  general,”’	  said	  Secretary	  of	  State	  James	  Baker.930	  	  Later	   accounts	   revealed	   the	   senator’s	   narrative	   to	   be	   far	   closer	   to	  reality.931	  Helms	   piously	   called	   it	   a	   ‘mystery’	   as	   to	   how	   ‘one	   obscure	   U.S.	  Senator’	  could	  put	   together	  a	   ‘more	  complete	  and	  more	  accurate	  account’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  926	  Helms,	  “Implementation	  Of	  The	  President’s	  1989	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Strategy,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   135	   (1989),	   22965,	   Joseph	   B.	   Treaster,	   “Account	   of	  Plot,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  5	  October,	  1989,	  A14,	  Thom	  Shanker,	  “Noriega’s	  fate	   split	   coup	   leaders,”	  Chicago	  Tribune,	   11	  October,	   1989,	   1,	   and	   Elaine	  Sciolino,	  “U.S.	  Says	  Leaders	  Of	  Panama	  Revolt	  Were	  In	  Disarray,”	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  11	  October,	  1989,	  A1.	  
927	  Helms	  “Implementation	  Of	  The	  President’s	  1989	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Strategy,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   135	   (1989),	   22965,	   and	   Helms,	   “Implementation	   Of	  The	   President’s	   1989	   National	   Drug	   Control	   Strategy,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   135	  (1989),	  23426.	  
928	  David	   Hoffman	   and	   Ann	   Devroy,	   “U.S.	  Was	   Caught	   Off	   Guard	   by	   Coup	  Attempt,”	  Washington	  Post,	  6	  October,	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  Post,	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   coup	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than	  the	  White	  House	  based	  only	  on	  open	  sources.932	  Of	  course,	  the	  senator	  knew	   exactly	   how	   it	   had	   been	   achieved.	   He	   readily	   admitted,	   in	   looking	  back	   on	   his	   political	   career,	   that	   his	   staff’s	   information	   network	   was	  designed	  to	  provide	  him	  with	  the	  facts	  from	  trustworthy	  sources	  so	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  U.S.	  government	  for	  information.933	  	  The	  Giroldi	   coup	  vindicated	   this	  approach,	  particularly	  as	   the	  White	  House	  conceded	  its	  own	  network	  had	  been	  defective.	  Its	  complicated	  multi-­‐agency	   intelligence	   reporting	   system	   led	   to	   ‘“fast	   and	   furious	   and	  contradictory”’	   messages	   being	   transmitted.	   ‘“[N]one	   of	   the	  [administration’s]	  sources	  were	  that	  good	  anyway”’,	  said	  one	  senior	  official,	  and	   result	   was	   a	   ‘“confused”’	   bureaucracy. 934 	  As	   a	   result,	   as	   Helms	  delighted	   in	   reminding	   his	   colleagues,	   the	   administration	   could	   only	  suggest	  that	  senators	  ‘“turn	  on	  CNN”’	  for	  information	  about	  the	  coup.935	  In	  the	   most	   damning	   example	   of	   administration	   underperformance,	   John	  Sununu	  and	  Brent	  Scowcroft	  did	  not	  even	  know	  the	  Comandancia	  could	  be	  reached	   by	   telephone.936	  Helms’	   non-­‐state	   network	   thus	   represented	   the	  benchmark	   for	   those	   seeking	   to	   bypass	   executive	   information	   gridlock	   in	  crisis	  scenarios.	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Closely	   related	   to	   this	  was	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  an	  account	  derived	  from	   non-­‐administration	   sources	   threatened	   the	   executive’s	   message	  control.	  The	  White	  House	  was	  frustrated	  by	  Helms’	  ability	  to	  operate	  with	  his	   own	   information,	   which	   created	   concern	   about	   the	   potential	   damage	  the	  senator	  might	   inflict.	  The	  administration	  moved	   to	  reassert	  control	  of	  the	   information	   flow	   by	   calling	   Helms	   to	   the	   White	   House.	   The	   senator	  instead	   sent	   DeMoss	   and	   Jim	   Lucier,	   who	   rejected	   a	   demand	   from	   John	  Sununu	  and	  Brent	  Scowcroft	   to	  name	  all	   their	   sources.937	  Then,	  when	   the	  exiled	  rebels	  and	  Giroldi’s	  wife	  reached	  Florida,	  the	  White	  House	  instructed	  them	   not	   to	   embarrass	   the	   administration	   by	   divulging	   harmful	   details	  about	   the	   coup.938	  Bush’s	   advisers	   were	   particularly	   concerned	   that	   any	  complaints	   would	   reach	   Helms’	   office.939	  Such	   fears	   were	   proved	   correct	  when,	   after	   being	   put	   in	   touch	   with	   the	   senator’s	   office	   by	   sympathetic	  Panamanians	   in	   Miami,	   DeMoss	   travelled	   to	   Florida	   to	   meet	   with	   the	  group.940	  	  To	   discourage	   future	   information	   entrepreneurship,	   the	  administration	   aimed	   at	   the	   messengers.	   Dick	   Cheney	   criticised	   those	  lawmakers	   who	   had	   contacted	   American	   and	   Panamanian	   sources	   on	   3	  October,	  saying	  they	  did	  not	  ‘“contribute	  anything	  in	  a	  positive	  nature”’	  and	  created	   ‘“all	   kinds	   of	   problems”’.941	  Later,	   White	   House	   staff	   portrayed	  Helms’	  staff	  as	  uninformed	  and	  ineffective.	  ‘“My	  personal	  feeling	  is	  that	  the	  Senator	  was	  badly	  misserved	  by	  his	  staff”’,	  said	  one	  official,	  who	  criticised	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  Stephen	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   Over	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The	  New	  York	  Times,	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  1989,	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their	   information	   as	   factually	   inaccurate.942	  Officials	   even	   suggested	   that	  Helms	  might	  manipulate	  sources	  into	  altering	  the	  substance	  of	  information	  to	  suit	  his	  own	  purposes.943	  	  Frustration	  at	  Helms’	  strategy	  added	  to	  bewilderment	  at	  why	  he	  had	  chosen	   to	   concentrate	   so	   intently	   on	   the	   coup	   and	   American	   response.	  Officials	   told	   the	   press	   they	   were	   ‘“perplexed”’	   by	   Helms’	   criticism,	  especially	   because	   of	   the	   close	   working	   relationship	   between	   President	  Bush	   and	   the	   senator.	   ‘“The	  President	   has	   campaigned	   for	   him.	  We	  work	  with	   Jesse.	  He	   still	   comes	   over	   to	   see	  Bush”’,	   remarked	   one	  White	  House	  aide.944	  Some	   officials,	   as	   has	   been	   noted,	   blamed	   the	   senator’s	   staff	   for	  stirring	   up	   trouble.	   Helms	   quickly	   dispatched	   this	   reasoning.	   ‘“I	  wouldn’t	  take	  back	  one	  syllable”’,	  he	  retorted.	  945	  Others,	  however,	  pinned	  the	  blame	  on	  Helms’	  ideology.	  ‘“The	  most	  logical	  assumption”’,	  argued	  one	  official,	  ‘“is	  ideological,	  just	  because	  that	  motivates	  him	  on	  so	  many	  things.”’946	  	  	   The	  benefit	  of	  Helms’	  commitment	  to	  the	  historical	  record	  is	  that	  an	  examination	  of	  his	  speeches	  and	  legislative	   initiatives	  reveals	  an	  excellent	  picture	  of	  his	  thinking	  on	  the	  coup.	  It	  was	  no	  mystery	  as	  to	  why	  he	  engaged	  so	   closely	   with	   the	   rebellion.	   Helms	   believed	   that	   the	   United	   States	   had	  failed	  to	  act	  in	  support	  of	  democracy	  and	  hemispheric	  security.	  The	  ‘arsenal	  of	  democracy’,	  he	  told	  colleagues,	  had	  ‘run	  out	  of	  firepower’	  if	  it	  could	  not	  support	  Panamanians	  crying	  out	  for	  help.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Bush’s	  inaction	  brought	   into	  question	  the	  nation’s	  credibility.	  Having	  been	  encouraged	  by	  the	   administration	   to	   oust	   Noriega	   over	   the	   course	   of	   several	   months,	  which	  Panamanians	  would	  now	  contemplate	  such	  action	  given	  the	   lack	  of	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help	   from	   the	   United	   States	   when	   it	   really	   mattered?	   ‘I	   am	   absolutely	  convinced	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  stop	  dillydallying	  and	  live	  up	  to	  all	  of	  what	  we	  have	  been	  saying,	  in	  all	  of	  our	  exhortations	  of	  rhetoric’,	  said	  Helms.947	  	  	  	   Helms’	  legislative	  record	  emphasised	  this	  point.	  On	  3	  October,	  only	  hours	  after	  Noriega’s	  escape,	  Helms	  introduced	  an	  amendment	  that	  aimed	  to	  ‘“provide	  for	  authority	  for	  the	  President	  to	  use	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  secure	  the	  removal	  of	  Gen.	  Manuel	  Antonio	  Noriega	  from	  his	   illegal	   control	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Panama.”’ 948 	  He	   feared	   the	  administration,	   and	   Congress,	   were	   sending	   mixed	   signals.	   ‘I	   want	   the	  Senate	   of	   the	   United	   States	   to	   tell	   the	   President	   that	   he	   does	   have	   the	  authority’	   to	   remove	  Noriega,	   he	   said.	   ‘We	  must	   keep	   alive	   the	  hope	   that	  one	  of	  these	  days	  those	  courageous	  people	  in	  Panama	  may	  attempt	  again	  to	  rid	  themselves	  of	  General	  Noriega.	  And	  we	  must	  be	  prepared	  to	  help.’949	  	  Two	  days	   later,	  Helms	  again	  urged	  his	  colleagues	   to	  go	  on	  record	   in	  support	  of	  presidential	  action	  against	  Noriega.	  He	  proposed	  an	  amendment	  that	  would	  reaffirm	  (initially	  it	  had	  been	  to	  ‘authorize’)	  Bush’s	  authority	  to	  use	   American	   military	   forces	   to	   bring	   Noriega	   to	   the	   U.S.	   for	   trial.950	  Concerned	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   Gulf	   of	   Tonkin-­‐style	   resolution,	   the	  Senate	   rejected	   Helms’	   proposals.	   A	   substitute,	   watered	   down	   to	   simply	  express	  support	  for	  the	  full	  range	  of	  presidential	  efforts	  to	  remove	  Noriega,	  passed	  ninety-­‐nine	  to	  one.	  Helms	  voted	  for	  the	  amendment,	  but	  described	  his	  vote	  as	  ‘equivalent	  to	  a	  passionate	  kiss	  of	  my	  sister’.	  ‘If	  ever	  a	  mountain	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  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Implementation	   Of	   The	   President’s	   1989	   National	  Drug	  Control	  Strategy,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  23426-­‐23438.	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  “Amendment	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  935	  To	  Amendment	  No.	  924,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	   (1989),	  22965.	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  Helms,	  “Implementation	  Of	  The	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  135	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labored	   and	   brought	   forth	   a	   mouse,	   this	   is	   it’,	   he	   said.	   ‘Who	   can	   take	  exception	  to	  what	  is	  in	  it?’951	  	  	   Helms	   did	   not	   call	   for	   an	   outright	   invasion	   of	   Panama.	   Unlike	  Alfonse	  D’Amato,	  who	   told	   the	  Senate	   that	  Helms’	   amendment	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  and	  ‘maybe	  it	  is	  about	  time	  we	  said,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  have	  a	  war	  against	   an	   international	   drug	   cartel’,	   Helms	   claimed	   only	   to	   want	   to	  reaffirm	  Bush’s	   authority	   to	   intervene	  militarily.	   Yet	   it	  was	   impossible	   to	  miss	   the	   bellicosity	   in	   the	   senator’s	   language.	   Helms	   claimed	   Noriega	  loyalists	   would	   never	   have	   reached	   the	   Comandancia	   had	   fully-­‐armed	  American	  troops	  been	  effectively	  deployed,	  and	  he	  criticised	  the	  Chairman	  of	   the	   Joint	   Chiefs	   for	   his	   passivity	   during	   the	   coup.	   ‘Something	  has	   been	  said	  about	  armchair	  generals’,	  Helms	  noted,	  in	  reference	  to	  Baker’s	  barbed	  comments,	   ‘we	  do	  not	  need	  armchair	  generals	  at	   the	   Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff.’	  All	   are	   entitled	   to	   their	   opinion,	   though	   ‘it	   is	   difficult	   for	   this	   Senator	   to	  understand	  what	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  military	  force	  is	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  defend	  U.S.	  vital	  interests.’952	  	  Such	  talk	  reflected	  the	  senator’s	  wider	  support	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  pursuit	  of	  foreign	  policy	  goals,	  but	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  Panama	  it	  also	  represented	   a	  more	   specific	  movement	   conservative	   demand	   for	  military	  action	   against	   Noriega.	   Commentators	   on	   the	   right	   frequently	   chastised	  Bush	  for	  his	   ‘kinder,	  gentler’	  approach	  to	  the	  region,	  and	  since	  early	  1989	  had	   explicitly	   called	   for	   a	   far	   more	   robust	   response	   to	   Noriega’s	  provocations. 953 	  Helms’	   rhetoric,	   and	   amendments,	   fitted	   into	   this	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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   Retirement,”	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  Human	  Events,	  14	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  1989,	  1,	  “Consensus	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  Noriega’s	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  Human	  Events,	  3	  June,	  1989,	  5,	  “Bush	  Must	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  Noriega’s	  Ouster,”	  Human	  Events,	  20	  May,	  1989,	  1,	   James	   C.	   Roberts,	   “Action	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   at	   Our	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Human	  Events,	  6	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framework.	   Indeed,	   the	   American	   Conservative	   Union	   marked	   Helms’	   5	  October	   amendment	   as	   a	   benchmark	   vote	   for	   its	   annual	   congressional	  scorecard.	  Those	  who	  voted	  against	  Nunn’s	  tabling	  amendment	  received	  a	  mark	  of	  approval	  from	  the	  national	  conservative	  body.954	  	  	   The	   increasing	   militancy	   on	   Helms’	   part	   suggested	   a	   further	  widening	   in	   the	   divide	   between	   himself	   and	   the	   administration.	   The	  senator’s	  message	  did	  not	  tally	  with	  an	  administration	  keen	  to	  emphasis	  its	  prudence,	   both	   publicly	   and	   privately.	   ‘“I	   would	   hope	   that	   you	   recognize	  the	   restraint	   which	   the	   U.S.	   exercised	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   events	   of	   last	  week,”’	   the	  president	  wrote	   in	   a	   cable	   to	   all	   hemispheric	   leaders,	   ‘“which	  took	   into	   account	   the	   sensitivities	   of	   you	   and	   your	   colleagues	   about	   U.S.	  behavior.”’955	  Indeed,	  the	  incident	  had	  echoes	  of	  the	  Sea	  Wolf	  affair	  in	  1975.	  The	  administration	  may	  well	  have	  been	  incompetent	  in	  its	  response	  to	  the	  coup,	  but	  Bush’s	  caution,	  like	  President	  Ford’s	  understated	  response	  to	  Sea	  
Wolf,	   headed	   off	   the	   prospect	   of	   international	   condemnation	   over	   any	  aggressive	  U.S.	   response.	  Helms,	   though,	   could	   capitalise	  on	   the	   coup	  and	  the	   administration’s	   inaction	   by	   resorting	   to	   a	   familiar	   “bomb	   throwing”	  strategy	  that	  did	  not	  translate	  into	  necessarily	  workable	  policy.	  	  For	   Helms,	   the	   coup	   marked	   another	   high	   point	   in	   his	   Panama	  entrepreneurship.	   Administration	   officials	   spoke	   of	   the	   ‘“serious	  problems”’	   the	  senator	  had	  caused,	  not	   least	   in	  helping	  other	  members	  of	  Congress	   justify	   their	   opposition	   to	   the	   president	   on	   the	   coup. 956	  Meanwhile,	   commentators	   credited	   Helms	   with	   shifting	   the	   debate.	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   The	  American	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   Union,	   accessed	   20	   September,	   2013,	  http://www.conservative.org/ratingsarchive/uscongress/1989/desc_sen.html.	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  WHORM:	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  Stephen	   Engelberg,	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   Over	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The	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  Times,	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Rowland	   Evans	   and	   Robert	   Novak	   said	   the	   senator	   had	   ‘raised	   far	  more	  hackles	  than	  the	  fiasco	  in	  Panama’,	  and	  forced	  the	  administration	  to	  resort	  to	   ‘political	   damage	   control.’957	  Human	  Events	   praised	  Helms	   for	   pressing	  the	  administration	  over	  the	  coup.958	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  concluded	  that	  the	  senator	  had	  achieved	  ‘considerable	  gravitational	  pull	  on	  the	  pace	  of	  official	  disclosures’	   about	   Panama.	   He	   had	   ‘almost	   dictated	   that	   pace’	   by	   his	  effective	  use	  of	  Senate	  speeches	  and	  media	  appearances.959	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this,	  as	  the	  paper	  also	  noted,	  was	  Helms’	  ‘personal	  intelligence	  network’.	  He	  collected	  more	  detailed	  information	  more	  rapidly	  than	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  U.S.	  intelligence	  community	  put	  together.960	  As	  DeMoss	  had	  told	  an	  angry	  John	  Sununu	  and	  Brent	  Scowcroft,	  ‘“We	  have	  good	  sources.	  You	  don’t.”’	  	  Two	  months	   later,	   on	   20	  December,	   President	   Bush	   authorised	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  invade	  Panama	  and	  arrest	  Noriega.	  Bush	  told	  the	  American	  people	  that	   intervention	  was	   required	  because	  of	  Panama’s	   ‘reckless	   threats	   and	  attacks	  upon	  Americans’.961	  Informing	  congressional	  leaders	  of	  his	  decision	  to	   launch	   combat	   operations,	   the	   president	  was	  more	   expansive.	  Military	  action	  was	  required,	  he	  said,	  in	  order	  ‘to	  protect	  American	  lives,	  to	  defend	  democracy	  in	  Panama,	  to	  apprehend	  Noriega	  and	  bring	  him	  to	  trial	  on	  the	  drug-­‐related	  charges	  for	  which	  he	  was	  indicted	  in	  1988,	  and	  to	  ensure	  the	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integrity	   of	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties.’962	  An	   overwhelming	   display	   of	  force	  quickly	  subdued	  PDF	  forces	  in	  Panama	  City,	  and,	  on	  3	  January,	  1990,	  U.S.	   troops	  arrested	  Noriega	  after	  he	  surrendered	  outside	  the	  gates	  of	   the	  Papal	   Embassy	   in	   which	   he	   had	   taken	   refuge	   shortly	   after	   the	   invasion	  began.	   He	   was	   flown	   back	   to	   the	   United	   States	   and	   arraigned	   on	   drug	  charges	   in	   Florida,	   while	   in	   Panama,	   the	   PDF	   was	   disbanded	   and	   the	  government	  of	  Guillermo	  Endara	  began	  the	  task	  of	  rebuilding	  the	  nation.	  	  Operation	   Just	   Cause	   is	  widely	   seen	   by	   scholars	   as	   a	   post-­‐Cold	  War	  operation.	  The	  Bush	  administration,	   it	   is	   argued,	   launched	  military	  action	  to	   deal	   with	   non-­‐traditional	   threats	   (drug	   trafficking),	   new	   imperatives	  (democracy	   promotion)	   and	   regional	   goals	   (Canal	   security	   and	   the	  protection	  of	  American	  citizens)	  without	  an	  anti-­‐communist	   ideology	  as	  a	  fundamental	   framework.963	  In	   an	   international	   environment	   in	  which	   the	  rapid	   decline	   of	   Soviet	   power	   had	   rendered	   anti-­‐communism	   almost	  redundant	   by	   late	   1989,	   Just	   Cause	   represented	   one	   of	   the	   initial	   contact	  points	   with	   Bush’s	   new	   world	   order.	   Noam	   Chomsky,	   a	   strong	   critic	   of	  Bush’s	   intervention	   in	   Panama,	   goes	   as	   far	   as	   to	   say	   the	   operation	  ‘inaugurated’	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era.964	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
962	  “Letter	  to	  the	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  and	  the	  President	  Pro	  Tempore	  of	  the	  Senate	  on	  United	  States	  Military	  Action	  in	  Panama,	  21	  December,	   1989,”	   Public	   Papers,	   George	   Bush	   Library,	   accessed	   20	   May,	  2014,	  http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1364. 
963	  Glenn	  J.	  Antizzo,	  U.S.	  Military	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era:	  How	  
to	  Win	  America’s	  Wars	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  (Baton	  Rouge:	  Louisiana	  State	   University	   Press,	   2010),	   41-­‐68,	   Zelizer,	   Arsenal	   of	   Democracy,	   357,	  Gilboa,	   “The	   Panama	   Invasion	   Revisited,”	   539,	   and	   Waltraud	   Queiser	  Morales,	   “US	   Intervention	   and	   the	   New	  World	   Order:	   Lessons	   from	   Cold	  War	  and	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Cases,”	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  15,	  No.	  1,	  The	  South	  in	  the	  New	  World	  (Dis)Order	  (March,	  1994),	  78.	  
964	  Noam	   Chomsky,	   “A	   View	   from	  Below,”	   in	  The	  End	  of	   the	  Cold	  War:	   Its	  
Meaning	   and	   Implications,	   ed.	   Michael	   J.	   Hogan	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  144-­‐145.	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There	   is	   much	   to	   be	   said	   for	   these	   arguments.	   Few	   in	   the	   United	  States	   subscribed	   to	   the	   argument	   that	   Noriega	   was	   a	   communist	  ideologue,	  and	  reaction	  to	  Just	  Cause	  –	  whether	  supportive	  or	  critical	  –	  was	  largely	   devoid	   of	   red-­‐hunting	   rhetoric.	   In	   Congress,	   the	   House	   passed	   a	  resolution	  backing	  the	  president’s	  decision	  ‘to	  further	  universal	  democratic	  ideals,	   to	   protect	   American	   lives	   and	   to	   bring	   to	   justice	   a	   major	  international	  criminal’,	  and	  individual	  expressions	  of	  support	  lauded	  Bush	  for	   his	   ‘demonstration	   of	   our	   Nation's	   commitment	   to	   democracy’	   and	  promotion	   of	   ‘the	   kind	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   environment	   in	   which	  democracy	   will	   thrive.’965	  The	   national	   media,	   even	   press	   organs	   highly	  critical	  of	  the	  invasion,	  also	  focused	  on	  non-­‐ideological	  justifications	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  Cold	  War)	  for	  the	  operation.	  	   Yet,	   as	   John	   Lewis	   Gaddis	   notes,	   the	   Cold	  War	   ‘was	  many	   things	   to	  many	   people’.966	  	   For	   Helms,	   Panama	   was	   not	   divorced	   from	   the	   grand	  East-­‐West	  conflict.	  Noriega’s	  (supposed)	  communist	   ideology	  and	  support	  for	  communist	  guerrillas	  and	  drug	  traffickers	  in	  the	  hemisphere	  had	  made	  Panama	   a	   critical	   battleground	   in	   the	   senator’s	   Cold	   War.	   To	   deny	   Just	  Cause’s	  relevance	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  is	  to	  deny	  the	  views	  of	  those,	  like	  Helms,	  who	   interpreted	   several	   key	   issues	   relating	   to	   Panama	   in	   Cold	   War	  ideological	   terms.	   Furthermore,	   it	   denies	   the	   views	   of	   a	   conservative	  movement	  who	  were	  not	  inclined	  to	  see	  late	  1989	  as	  the	  start	  of	  a	  new	  era	  in	   international	   affairs.	   “Don’t	   Bet	   Your	   Life	   the	   Cold	   War’s	   Over”,	  conservative	  activist	  Morton	  Blackwell	  told	  Human	  Events’	  readers	  shortly	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  “Expressing	   the	   sense	   of	   Congress	   concerning	  Operation	   Just	   Cause	   in	  Panama	  (H.	  Con.	  Res.	  262),”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  1507,	  Strom	  Thurmond	  (SC),	   “Supporting	  The	  President’s	  Action	   In	  Panama	  And	  Recognising	  The	  Sacrifices	  Of	  Our	  Nation’s	  Servicemen	  And	  Servicewomen,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	   1050,	   and	   William	   Broomfield	   (R-­‐MI),	   “Sense	   Of	   Congress	  Concerning	  Operation	  Just	  Cause	  In	  Panama,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  1508.	  
966	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	   “The	  Cold	  War,	   the	  Long	  Peace,	  and	   the	  Future,”	   in	  
The	  End	  of	  the	  Cold	  War:	  Its	  Meaning	  and	  Implications,	  ed.	  Michael	  J.	  Hogan	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  21.	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after	  combat	  operations	  began	  in	  Panama.	  Any	  euphoria	  over	  the	  decline	  of	  communism	  was	  ‘extremely	  dangerous	  and	  irresponsible.’967	  	  Noriega’s	  drug	  trafficking	  is	  the	  best	  example	  to	  use.	  During	  the	  Bush	  administration,	   policy-­‐makers	   increasingly	   depicted	   the	   hemispheric	  narcotics	   trade	   as	   an	   independent	   security	   issue,	   distinct	   from	   a	   wider	  communist	   threat. 968 	  Yet,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   Helms	   and	   a	   number	   of	  conservatives	  continued	  to	  focus	  on	  alleged	  ‘narco-­‐communist’	  connections	  at	   the	   heart	   of	   Noriega’s	   rule.	   Only	   four	   months	   before	   Just	   Cause,	   the	  senator	   had	   described	   Panama’s	   ruler	   as	   ‘the	   intimate	   partner	   of	   Fidel	  Castro	   in	   drug-­‐running,	   smuggling,	   and	   gun-­‐running	   to	   Communist	  guerrillas’,	   drawing	   a	   direct	   relationship	   between	   the	   war	   on	   drugs	   and	  anti-­‐communist	   counterinsurgency	   that	   had	   been	   the	   foundation	   of	   U.S.	  Cold	  War	  policy	  in	  Central	  America.969	  When	  Helms	  celebrated	  the	  end	  of	  a	  Panamanian	   government	   that	   had	   been	   ‘in	   the	   hands	   of	   drug	   traffickers’	  right	   back	   to	   the	   days	   of	   Torrijos,	   he	   was	   also	   speaking	   of	   a	   significant	  triumph	  in	  his	  Cold	  War.970	  	  Other	   conservatives	   saw	   Panama	   as	   a	   Cold	   War	   victory.	   When	  
National	   Review	   praised	   the	   ‘remarkable’	   success	   of	   Just	   Cause,	   it	   did	   so	  because	   Bush’s	   action	   had	   removed	   ‘a	   dope-­‐dealing	   friend	   of	   Fidel.’971	  M.	  Stanton	   Evans,	   writing	   in	   Human	   Events,	   was	   optimistic	   that	   Noriega’s	  arrest	   should	   lead	   to	   greater	   scrutiny	   of	   Castro	   and	   the	   ‘considerable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  967	  Morton	   Blackwell,	   “Don’t	   Bet	   Your	   Life	   the	   Cold	   War’s	   Over,”	  Human	  
Events,	  30	  December,	  1989,	  10.	  
968	  Carpenter,	  Bad	  Neighbor	  Policy,	  48.	  
969	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   ““Providing	   Urgent	   Assistance	   For	   Democracy	   In	  Panama,”	   Cong.	   Rec.	   136	   (1990),	   1613,	   and	   Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “More	  Generals	  Needed	  In	  The	  War	  On	  Drugs,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  135	  (1989),	  17486.	  
970	  Helms,	  ““Providing	  Urgent	  Assistance	  For	  Democracy	  In	  Panama,”	  Cong.	  
Rec.	  136	  (1990),	  1613.	  
971	  “Just	  Cause:	  How	  Well	  Did	  We	  Do?”	  National	  Review,	  22	  January,	  1990,	  14,	  and	  “Our	  SOB,”	  National	  Review,	  22	  January,	  1990,	  14.	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network	   of	   Communists	   and	   pro-­‐Communist	   forces	   in	   this	   hemisphere,	  busily	   dealing	   in	   weapons	   and	   laundered	   money’	   of	   which	   the	   former	  Panamanian	  general	  was	  a	   ‘player’.972	  Evans’	  use	  of	  the	  present	  tense,	  and	  his	  comments	  in	  January	  1990	  that	  communist	  influence	  in	  the	  drug	  trade	  remained	  a	  ‘substantive	  issue’,	  gives	  an	  indication	  that	  Just	  Cause	  was	  very	  much	   part	   of	   the	   on-­‐going	   Cold	   War	   narco-­‐communist	   dynamic	   for	  movement	  conservatives.973	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   democracy	   promotion	   in	   Panama	   had,	   for	   Helms	  and	   other	   conservatives,	   always	   been	   refracted	   through	   an	   anti-­‐communism	   prism.	   Convinced	   that	   Noriega	   was	   a	   communist	   ideologue	  intent	   on	   imposing	   another	   Cuba	   –	   alongside	   Nicaragua	   –	   in	   Central	  America,	  supporting	  the	  democratic	  process	  in	  Panama	  had	  been	  a	  part	  of	  this	   framework.	   As	   Human	   Events	   argued,	   American	   intervention	   in	  Panama	  was	  ‘an	  important	  signal	  to	  Stalinist	  dictators	  still	  reigning	  in	  this	  hemisphere’	   that	   the	   United	   States	   retained	   the	   capacity	   for	   swift	   and	  decisive	   action.974	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  magazine	   asked,	   if	   the	   Cold	  War	  was	   supposed	   to	   be	   over,	   why	   ‘are	   the	   Communist	   nations	   worldwide,	  along	   with	   their	   acolytes,	   directing	   such	   vicious	   rhetoric	   against	   the	   U.S.	  policy	   in	   Panama?’975	  Two	  months	   after	   Noriega’s	   arrest,	   it	   declared	   that	  the	  outcome	  of	  Just	  Cause,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Nicaraguan	  election,	  indicated	  the	  war	  on	   communism	  was	  being	  won.	  Yet	   there	  was	   still	   a	   long	  way	   to	   go.	  Removing	  Castro,	  it	  argued,	  was	  the	  essential	  task	  of	  the	  ‘huge	  mopping	  up	  operation	  left	  to	  be	  accomplished.’976	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  M.	  Stanton	  Evans,	   “It’s	  Time	  to	  Expose	  the	   ‘Cuban	  Connection,”	  Human	  
Events,	  20	  January,	  1990,	  8.	  
973	  M.	  Stanton	  Evans,	  “No	  Issues	  for	  Conservatives?	  Nonsense,”	  13	  January,	  1990,	  8.	  
974  “Bush’s	   Panama	   Decision	   Right	   on	   the	   Mark,”	   Human	   Events,	   30	  December,	  1989,	  1. 
975	  “Harsh	  Communist	  Reaction,”	  Human	  Events,	  30	  December,	  1989,	  3.	  
976	  “How	  Conservatives	  Can	  Topple	  Castro,”	  Human	  Events,	  10	  March,	  1990,	  3.	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  Clearly	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  overestimate	  the	  extent	  of	  Cold	  War	  rhetoric	   surrounding	   Just	   Cause.	  Many	   conservatives	   joined	  with	   liberals	  and	  moderates	  in	  seeing	  Bush’s	  intervention	  as	  a	  new	  start	  for	  the	  United	  States’	   foreign	   policy.	   George	   Will,	   for	   example,	   while	   seeing	   Just	   Cause	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ‘climax’	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  nevertheless	  argued	  the	  operation	  ‘turns	  a	  page	  in	  the	  book	  of	  U.S.	  history’	  and	  began	  a	  new	  chapter	  in	   ‘the	   story	   of	   American	   attempts	   to	   comprehend	   the	   rights	   and	  responsibilities	   that	   come	   with	   the	   possession	   of	   great	   power	   and	   the	  enjoyment	  of	  democracy.’977	  	   	  	  	   Yet,	   Gaddis’	   comment	   on	   the	  multi-­‐faceted	  nature	   of	   the	  Cold	  War	  should	   give	  pause	   for	   thought.	  Helms	   and	   those	  movement	   conservatives	  who	  had	  seen	  Noriega	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  did	  not	  jettison	  this	  framework	   during,	   or	   because	   of,	   Operation	   Just	   Cause.	   Indeed,	   they	  supported	   Just	   Cause	  precisely	   because	   they	   saw	   it	   as	   a	   chance	   to	   finally	  conclude	  a	  Cold	  War	  victory	  in	  Central	  America.	  It	  was	  a	  victory	  that	  they	  believed	  would	   provide	   a	   springboard	   for	   further	   assaults	   on	   the	   United	  States’	   enemies	   in	   the	   hemisphere,	   and	   suggested	   that	   the	   region’s	   long	  Cold	   War,	   as	   indicated	   by	   Gilbert	   M.	   Joseph,	   is	   a	   viable	   framework	   for	  understanding	  its	  twentieth	  century	  struggles.978	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  977	  George	  F.	  Will,	  “Good	  Neighbor	  Policy,”	  Washington	  Post,	  21	  December,	  1989,	  A29.	  
978	  See	   Gilbert	   M.	   Joseph,	   “Latin	   America’s	   Long	   Cold	   War:	   A	   Century	   of	  Revolutionary	   Process	   and	   U.S.	   Power,”	   in	   A	   Century	   of	   Revolution:	  
Insurgent	  and	  Counterinsurgency	  Violence	  During	  Latin	  America’s	  Long	  Cold	  
War,	   eds.	   Greg	   Grandin	   and	   Gilbert	  M.	   Joseph	   (Durham:	   Duke	   University	  Press,	  2010):	  398-­‐414.	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Conclusion	  	  	  	   ‘“I	  realize	  that	  being	  remembered	  isn't	  important.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  standing	  up	  for	  what	  you	  believe	  to	  be	  right,	  hoping	  that	  you	  have	  done	  everything	  you	  can	  to	  preserve	  the	  moral	  and	  spiritual	  principles	  that	  made	  America	  great	  in	  the	  first	  place.”’979	  	  	   Jesse	  Helms	  never	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  deliver	  these	  remarks.	  Part	  of	  a	  proposed	   final	   speech	   to	   the	  Senate	   that	  his	   ailing	  health	  precluded,	   they	  were	  entered	  into	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  in	  October	  2002,	  shortly	  before	  his	   retirement	   from	   public	   service.	   Though	   the	   senator	   never	   spoke	   the	  words,	   they	   are	   still	   a	   fitting	   conclusion	   to	   an	   account	   of	   his	   record	   in	  Central	   America	   –	   and,	   indeed,	   his	   legacy	   in	   both	   foreign	   policy	   and	   the	  modern	  conservative	  movement.	  Of	  course,	  Helms	  was	  being	  disingenuous	  in	  his	  suggestion	  he	  did	  not	  seek	  remembrance.	  After	  all,	   the	  senator	  was	  open	  and	  forthright	  throughout	  the	  period	  about	  his	  efforts	  to	  construct	  a	  historical	  record	  of	  his	  positions	  on	  Central	  America	  policy.	  It	  is	  important	  we	  do	  remember	  him,	  not	  just	  for	  what	  his	  principles	  were	  and	  what	  he	  did	  to	   fight	   for	   them,	   but	   for	   how	   his	   efforts	   shaped	   the	   fate	   of	   modern	  conservatism	   and	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   in	   Central	   America	   in	   an	   era	   when	  both	  were	  high	  on	  the	  nation’s	  agenda.	  	   	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   thesis	   has	   been	   the	   idea	   of	   conflicting	  conservatisms:	  a	  contest	  within	  the	  post-­‐war	  American	  right	  over	  how	  best	  to	   implement	   the	   basic	   principles	   of	   conservatism	   in	   the	   foreign	   policy	  sphere,	  following	  the	  work	  of,	  among	  others,	  James	  M.	  Scott,	  Julian	  Zelizer,	  William	  M.	  LeoGrande,	  Robert	  Mason,	  Colin	  Dueck	  and	  Sandra	  Scanlon.	  As	  a	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  2008,	   accessed	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case	  study	  in	  understanding	  when,	  where,	  and	  how	  competition	  within	  the	  conservative	   movement	   occurred,	   Jesse	   Helms	   offers	   a	   wonderful	  opportunity	   to	   explore	   the	   details	   and	   nuances	   of	   this	   conflict.	   Several	  conclusions	   have	   been	   reached,	   while	   other	   avenues	   of	   future	   research	  have	  emerged.	  This	  conclusion	  will	  summarise	  each	  of	  these.	  	  	   Firstly,	   this	   thesis	   has	   outlined	   one	   of	   the	   conservative	   foreign	  policies	   that	   Alan	   Brinkley	   alluded	   to	   when	   he	   spoke	   of	   the	   existence	   of	  distinctive	   conservative	   international	   agendas.	   On	   a	   basic	   level,	   the	  principles	   of	   Helms’	   foreign	   policy	   were	   easily	   identifiable.	   He	   was	   a	  crusading	  anti-­‐communist,	  who	  advocated	  interventionist	  measures,	  while	  mostly	  steering	  clear	  of	  the	  delicate	  matter	  of	  American	  troop	  deployments.	  He	   proposed	   free-­‐market	   solutions	   to	   the	   region’s	   economic	   turmoil,	  though	  hated	  the	  notion	  that	  immoral,	  rampant	  capitalism	  might	  outweigh	  considerations	  of	  national	  security	  or	  prestige	  in	  international	  affairs.	  And	  he	   saw	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   tradition	   as	   critical	   in	  stemming	  the	  flow	  of	  communism	  and	  other	  left-­‐wing	  philosophies.	  He	  was	  a	   conservative	   internationalist,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   engaging	   with	   the	   wider	  world	  and	  seeking	  to	  roll	  back	  the	  malevolent	  reach	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	   Undoubtedly	   there	   is	   danger	   in	   drawing	   generalisations	   from	   the	  record	   of	   one	   individual,	   and	   this	   thesis	   has	   argued	   wholeheartedly	   in	  favour	   of	   scholarship	   that	   sees	   foreign	   policy	   not	   as	   the	   output	   of	  monolithic	   beliefs,	   but	   as	   the	   product	   of	   a	   multitude	   of	   interactions	  between	  individuals,	  whether	  like-­‐minded	  or	  not.	  Yet	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	   Helms	   spoke	   to	   a	   wider	   community,	   best	   labelled	   as	   “movement”	  conservatism.	  These	  members	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  American	  right	  consistently	  banded	   together	   in	   support	   of	   a	   foreign	   policy	   that	   contained	   all	   of	   the	  above	   characteristics	   but	   which,	   crucially,	   was	   never	   subjected	   to	   what	  they	   saw	   as	  moderation	   or	   political	   pragmatism.	   Thus,	   they	   agreed	  with	  fellow	  conservatives	  and	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party	  that	  the	  strategic	  objectives	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  abroad	  should	  be	  to	  roll	  back	  communism	  through	   military	   engagement.	   However,	   they	   loathed	   decisions	   made	   by	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those	   conservatives	   in	   government	  who	  accepted	   compromise	   in	   actually	  implementing	  policy.	  	  	   This	   movement	   conservative	   community	   took	   shape	   during	   the	  early	  1970s,	  when	  the	  group	  opposed	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  Gerald	  Ford	  in	  the	  pursuit	   of	   détente.	   The	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties	   were	   an	   especially	  important	   example	   of	   their	   dissent,	   and	   the	   foreign	   policy	   agenda	   and	  organisational	   prowess	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   fight	   against	   those	  agreements	  helped	  orientate	  movement	  conservatives	  for	  the	  next	  decade	  and	  a	  half.	  	  In	  these	  years,	  they	  worked	  to	  deter	  Ronald	  Reagan	  and	  George	  H.	   W.	   Bush	   from	   deviating	   from	   a	   pure	   conservative	   Central	   America	  strategy.	   Alongside	   Helms,	   the	   community	   included	   several	   outspoken	  conservative	   lawmakers	  –	  whose	  contributions	  mean	  we	  should	   treat	   the	  idea	   of	   Helms	   as	   an	   isolated	   contrarian	   legislator	  with	   caution	   –	   and	   the	  conservative	   media	   organs	   National	   Review	   and,	   particularly,	   Human	  
Events.	  	  	  	  	   Yet	  what	  comes	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  looking	  at	  Helms’	  foreign	  policy	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  broader	  labels	  often	  obscure	  the	  nuance	  and	  contradiction	  that	   individual	   foreign	   policy	   activists	   may	   display.	   Helms	   was	  interventionist,	   but	  mostly	   reluctant	   to	   see	  U.S.	   troops	  on	   the	   ground.	  He	  was	   suspicious	   of	   multilateral	   solutions	   and	   international	   organisations,	  yet	   embraced	   a	   transnational	   community	   of	   activists	   from	   across	   the	  western	  hemisphere.	  U.S.	  interests	  were	  his	  primary	  concern,	  but	  he	  sided	  with	   nationalists	   in	   Central	   America	   who	   resented	   and	   often	   opposed	  United	   States	   involvement	   in	   their	   country’s	   affairs.	   A	   conservative	   who	  found	   company	  with	  Ted	  Kennedy	   and	   John	  Kerry	   in	   a	   campaign	   against	  Manuel	   Noriega,	   a	   staunch	   proponent	   of	   senatorial	   prerogatives	   who	  defended	  the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  contempt	  for	  Congress	  during	  Iran-­‐Contra,	   an	   advocate	   of	   democracy	   who	   allied	   with	   dictators:	   Helms	   is	   a	  testament	   to	   the	   importance	  of	  understanding	   foreign	  policy	  not	   in	  broad	  generalisations,	  but	  as	   the	  output	  of	  a	  vast	   collection	  of	   individual	  actors,	  many	  of	  whom	  cannot	  be	  pinned	  down	  by	  a	  single	  label.	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  Asking	  whether	   one	   of	   these	   individuals	   can	  make	   a	   difference	   to	  foreign	   policy	   has	   also	   been	   a	   central	   part	   of	   this	   thesis.	   There	   has	   been	  strong	   debate	   in	   scholarship	   over	   the	   role	   of	   Congress,	   and	   individual	  legislators,	  in	  determining	  the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  Helms’	  record	  suggests	   that	   there	   is	   a	  middle	   ground	   between	   those	  who	   see	   a	   passive	  Congress	   and	   those	  who	  argue	   for	   a	  more	  assertive	  one:	   a	   synthesis	   first	  suggested	  by	  James	  Lindsay	  in	  his	  work	  on	  the	  new	  institutionalists	  of	  the	  1980s	   and	   early	   1990s.980	  Helms	   faced	   enormous	   challenges	   in	   trying	   to	  persuade	  successive	  administrations	  of	  his	  case.	  The	  executive	  branch	  has	  an	  enormously	  powerful	  voice	  in	  foreign	  policy,	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  bypass	  Congress	   in	   any	   number	   of	   ways:	   not	   least	   by	   sticking	   to	   the	   letter	   of	  foreign	   policy	   law,	   but	   not	   necessarily	   the	   spirit.	   Helms	   often	   found	   it	  difficult	   to	   overcome	   these	   restrictions,	   and	   the	   enormous	   bureaucratic	  momentum	  built	  up	  by	  years	  of	  one	  policy	  or	  another.	  	  However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   Helms	   did	   not	   enjoy	   success	   in	  influencing	   foreign	   policy.	   Committee	   hearings	   and	   floor	   speeches	  challenged	  dominant	  official	  agendas,	  and	  could	  place	  the	  executive	  branch	  or	  rival	  policy	  factions	  on	  the	  back	  foot.	  It	  could,	  over	  time,	  even	  contribute	  to	   noticeable	   about-­‐turns	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   policy	   –	   as	   was	   the	   case	   in	  Panama	   in	   the	   late	   1980s.	   The	   senator	   was	   especially	   successful	   when	  working	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   transnational	   conservative	   community	   that	  shared	  his	  vision	  for	  the	  hemisphere.	  This	  community	  provided	  Helms	  with	  access	   to	   both	   local	   political	   elites	   and	   grassroots	   sympathisers	   who	  provided	  trusted	  information	  –	  at	  least	  in	  the	  senator’s	  opinion	  –	  on	  events	  as	  they	  unfolded.	  Such	  information	  shaped	  Helms’	  rhetoric,	  and	  determined	  which	   issues	   he	   would	   focus	   on	   and	   at	   what	   time.	   It	   deprived	   the	   State	  Department	   and	   other	   executive	   branch	   agencies	   of	   a	   monopoly	   on	  information	   provided	   to	   Congress,	   reducing	   their	   ability	   to	   control	   the	  foreign	  policy	  narrative,	  and	  generating	  opportunities	  for	  Helms	  to	  craft	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  980	  Lindsay,	  “Congress,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  and	  the	  New	  Institutionalism,”	  281-­‐283.	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exploit	   policy	   windows.	   It	   suggests	   that,	   for	   those	   looking	   to	   succeed	   as	  policy	  entrepreneurs,	  externally-­‐sourced	  information	  is	  invaluable.	  	  Yet	   the	   transnational	   community	   that	   Helms	   and	   his	   staff	   worked	  within	  was	  more	  than	   just	  a	  means	  of	  gathering	   information.	   It	  permitted	  the	  senator	  to	  shape	  events	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  at	  various	  times	  he	  and	  his	  aides	  had	  a	  greater	  say	  in	  matters	  than	  executive	  branch	  officials.	  His	  close	  relationship	  with	  Roberto	  D’Aubuisson	   and	   the	   hard	   right	   in	   El	   Salvador,	  for	  example,	  was	  critical	   in	  reducing	  tensions	  at	  several	  points	  during	  the	  civil	   war.	   In	   Panama,	   it	   was	   with	   Helms	   and	   his	   staff	   that	   anti-­‐Noriega	  rebels	   negotiated	   during	   the	   failed	   Giroldi	   coup	   of	   October	   1989.	   In	  Nicaragua,	   where	   a	   fragmented	   Contra	   policy	   opened	   up	   any	   number	   of	  contact	  points	  with	   the	   foreign	  policy-­‐making	  process,	  Helms’	   allies	  were	  able	  to	  directly	  influence	  the	  composition	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  rebel	  forces.	  Each	   of	   these	   examples	   was	   a	   testament	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  transnational	  right	  in	  Latin	  America’s	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	  full	  extent	  of	  Helms’	  network,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  the	  conservative	  anti-­‐communist	   community	   in	   Latin	   America,	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   fully	   explored.	  There	  are	  challenges	  in	  furthering	  this	  line	  of	  research,	  not	  least	  a	  lingering	  resistance	  among	  members	  of	   these	  networks	   to	   fully	   reveal	   the	  complex	  web	   of	   connections	   that	   brought	   conservative	   anti-­‐communist	   activists	  together	  in	  this	  period.	  Yet	  as	  greater	  documentation	  is	  opened	  to	  scholarly	  scrutiny	  –	  and	  here	  the	  soon-­‐to-­‐be	  refurbished	  Helms	  papers	  will	  be	  critical	  –	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  draw	  more	  fulfilling	  conclusions	  about	  the	  goals	  and	  methods	  of	  this	  community.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  hoped	  that	  those	  wishing	  to	  develop	  the	   literature	  on	  modern	  conservatism,	  advocacy	  networks,	  or	   simply	   the	  Cold	   War	   more	   widely,	   will	   look	   to	   right-­‐wing	   networks	   with	   the	   same	  curiosity	  as	  that	  applied	  to	  left-­‐wing	  networks	  in	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  	   One	  thing	  that	  can	  be	  said	  of	  the	  transnational	  conservative	  network,	  and	   of	  Helms	   himself,	   is	   that	   a	   “long”	   Cold	  War	  was	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   their	  agenda.	  Far	   from	  culminating	  with	   the	  collapse	  of	   communism	   in	  Eastern	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Europe	   in	   the	   final	   days	   of	   1989,	   or	   even	   with	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  in	  1991,	  Cold	  War	  conservatism	  persisted	   into	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  beyond.	   Partly	   this	   reflected	   the	   continued	   presence	   of	   easily-­‐definable	  communist	   foes	   in	  Central	  America	   in	   the	  early	  1990s:	   the	  FMLN	  did	  not	  demobilise	   prior	   to	   the	   1992	   Salvadoran	   peace	   accords,	   nor	   did	   the	  Sandinistas	   disappear	   from	   Nicaragua’s	   post-­‐civil	   war	   reconstruction.	  Alongside	   Fidel	   Castro,	   whose	   endurance	   continued	   to	   infuriate	  conservatives,	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  organisations	  was	  sufficient	  for	  Helms	  and	  his	  conservative	  allies	  to	  reject	  the	  so-­‐called	  New	  World	  Order	  that	  the	  Bush	   administration	   embraced.	   It	   also	   differentiated	   the	   senator	   from	  former	  allies,	  most	  notably	  Pat	  Buchanan,	  who	  now	  saw	  a	  chance	  to	  return	  America	   –	   or	   at	   least	   the	   Republican	   Party	   –	   to	   a	   more	   isolationist	  standpoint.981	  	   Yet	   the	   “long”	  Cold	  War	   also	   reflected	   ideological	   imperatives	   that	  Helms	  attached	  to	  non-­‐traditional	   threats	  that	  challenged	  accepted	  norms	  of	   international	  politics	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Foremost	  among	  these	   was	   the	   proliferation	   of	   Latin	   American	   drug	   cartels	   and	   the	  increasing	   levels	   of	   illegal	   narcotics	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   While	   drug	  trafficking	  was	   incorporated	   into	   the	  national	   security	  agenda	   in	   the	   final	  years	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   the	   majority	   of	   American	   government	   and	   law	  enforcement	   officials	   divorced	   the	   issue	   from	   communism.	  Helms,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   long	   convinced	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   communists	   and	  drug	  trafficking,	  saw	  a	  continued	  communist	  effort	   to	  undermine	  western	  society	   from	   within.	   The	   relationship	   between	   drugs	   and	   communists	  sustained	   Helms’	   ideological	   fervour	   in	   his	   campaign	   against	   Manuel	  Noriega,	  and	  contributed	  to	  his	  continuing	  obsession	  with	  Fidel	  Castro.	  	  This	   commitment	   to	   Cold	   War	   ideals	   persisted	   right	   through	   the	  mid-­‐1990s.	   Helms	   derailed	   Robert	   Pastor’s	   nomination	   as	   President	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  981	  John	  Kenneth	  White,	  Still	  Seeing	  Red:	  How	  the	  Cold	  War	  Shapes	  the	  New	  
American	  Politics	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1998),	  206-­‐207.	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Clinton’s	  ambassador	  to	  Panama	  out	  of	  a	  lingering	  anger	  at	  Pastor’s	  role	  in	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Treaties,	  prompting	  Pastor	   to	  condemn	  the	  senator	   for	  continuing	   to	   fight	   the	  Cold	  War.	  Yet	   it	  was	   the	  Helms-­‐Burton	  Act,	   signed	  into	   law	   by	   President	   Clinton	   in	   1996,	   which	   most	   clearly	   revealed	   the	  persistence	   of	   Cold	  War	   ideology	   undimmed	  by	   the	   shifting	   international	  arena	  of	   the	  1990s.	  The	  act	   extended	  U.S.	   sanctions	  against	  Cuba,	   and,	   as	  William	   LeoGrande	   notes,	   ‘chiselled	   into	   stone’	   thirty-­‐five	   years	   of	   U.S.	  antagonism	   toward	   the	   Caribbean	   nation.982 	  For	   Helms,	   it	   was	   not	   a	  product	  of	  a	  new	  foreign	  policy	  agenda,	  but	  rather	  the	  logical	  continuation	  of	   a	   strategy	   founded	  on	  almost	   forty	  years	  of	   anti-­‐communist	  principles.	  ‘There	  must	  be	  no	  retreat’,	  Helms	  told	  his	  Senate	  colleagues	  when	  he	  first	  introduced	  the	  bill.	  ‘If	  anything,	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  U.S.S.R.	  and	  the	  end	  of	   Soviet	   subsidies	   to	   Cuba,	   the	   embargo	   is	   finally	   having	   the	   effect	   on	  Castro	  that	  has	  been	  intended	  all	  along.	  Why	  should	  the	  United	  States	  let	  up	  the	  pressure	  now?	  It's	  time	  to	  tighten	  the	  screws	  –	  not	  loosen	  them.’983	  	   Running	  parallel	  to	  Helms’	  “long”	  Cold	  War	  was	  his	  “broad”	  Cold	  War.	  The	   senator’s	   record	   in	   Central	   America	   supports	   the	   calls	   to	   grant	   a	  greater	   role	   for	   agency	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   “periphery”	   in	   histories	   of	   the	  conflict.	  The	  senator’s	  concern	  that	  the	  fate	  of	  El	  Salvador,	  Nicaragua,	  and	  Panama	  would	   shape	   the	  United	   States’	   ability	   to	   survive	   the	  Cold	  War	   –	  not	   just	   ideologically,	   but	   physically	   –	   is	   a	   reminder	   that	   America’s	   Cold	  Warriors	   were	   expansive	   in	   their	   understanding	   of	   the	   conflict’s	  geographical	   spread,	   even	   if	   Helms	   continued	   to	   selectively	   interpret	  peripheral	  affairs	  as	  simple	  reflections	  of	  Soviet	  bloc	  priorities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  982	  William	   M.	   LeoGrande,	   “Enemies	   Evermore:	   U.S.	   Policy	   Toward	   Cuba	  After	  Helms-­‐Burton,”	  Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  Studies	  29,	  No.	  1	  (February,	  1997),	   211.	   For	   more	   on	   Helms-­‐Burton,	   see	   Morris	   Morley	   and	   Chris	  McGillion,	  Unfinished	  Business:	  America	  and	  Cuba	  After	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1989-­‐2001	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2002),	   79-­‐130,	   and	   Roy	  Joaquín,	   Cuba,	   The	   United	   States,	   and	   the	   Helms-­‐Burton	   Doctrine:	  
International	  Reactions	  (Gainesville:	  University	  of	  Florida	  Press,	  2000).	  
983 	  Jesse	   Helms	   (NC),	   “Statements	   On	   Introduced	   Bills	   And	   Joint	  Resolution,”	  Cong.	  Rec.	  141	  (1995),	  4238.	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   Central	  America	  was	   the	  place	   Jesse	  Helms	  made	  his	   stand	  over	   the	  fate	  of	  U.S.	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  He	  and	  his	  allies	  saw	  a	  chance	  to	  correct	  the	  wrongs	  of	  thirty	  years	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  It	  wasn’t	  just	  an	  opportunity	  to	  jolt	  the	  United	  States	  from	  its	  post-­‐Vietnam	  détente	  and	  malaise,	  but	  was	  also	  a	  chance	  to	  wrest	  the	  nation	  from	  a	  much	  longer	  and	  deeper	  unwillingness	  to	  make	   the	   sacrifices	   necessary	   to	   destroy	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   In	   Central	  America,	   the	  mistakes	  of	  Vietnam	  would	  be	   laid	   to	   rest,	  but	   so	   too	  would	  the	  nation’s	  errors	   in	   failing	  to	  deal	  resolutely	  with	  communism	  in	  Africa,	  Cuba,	   Korea,	   and	   China.	   Then,	   once	   the	   communist	   menace	   had	   been	  removed,	   the	  much-­‐vaunted	  empire	  of	   liberty	   that	  Helms	   treasured	  could	  be	   constructed.	   Sister	   republics	   –	   anti-­‐communist,	   devoted	   to	   the	   free-­‐market,	   and	   bound	   by	   shared	   Judaeo-­‐Christian	  morality	   and	   traditions	   –	  would	  not	   only	   allow	   their	   own	  people	   to	  prosper,	   but	  would	   strengthen	  the	  United	  States	  in	  turn.	  	   Central	   America	   was	   also	   a	   battlefield	   upon	   which	   Helms	   made	   a	  stand	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  modern	  American	  conservatism.	  In	  those	  years	  when	   the	   post-­‐war	   right	   grasped	   the	   reins	   of	   power	   in	  Washington,	   and	  faced	   the	   inevitable	   challenges	   of	   governing,	   Helms	   demanded	   a	   purist	  conservative	  foreign	  policy	  from	  his	  presidents.	  El	  Salvador,	  Nicaragua,	  and	  Panama,	  already	  suffering	   the	  effects	  of	   their	  own	  bitter	   internal	  conflicts	  as	  well	   as	   the	  superpower	  struggle	   imposed	  by	   the	  United	  States	  and	   the	  Soviet	   Union,	   found	   themselves	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   a	   conflict	   over	   how	  conservative	   principles	   would	   be	   translated	   into	   policy.	   It	   was	   a	   bitter	  contest,	  played	  out	  by	  rival	  factions	  spread	  across	  Congress,	  the	  executive	  branch,	   the	   media,	   and	   the	   grass-­‐roots	   conservative	   community.	   Jesse	  Helms	   was	   at	   its	   centre:	   rallying	   movement	   conservatives	   in	   their	  campaign	   to	   destroy	   not	   only	   communist	   and	   leftist	   forces	   in	   the	   region,	  but	  also	  those	  who	  would	  threaten	  the	  purity	  of	  conservatism.	  The	  senator	  was	  among	  the	  first	  to	  join	  the	  battlefield,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  last	  to	  leave.	  	  	  
	   329	  
Bibliography	  	  	  	  Archives	  	  C-­‐Span	  Video	  Library.	  C-­‐Span,	  http://www.c-­‐span.org.	  
	  
Congressional	  Record	  Permanent	  Digital	  Collection.	  ProQuest.	  	  Department	   of	   State	   Virtual	   Reading	   Room.	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   State,	  http://foia.state.gov/Search/Search.aspx.	  
	  
Digital	  National	  Security	  Archive.	  http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do.	  	  Foreign	   Affairs	   Oral	   History	   Collection.	   Association	   for	   Diplomatic	   Studies	  
and	  Training.	  Arlington,	  VA.	  www.adst.org.	  	  
George	  Bush	  Presidential	  Library.	  College	  Station,	  TX.	  Staff	  and	  Office	  Files.	  	   Office	  of	  Legislative	  Affairs.	  White	  House	  Office	  of	  Records	  Management	  (WHORM)	  Subject	  Files.	  Countries:	  CO046	  El	  Salvador.	  —	  CO121	  Panama.	  	  
Jimmy	  Carter	  Presidential	  Library.	  Atlanta,	  GA.	  Staff	  and	  Office	  Files.	  Office	  of	  Congressional	  Liaison:	  Frank	  Moore’s	  Correspondence.	  White	  House	  Central	  Files	  (WHCF)	  Subject	  Files.	  Countries:	  CO114	  Nicaragua.	  Foreign	  Affairs:	  FO15	  The	  Panama	  Canal.	  	  — FO16	  The	  Panama	  Canal.	  Vertical	  File.	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski	  Collection.	  	  
	   330	  
Ronald	  Reagan	  Presidential	  Library.	  Simi	  Valley,	  CA.	  Staff	  and	  Office	  Files.	  	   Constantine	  Menges	  Files.	  Executive	  Secretariat,	  NSC:	  Country	  Files,	  El	  Salvador.	  — Country	  Files,	  Latin	  America.	  Office	  of	  Speechwriting,	  Research	  Office:	  Records.	  White	  House	  Office	  of	  Records	  Management	  Files	  (WHORM)	  Alpha	  Files.	  Jesse	  A.	  Helms.	  WHORM	  Subject	  Files.	  Countries:	  CO046	  El	  Salvador.	  — CO114	  Nicaragua.	  — CO121	  Panama.	  — CO164	  Union	  of	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republics	  (USSR).	  Federal	   Government	   Organisations:	   FG006-­‐12	   National	   Security	  Council.	  —	  FG013	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  	  	  Websites	  	  ACU	   Ratings.	   The	   American	   Conservative	   Union.	  www.conservative.org/legislative-­‐ratings.	  	  “Narcotics	  Security	  Decision	  Directive	  Number	  221.”	  Narcotics	  and	  National	  
Security	   (NSC-­‐NSDD-­‐221).	   Federation	   of	   American	   Scientists	   Intelligence	  Resource	   Program.	   Accessed	   21	   March,	   2014.	  http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-­‐221.htm	  	  "Republican	   Party	   Platform	   of	   1976."	   Republican	   Party	   Platforms.	   18	  August,	  1976,	  online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley.	  The	  American	  
Presidency	   Project.	   Accessed	   26	   February,	   2013.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25843.	  	  	  
	   331	  
	  	  	  Interviews	  	  Abrams,	  Elliot.	  Skype	  conversation.	  2014.	  	  Barnes,	  Michael.	  Skype	  conversation.	  2013.	  	  Pastor,	  Robert.	  E-­‐mail	  correspondence.	  2012.	  	  Rossin,	  Lawrence.	  E-­‐mail	  correspondence.	  2012.	  	  Rousseau,	  Rudolph	  R.	  E-­‐mail	  correspondence.	  2013.	  	  Winer,	  Jonathan.	  Skype	  conversation.	  2013.	  	  	  Newspaper	  and	  Periodicals	  	  
Atlanta	  Constitution	  	  
Atlanta	  Daily	  World.	  	  
Chicago	  Tribune.	  	  
Crisis	  Magazine.	  	  
Guardian.	  	  
Human	  Events.	  	  
Mother	  Jones.	  	  
National	  Review.	  
	   332	  
	  
The	  New	  York	  Times.	  
	  
Time.	  	  
Washington	  Post.	  	  
Weekly	  Standard.	  	  	  Unpublished	  Theses	  	  Hall,	  Matthew	   J.	   “Cold	  Warriors	   in	   the	  Sunbelt:	   Southern	  Baptists	  and	   the	  Cold	  War,	  1947-­‐1989.”	  Ph.D.	  diss.,	  University	  of	  Kentucky,	  2014.	  	  Hardin	  Thrift,	  Bryan.	  “Jesse	  Helms,	  the	  New	  Right,	  and	  American	  Freedom.”	  Ph.D.	  diss.,	  Boston	  University,	  2005.	  	  Hemmer,	   Nicole.	   “Messengers	   of	   the	   Right:	   Media	   and	   the	   Modern	  Conservative	  Movement.”	  Ph.D.	  diss.,	  Columbia	  University,	  2010.	  	  Packer,	   Tom.	   “Jesse	  Helms	   and	  North	  Carolina	  Politics,	   1972-­‐1984.”	   Ph.D.	  diss.,	  University	  of	  Oxford,	  2012.	  	  	  Unpublished	  Papers	  	  Hepple,	   Leslie	   W.	   “Lewis	   Tambs,	   Latin	   American	   Geopolitics	   and	   the	  American	  New	  Right.”	  Les	  Hepples	  Unpublished	  Papers.	  University	  of	  Bristol	  School	   of	   Geopolitical	   Sciences.	   Accessed	   20	   October	   2012,	  http://www.ggy.bris.ac.uk/personal/LesHepple/lewis.pdf,	  14.	  	  	  
	   333	  
	  	  Articles	  	  Andres,	   Gary	   J.	   ““The	   Contemporary	   Presidency”:	   Parties,	   Process,	   and	  Presidential	  Power:	  Learning	  from	  Confirmation	  Politics	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Senate.”	  
Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	  32,	  No.	  1	  (March,	  2002):	  147-­‐156.	  	  Bayly	   C.	   A.,	   Beckert,	   Sven,	   Connelly,	   Matthew,	   Hofmeyr,	   Isabel,	   Kozol,	  Wendy,	  and	  Seed,	  Patricia.	  “AHR	  Conversation:	  On	  Transnational	  History.”	  
The	  American	  Historical	  Review	  111,	  No.	  5	  (December,	  2006):	  1441-­‐1464.	  	  Bourgois,	   Philippe.	   “Class,	   Ethnicity,	   and	   the	   State	   among	   the	   Miskitu	  Amerindians	  of	  Northeastern	  Nicaragua.”	  Latin	  American	  Perspectives	  8,	  No.	  2,	  Revolutionary	  Nicaragua	  (Spring,	  1981):	  22-­‐39.	  	  Bowen,	   Gordon	   L.	   “Presidential	   Action	   and	   Public	   Opinion	   about	   U.S.	  Nicaraguan	   Policy:	   Limits	   to	   the	   “Rally	   ‘Round	   the	   Flag”	   Syndrome.”	   PS:	  
Political	  Science	  and	  Politics	  22,	  No.	  4	  (December,	  1989):	  793-­‐800.	  	  Briggs,	   Laura,	   McCormick,	   Gladys,	   and	   Way,	   J.T.	   “Transnationalism:	   A	  Category	  of	  Analysis.”	  American	  Quarterly	  60,	  No.	  3,	  Nation	  and	  Migration:	  Past	  and	  Future	  (September,	  2008):	  625-­‐648.	  	  Brinkley,	   Alan.	   “Conservatism	   as	   a	   Growing	   Field	   of	   Study.”	   Journal	   of	  
American	  History	  98,	  No.	  3	  (December,	  2011):	  748-­‐751.	  	  —	  “Response	  to	  the	  Comments	  of	  Leo	  Ribuffo	  and	  Susan	  Yohn.”	  American	  
Historical	  Review	  99,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1994):	  450-­‐452.	  	  —	   “The	   Problem	   of	   American	   Conservatism.”	   American	  Historical	   Review	  99,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1994):	  409-­‐429.	  	  
	   334	  
Bruce,	  Steve.	  “Modernity	  and	  Fundamentalism:	  The	  New	  Christian	  Right	  in	  America.”	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  41,	  No.	  4	  (December,	  1990):	  477-­‐496.	  	  Burgin,	   Eileen.	   “Congress,	   the	  War	   Powers	   Resolution,	   &	   the	   Invasion	   of	  Panama.”	  Polity	  25,	  No.	  2	  (Winter,	  1992):	  217-­‐242.	  	  Calvert,	   Randall	   L.,	   McCubbins,	   Mathew	   D.,	   and	   Weingast,	   Barry	   R.	   “A	  Theory	   of	   Political	   Control	   and	   Agency	   Discretion.”	   American	   Journal	   of	  
Political	  Science	  33,	  No.	  3	  (August,	  1989):	  588-­‐611.	  	  Clinton,	   Joshua	   D.,	   and	   Lapinski,	   John.	   “Laws	   and	   Roll	   Calls	   in	   the	   U.S.	  Congress,	   1891-­‐1994.”	  Legislative	   Studies	  Quarterly	   33,	   No.	   3	   (November,	  2008):	  511-­‐541.	  	  Dennis,	   Philip	   A.	   “The	   Miskito-­‐Sandinista	   Conflict	   in	   Nicaragua	   in	   the	  1980s.”	  Latin	  American	  Research	  Review	  28,	  No.	  3	  (1993):	  214-­‐234.	  	  Dickey,	   Christopher.	   “Central	   America:	   From	   Quagmire	   to	   Cauldron?”	  
Foreign	  Affairs	  62,	  No.	  3,	  America	  and	  the	  World	  1983	  (1983):	  659-­‐694.	  	  Evans,	   M.	   Stanton.	   “Raico	   on	   Liberalism	   and	   Religion.”	   New	   Individualist	  
Review	   4,	   No.	   2	   (Winter,	   1966).	   Accessed	   12	   April,	   2013.	  http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2136/195435.	  	  	  Flood,	  Daniel	   J.	   “Panama	  Canal	  Zone:	  Constitutional	  Domain	  of	   the	  United	  States.”	  World	  Affairs	  121,	  No.	  3	  (Fall,	  1958):	  74-­‐77.	  	  Furlong,	   William	   L.	   “The	   1977	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties:	   The	   Non-­‐Issue	  Issue.”	  The	  World	  Today	  44,	  No.	  1	  (January,	  1988):	  10-­‐15.	  	  Gilboa,	  Eytan.	  “The	  Panama	  Invasion	  Revisited:	  Lessons	  for	  the	  Use	  of	  Force	  in	   the	   Post	   Cold	  War	   Era.”	  Political	   Science	  Quarterly	   110,	   No.	   4	   (Winter,	  
	   335	  
1995-­‐1996):	  539-­‐562.	  	  Gilderhus,	   Mark	   T.	   “The	   Monroe	   Doctrine:	   Meaning	   and	   Implications.”	  
Presidential	   Studies	   Quarterly	   36,	   No.	   1,	   Presidential	   Doctrines	   (March,	  2006):	  5-­‐16.	  	  Harwood,	   Edwin.	   “American	  Public	  Opinion	   and	  U.S.	   Immigration	  Policy.”	  
Annals	   of	   the	   American	   Academy	   of	   Political	   and	   Social	   Science	   487,	  Immigration	  and	  American	  Public	  Policy	  (September,	  1986):	  201-­‐212.	  	  Helms,	   Jesse.	   “A	   New	   Policy	   for	   Latin	   America.”	   The	   Journal	   of	   Social,	  
Political,	  and	  Economic	  Affairs	  1,	  No.	  1	  (January,	  1976):	  15-­‐20.	  	  Hendershot,	   Heather.	   “God's	   Angriest	   Man:	   Carl	   McIntire,	   Cold	   War	  Fundamentalism,	   and	   Right-­‐Wing	   Broadcasting.”	   American	   Quarterly	   59,	  No.	  2	  (June,	  2007):	  373-­‐396.	  	  Hitchens,	   Christopher.	   “Farewell	   to	   the	   Helmsman.”	   Foreign	   Policy	   126	  (September-­‐October,	  2001):	  68-­‐71.	  	  Hoeveler,	   Jr.,	   J.	   David.	   “Conservative	   Intellectuals	   and	   the	   Reagan	  Ascendency.”	  The	  History	  Teacher	  23,	  No.	  3	  (May,	  1990):	  305-­‐318.	  	  Holsti,	   Ole	   R.,	   and	   Rosenau,	   James	   N.	   “Consensus	   Lost.	   Consensus	  Regained?:	   Foreign	   Policy	   Beliefs	   of	   American	   Leaders,	   1976-­‐1980.”	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  30,	  No.	  4	  (December,	  1986):	  375-­‐409.	  	  Johnson,	  Loch	  K.	  “Congressional	  Supervision	  of	  America's	  Secret	  Agencies:	  The	   Experience	   and	   Legacy	   of	   the	   Church	   Committee.”	   Public	  
Administration	  Review	  64,	  No.	  1	  (January	  -­‐February,	  2004):	  3-­‐14.	  	  
	   336	  
Kuperman,	   Alan	   J.	   “The	   Stinger	   Missile	   and	   U.S.	   Intervention	   in	  Afghanistan.”	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	   114,	  No.	   2	   (Summer,	   1999),	   219-­‐263.	  	  Lee,	  Michael	  E.	  “Liberation	  Theology's	  Transcendent	  Moment:	  The	  Work	  of	  Xavier	   Zubiri	   and	   Ignacio	   Ellacuría	   as	   Noncontrastive	   Discourse.”	   The	  
Journal	  of	  Religion	  83,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  2003):	  226-­‐243.	  	  LeoGrande,	  William	  M.	  “From	  Havana	  to	  Miami:	  U.S.	  Cuba	  Policy	  as	  a	  Two-­‐Level	   Game.”	   Journal	  of	   Interamerican	  Studies	  and	  World	  Affairs	   40,	   No.	   1	  (Spring,	  1998):	  67-­‐86.	  	  —	   “Enemies	   Evermore:	   U.S.	   Policy	   Toward	   Cuba	   After	   Helms-­‐Burton.”	  
Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  Studies	  29,	  No.	  1	  (February,	  1997):	  211-­‐221.	  	  Lindsay,	  James	  M.	  “Congress,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  and	  the	  New	  Institutionalism.”	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  38,	  No.	  2	  (June,	  1994):	  281-­‐304.	  	  Macekura,	   Stephen.	   “For	   Fear	   of	   Persecution”:	  Displaced	   Salvadorans	   and	  U.S.	  Refugee	  Policy	  in	  the	  1980s.”	  Journal	  of	  Policy	  History	  23,	  No.	  3,	  (2011):	  357-­‐380.	  	  Maddux,	   Thomas	   R.	   “Ronald	   Reagan	   and	   the	   Task	   Force	   on	   Immigration,	  1981.”	  Pacific	  Historical	  Review	  74,	  No.	  2	  (May,	  2005):	  195-­‐236.	  	  Mathews,	   Jessica.	   “Power	   Shift.”	   Foreign	   Affairs	   76,	   No.	   1	   (January-­‐February,	  1997):	  50-­‐66.	  	  Massey,	   Douglas	   S.	   and	   Pren,	   Karen	   A.	   “Unintended	   Consequences	   of	   US	  Immigration:	   Explaining	   the	   Post-­‐1965	   Surge	   from	   Latin	   America.”	  
Population	  and	  Development	  Review	  38,	  No.	  1	  (March,	  2012):	  1-­‐29.	  	  
	   337	  
McCubbins,	   Mathew	   D.,	   and	   Schwartz,	   Thomas.	   “Congressional	   Oversight	  Overlooked:	   Police	   Patrols	   versus	   Fire	   Alarms.”	   American	   Journal	   of	  
Political	  Science	  28,	  No.	  1	  (February,	  1984):	  165-­‐179.	  	  McFaul,	   Michael.	   “Rethinking	   the	   "Reagan	   Doctrine"	   in	   Angola.”	  
International	  Security	  14,	  No.	  3	  (Winter,	  1989-­‐1990):	  99-­‐135.	  	  Mead,	   Walter	   Russell.	   “The	   Bush	   Administration	   and	   the	   New	   World	  Order.”	  World	  Policy	  Journal	  8,	  No.	  3	  (Summer,	  1991):	  375-­‐420.	  	  Moe,	  Ronald	  C.	  “Senate	  Confirmation	  of	  Executive	  Appointments:	  The	  Nixon	  Era.”	   Proceedings	   of	   the	   Academy	   of	   Political	   Science	   32,	   No.	   1,	   Congress	  against	  the	  President	  (1975):	  141-­‐152.	  	  Morales,	   Waltraud	   Queiser.	   “US	   Intervention	   and	   the	   New	  World	   Order:	  Lessons	   from	  Cold	  War	   and	   Post-­‐Cold	  War	   Cases.”	  Third	  World	  Quarterly	  15,	  No.	  1,	  The	  South	  in	  the	  New	  World	  (Dis)Order	  (March,	  1994):	  77-­‐101.	  	  Mosher,	   Frederick	   C.	   “Presidential	   Transitions	   and	   Foreign	   Policy:	   The	  American	  Experience.”	  Public	  Administration	  Review	  45,	  No.	  4	  (July-­‐August,	  1985):	  468-­‐474.	  	  Ornstein,	  Norman,	  and	  Donilon,	  Thomas.	  “The	  Confirmation	  Clog.”	  Foreign	  
Affairs	  79,	  No.	  6	  (November-­‐December,	  2000):	  87-­‐99.	  	  Pach,	   Chester.	   “The	   Reagan	   Doctrine:	   Principle,	   Pragmatism,	   and	   Policy.”	  
Presidential	   Studies	   Quarterly	   36,	   No.	   1,	   Presidential	   Doctrines	   (March,	  2006):	  75-­‐88.	  	  Paige,	  Jeffrey	  M.	  “Coffee	  and	  Power	  in	  El	  Salvador.”	  Latin	  American	  Research	  
Review	  28,	  No.	  3	  (1993):	  7-­‐40.	  	  Pastor,	   Robert.	   “The	   Bush	   Administration	   and	   Latin	   America:	   The	  
	   338	  
Pragmatic	   Style	   and	   the	   Regionalist	   Option.”	   Journal	   of	   Interamerican	  
Studies	  and	  World	  Affairs	  33,	  No.	  3	  (Autumn,	  1991):	  1-­‐34.	  	  Patterson,	   Henry.	   “The	   United	   States	   and	   Post-­‐Revolutionary	   Nicaragua.”	  
Irish	  Journal	  of	  American	  Studies	  3	  (1993):	  72-­‐92.	  	  Pérez,	  Jr.,	  Louis	  A.	  “Fear	  and	  Loathing	  of	  Fidel	  Castro:	  Sources	  of	  US	  Policy	  toward	  Cuba.”	  Journal	  of	  Latin	  American	  Studies	  34,	  No.	  2	  (May,	  2002):	  227-­‐254.	  	  Phillips-­‐Fein,	   Kim.	   “Conservatism:	   A	   State	   of	   the	   Field.”	   The	   Journal	   of	  
American	  History	  98,	  No.	  3	  (December,	  2011):	  723-­‐743.	  	  Piedra,	   Alberto	   M.	   “Some	   Observations	   on	   Liberation	   Theology.”	   World	  
Affairs	  148,	  No.	  3	  (Winter,	  1985-­‐1986):	  151-­‐158.	  	  Putnam,	   Robert	   D.	   “Diplomacy	   and	   Domestic	   Politics:	   The	   Logic	   of	   Two-­‐Level	  Games.”	   International	  Organization	   42,	  No.	   3	   (Summer,	   1998):	   427-­‐460.	  	  Quaile	   Hill,	   Kim,	   and	   Hurley,	   Patricia	   A.	   “Symbolic	   Speeches	   in	   the	   U.S.	  Senate	  and	  Their	  Representational	  Implications.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  64,	  No.	  1	  (February,	  2002):	  219-­‐231.	  	  Rabe,	  Stephan	  G.	  “More	  Precious	  than	  Peace:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Struggle	  
for	  the	  Third	  World	   by	  Peter	  W.	  Rodman.”	  The	  American	  Historical	  Review	  101,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1996):	  593.	  	  	  Rettberg,	   Angelika.	   “The	   Private	   Sector	   and	   Peace	   in	   El	   Salvador,	  Guatemala,	   and	   Colombia.”	   Journal	   of	   Latin	   American	   Studies	   39,	   No.	   3	  (August,	  2007):	  463-­‐494.	  	  
	   339	  
Ribuffo,	  Leo	  P.	  “The	  Discovery	  and	  Rediscovery	  of	  American	  Conservatism	  Broadly	   Conceived.”	   OAH	   Magazine	   of	   History	   17,	   No.	   2,	   Conservatism	  (January,	  2003):	  5-­‐10.	  	  —	  “Why	  is	  There	  so	  Much	  Conservatism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Why	  Do	  So	  Few	  Historians	  Know	  Anything	  about	  It.”	  American	  Historical	  Review	  99,	  No.	  2	  (April,	  1994):	  438-­‐449.	  	  Ricard,	  Serge.	   “The	  Roosevelt	  Corollary.”	  Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	  36,	  No.	  1,	  Presidential	  Doctrines	  (March,	  2006):	  17-­‐26.	  	  Rosati,	   Jerel,	   and	   Creed,	   John.	   “Extending	   the	   Three-­‐	   and	   Four-­‐Headed	  Eagles:	  The	  Foreign	  Policy	  Orientations	  of	  American	  Elites	  during	   the	  80s	  and	  90s.”	  Political	  Psychology	  18,	  No.	  3	  (September,	  1997):	  583-­‐623.	  	  Rosenfeld,	   Stephen	   S.	   “The	   Panama	   Negotiations:	   A	   Close	   Run	   Thing.”	  
Foreign	  Affairs	  54,	  No.	  1	  (October,	  1975):	  1-­‐13.	  	  Ruotsila,	   Markku.	   “Carl	   McIntire	   and	   the	   Fundamentalist	   Origins	   of	   the	  Christian	  Right.”	  Church	  History	  81,	  No.	  2	  (June,	  2012):	  378-­‐407.	  	  Scanlon,	  Sandra.	  “The	  Conservative	  Lobby	  and	  Nixon’s	  “Peace	  with	  Honor”	  in	  Vietnam.”	  Journal	  of	  American	  Studies	  43,	  No.	  2	  (August,	  2009):	  255-­‐276.	  	  Scott,	   James	   M.	   “Reagan’s	   Doctrine?	   The	   Formulation	   of	   an	   American	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy.”	  Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	  26,	  No.	  4,	  Intricacies	  of	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Fall,	  1996):	  1047-­‐1061.	  	  Scott,	   James	   M.,	   and	   Carter,	   Ralph	   G.	   “Acting	   on	   the	   Hill:	   Congressional	  Assertiveness	   in	   U.S.	   Foreign	   Policy.”	  Congress	  &	   the	  Presidency	   29,	   No.	   2	  (Autumn,	  2009):	  151-­‐169.	  	  Skidmore,	  David.	   “Foreign	  Policy	   Interest	  Groups	  and	  Presidential	  Power:	  
	   340	  
Jimmy	   Carter	   and	   the	   Battle	   over	   Ratification	   of	   the	   Panama	   Canal	  Treaties.”	   Presidential	   Studies	   Quarterly	   23,	   No.	   3,	   The	   Domestic	   and	  Foreign	  Policy	  Presidencies	  (Summer,	  1993):	  477-­‐497.	  	  Stahler-­‐Sholk,	   Richard.	   “El	   Salvador's	   Negotiated	   Transition:	   From	   Low-­‐Intensity	   Conflict	   to	   Low-­‐Intensity	   Democracy.”	   Journal	   of	   Interamerican	  
Studies	  and	  World	  Affairs	  36,	  No.	  4	  (Winter,	  1994):	  1-­‐59.	  	  Strong,	   Robert	   A.	   “Jimmy	   Carter	   and	   the	   Panama	   Canal	   Treaties.”	  
Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly	  21,	  No.	  2,	  Measures	  of	  the	  President:	  Hoover	  to	  Bush	  (Spring,	  1991):	  269-­‐286.	  	  Tucker,	   Robert	   W.	   “Reagan’s	   Foreign	   Policy.”	   Foreign	   Affairs	   68,	   No.	   1,	  America	  and	  the	  World	  1988/89	  (1988/1989):	  1-­‐27.	  	  Tyrrell,	   Ian.	  “American	  Exceptionalism	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  International	  History.”	  
The	  American	  Historical	  Review	  96,	  No.	  4	  (October,	  1991):	  1031-­‐1055.	  	  Valkenier,	  Elizabeth	  Kridl.	  “More	  Precious	  Than	  Peace:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  
Struggle	   for	   the	   Third	   World	   by	   Peter	   W.	   Rodman.”	   Political	   Science	  
Quarterly	  110,	  No.	  2	  (Summer,	  1995):	  346-­‐347.	  	  Zaretsky,	   Natasha.	   “Restraint	   or	   Retreat?	   The	   Debate	   Over	   the	   Panama	  Canal	  Treaties	  and	  U.S.	  Nationalism	  After	  Vietnam.”	  Diplomatic	  History	  35,	  No.	  3	  (June,	  2011):	  535-­‐562.	  	  Zelizer,	   Julian	   E.	   “Reflections:	   Rethinking	   the	   History	   of	   American	  Conservatism.”	  Reviews	  in	  American	  History	  38,	  No.	  2	  (2010):	  367-­‐392.	  	  	  	  Secondary	  Material	  	  Allitt,	   Patrick.	   The	   Conservatives:	   Ideas	   and	   Personalities	   Throughout	  
American	  History.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  
	   341	  
	  Antizzo,	  Glenn	  J.	  U.S.	  Military	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era:	  How	  to	  
Win	   America’s	   Wars	   in	   the	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century.	  Baton	   Rouge:	   Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  	  Armony,	   Ariel	   C.	   Argentina,	   The	   United	   States,	   and	   the	   Anti-­‐Communist	  
Crusade	   in	   Central	   America,	   1977-­‐1984.	   Athens:	   Ohio	   University	   Press,	  1997.	  	  Arnson,	   Cynthia.	   Crossroads:	   Congress,	   the	  President,	   and	  Central	  America,	  
1976-­‐1993.	  Pennsylvania:	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press,	  1993.	  	  Bacchus,	   William	   I.	   Staffing	   for	   Foreign	   Affairs:	   Personnel	   Systems	   for	   the	  
1980’s	  and	  1990’s.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1983.	  	  Baumgartner	   Frank	   R.,	   and	   Jones,	   Bryan	   D.	   Agendas	   and	   Instability	   in	  
American	  Politics.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1993.	  	  Berman,	  William	  C.	  America’s	  Right	  Turn:	  From	  Nixon	  to	  Clinton.	  Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1998.	  	  Blumenthal,	   Sidney.	   The	   Rise	   of	   the	   Counter-­‐Establishment:	   From	  
Conservative	  Ideology	  to	  Political	  Power.	  New	  York:	  Perennial	  Library,	  1988.	  	  Bonner,	   Raymond.	  Weakness	   and	  Deceit:	   U.S.	   Policy	   and	   El	   Salvador.	   New	  York:	  Times	  Books,	  1984.	  	  Brands,	   Hal.	   Latin	   America’s	   Cold	   War.	   Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	  Press,	  2010.	  	  Brauer,	  Carl	  M.	  Presidential	  Transitions:	  Eisenhower	  Through	  Reagan.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986.	  	  
	   342	  
Brown,	  Timothy	  C.	  The	  Real	  Contra	  War:	  Highlander	  Peasant	  Resistance	  in	  
Nicaragua.	  Norman:	  University	  of	  Oklahoma	  Press,	  2001.	  	  Bruce,	   Steve.	   The	   Rise	   and	   Fall	   of	   the	   New	   Christian	   Right:	   Conservative	  
Protestant	  Politics	  in	  America,	  1978-­‐1988.	  Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  1988.	  	  Brzezinski,	  Zbigniew.	  Power	  and	  Principle.	  New	  York:	  Farrah	  Straus	  Giroux,	  1983.	  	  Burke,	   Kevin	   F.	   The	   Ground	   Beneath	   the	   Cross:	   The	   Theology	   of	   Ignacio	  
Ellacuría.	  Washington	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  	  Burns,	   E.	   Bradford.	   At	   War	   in	   Nicaragua:	   The	   Reagan	   Doctrine	   and	   the	  
Politics	  of	  Nostalgia.	  New	  York:	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1987.	  	  Bush,	   George,	   and	   Scowcroft,	   Brent.	   A	   World	   Transformed.	   New	   York:	  Random	  House,	  1999.	  	  Byrne,	  Hugh.	  El	  Salvador’s	  Civil	  War:	  A	  Study	  of	  Revolution.	  Boulder:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  1996.	  	  Campbell,	   Kurt	   M.	   and	   Steinberg,	   James	   B.	   	   Difficult	   Transitions:	   Foreign	  
Policy	   Troubles	   at	   the	   Outset	   of	   Presidential	   Power.	   Washington,	   D.C.:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2008.	  	  Canon,	   Lou.	   President	   Reagan:	   The	   Role	   of	   a	   Lifetime.	   New	   York:	   Public	  Affairs,	  2000.	  	  Carothers,	   Thomas.	   In	   the	   Name	   of	   Democracy:	   U.S.	   Policy	   Toward	   Latin	  
America	  in	  the	  Reagan	  Years.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1991.	  	  Carpenter,	   Ted	   Galen.	   Bad	   Neighbor	   Policy:	   Washington’s	   Futile	   War	   on	  
Drugs	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Gordonsville:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2003.	  
	   343	  
	  Carter,	  Dan	  T.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Rage:	  George	  Wallace,	   the	  Origins	  of	   the	  New	  
Conservatism	   and	   the	   Transformation	   of	   American	   Politics.	   Baton	   Rouge:	  Louisiana	  State	  University,	  1995.	  	  Carter,	  Jimmy.	  Keeping	  Faith:	  Memoirs	  of	  a	  President.	  London:	  Collins,	  1982.	  	  Carter,	   Ralph	   G.,	   and	   Scott,	   James	   M.	   Choosing	   to	   Lead:	   Understanding	  
Congressional	   Foreign	   Policy	   Entrepreneurs.	   Durham:	   Duke	   University	  Press,	  2009.	  	  Cavell,	   Colin	   S.	   Exporting	   ‘Made-­‐in-­‐America’	   Democracy:	   The	   National	  
Endowment	  for	  Democracy	  &	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy.	   Lanham:	  University	  Press	  of	  America,	  2002.	  	  Chavez,	  Leo	  R.	  The	  Latino	  Threat:	  Constructing	  Immigrants,	  Citizens,	  and	  the	  
Nation.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2013.	  	  Chodorov,	   Frank.	  Out	   of	   Step:	   The	   Autobiography	   of	   an	   Individualist.	   New	  York:	  The	  Devin-­‐Adair	  Company,	  1962.	  	  Clark,	   Paul	   Coe.	   The	   United	   States	   and	   Somoza,	   1933-­‐1956:	   A	   Revisionist	  
Look.	  Westport:	  Praeger,	  2002.	  	  Clymer,	   Adam.	   Drawing	   the	   Line	   at	   the	   Big	   Ditch:	   The	   Panama	   Canal	  
Treaties	   and	   the	   Rise	   of	   the	   Right.	   Lawrence:	   University	   Press	   of	   Kansas,	  2008.	  	  Cockburn,	   Leslie.	  Out	   of	   Control:	   The	   Story	   of	   the	  Reagan	  Administration’s	  
Secret	   War	   in	   Nicaragua,	   the	   Illegal	   Arms	   Pipeline,	   and	   the	   Contra	   Drug	  
Connection.	  London:	  Bloomsbury,	  1988.	  	  
	   344	  
Collin,	   Richard	   H.	   Theodore	   Roosevelt’s	   Caribbean:	   the	   Panama	   Canal,	   the	  
Monroe	  Doctrine,	  and	   the	  Latin	  American	  Context.	   Baton	   Rouge:	   Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  	  Crane,	  Phillip	  M.	  Surrender	  in	  Panama:	  The	  Case	  Against	  the	  Treaty.	  Ottawa:	  Green	  Hill	  Publishers,	  Inc,	  1978.	  	  Crespino,	   Joseph.	   Strom	   Thurmond’s	   America.	   New	   York:	   Hill	   and	   Wang,	  2012.	  	  —	   In	   Search	   of	   Another	   Country:	   Mississippi	   and	   the	   Conservative	  
Counterrevolution.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  	  Crawley,	   Andrew.	   Somoza	   and	   Roosevelt:	   Good	   Neighbour	   Diplomacy	   in	  
Nicaragua,	  1933-­‐1945.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  	  Destler,	   Irvin,	  Gelb,	  Leslie,	  and	  Lake,	  Anthony.	  Our	  Own	  Worst	  Enemy:	  The	  
Unmaking	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Policy.	  New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1984.	  	  Dickey,	  Christopher.	  With	  the	  Contras:	  A	  Reporter	  in	  the	  Wilds	  of	  Nicaragua.	  New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1985.	  	  Diggins,	   John	   Patrick.	   Ronald	   Reagan:	   Fate,	   Freedom,	   and	   the	   Making	   of	  
History.	  New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  2007.	  	  —	   Up	   From	   Communism:	   Conservative	   Odysseys	   in	   American	   Intellectual	  
History.	  New	  York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1975.	  	  Dinges,	   John.	   Our	   Man	   in	   Panama:	   How	   General	   Noriega	   Used	   the	   United	  
States	  –	  And	  Made	  Millions	   in	  Drugs	  and	  Arms.	   New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1990.	  	  
	   345	  
Draper,	  Theodore.	  A	  Very	  Thin	  Line:	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Affairs.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1991.	  	  Dunkerley,	   James.	   Power	   in	   the	   Isthmus:	   A	   Political	   History	   of	   Central	  
America.	  London:	  Verso,	  1988.	  	  —	  Rebellion	   in	   the	  Veins:	   Political	   Struggle	   in	  Bolivia,	   1952-­‐1982.	   London:	  Verso,	  1984.	  	  	  Ehrman,	  John.	  The	  Rise	  of	  Neoconservatism:	  Intellectuals	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  
1945-­‐1994.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  	  Evangelista,	  Matthew.	  Unarmed	  Forces:	  The	  Transnational	  Movement	  to	  End	  
the	  Cold	  War.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1999.	  	  Fischer,	  Beth	  A.	  The	  Reagan	  Reversal:	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War.	  Columbia:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  2000.	  	  Ford,	  Gerald.	  A	  Time	  To	  Heal.	  New	  York:	  Harpers	  and	  Row,	  1979.	  	  Furgurson,	  Ernest	  B.	  Hard	  Right:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Jesse	  Helms.	  New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  1986.	  	  Furlong,	   William	   L.,	   and	   Scranton,	   Margaret	   E.	   The	   Dynamics	   of	   Foreign	  
Policymaking:	   the	   President,	   the	   Congress,	   and	   the	   Panama	  Canal	   Treaties.	  Boulder:	  Westview,	  1984.	  	  Gaddis,	  John	  Lewis.	  The	  Cold	  War:	  A	  New	  History.	  New	  York:	  Penguin,	  2007.	  	  —	   Strategies	   of	   Containment:	   A	   Critical	   Appraisal	   of	   American	   National	  
Security	  Policy	  During	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  	  
	   346	  
—	  We	  Now	  Know:	  Rethinking	  Cold	  War	  History.	   Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  	  Gambone,	  Michael	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  Somoza,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	   in	  Nicaragua,	  
1953-­‐1961.	  Westport:	  Praeger,	  1997.	  	  Garrison,	   Justin	   D.	   “An	   Empire	   of	   Ideals”:	   The	   Chimeric	   Imagination	   of	  
Ronald	  Reagan.	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2013.	  	  	  Goldberg,	  Robert	  Alan.	  Barry	  Goldwater.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  	  Goldwater,	   Barry.	   Conscience	   of	   a	   Conservative.	   New	   York:	   Macfadden,	  1960.	  	  Grandin,	  Greg.	  Empire’s	  Workshop:	  Latin	  America,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  
Rise	  of	  the	  New	  Imperialism.	  New	  York:	  Metropolitan	  Books,	  2006.	  	  Gutman,	   Roy.	   Banana	   Diplomacy:	   The	   Making	   of	   American	   Policy	   in	  
Nicaragua,	  1981-­‐1987.	  New	  York:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  1998.	  	  Guttman,	   Allen.	  The	  Conservative	  Tradition	   in	  America.	   New	   York:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1967.	  	  Haig	   Jr.,	   Alexander	   M.	   Caveat:	   Realism,	   Reagan,	   and	   Foreign	   Policy.	   New	  York:	  MacMillan	  Publishing	  Company,	  1984.	  	  Hale,	   Charles	   R.	   Resistance	   and	   Contradiction:	   Miskitu	   Indians	   and	   the	  
Nicaraguan	  State,	  1894	  –	  1987.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  	  Hannaford,	   Peter.	   The	   Reagans:	   A	   Political	   Portrait.	   New	   York:	   Coward-­‐McCann,	  Inc.,	  1983.	  	  
	   347	  
Hart,	   Jeffrey.	  The	  Making	   of	   American	  Conservative	  Mind:	  National	  Review	  
and	  its	  Times.	  Wilmington:	  Isi	  Books,	  2007.	  	  Hartz,	   Louis.	   The	   Liberal	   Tradition	   in	   America:	   An	   Interpretation	   of	  
American	  Political	  Thought	  since	  the	  Revolution.	  New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Brace,	  1955.	  	  Hayward,	   Steven	   F.	   The	   Age	   of	   Reagan:	   The	   Fall	   of	   the	   Old	   Liberal	   Order,	  
1964-­‐1980.	  Roseville:	  Forum,	  2001.	  	  Heale,	   Michael	   J.	  American	  Anticommunism:	   Combating	   the	  Enemy	  Within,	  
1830-­‐1970.	  Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  	  Helms,	   Jesse.	  Here’s	  Where	   I	   Stand:	  A	  Memoir.	   New	   York:	   Random	  House,	  2005.	  	  —	   Empire	   for	   Liberty:	   A	   Sovereign	   America	   and	   Her	   Moral	   Mission.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  Regnery	  Publishing	  Inc.,	  2001.	  	  Hendershot,	   Heather.	   What’s	   Fair	   on	   the	   Air:	   Cold	   War	   Right-­‐Wing	  
Broadcasting	  and	  the	  Public	  Interest.	   Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2011.	  	  —	  Shaking	  the	  World	  for	  Jesus:	  Media	  and	  Conservative	  Evangelical	  Culture.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2004.	  	  Hersman,	   Rebecca	  K.	   C.	  Friends	  and	  Foes:	  How	  Congress	  and	   the	  President	  
Really	  Make	  Foreign	  Policy.	  Washington,	   D.C.:	   Brookings	   Institution	   Press,	  2000.	  	  Himmelstein,	   Jerome	   L.	   To	   The	   Right:	   The	   Transformation	   of	   American	  
Conservatism.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1990.	  	  
	   348	  
Hinckley,	  Barbara.	  Less	  Than	  Meets	  The	  Eye:	  Foreign	  Policy	  Making	  and	  the	  
Myth	  of	  the	  Assertive	  Congress.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994.	  	  Hing,	  Bill	  Ong.	  Defining	  America	  Through	  Immigration	  Policy.	  Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  	  Hoeveler,	   Jr.,	   J.	  David.	  Watch	  on	  the	  Right:	  Conservative	  Intellectuals	   in	  the	  
Reagan	  Era.	  Madison:	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press,	  1991.	  	  Hofstadter,	   Richard.	   The	   Paranoid	   Style	   in	   American	   Politics	   and	   Other	  
Essays.	  London:	  Jonathan	  Cape,	  1966.	  	  Hogan,	   J.	   Michael.	   The	   Panama	   Canal	   in	   American	   Politics:	   Domestic	  
Advocacy	   and	   the	   Evolution	   of	   Policy.	   Carbondale:	   Southern	   Illinois	  University	  Press,	  1986.	  	  Jackson,	  Kenneth	  T.	  Crabgrass	  Frontier:	  The	  Suburbanization	  of	   the	  United	  
States.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985.	  	  Joaquín,	   Roy.	   Cuba,	   The	   United	   States,	   and	   the	   Helms-­‐Burton	   Doctrine:	  
International	  Reactions.	  Gainesville:	  University	  of	  Florida	  Press,	  2000.	  	  Johnson,	  Robert	  David.	  Congress	  and	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  	  Jorden,	  William	  J.	  Panama	  Odyssey.	  Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  1984.	  	  Juhn,	   Tricia.	  Negotiating	   Peace	   in	   El	   Salvador:	   Civil-­‐Military	   Relations	   and	  
the	   Conspiracy	   to	   End	   the	   Civil	   War.	   Basingstoke:	   MacMillan	   Press	   Ltd.,	  1998.	  	  Kagan,	   Robert.	  A	  Twilight	  Struggle:	  American	  Power	  and	  Nicaragua,	  1977-­‐
1990.	  London:	  Free	  Press,	  1996.	  
	   349	  
	  Kalman,	  Laura.	  Right	  Star	  Rising:	  A	  New	  Politics,	  1974-­‐1980.	  New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  2010.	  	  Kashatus,	   William	   C.	   Dapper	   Dan	   Flood:	   The	   Controversial	   Life	   of	   a	  
Congressional	  Power	  Broker.	  University	  Park:	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  	  Kaufman,	   Scott.	   Plans	   Unraveled:	   The	   Foreign	   Policy	   of	   the	   Carter	  
Administration.	  Dekalb:	  Northern	  Illinois	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  	  Kazin,	   Michael.	   The	   Populist	   Persuasion:	   An	   American	   History.	   Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1998.	  	  Keck,	  Margaret	  E.,	  and	  Sikkink,	  Kathryn.	  Activists	  Beyond	  Borders:	  Advocacy	  
Networks	  in	  International	  Politics.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1998.	  	  Kempe,	   Frederick.	   Divorcing	   the	   Dictator:	   America’s	   Bungled	   Affairs	   with	  
Noriega.	  London:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd,	  1990.	  	  King,	   Desmond	   S.	   The	   New	   Right:	   Politics,	   Markets	   and	   Citizenship.	  Basingstoke:	  Macmillan,	  1987.	  	  Kingdon,	   John	   W.	   Agendas,	   Alternatives,	   and	   Public	   Policies.	   New	   York:	  Longman,	  1995.	  	  Kinzer,	   Stephen.	  Blood	  of	  Brothers:	  Life	  and	  War	  in	  Nicaragua.	   Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  	  Kirk,	  Russell.	  The	  Conservative	  Mind.	  London:	  Faber	  and	  Faber,	  1954.	  	  Koster,	   R.	   M.,	   and	   Sanchez	   Borbon,	   Guillermo.	   In	   The	   Time	   of	   Tyrants:	  
Panama,	  1968-­‐1989.	  London:	  Secker	  &	  Warburg,	  1990.	  
	   350	  
	  Kruse,	  Kevin.	  White	  Flight:	  Atlanta	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Conservatism.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  	  LaFeber,	  Walter.	  America,	  Russia,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐1996.	  New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill,	  1997.	  	  —	   Inevitable	  Revolutions:	  The	  United	  States	   in	  Central	  America.	  New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  1993.	  	  —	  The	  Panama	  Canal:	  The	  Crisis	  in	  Historical	  Perspective.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1978.	  	  Lagon,	   Mark	   P.	   The	   Reagan	   Doctrine:	   Sources	   of	   American	   Conduct	   in	   the	  
Cold	  War’s	  Last	  Chapter.	  Westport:	  Praeger,	  1994.	  	  Laham,	   Nicholas.	   Ronald	   Reagan	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Immigration	   Reform.	  Westport:	  Praeger,	  2000.	  	  Lake,	  Anthony.	  Somoza	  Falling.	  Boston:	  Houghton	  Mifflin,	  1989.	  	  Lassiter,	   Matthew	   D.	   The	   Silent	  Majority:	   Suburban	   Politics	   in	   the	   Sunbelt	  
South.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  	  LeoGrande,	   William	   M.	   Our	   Own	   Backyard:	   The	   United	   States	   in	   Central	  
America,	  1977-­‐1992.	  Chapel	  Hill:	  North	  Carolina	  University	  Press,	  1998.	  	  Link,	   William.	   Righteous	   Warrior:	   Jesse	   Helms	   and	   the	   Rise	   of	   Modern	  
Conservatism.	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press:	  New	  York,	  2008.	  	  Livingstone,	   Grace.	   America’s	   Backyard:	   The	   United	   States	   and	   Latin	  
America	  from	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terror.	  London:	  Zed	  Books,	  2009.	  
	   351	  
	  Lynch,	   Edward	  A.	  The	  Cold	  War’s	  Last	  Battlefield:	  Reagan,	   the	  Soviets,	  and	  
Central	  America.	  Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2011.	  	  Major,	  John.	  Prize	  Possession:	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Panama	  Canal,	  1903-­‐
1979.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993.	  	  Mason,	  Robert.	  The	  Republican	  Party	  and	  American	  Politics	  from	  Hoover	  to	  
Reagan.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  	  —	   Richard	   Nixon	   and	   the	   Quest	   for	   a	   New	   Majority.	   Chapel	   Hill:	   The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2004.	  	  Mayhew,	   David	   R.	   America’s	   Congress:	   Actions	   in	   the	   Public	   Sphere,	   James	  
Madison	  through	  Newt	  Gingrich.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  	  Melanson,	  Richard	  A.	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  Since	  The	  Vietnam	  War:	  The	  
Search	  for	  Consensus	  from	  Richard	  Nixon	  to	  George	  W.	  Bush.	  Armonk:	  M.	  E.	  Sharpe,	  2005.	  	  McClintock,	   Michael.	   Instruments	   of	   Statecraft:	   U.S.	   Guerrilla	   Warfare,	  
Counterinsurgency,	  and	  Counter-­‐Terrorism,	  1940-­‐1990.	  New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1992.	  	  —	  The	  American	  Connection	  Volume	  1:	  State	  Terror	  and	  Popular	  Resistance	  
in	  El	  Salvador.	  London:	  Zed	  Books	  Ltd,	  1985.	  	  McCullough,	  David.	  The	  Path	  Between	  the	  Seas:	  the	  Creation	  of	  the	  Panama	  
Canal,	  1870-­‐1914.	  New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1977.	  	  McGirr,	   Lisa.	   Suburban	  Warriors:	   The	   Origins	   of	   the	   New	   American	   Right.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001.	  	  
	   352	  
McPherson,	  Alan.	  Intimate	  Ties,	  Bitter	  Struggles:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Latin	  
America	  Since	  1945.	  Washington	  D.C.:	  Potomac	  Books,	  2006.	  	  Moffett	   III,	  George	  D.	  The	  Limits	  of	  Victory:	  The	  Ratification	  of	  the	  Panama	  
Canal	  Treaties.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1985.	  	  Montgomery,	   Tommie	   Sue.	   Revolution	   in	   El	   Salvador:	   From	   Civil	   Strife	   to	  
Civil	  Peace.	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1995.	  	  Moreton,	   Bethany.	   To	   Serve	   God	   and	   Wal-­‐Mart.	   Cambridge:	   Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  	  	  Morley,	  Morris,	  and	  McGillion,	  Chris.	  Unfinished	  Business:	  America	  and	  Cuba	  
After	   the	   Cold	   War,	   1989-­‐2001.	   Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  2002.	  	  Moyn,	   Samuel.	  The	  Last	  Utopia:	  Human	  Rights	   in	  History.	   Cambridge:	   The	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  	  Nash,	   George	   H.	   The	   Conservative	   Intellectual	  Movement	   in	   America	   Since	  
1945.	  New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1976.	  	  Nau,	   Henry	   R.	   Conservative	   Internationalism:	   Armed	   Diplomacy	   under	  
Jefferson,	  Polk,	  Truman,	  and	  Reagan.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2013.	  	  Neustadt,	   Richard	   E.	   Presidential	   Power	   and	   the	   Modern	   Presidents:	   The	  
Politics	  of	  Leadership	  from	  Roosevelt	  to	  Reagan.	  New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1990.	  	  North,	  Oliver.	  Under	  Fire:	  An	  American	  Story.	  New	  York:	  Harper	  Paperbacks,	  1992.	  	  
	   353	  
Orfield,	  Gary.	  Congressional	  Power:	  Congress	  and	  Social	  Change.	  New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Brace	  Jovanovich,	  1975.	  	  Paige,	   Jeffrey	  M.	  Coffee	  and	  Power:	  Revolution	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Democracy	  in	  
Central	  America.	  Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  	  Pardo-­‐Maurer,	   Rogelio.	  The	  Contras,	   1980-­‐1989:	  A	   Special	  Kind	   of	   Politics.	  New	  York:	  Praeger,	  1990.	  	  Pastor,	   Robert	   A.	   Not	   Condemned	   to	   Repetition:	   The	   United	   States	   and	  
Nicaragua.	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  2002.	  	  —	  Condemned	  to	  Repetition.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1988.	  	  Patterson,	  James	  T.	  Grand	  Expectations:	  The	  United	  States,	  1945-­‐1974.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996.	  	  Peele,	   Gillian.	   Revival	   and	   Reaction:	   The	   Right	   in	   Contemporary	   America.	  Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  1984.	  	  Perlstein,	  Rick.	  Before	  the	  Storm:	  Barry	  Goldwater	  and	  the	  Unmaking	  of	  the	  
American	  Consensus.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  2001.	  	  Peterson,	   Anna	   L.	   Martyrdom	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Religion:	   Progressive	  
Catholicism	  in	  El	  Salvador’s	  Civil	  War.	  Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1997.	  	  Phillips,	  Kevin.	  Post-­‐Conservative	  America:	  People,	  Politics,	  and	  Ideology	  in	  a	  
Time	  of	  Crisis.	  New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1982.	  	  Phillips-­‐Fein,	   Kim.	   Invisible	  Hands:	   The	   Businessmen’s	   Crusade	   Against	   the	  
New	  Deal.	  New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  2009.	  	  
	   354	  
Preston,	   Andrew.	   Sword	   of	   the	   Spirit,	   Shield	   of	   the	   Faith:	   Religion	   in	  
American	  War	  and	  Diplomacy.	  New	  York:	  Anchor	  Books,	  2012.	  	  Reichley,	  A.	   James.	  Conservatives	   in	  an	  Age	  of	  Change:	  The	  Nixon	  and	  Ford	  
Administrations.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  Brookings	  Institution,	  1981.	  	  Robinson,	  William	  I.	  Transnational	  Conflicts:	  Central	  America,	  Social	  Change	  
and	  Globalization.	  London:	  Verso,	  2003.	  	  —	   Promoting	   Polyarchy:	   Globalization,	   US	   intervention,	   and	   hegemony.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996.	  	  Roosevelt,	   Theodore.	   The	   Strenuous	   Life:	   Essays	   and	   Address.	   Mineola:	  Dover	  Publications,	  2009.	  	  —	  An	  Autobiography.	  New	  York:	  Charles	  Scribner’s	  Sons,	  1929.	  	  Rothbard,	   Murray.	   For	  A	  New	  Liberty:	   The	   Libertarian	  Manifesto.	   Auburn:	  Ludwig	   von	   Mises	   Institute,	   2006.	   Accessed	   13	   April	   2013,	  http://library.mises.org/books/Murray%20N%20Rothbard/For%20a%20New%20Liberty%20The%20Libertarian%20Manifesto.pdf.	  	  Rubin,	  Barry.	  Secrets	  of	  State:	  The	  State	  Department	  and	  the	  Struggle	  Over	  
U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985.	  	  Sanders,	   Jerry	   Wayne.	   Peddlers	   of	   Crisis:	   The	   Committee	   on	   the	   Present	  
Danger	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Containment.	  Cambridge:	  South	  End	  Press,	  1983.	  	  Santa	  Ana,	  Otto.	  Brown	  Tide	  Rising:	  Metaphors	  of	  Latinos	   in	  Contemporary	  
American	  Public	  Discourse.	  Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas,	  2002.	  	  Schoultz,	   Lars.	   Beneath	   the	   United	   States:	   A	   History	   of	   U.S.	   Policy	   Toward	  
Latin	  America.	  Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1998.	  
	   355	  
	  Scott,	   James	  M.	  Deciding	   to	   Intervene:	   The	  Reagan	  Doctrine	   and	  American	  
Foreign	  Policy.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1996.	  	  Scranton,	   Margaret.	   The	   Noriega	   Years:	   U.S.-­‐Panamanian	   Relations,	   1981-­‐
1990.	  Boulder:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  1991.	  	  Sexton,	   Jay.	  The	  Monroe	  Doctrine:	  Empire	  and	  Nation	  in	  Nineteenth	  Century	  
America.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  2011.	  	  Smith,	  Gaddis.	  The	  Last	  Years	  of	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  1945-­‐1993.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1994.	  	  —	  Morality,	   Reason,	   and	   Power:	   American	   Diplomacy	   in	   the	   Carter	   Years.	  New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1986.	  	  Smith,	   Peter	   H.	   Talons	   of	   the	   Eagle:	   Dynamics	   of	   U.S.-­‐Latin	   American	  
Relations.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  	  Smith,	   Tony.	   America’s	   Mission:	   The	   United	   States	   and	   the	   Worldwide	  
Struggle	   for	   Democracy	   in	   the	   Twentieth-­‐Century.	   Princeton:	   Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  	  Sobel,	   Richard.	   The	   Impact	   of	   Public	   Opinion	   on	   U.S.	   Foreign	   Policy	   Since	  
Vietnam.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001.	  	  Spear,	  Sheldon.	  Daniel	  J.	  Flood:	  A	  Biography	  –	  The	  Congressional	  Career	  of	  an	  
Economic	   Savior	   and	   Cold	  War	   Nationalist.	   Bethlehem:	   Lehigh	   University	  Press,	  2008.	  	  Spooner,	   Mary	   Helen.	   Soldiers	   in	   a	   Narrow	   Land:	   The	   Pinochet	   Regime	   in	  
Chile.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1994.	  	  
	   356	  
Stanley,	   William.	   The	   Protection	   Racket	   State:	   Elite	   Politics,	   Military	  
Extortion,	   and	   Civil	   War	   in	   El	   Salvador.	   Philadelphia:	   Temple	   University	  Press,	  1996.	  	  Strong,	   Robert	   A.	  Working	   in	   the	  World:	   Jimmy	   Carter	   and	   the	  Making	   of	  
American	   Foreign	   Policy.	   Baton	   Rouge:	   Louisiana	   State	   University	   Press,	  2000.	  	  Tichenor,	   Daniel	   J.	   Dividing	   Lines:	   The	   Politics	   of	   Immigration	   Control	   in	  
America.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002.	  	  Tower,	  John,	  Muskie,	  Edmund,	  and	  Scowcroft,	  Brent.	  The	  Tower	  Commission	  
Report:	   The	   Full	   Text	   of	   the	   President’s	   Special	   Review	   Board.	   New	   York:	  Bantam	  Books;	  Times	  Books,	  1987.	  	  Tyrrell,	   Ian	   R.	   Transnational	   Nation:	   United	   States	   History	   in	   Global	  
Perspective	  Since	  1789.	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2007.	  	  Vance,	  Cyrus.	  Hard	  Choices:	  Critical	  Years	  in	  America’s	  Foreign	  Policy.	  New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1983.	  	  Villiers	   Negroponte,	   Diana.	   Seeking	   Peace	   in	   El	   Salvador:	   The	   Struggle	   to	  
Reconstruct	   a	   Nation	   at	   the	   End	   of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Basingstoke:	   Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2010.	  	  Walker,	  Thomas	  W.	  Nicaragua:	  Living	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  the	  Eagle.	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  2003.	  	  Walsh,	  Lawrence	  E.	  Firewall:	  The	  Iran-­‐Contra	  Conspiracy	  and	  Cover-­‐Up.	  New	  York:	  Norton,	  1997.	  	  Walter,	   Knut.	   The	   Regime	   of	   Anastasio	   Somoza,	   1936-­‐1956.	   Chapel	   Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1993.	  
	   357	  
	  Weeks,	   John,	   and	   Gunson,	   Phil.	   Panama:	  Made	   in	   the	   USA.	   London:	   Latin	  American	  Bureau,	  1991.	  	  Westad,	  Odd	  Arne.	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War:	  Third	  World	  Interventions	  and	  the	  
Making	  of	  Our	  Times.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  	  White,	   John	   Kenneth.	   Still	   Seeing	   Red:	   How	   the	   Cold	  War	   Shapes	   the	  New	  
American	  Politics.	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1998.	  	  Whitfield,	   Teresa.	   Paying	   the	   Price:	   Ignacio	   Ellacuría	   and	   the	   Murdered	  
Jesuits	  of	  El	  Salvador.	  Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  	  Wieck,	   Randolph.	   Ignorance	   Abroad:	   American	   Educational	   and	   Cultural	  
Foreign	   Policy	   and	   the	   Office	   of	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State.	   Westport:	  Praeger,	  1992.	  	  Wittkopf,	  Eugene	  R.	  Faces	  of	  Internationalism:	  Public	  Opinion	  and	  American	  
Foreign	  Policy.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  	  Woodward,	  Bob.	  Veil:	  The	  Secret	  Wars	  of	  the	  CIA,	  1981-­‐1987.	  London:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  1987.	  	  Zelizer,	   Julian	   E.	  Arsenal	   of	   Democracy:	   The	   Politics	   of	  National	   Security	   –	  
From	  World	  War	  II	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism.	  New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2010.	  	  	  	  	  Edited	  Collections	  	  Evans,	   Peter	   B.,	   Jacobson,	   Harold	   K.,	   and	   Putnam,	   Robert	   D.,	   eds.	  Double-­‐
Edged	  Diplomacy:	  International	  Bargaining	  and	  Domestic	  Politics.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1993.	  	  
	   358	  
Florini,	  Ann	  M.,	  ed.	  The	  Third	  Force:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Transnational	  Civil	  Society.	  Washington,	   D.C.:	   Japan	   Center	   for	   International	   Exchange	   and	   Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  2000.	  	  Hahn,	  Walter	  F.,	  ed.	  Central	  America	  and	  the	  Reagan	  Doctrine.	  Boston:	  The	  Centre	  for	  International	  Relations,	  1987.	  	  Hassett,	   John	   J.,	   and	   Lacey,	   Hugh,	   eds.	   Towards	   a	   Society	   that	   Serves	   its	  
People:	   The	   Intellectual	   Contribution	   of	   El	   Salvador’s	   Murdered	   Jesuits.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  1991.	  	  Hogan,	  Michael	  J.,	  ed.	  The	  End	  of	  the	  Cold	  War:	  Its	  Meaning	  and	  Implications.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992.	  	  Iriye,	  Akira,	  Goedde,	  Petra,	  and	  Hitchcock,	  William	  I.,	  eds.	  The	  Human	  Rights	  
Revolution:	  An	  International	  History.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  	  	  Joseph,	   Gilbert	   M.,	   and	   Spenser,	   Daniela,	   eds.	   In	   from	   the	   Cold:	   Latin	  
America’s	   New	   Encounter	   with	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Durham:	   Duke	   University	  Press,	  2008.	  	  Khagram,	  Sanjeev,	  Riker,	  James	  V.,	  and	  Sikkink,	  Kathryn,	  eds.	  Restructuring	  
World	   Politics:	   Transnational	   Social	   Movements,	   Networks,	   and	   Norms.	  Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2002.	  	  Meyer,	   Frank	   S.,	   ed.	  What	   is	  Conservatism?	   New	   York:	   Holt,	   Rinehart	   and	  Winston,	  1964.	  	  Oye,	   Kenneth	   A.,	   Rothchild,	   Donald,	   and	   Lieber,	   Robert	   J.,	   eds.	   Eagle	  
Entangled:	   U.S.	   Foreign	   Policy	   in	   a	   Complex	   World.	   New	   York:	   Longman,	  1979.	  	  
	   359	  
—	  Eagle	  Defiant:	  United	   States	   Foreign	  Policy	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Boston:	   Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1983.	  	  Risse,	   Thomas,	   Ropp,	   Stephen	  C.,	   and	   Sikkink,	   Kathryn,	   eds.	  The	  Power	  of	  
Human	   Rights:	   International	   Norms	   and	   Domestic	   Change.	   Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999.	  	  Schulman,	   Bruce	   J.,	   and	   Zelizer,	   Julian	   E.,	   eds.	   Rightward	   Bound:	   Making	  
America	   Conservative	   in	   the	   1970s.	   Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	  2008.	  	  Sundaram,	   Anjali,	   and	   Gelber,	   George,	   eds.	   A	   Decade	   of	  War:	   El	   Salvador	  
Confronts	  the	  Future.	  London:	  Catholic	   Institute	  of	   International	  Relations,	  1991.	  	  Watson	  Bruce	  W.,	  and	  Tsouras,	  Peter	  G.,	  eds.	  Operation	  Just	  Cause:	  The	  U.S.	  
Intervention	  in	  Panama.	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1991.	  	  Single	  Chapters	  in	  Edited	  Collections	  	  Bon	   Tempo,	   Carl	   J.	   “From	   the	   Centre-­‐Right:	   Freedom	   House	   and	   Human	  Rights	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s.”	   In	   The	   Human	   Rights	   Revolution:	   An	  
International	  History,	   edited	   by	   Akira	   Iriye,	   Petra	   Goedde,	   and	  William	   I.	  Hitchcock,	  223-­‐244.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  	  Cañas,	   Antonio,	   and	   Dada,	   Hêctor.	   “Political	   Transition	   and	  Institutionalization	  in	  El	  Salvador.”	  In	  Comparative	  Peace	  Processes	  in	  Latin	  
America,	   edited	   by	   Cynthia	   J.	   Arnson,	   69-­‐96.	   Washington	   D.C.:	   Woodrow	  Wilson	  Center	  Press,	  1999.	  	  Kellstedt,	  Lyman	  A.,	  and	  Guth,	   James	  L.	  “Religion	  and	  Political	  Behavior	   in	  the	   Sunbelt.”	   In	   Sunbelt	   Rising:	   The	   Politics	   of	   Space,	   Place,	   and	   Region,	  
	   360	  
edited	   by	  Michelle	   Nickerson	   and	  Darren	  Dochuk,	   110-­‐138.	   Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2011.	  	  Shaw,	   Timothy	  M.	   “Overview	   –	   Global/Local:	   States,	   Companies	   and	   Civil	  Societies	   at	   the	   End	   of	   the	   Twentieth	   Century.”	   In	  Global	   Institutions	  and	  
Local	  Empowerment:	  Competing	  Theoretical	  Perspectives,	  edited	  by	  Kendall	  Stiles,	  1-­‐8.	  New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  2000.	  	  Stanley,	   William	   Deane.	   “El	   Salvador:	   state	   building	   before	   and	   after	  democratization,	   1980-­‐95.”	   In	   From	   Nation-­‐Building	   to	   State-­‐Building,	  edited	  by	  Mark	  T.	  Berger,	  97-­‐110.	  London:	  Routledge,	  2008.	  
